Soviet air defense systems of the SA-75 and S-75 families, as well as their foreign copies
“Military Review” is in many ways an open discussion platform where a registered site visitor can leave a comment on a publication. As on other Internet resources, comments can be different: smart, competent, literate, or not so good. It all depends on the intellectual and cultural level of the user, his knowledge in a particular issue.
There is nothing surprising or reprehensible in the fact that a person with a specialized civilian education, who served as a conscript tanker or sapper, or even did not serve at all, writes controversial posts concerning highly specialized topics: combat aviation, air defense systems, fleet or missile strategic forces.
Fortunately, the site is often visited by professionals who have given most of their lives to military service, the defense industry and science, who, naturally, without disclosing confidential data, can correct those who make erroneous statements.
The situation is completely different with the regular authors of Military Review. In my opinion, it is completely unacceptable when some authors, who are not experts in any field, are very dishonest in collecting material, which ultimately leads to the appearance of publications containing distorted information. Of course, anyone can make a mistake, but when the entire article is a “mistake” and gives an incompetent reader a false impression on some issue, this causes enormous damage to the site’s reputation.
For example, some time ago, from a publication by an author who regularly writes for Military Review, I was surprised to learn that the Su-27P fighter appeared in our Air Force later than the Su-30. This generally good author, who publishes about a hundred articles a year, which have a large number of views, suddenly began to describe the combat use of air defense systems of the S-75 family and foreign versions of this complex. As a result, readers had the pleasure of reading this:
even in the 60s, the elimination of air defense systems was a serious task. Suffice it to recall the American black day of July 27, 1965, when a group of F-105s at low altitude, beyond the estimated visibility of the S-75 radars, approached the area where three Phantoms had already been shot down. But instead of the S-75, they found an ambush from a large number of automatic guns...
Or this:
a copy of the S-75 is not the S-75, the missile there is modernized to the best of its ability by the Iranian military-industrial complex and differs from the Soviet one, just as the BM-13 Katyusha projectile differs from the BM-21 Grad projectile.
Although there is a lot of information on the Internet about the combat use of the SA-75M (in Vietnam there were precisely these complexes) and S-75 of various modifications, as well as about foreign copies of the “seventy-five”, the author of the quoted lines did not consider it necessary to work with serious sources, and today I am forced return once again to the description of the creation and operation of the SA-75 and S-75, and also recall the foreign versions of these air defense systems.
Prerequisites for the creation of the S-75 air defense system
The first Soviet anti-aircraft missile system was the S-25 Berkut. This multi-channel stationary air defense system was deployed around Moscow in 1955, but due to the high cost of construction and operation, it was absolutely unrealistic to cover all important objects on the territory of the USSR with its help.
After the adoption of the S-25 air defense system, the question quite naturally arose about creating a single-channel, but much cheaper complex, with the ability to change position and suitable for mass deployment without the construction of capital reinforced concrete structures. The use of transportable air defense systems made it possible to solve a number of new tactical tasks, for example, escaping from enemy attack by changing positions, operating from ambushes, and deploying reserve systems to replace disabled ones, which was not possible for the stationary S-25.
10-cm range air defense systems SA-75 and SA-75M
The creation of a new anti-aircraft missile system was entrusted to the design bureau under the leadership of A. A. Raspletin (KB-1, which was part of the Ministry of Medium Engineering). This organization carried out work on the creation of the system as a whole, on-board missile equipment, control command receiver, transponder, on-board antennas, autopilot, steering gear, as well as a missile guidance station located on a vehicle chassis. The design of the missile guidance station (MNS) as part of KB-1 was carried out by a group led by S. P. Zavorotishchev and V. D. Seleznev.
The creation of a guided anti-aircraft missile (SAM) was entrusted to OKB-2 under the leadership of P. D. Grushin. The development of the solid fuel engine was carried out by specialists from KB-2 of Plant No. 81 under the leadership of I. I. Kartukov. The propulsion liquid engine was designed at OKB-5, headed by A.M. Isaev and D.D. Sevruk. The SM-63 launcher was created at TsKB-34 under the leadership of chief designer B. S. Korobov. The GSKB developed the PR-11 transport-loading vehicle.
To guide the radio command missile system to the target, it was decided to use the “half straightening” method, which made it possible to build and select the most optimal missile flight trajectories. The three-point method was also used as an auxiliary method.
In the process of designing the mobile complex, developments and engineering solutions found during the creation of the S-25 were widely used, including those not implemented in the stationary air defense system. The three-channel design of the missile guidance circuit provided the possibility of simultaneous firing of three missiles at a target. Radar tracking of the missile was carried out according to a signal from the on-board radio transponder in automatic mode along all coordinates.
The first anti-aircraft missile, known under the unclassified designation as 1D (V-750), had a normal aerodynamic design and two stages: a sustainer with a liquid-propellant jet engine and a launch stage with a solid-fuel booster engine. The separating launch stage, which operated for 4,5 seconds, ensured rocket acceleration and a confident launch from an inclined launch. The operating time of the main engine was determined by the capacity of the fuel and oxidizer tanks and was about 25 seconds.
Anti-aircraft missile 1D
Subsequently, the serial "seventy-five" 6-cm and 10-cm ranges used missiles of several modifications with improved performance characteristics, but they all retained the basic layout and were almost identical in appearance. All-moving rudders for pitch, yaw and roll control are located in the rear part of the sustainer stage, and ailerons for roll control during the flight phase with the launch accelerator are located on the launch accelerator in the same plane. To reduce longitudinal static stability, the nose of the rocket has trapezoidal destabilizers on early modifications of the rocket and triangular destabilizers on late series rockets.
On the “seventy-five” later versions, in order to increase the firing range, the missile was aimed at the target in the passive section after the fuel had been exhausted. The warhead is detonated by a signal from a radio fuse or by a command from a ground guidance station when approaching the target. Self-destruction of the rocket is carried out according to the flight time.
1D anti-aircraft missile on a launcher
The choice of a sustainer liquid jet engine running on TG-02 fuel (a mixture of xylidines and triethylamine) and AK-20 oxidizer (nitric acid saturated with nitrogen oxides) was due to the fact that in the USSR at that time there were no solid fuel formulations capable of providing required firing range. The use of a liquid-propellant rocket engine made it possible, with a limited launch mass, to achieve a high average speed along the trajectory and ensure an inclined launch of the rocket, corresponding to the fastest launch of the rocket towards the target.
In addition to the fuel and oxidizer, on board the rocket there was a tank for the initiating liquid OT-155 (isopropyl nitrate), which, when decomposed, spun the turbopump unit that supplied the fuel components.
The B-750 missile turned out to be almost twice as light as the S-25 missile system with almost the same reach in range and altitude. However, the B-750 carried a less powerful warhead.
The project of the air defense system, called S-75, was ready in mid-1954. Flight tests of the D-1 rocket began in April 1955.
1D rocket launch
The program for creating a mass mobile air defense system had a high priority, and therefore field testing and fine-tuning of the complex’s elements proceeded at a high pace. In the 1950s, foreign aircraft often invaded the airspace of the USSR, and the Soviet military-political leadership rushed designers and testers.
However, the creation of the S-75 air defense system with the initially specified characteristics was hampered by the unavailability of the necessary elemental base. Electrovacuum devices for the 6-cm range were just being developed and mastered by industry. The creation of moving target selection equipment also stalled.
Therefore, for the timely assembly and commissioning of the missile guidance station, it was decided to make a simplified version of it using a 10-cm magnetron (B-band). The 10-cm range guidance equipment had approximately 1,5 times worse accuracy than the 6-cm range and was more easily suppressed by interference, but due to the urgent need for a mobile medium-range air defense system, the developers were forced to do this. The requirements for the affected area were also reduced: range – up to 29 km, height – from 3 to 22 km.
By Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1382/638 of December 11, the SA-75 “Dvina” air defense system with the RSNA-75 guidance station operating in the 10-cm range was adopted for service, and its serial production began. The new complex could fight front-line and strategic bombers and reconnaissance aircraft flying at subsonic or moderate supersonic speeds at medium and high altitudes. In 1957, the industry managed to produce 30 anti-aircraft missile systems and 621 missiles.
The composition of the control and guidance systems of the first SA-75 Dvina SAM system was far from optimal. All elements were mounted on a vehicle chassis (vans on the chassis of the ZiS-150 vehicle), artillery on a KZU-16 cart (antenna post) or on a special wheeled chassis with removable tracks (launchers).
It took about 75 hours to fully deploy all elements of the SA-5 air defense system. For installation and dismantling of antenna devices, cranes were needed, and special trailers were needed for transportation. Placing the equipment in numerous cabins and at the antenna post required lengthy docking and undocking of a large number of cable connections.
The missile battery had six SM-63-I launchers and up to 12 PR-11 transport-loading vehicles and means of towing them. Six launchers involved in the missile battery were located at a distance of 50–75 m from the missile guidance station. Between the launchers there were roads for transport loading vehicles (TZM).
After the end of the trial operation period, the following procedure for using missiles was adopted for the combat anti-aircraft missile division (ZRDN): there were 6 missiles at the firing position in a state of final readiness and up to 18 missiles on TZM in a state of intermediate readiness (without filling with oxidizer), another 18 combat and 2 training missiles were in storage. The same scheme was subsequently used on complexes of later modifications.
In the circular or sector scan mode, the missile guidance station could independently search for a target, but the airspace scanning speed was low. In this regard, when operating as part of a centralized system Defense External target designation was carried out from the regiment or brigade command post. When the division conducted independent combat operations, it was provided with a P-12 Yenisei reconnaissance and target designation radar and a PRV-10 radio altimeter.
Since the 6-cm version of the guidance station was not yet ready, the improvement of the SA-75 air defense system continued. The main directions of modernization were improving operational reliability and increasing the altitude reach to 25 km. At the same time, the far border of the affected area was increased to 29 km. The increase in altitude and range was made possible by increasing the thrust of the main liquid-propellant rocket engine from 2 to 650 kg. The “high-altitude” version of the 3-cm range missile was designated 100D (V-10V).
A three-cabin version of the complex was also created. Cabin "P" was left unchanged. The rest of the equipment was mounted in cabins located on two car trailers. To deliver missiles to the launchers, TZM PR-11AM with ZIL-157KV tractors were used.
Transport-loading vehicles PR-11AM with ZIL-157KV tractors
After serial production of the S-75 Desna air defense system with a guidance station operating in the 6-cm range began, the production of the modernized CA-75M and SA-75MK with the RSN-75MA missile guidance station in a three-cabin version was carried out only for deliveries to other countries . The Soviet leadership, wanting to keep information about the new air defense system secret, for some time intended to limit the sale abroad of 6-cm range complexes that had improved characteristics.
Antenna post of the SA-75M air defense missile system guidance station
Until the end of the 75s, the CA-1960M/MK Dvina air defense systems were built for export and at that time were popular with foreign customers.
Looking ahead, I want to say that it was the CA-75M Dvina with the V-750V missile defense system, and not the S-75M Volga with a 6-cm range guidance station and V-750VN missiles, that was used against American aircraft in Vietnam.
The B-750V missile, used during the Vietnam War as part of the SA-75M air defense system on a launcher at the Aviation Museum in Hanoi
Why more noise-resistant and accurate 6-cm range systems were not supplied to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will be discussed in the second part of the review, dedicated to the combat use of the SA-75M, S-75M and S-75M3 air defense systems.
The CA-75M and SA-75MK air defense systems (commercial for non-socialist countries) differed slightly in the composition of their equipment and design. When delivering complexes abroad, the climatic conditions of the customer country were taken into account.
In the USSR, the SA-75 air defense system with 10-cm range stations served until the early 1970s. In a number of countries in Eastern Europe, the CA-75M was operated until the early 1990s. The last SA-75MK complex in India was removed from its position in the early 2000s.
The reader who has reached this point may have a question: what is the difference between the SA-75 and S-75 air defense systems, if they had almost the same appearance and method of application? Why are these complexes confused with each other?
And all because to say that there is not much difference between the air defense systems of the SA-75 and S-75 families is about the same as saying that there is no difference between the AK-47 and AK-74 assault rifles. Externally, these samples are similar, but have very different characteristics, differ in design and manufacturing technology.
SAM 6-cm range S-75
After the SA-75 air defense system was put into service, work continued on creating a complex with 6-cm range equipment (“H” range). By Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 561-290 of May 22, 1959 and Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 0056, the S-75 “Desna” complex with the “high-altitude” missile V-750VN (13D) was adopted for service.
When creating the S-75, the operating experience of the SA-75 and the developments introduced in the modernized SA-75M were taken into account. When creating the production model of the S-75 air defense system, a three-cabin version was implemented with the placement of the indicator and control cabin equipment not in the bodies of ZIL-150 (ZIL-151) vehicles, but on trailers. Cabins on car trailers were more spacious than cramped equipment rooms on car chassis, which made it possible to reduce the number of cabs.
The hardware of the transmitting cabin “P” also underwent significant changes; the cabins “U” and “A” were redesigned. The guidance station received a moving target selection system, which significantly facilitated the search for low-altitude targets and work in conditions of passive jamming by the enemy. To combat active interference, automated frequency tuning of the guidance radar was introduced. The APP-75 launch device was introduced into the guidance station equipment, which automated the generation of permission to launch missiles depending on the parameters of the target’s flight path as it approached the affected area.
During serial production, the B-750VN missile defense system was consistently improved in terms of increasing reliability and efficiency. In 1964, in order to increase the probability of hitting a target, a new pulse radio fuse and a more effective warhead weighing 191 kg were introduced. By maintaining the missile's controllability in the passive part of the trajectory, the range was increased to 34 km, the ceiling remained the same.
The S-75 Desna air defense system used launchers SM-63-I and SM-63-II, as well as TZM PR-11BM (based on a special semi-trailer and a ZIL-151KV tractor).
In fact, it was the S-75 Desna air defense system that became truly widespread in the Air Defense Forces. The launch of this complex into mass production made it possible to begin the massive deployment of anti-aircraft missile systems in various parts of the USSR and to cover a significant territory of the country from enemy bombers and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
Even before the adoption of the S-75 Desna air defense system, work began on a modernized version of the S-75M Volkhov. During its creation, a number of innovations were introduced into the guidance station.
To increase noise immunity and increase the target detection range without increasing the transmitter power, it was decided to use two additional parabolic antennas for a “narrow beam” probing the target.
At the same time, to create a noise-resistant radio command control system, the SNR hardware was improved, built on a new element base. The S-75M radio battery included PV, UV and AV cabins, replacing the P, U and B cabins of the S-75 complex. The new composition of the equipment of the RSN-75V missile guidance station made it possible to fire at targets in conditions where the enemy used passive and active jamming.
Thanks to the use of the new 20D missile defense system (V-755), it was possible to increase the firing range and ceiling. The S-75M air defense system ensured the destruction of targets flying at speeds of up to 2 km/h, in the altitude range from 300 to 3 km at a distance of 30 to 12 km. The firing range at drifting balloons was increased to 40 km. S-43M anti-aircraft missile systems could fire at ground and surface targets not obscured by local objects or terrain, at ranges from 75 to 10 km.
Although the B-755 missile has remained virtually unchanged in appearance compared to previous modifications, most of its systems and assemblies have been replaced. An interference-resistant radio fuse, on-board radio control and radio imaging equipment units adapted to the new guidance station, a new autopilot, an improved liquid-propellant rocket engine with adjustable thrust, and a more powerful launch accelerator were introduced. The latter determined the need to design a launcher capable of withstanding greater exposure to a jet of combustion products.
Increased reliability of the rocket was achieved through the use of ampulized fuel tanks. The B-755 missile defense system was equipped with a warhead weighing 196 kg with ready-made submunitions obtained from ball-bearing production waste.
The SM-90 launcher with an adjustable tilt angle was equipped with a synchronous servo drive. When a rocket is launched, a gas deflector is used, which is pressed against the ground by the gas jet of the starting engine. The launchers, placed on detachable wheels, were towed by KrAZ-214 vehicles along the highway when changing position at speeds of up to 40 km/h.
To ensure autonomous operations, the division was assigned a P-12M “Desert” reconnaissance and target designation station (later P-18 radar) and a radio altimeter. The 5F20 communication and interface cabin allowed the missile guidance station to operate in the mode of receiving target designations from the automated fire control system of the ASURK-1 missile systems.
Thus, the transmission of data on the coordinates of the target and the guidance of the SNR at the selected target from the command post of the air defense unit or formation was ensured. The automated system could simultaneously manage the combat work of 12 divisions.
After the complex was put into service, the missile guidance equipment was improved, which made it possible to reduce the minimum engagement altitude to 1 km.
The S-75M complex with the B-755 missile was adopted by the country's Air Defense Forces by Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated April 20, 1961 No. 356-130 and Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 0054. However, serial deliveries began only a year later.
In fact, the creation of the S-75M Volkhov gave the air defense system of this family a finished look. Subsequently, new missile defense systems were introduced, the guidance station was improved, and additional elements and updated transport-loading vehicles were introduced into the modernized complexes. But the technical appearance did not change radically.
After the start of serial production of the new air defense system, some of the S-75 Desna complexes available to the troops were upgraded to the level of the S-75M Volkhov, which made it possible to increase their combat characteristics and extend their service life.
In the mid-1960s, the S-75M air defense system was equipped with a 15D (V-760) missile with a “special” warhead, designed to destroy group targets in conditions of strong interference. The B-755 missile differed in appearance from the B-760 missile in its warhead and the absence of destabilizers.
SAM V-760 connected to test equipment
The divisions prepared for the use of the B-760 missile system had special control, measuring and transport vehicles and specialists with appropriate qualifications.
The reliability of the B-760 missile was ensured by two sets of on-board radio control and radio imaging equipment. To prevent the warhead from triggering from accidental and false signals, there was no radio fuse on board, and the warhead was detonated by a command transmitted to the missile from the missile guidance station.
Transportation of B-760 missiles
To transport B-760 missiles, the PR-11DA TZM with a warhead heating unit was designed. Special storage facilities with a thermal stabilization and air dehumidification system were also built.
For reliable guidance of a missile with a counter-surface unit in a difficult jamming environment and accurate determination of the range to the target, the RD-760 “Amazon” radio range finder was introduced into the divisions that had the B-75 missile defense system.
The radio rangefinder, operating at frequencies of 760–1 MHz, had the ability to abruptly change the operating frequency when the enemy tried to actively jam. The radio rangefinder antennas were aimed in azimuth and elevation in the direction of the target using synchronous communication with the SNR antenna post. The RD-200 radio rangefinder was considered secret and was not supplied abroad.
The next modification of the S-75M1 Volkhov featured an improved RSN-75V1 guidance station, a modernized P1V antenna post, and an improved SM-90 launcher with a new electric power drive.
On the S-75M2 "Volkhov" air defense system, which was put into service in 1971, due to the introduction of the new 5YA23 (V-759) anti-aircraft missile, it was possible to achieve a significant increase in combat characteristics.
B-759 rocket on the CM-90 launcher
The length of the B-759 missile defense system was 10,91 m. When fully loaded and fueled, the missile weighed 2 kg. Two types of warheads could be installed on it: weighing 406 kg (201 kg of explosives) - with ready-made fragments in the form of a truncated pyramid, and weighing 90 kg (197 kg of explosives) - with ball striking elements. With this missile defense system, a destruction zone was provided: in range 90–6 km, in height – 56–0,1 km. The maximum speed of the target hit is 30 km/h.
In 1975, serial construction began of the most popular late modification of the S-75 family - the S-75M3 Volkhov air defense system. In this complex, most of the comments identified during the operation of previous versions were eliminated, and the reliability of electronic components was significantly increased. The modified version of the antenna post received the designation PZV. To suppress noise interference marks on SNR indicators, a noise filter is included in the equipment.
The guidance station of this complex was equipped with a television-optical sighting device (TOV), with the introduction of an optical target tracking channel, which made it possible, under conditions of visual observation of an air target, to track and fire it without the use of air defense missile systems in radiation mode.
The S-75M3 complex with a modified guidance station has become a kind of standard. The range of detection and stable tracking of a target depends on the type of target, its flight altitude and the operating mode of the control system. An Il-28 bomber flying at medium altitude (10–12 km) could be detected by the SNR-75M3 at a range of 110–150 km, and a MiG-17 fighter at a range of 75–110 km. Stable escort of a bomber was provided from 90–120 km, and of fighters from 60–70 km.
The ammunition load included a new 5В29 (В-760В) missile defense system with a special warhead with corresponding control and guidance system equipment. The B-760B missile had an expanded destruction zone (compared to the B-760 missile) down to extremely low altitudes, which predetermined a number of application features and made it possible to strike ground targets.
The launch of the B-760B rocket was possible only after receiving special permission from higher command. To prevent unauthorized launch of the B-760V missile, there was a “Permission-Prohibition” code chip in the launch circuit on the front panel of the I-62V unit. Upon receipt of approval from the regiment (brigade) command post, the division commander set the code chip to the “Permission” position.
Transport-loading vehicle PR-11DA with tractor ZIL-131V
The expansion of the range of missiles (including those with a “special warhead”) required the maintenance of a new TZM PR-11DA, which provided the ability to work with the V-750VN, V-755, V-759, V-760 and V-760V missiles.
In November 1978, tests of the S-75M4 Volkhov air defense system with a guidance station were completed, which had a new “narrow” beam antenna design and received a number of modifications to increase noise immunity. The complex included “Dubler” equipment with remote simulators SNR-75.
However, due to the adoption of the S-300PT air defense system, the S-75M4 complex was not built en masse, and the innovations obtained during its creation were introduced into early versions during major overhauls, which made it possible to increase their combat potential and extend their service life.
For export deliveries, modifications of the S-75M/M1/M2/M3 “Volga” were created, which mainly differed from the complexes operated by the USSR Air Defense Forces in control and state identification equipment and climatic design. In terms of combat characteristics (in terms of noise immunity, affected area and fire performance), the export versions did not differ from the corresponding complexes intended “for domestic consumption.”
As follows from declassified archives of the Soviet era, air defense systems of the S-75M and S-75M3 modifications were supplied abroad. Subsequently, some of the S-75Ms operated in friendly countries were gradually developed to the level of later modifications. This was done by visiting teams of Soviet specialists, and in a number of countries enterprises were built to repair and modernize complexes of this family.
Foreign copies of SA-75 and S-75 air defense systems
In 1958–1959 The USSR supplied five combat and one technical SA-75 Dvina division to the PRC. In the 1960s, Chinese specialists, using a copying method based on the Soviet SA-75, created the HQ-1 anti-aircraft complex, the guidance station of which also operated in the 10-cm frequency range. But socio-political changes in the PRC, initiated by the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPC, and the breakdown of military-technical cooperation with the USSR led to the impossibility of producing significant volumes of high-tech products and did not allow achieving an acceptable level of reliability and combat effectiveness, and therefore the HQ-1 air defense system in China built a little.
A new impetus in the development of Chinese anti-aircraft systems occurred in the late 1960s after the start of deliveries through Chinese territory to the DRV of the SA-75M Dvina air defense system. During transportation by Chinese railway, some of the Soviet air defense systems were “lost.”
Realizing that there was a risk of losing critical defense technologies, the Soviet leadership did not supply the S-75M with the 6-cm range SNR to Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Chinese managed to make significant progress in improving their own air defense systems, copying a number of elements of the new B-750V missile defense system, and creating a new HQ-2 air defense system.
However, due to poor assembly quality and flaws in manufacturing technology, complexes of this type initially had an unsatisfactory combat readiness ratio. According to American intelligence, approximately a quarter of the total number of HQ-2 air defense systems available to the troops was faulty and could not carry out the combat mission.
In 1978, the PRC adopted the HQ-2A air defense system. In addition to increasing reliability, the firing range was increased to 34 km, and the ceiling to 27 km. In fact, the HQ-2A air defense system corresponded to the “seventy-five” created in the USSR in the early 1960s. It may be recalled that the S-75M3 Volkhov air defense system with the V-759 (5YA23) missile defense system, which was put into service in 1975, had a maximum firing range of more than 50 km and an altitude reach of 30 km.
In the second half of the 1970s, it became obvious that the development of the HQ-2 family of air defense systems in China had stalled. Chinese specialists had an understanding of how to improve the flight characteristics of the rocket and improve the efficiency of the complex as a whole. However, an insufficiently developed design school, lack of necessary experience, as well as a weak scientific, laboratory and production base hindered rapid progress in this area, and in order to maintain the necessary pace of improvement of Chinese air defense systems, the path of stealing Soviet secrets was continued.
After Egypt concluded a peace treaty with Israel, and there was a military-political rapprochement between Beijing and Washington, Chinese intelligence gained access to the Egyptian S-75M Volga with B-755 missiles and to detailed technical documentation available at the repair facility in Cairo.
After getting acquainted with the S-75M air defense system, the development of Chinese air defense systems received a new impetus. In the mid-1980s, the HQ-2B air defense system entered service with the PLA, which largely borrowed the technical solutions of the Soviet S-75M. For this modification, a more noise-resistant guidance station was developed, and the firing range was increased to 40 km.
SAM of the Chinese HQ-2B complex
The missile, weighing 2 kg, uses improved radio control and radio imaging equipment, a new autopilot, a radio fuse, a warhead with ready-made submunitions, a variable-thrust liquid-propellant rocket engine and a more powerful launch accelerator. However, in terms of target engagement range, the HQ-330B was still significantly inferior to the Soviet S-2M75 air defense system.
In the second half of the 1980s, the HQ-2J air defense system was created. According to information presented at international arms exhibitions, the probability of defeating one missile defense system, in the absence of organized interference, for this complex is 92%. Thanks to the introduction of an additional target channel into the SJ-202B SNR, in the working sector of the guidance radar it became possible to simultaneously fire at two targets with four missiles aimed at them. But in terms of firing range, it was not possible to get closer to the Soviet B-759 missile defense system.
The improvement of the HQ-2 air defense system in China finally stopped in the late 1990s after Chinese experts came to the conclusion that the anti-aircraft systems with missiles and guidance equipment, built on the basis of technical solutions of the late 1950s, were hopelessly outdated.
In the first half of the 1980s, due to the exhaustion of their service life, some of the Chinese anti-aircraft missiles used as part of the HQ-2 air defense system were converted into operational-tactical ones. As part of the R&D Project 8610, the DF-7 (Dongfeng-7) ballistic missile with a launch range of up to 200 km was created on the basis of the missile defense system.
By using a compact inertial guidance system, it was possible to free up additional internal volume and install a more powerful high-explosive fragmentation warhead. The acceleration characteristics of the rocket have increased due to the use of a powerful solid-fuel accelerator of the first stage.
Apparently, the DF-7 OTR was used in very small quantities by the PLA, and most of the obsolete HQ-2 air defense missiles were shot at testing sites during control and training launches or converted into aerial targets.
According to information published in Western sources, DF-7 operational-tactical missiles under the designation M-7 were exported to the DPRK, Pakistan and Iran. According to experts, it was not the missiles themselves that were mainly transferred to these countries, but technical documentation and, at a certain stage, some details that made it possible to quickly convert existing missiles into OTR.
With Chinese and French support, Egypt has modernized some of its S-75M Volga air defense systems and launched the production of its own missiles for them. The modernized version of the Egyptian "seventy-five" is known as Tayir as Sabah ("Morning Bird"). In terms of basic characteristics, it roughly corresponds to the S-75M3, but does not have a TOV.
During the Iran-Iraq War, China, along with other weapons, supplied HQ-2A/B air defense systems to Iran. The cooperation turned out to be mutually beneficial. Iran gained access to, albeit not the most modern, but quite combat-ready arms, and in China, which was experiencing significant economic difficulties in the early 1980s, Iranian oil was supplied at a reduced price as payment for the supplied equipment, weapons and ammunition.
After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, military-technical cooperation between Iran and China in the field of air defense continued. Thanks to Chinese support, in the second half of the 1990s, Iran began its own production of Sayyad-1 anti-aircraft missiles (a copy of the HQ-2B missile defense system), intended for use as part of Chinese air defense systems.
According to unconfirmed reports, the firing range of the modernized Iranian missiles was increased to 50 km, but even in this case, the assertion that the Iranian missile differs from the Soviet one, just as the BM-13 Katyusha projectile differs from the BM-21 Grad projectile, to put it mildly, not entirely correct, since it was not possible to surpass the Soviet B-759 missile defense system in range.
The Iranian media published information that some of the modernized anti-aircraft missiles in the 21st century were equipped with a cooled IR seeker, which is activated at the final part of the trajectory, which increases the likelihood of hitting the target.
In this way, the Iranians attempted to compensate for the extreme vulnerability of the Sayyad-1 single-channel radio command guidance system to modern systems. EW.
The next publication in this series will be devoted to the service and combat use of the SA-75, SA-75M, S-75M and S-75M3 air defense systems, as well as their foreign analogues.
To be continued ...
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