Brave, but lacking initiative. Why did the Russian Empire lose the war with Japan?

95
Brave, but lacking initiative. Why did the Russian Empire lose the war with Japan?


How many times have I met in the army -
in high and small positions -
certainly brave people
but afraid of responsibility!

Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin

They were not afraid of the enemy, they were timid in front of their superiors


Why are these lines from the memoirs of the legendary general included in the epigraph?



You know, you can, for example, talk for hours about the crisis of landownership in post-reform Russia. Boring, monotonous and citing a lot of numbers, as well as various kinds of statistics. Or you can read “The Cherry Orchard”. And using the example of one family, much, if not all, will become clear.

So it is in this case: in one single phrase at least a very important, perhaps the key reason for the defeat of the Russian Imperial Army in the war with the clearly underestimated Japan is compressed.

Denikin recalled how, as a young captain, he left the Warsaw Military District for the Far East. Fight. Volunteer. I could not have gone: shortly before the Manifesto on the declaration of war, I fell from my horse and seriously injured my leg. The doctors' verdict is bed rest. But instead, the captain submits a report with a request to be sent to the active army.

Moreover, what we have before us is precisely a patriotic impulse, and not the smell of blood smelled by the dog of war (to make it clear what I mean, I recommend the good Polish film “Demons of War”, there is a good image of such a fighter - Senior Corporal Tichy; or, say, read biographies , on the one hand, the White Guard Lieutenant General V.L. Pokrovsky, on the other, the Red Commissar I.E. Yakir).

Yes, and do you know what response Denikin received to his report? At first it’s just a refusal. The captain did not give up: he sent a second report (Anton Ivanovich never gave up at all). From the district headquarters they asked whether Denikin spoke English. He answered with irritation:

I don’t know English, but I will fight no worse than those who know it.

In general, not immediately, but the request was granted, and the young captain went to the Far East, ending up at the headquarters of the detachment of Major General P.K. Rennenkampf, popular among officers, where they followed the rule: do not bow to bullets. That is why the losses were high. Pavel Karlovich himself was wounded in the neck.


Major General P.K. Rennenkampf in China during the suppression of the Yihetuan uprising, better known in our country as the “Boxer” uprising. 1900

And, in fact, the following episode occurred in the detachment with Denikin:

On November 23, our outposts at Tsinghechen were pushed back by the Japanese, and on the morning of the 24th, the vanguard sent forward discovered the advance of dense enemy columns along the ravine.
The Qinghechen battle began. General Rennenkampf and his staff went to an observation post at the commanding height, from which the entire panorama of the battle was visible. An alarming and confusing report was received from the head of the vanguard - the commander of the Cossack regiment. Rennenkampf sent him an unpleasant field note and cursed:
– I’m afraid that this... will confuse everything for me!..
- Your Excellency, allow me to receive the vanguard.
- With pleasure, I wish you success.
I went to the vanguard, thinking about how to gild the pill for my predecessor. Unnecessary worry. When the colonel found out about his shift, he took off his hat, crossed himself and said:
- Glory to You, Lord! At least now I won’t be the answer.

I put Denikin’s maxim on this colonel’s sigh of relief in the epigraph, as explaining one of the reasons for the defeat in the war with the Land of the Rising Sun. People as proactive as Denikin turned out to be critically insufficient for victory.

In general, the Russian officer in general strangely combined personal courage and at the same time not only lack of initiative - fear of responsibility: sometimes less than the commanders were afraid of the enemy. Remember the famous Captain Tushin from War and Peace, fearless and calm in the face of the enemy, but timid in the presence of his superiors.


Captain Tushin. Undoubtedly, the Russian army rested and is supported by such officers - often “eternal captains”

In general, the described case is not an isolated one. The problem (not everyone, of course) was recognized at the very top of the military hierarchy.

The same Adjutant General A.N. Kuropatkin:

There is no doubt that for the War Ministry the position of officers in the active army presented a very difficult task. But this task was complicated by circumstances beyond the army’s control. When big battles and heavy losses in the officer corps began, the difference in regiments between the payroll and available personnel quickly increased. A large number of wounded and sick were listed on the lists of the regiments for a very long time. There were regiments where, according to the lists, there were more than two full-time officers, but only half of the staff was available.
The wounded and sick who were at the theater of war returned, albeit slowly, to their units, but many of the officers taken to European Russia were stuck there and, despite recovery, did not go to the army.
There were cases where commanders of individual units, who were treated in Russia and had long since recovered, did not return to the army for almost a year, being listed as the head of the regiment and receiving the salary assigned to this position.
A large number of officers who arrived in European Russia from the army due to illness or to heal wounds lived in capitals or big cities for months, wandered the streets, and neither society nor the military authorities found their behavior reprehensible.

Of course, each case of skipping the duty to return to the front had its own reasons, but I would venture to suggest that a significant role was played by the reluctance to take responsibility in battle again, a kind of syndrome of the colonel described by Denikin.


Adjutant General A. N. Kuropatkin

Another thing: after the war, such officers were in no hurry to demobilize. On the contrary, many returned to their units, pushing aside the comrades who had advanced to the fields of the Russian-Japanese war.

One of the officers even published an article on this topic in the military magazine “Reconnaissance,” with the expressive title “Resurrection of the Dead.”

I think Kuropatkin’s words apply precisely to this category of officers:

Peacetime certifications were largely found to be inconsistent during combat testing. The commanders who served everywhere with the marks “outstanding”, “out of turn”, on the battlefield, due to their physical and spiritual qualities, did not withstand the combat test.

I believe that any reader, even if he has been in contact with the army for a short time at the level of conscript service, will agree: the qualities that allow an officer to climb the career ladder in peacetime (including the brilliant certification noted by Kuropatkin) are not always suitable in combat conditions .

It is likely that the Cossack colonel mentioned by Denikin successfully served in his position until he was transferred to the reserve, perhaps unwittingly standing in the way of a younger, proactive, unafraid of responsibility and capable officer, who also proved himself during the Russian-Japanese War.

And after all, the first type of officer is much more convenient for higher authorities in peacetime. Dutiful and non-argumentative. It’s easier with him, although he can get tricky during maneuvers. Not to mention the war.

It’s like in the joke about firefighters, when one of them talks about the service:

And the team is excellent, and they pay well and feed them too, but like wildfire - at least quit.

Of course, I am not saying that officers who had made a good career in peacetime suddenly turned out to be professionally incompetent on the battlefield, but it is obvious that not all of them could effectively lead troops, especially when the enemy’s actions went beyond what was expected (a striking example: offensive Wehrmacht operations in 1939–1940, which almost stupefied the Polish and French command, which thought in terms of the First World War).

It's all character's fault


Here the question naturally arises: why have proactive, competent officers capable of taking responsibility in battle not always made and are making a successful career in the peacetime army?

Part of the answer is contained in another episode from Denikin’s biography, described by himself and associated with his non-assignment to the General Staff after graduating from the Nikolaev Academy (Anton Ivanovich was included later).

It was just at the graduation reception:

I stated my rank and surname. The Emperor's voice was heard:
- Well, how do you think about getting a job?
- Don't know. I await Your Imperial Majesty's decision.
The Emperor turned half a turn and looked questioningly at the Minister of War. General Kuropatkin bent low and reported:
– This officer, Your Imperial Majesty, is not included in the General Staff for his character.
The Emperor turned to me again, nervously tugged at his aiguillette and asked two more questions: how long have I been in the service and where is my brigade located. He nodded affably and moved on...

For character... Here is the answer to the question: why the careers of proactive and competent officers often stalled and are stalling.

When I put the quote, re-reading Denikin’s memoirs for the umpteenth time, I suddenly remembered the good Soviet action film “Retaliation” that I had seen in my youth. And superbly played by Vadim Spiridonov, the marine captain Shvets, who did not get along with his superiors.


Captain Shvets from the film "Retaliation"

And as a result, in his own words: “the eternal captain.” Also for character. Although his company is the best in navy. But in war conditions, the captain might have been promoted quickly. And how many, thanks to such “eternal captains” in peacetime, conscript soldiers returned home alive from Afghanistan after two Chechen campaigns. And how many seemingly impossible combat missions were completed by them, and with minimal losses.

Yes, and Denikin: he went to the Russian-Japanese as a captain, returned as a colonel, leaving behind the memory of a hill named after him. He met the First World War as a brigade commander, ended up as a corps commander, and was very famous and respected among officers, which was recognized even by his opponent and successor as commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel, also talented and ready to take on responsibility of a military leader who met the First World War as a squadron commander, and in 1917 as a corps commander.

Denikin achieved respect and recognition without any patronage. Only personal labor, courage, literacy in battle and a willingness to take responsibility.

Who made a career?


And if it weren’t for these two wars, Anton Ivanovich would have faced routine service and, quite possibly, a rank no higher than lieutenant colonel.

Or let’s imagine, if Russia had not waged war in the second half of the 1th century, how the career of A.V. Suvorov or F.F. Ushakov would have developed? In the best case, the first would become a colonel, and the second would become a captain of the XNUMXst rank.

But who, in fact, often made a career in the army, pushing aside people like Denikin, Tushin or Shvets?


В stories Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin remained a controversial figure, but his undoubted merit is the brilliantly described life of the Imperial Army at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

On the one hand, executive, but lacking in initiative, officers who were convenient to their superiors in peacetime were often promoted.

However, there was another type, described not without malice by Anton Ivanovich:

The first year of academic study ended sadly for me. I successfully passed the exam on the history of military art with Professor Geisman and moved on to Baskakov. We got the Battle of Wagram. After listening for some time, Baskakov interrupted me:
– Start with the sides at exactly 12 o'clock.
It seemed to me that at that hour there was no turning point. Started to get confused. No matter how I approached the events, the moment did not satisfy Baskakov, and he repeated irritably:
- Exactly at 12 o'clock.
Finally, looking, as always, dispassionately contemptuously, somehow above his interlocutor, he said:
“Perhaps you need to think about it for another hour?”
- Completely unnecessary, Mr. Colonel.
At the end of the exam, the commission deliberated for a very long time. Longing... Finally, Geisman comes out with a list, reads the marks and finally says:
- In addition, the commission had a judgment regarding lieutenants Ivanov and Denikin and decided to add half a point to both. Thus, Lieutenant Ivanov was given 7, and Lieutenant Denikin 6½.
Assessing knowledge is a matter of professorial conscience, but such an “increase” was only an evil mockery: at least 7 points were required to transfer to the second year. I blushed and reported:
– I humbly thank the commission for its generosity.
Failure. They did not leave for the second year at the Academy and, therefore, were subject to expulsion.
I'll get ahead of myself.
A few years later I got my revenge. The war with Japan... 1905... The beginning of the Battle of Mukden... General Mishchenko is being treated for wounds, and General Grekov was sent to temporarily command his Cavalry detachment and with him as chief of staff - professor, Colonel Baskakov... I was there at that time time as chief of staff of one of Mishchenko’s divisions. We have already fought a little and gained some experience. Baskakov is new to combat and, apparently, is lost. He comes to my observation post and asks:
– What do you think this Japanese movement means?
– It is clear that this is the beginning of a general offensive and coverage of the right flank of our armies.
– I completely agree with you.
Baskakov came three or four more times to inquire “what I think,” until he came under heavy machine-gun fire, after which his visits stopped.
I must confess to human weakness: these meetings gave me satisfaction, as retribution for Wagram’s “12th hour” and for the half-point increase...

There have always been and are enough of such Baskakovs not only in the academy, but also in combat positions. Dry and arrogant clerks in peacetime, often insolvent in wartime.

By the way, Baskakov was not such an unknown figure.

Military historians A.V. Ganin and V.G. Semenov write the following about him:

Colonel Veniamin Ivanovich Baskakov, an ordinary professor at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, was appointed chief of staff of the Orenburg Cossack division...
He was a typical officer in his own way - his career was quite typical for many staff officers of the early twentieth century, who, being strict theorists of military affairs, had little knowledge of the real state of affairs in the army.
Baskakov served mainly in the headquarters of the I Army Corps and the Kyiv Military District. In 1892–1895 was in the reserve, and then taught at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, where he taught a course on the history of the Napoleonic Wars.
By the way, it was precisely because of Baskakov’s failure at the exam that the future leader of the White movement, and then still artillery Lieutenant A. I. Denikin (in the same year he re-entered the academy and later successfully graduated from it).
Denikin in his memoirs described his meeting with Baskakov near Mukden. Let us note that we are talking about the events of 1905, when Baskakov had already been in the positions of chief of staff of the Orenburg Cossack division and chief of staff of the cavalry detachment of General Grekov for over eight months and had at least seven months of experience in participating in hostilities.
It is difficult to say how important it is for a staff officer to bravely stand under enemy fire, but if Denikin is to be believed, it turns out that even in 1905 Baskakov understood little about the theater of war, and in this case it is difficult to imagine how he reached those described in this episode of events led the headquarters of the Orenburg Cossack division.
As for Baskakov’s character and his personal characteristics, he was considered “a great debater... [who] presented his “teachings” slowly and at length and not without a polemical “challenge.”
In addition, while teaching at the academy, he was extremely partial to his students and could not stand independent and self-confident officers. That is, in addition to a certain incompetence, we can say that Grekov’s chief of staff also had a difficult, proud character and probably prevented his subordinates from showing initiative.
We also add that soon after the war Baskakov submitted his resignation due to health reasons, which sharply worsened in Manchuria in 1904, and already on March 7, 1906 he retired.

And, probably, he prevented his subordinates from showing initiative...

Unlike Baskakov, after the war this type of officer continued to make a good career, which I mentioned above and what Kuropatkin wrote about when he noted their return back to the units after the Portsmouth Peace and the pushing back of their comrades who had advanced to the battlefields.

It’s not surprising: the former know how to build a career and adapt to circumstances, the latter know how to fight.

Actually, this is partly the reason why an army that has not fought for a long time often suffers defeats at the beginning of a campaign. And it’s good if in its ranks there are enough people like Denikin, Tushin, Shvets.

In conclusion: of course, in the army there have always been, are and will be competent, enterprising officers whose careers are developing well (and it happens that competent and talented ones like Tushin do not work out both in wartime) and in peacetime.
The main thing is that their percentage ensures the country’s defense capability and a high level of combat readiness of its armed forces. And in 1905 they lost in many ways due to the fact that there were clearly not enough people like Denikin, and there was an overabundance of the Cossack colonels he described.

Next time we’ll talk about the command staff at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. There were plenty of problems there too.

Использованная литература:
Denikin A.I. “The path of the Russian officer.” M.: Prometheus. 1990.
Ganin A.V., Semenov V.G. “Officer Corps of the Orenburg Cossack Army (1891–1945).” Biographical reference book. M.: Library-Fund “Russian Abroad”. 2007.
Kuropatkin A. N. “Notes on the Russo-Japanese War.” M.: Veche. 2020.
95 comments
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  1. +6
    13 June 2024 05: 04
    ".. To be loyal to the Soviet Motherland... By order of the Soviet government, come to the defense..." /Oath of the USSR 1975/

    "...I swear to defend the Constitution of the United States from enemies foreign and domestic, I take the oath freely without mental excuses and so help me God." / Oath of US Military Service /

    ".. In Russia, he sat down by order, stood up by order.... Without an order, a pimple will not pop up.." /Saltykov-Shchedrin/

    The biggest problem happened in 1991, when the country was completely screwed up and given over to the thieves simply because there was no order from the Government to “come to the defense” .... And so, everyone was brave and faithful to the Oath .....
    There's something inhuman about this
    1. +4
      13 June 2024 05: 22
      Denikin was undoubtedly a brave and talented military man.

      But why, until his death, did he call on the West to destroy the USSR and was eventually buried in the USA, as the commander-in-chief of the “US-allied army”?
      I believe this can be explained by the fact that Denikin did not believe in the historical perspective of Russian society outside of subordination to the West. But only "under the command of white people." .... Just like Yeltsin and many others.
      1. +4
        13 June 2024 07: 22
        Denikin did not believe in the historical perspective of Russian society outside of subordination to the West. But only "under the command of white people."

        good good good
      2. +12
        13 June 2024 08: 32
        I don’t know what Denikin called for, but he refused to cooperate with Hitler
        1. +11
          13 June 2024 10: 43
          Because in life I was an Anglophile, and not like Krasnov a Germanophile, Anglophile saved me from the noose..
      3. +5
        13 June 2024 18: 41
        Where did you get the idea that “Denikin did not believe in the historical perspective of Russian society without subordination to the West”?

        As early as 1935 (see "The Sentinel" No. 145): "... Gen. Denikin declares that Russian emigrants should under no circumstances, in the event of a foreign invasion of Russia, participate in this invasion. For in both cases - both the victory of the USSR and its defeat, their role will be considered shameful... National Russia has no friends... Even the obvious goals of Japan and Germany are definitely directed against the national interests of Russia. It must be assumed that their secret goals bring us, with all their ruthlessness, even greater dangers and damage. But what then? After all, it is practically impossible to consider the Russian case outside the international situation. And in the international situation, not a single favorable factor for Russia is looming. Blows are being prepared against the Soviet power, but all of them are invariably directed against the Russian people...".

        The full text can be viewed here: www.soltsy.orthodoxy.ru/denikin_1934_1_sm.jpg and www.soltsy.orthodoxy.ru/denikin_1934_2_sm.jpg
      4. +1
        15 June 2024 12: 34
        Quote: ivan2022
        Denikin did not believe in the historical perspective of Russian society

        Or vice versa - he realized the futility of a society under the control of local corrupt officials
  2. +3
    13 June 2024 05: 04
    . And how many, thanks to such “eternal captains” in peacetime, conscript soldiers returned home alive from Afghanistan after two Chechen campaigns.

    My friends are bosses, but I was unlucky:
    I've been wandering with a gun for a year.
    Such a harsh, masculine craft
    Aty-baty, Aty-baty.

    Afghanistan, Moldova and now Chechnya
    Left the pain of loss in my heart
    For everyone whom he did not bring out from under heavy fire.
    Aty - baht, aty - baht.

    My beautiful wife left me.
    She was not to blame for anything.
    No home, no shelter - what kind of family is there!
    Aty - baht, aty - baht.

    I served not for ranks or orders.
    I don't like asterisks in a pull,
    But I served the captain's stars in full.
    Aty - baht, aty-baht.

    Russia does not favor us with either fame or rubles,
    But we are her last soldiers.
    And that means we need to survive until we die.
    Aty-bats, aty-bats
    Aty-baty, aty-baty.
    → https://songspro.pro/17/STrofimov/tekst-pesni-Slujil-ya-ne-za-zvaniya-i-ne-za-ordena
  3. +1
    13 June 2024 06: 25
  4. +6
    13 June 2024 06: 25
    Brave, but lacking initiative.
    And why did this happen? Bravely and without initiative they were defeated in the Russo-Japanese War?
    1. +6
      13 June 2024 07: 21
      And why did this happen?

      This has never happened before - and here it is again.
      Alexey, good morning!!! hi
      1. +1
        13 June 2024 10: 36
        Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
        This has never happened before - and here it is again.
        "...and here it is again, the same thing" You need to know the classicslol hi
      2. +6
        13 June 2024 13: 53
        Eduard, good afternoon! The same thing happened during WWI, because ever since the time of Paul, initiative was punishable, and during the reign of Alexander I and his brother it was eradicated. By the way, many know about Narodnaya Volya, that they are bloodthirsty murderers, but few people know that in the 80s the Narodnaya Volya was joined by a Military Group, mainly consisting of artillery and naval officers and was not small in number, about 400-600 people, and perhaps even more, in this group there were just initiative officers.
        1. +5
          13 June 2024 16: 36
          Quote: parusnik
          The same thing happened again during WWI, because since the time of Paul, initiative has been punishable, and during the reign of Alexander I and his brother it was completely eradicated.

          Right. Because the initiative of officers in those days most often ended for the emperor hemorrhoidal colic with a fork or apoplexy snuff. Things got to the point where the next emperor had to lead officers to the meridian with the help of buckshot and cannonballs.
    2. +7
      13 June 2024 08: 14
      Because there were brave and proactive people on the other side.
    3. +2
      13 June 2024 14: 04
      Quote: parusnik
      And why did this happen? Bravely and without initiative they were defeated in the Russo-Japanese War?

      War is not football, you have to win it, and not play by some rules.
      1. +3
        13 June 2024 14: 10
        Do you want to say that the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War happened according to some rules? Or did Russia fight according to the rules, and Japan, without rules?
    4. 0
      15 June 2024 00: 12
      And why did this happen? Bravely and without initiative they were defeated in the Russo-Japanese War?
      Yes because
      Kuropatkin's words:

      Peacetime certifications were largely found to be inconsistent during combat testing. The commanders who served everywhere with the marks “outstanding”, “out of turn”, on the battlefield, due to their physical and spiritual qualities, did not withstand the combat test.
      he said, in a smart way, assessing other officers, but, at the same time, he did not notice that he was talking about himself too! And his (also with the most excellent peacetime certifications) inability to manage the troops entrusted to him in the war played a major role in that defeat!
      So, later, during the First World War, he went to war to demonstrate his inability... and demonstrated it again!
  5. +2
    13 June 2024 06: 38
    Reality is always more beautiful than fiction. Here they complain why the military did not act "on the orders of the Soviet government". Because there was no such order. There was complete inertia among the people. And this inertia is repeated from decade to decade. People are divided by character. A sanguine person will never do what a choleric person can do. A meloncholic person is stuck between these two characters. If a private is encouraged by promotion, then his initiative increases many times over. He begins to believe in his own strength.
    1. +4
      13 June 2024 06: 56
      And if the boss comes and says: “You have a mess, now you will all breathe as I order...” - that’s when the complete chaos begins. laughing
    2. +1
      13 June 2024 10: 09
      Vysotsky has a very precise definition:
      "...there are few violent ones, and therefore there are not enough leaders..."
    3. +6
      13 June 2024 10: 41
      Quote: Nikolay Malyugin
      Yes, because there was no such order. There was complete inertia among the people.
      Nevzorov said that when in the 90s, he was going to save the USSR (yes, yes, this later overcame him), being a journalist, he came to the head of the KGB, like, let's raise control and disperse the protesters, he told him, like, I know only one, who will come with us? So we will be - three against thousands
      1. +1
        13 June 2024 19: 45
        being a journalist, I came to the head of the KGB, like let’s raise the control and disperse the protesters, he said, I know only one who will go with us.
        A blind necrophiliac is lying. However, it was his uncle from the KGB, who placed an idiot with a 10th grade education on Leningrad TV, who could have blurted out such a thing. And everyone would go if there was an order. After giving the order, no one asks for wishes. There other methods of persuasion are used.
    4. +6
      13 June 2024 10: 56
      And who was there to speak for? In 1986, I was a senior lieutenant at a political work training camp. And they called my name as someone who worked poorly. Although I had nothing to do with political workers. Then this colonel comes to Mongolia, where I served, and starts talking about how he was a perestroika supporter and so on. Well, I got up and gave this colonel a good talking to about party ethics, unity of command, and all sorts of nonsense about party discipline in front of the entire regiment. He looked pale. And in the end, they almost called me an anti-Soviet. Then the regiment's deputy political officer started pestering me about my notes, and I insisted that with a higher education, it was not in my interests to write all sorts of crap. I had to scribble Gorbaty's speech at the April plenum by order. But the political officer did not want to transfer with the regiment to the Far East.
    5. +2
      13 June 2024 16: 38
      Quote: Nikolay Malyugin
      Here they are complaining why the military did not act “on the orders of the Soviet government.” Yes, because there was no such order. There was complete inertia among the people.

      This is not inertia. An army in which officers act without orders from the political leadership and contrary to the Charter is not an army, but an illegal armed formation.
      1. +1
        15 June 2024 12: 37
        Quote: Alexey RA
        An army in which officers act without orders from the political leadership and contrary to the Charter

        Let me note that the Soviet charter specifically... assigned an officer to defend the Motherland upon the fact of an attack, and not on orders.
        In general, everything was thought out there in case the war started with the evaporation of the headquarters by a nuclear charge. But the case of treason at the very top was not foreseen
  6. +3
    13 June 2024 07: 54
    An interesting attempt to explain the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.

    All the materials of German generals that I read speak of the lack of initiative and, often, of the poor training of Soviet generals, with rare exceptions. Napoleon's marshals also spoke about our generals, and he himself, except for Bagration, respected no one. Our soldiers were always praised by everyone (albeit with reservations), but generals - no one, ever.

    I think this factor - the low quality of our senior command personnel - has been our problem for centuries, but this factor is a constant, we have always fought, and often very successfully, despite it.

    Therefore, the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War has many reasons, the poor quality of the command staff is only one of them.
  7. +3
    13 June 2024 07: 58
    Remember the famous Captain Tushin from War and Peace, fearless and calm in the face of the enemy, but timid in the presence of his superiors.

    You can kill the enemy, but under no circumstances kill your commander.
    This is what mental training in our army is based on, so that the “father-commanders” are feared more than the enemy. In peacetime it helped, but in Russian-Japanese soldiers began to shoot at their officers who were trying to stop the flight. The traditions remained in the principles of "hazing".
  8. +6
    13 June 2024 08: 16
    In general, the Russian officer strangely combined personal courage and at the same time not only lack of initiative - fear of responsibility
    Where did this combination come from? The reason for its appearance, they already said the investigation, name the reason. Or should we read “The Cherry Orchard” to understand? Or "Duel"?
  9. +10
    13 June 2024 08: 25
    It’s a strange thing, Russia fought with Turkey in 77-78, and then with Japan in 04-05, and the problem is in the command, they say they haven’t fought for a long time (25 years). However, Germany last fought in the year 70, and by the year 14 (i.e. 40 years of peace) it is the best army in Europe, unlike Russia (which has 9 years of peace).
    What's wrong with the theory of a long non-combatant army?
    1. +8
      13 June 2024 13: 05
      Germany was preparing for the inevitable war, we were preparing for the highest review.
      1. +1
        13 June 2024 15: 01
        Those. the problem is not in the “peaceful” and “military” captains, but in something else?
    2. +2
      13 June 2024 13: 58
      Germany prepared for a long time and carefully, constantly conducting exercises and training. The German colonels had more experience than the Allied generals.
  10. +2
    13 June 2024 08: 38
    Why did the Russian Empire lose the war with Japan?
    In order to explain this issue, we must first look for the root cause. Perhaps the main and decisive factor was the financial component. For food for thought, here are excerpts from an article by James Long, history professor at the University of Colorado in the USA, “French-Russian relations during the Russo-Japanese War”:
    After “Bloody Sunday,” the author points out, numerous groups in France and Russia from the opposition and radical sectors of society demanded that the French government suspend subsidies to the autocracy, because it could use loans to stifle the liberation struggle of the Russian people. Nevertheless, the French government helped tsarism obtain a loan for a huge amount - 2,25 billion francs. The government of the Third Republic, he writes, could not close its financial market to Russia, because if it suspended payment of its obligations for even 3 months, the Paris stock exchange would be hit by an unprecedented blow that threatened thousands of rentiers.
    During the war, French monopoly circles, with the assistance of their government, took a course toward increasing the subordination of the Russian economy to their influence, tying the provision of loans to demands for concessions in the areas of trade and industry. The French government also used Russia's financial dependence to exert political pressure on the autocracy. In the spring of 1905, the Rouvier cabinet openly demanded that tsarism immediately conclude peace with Japan. Financial considerations, along with military failures, forced Russia to sign peace in Portsmouth.
    hi
    1. +3
      13 June 2024 13: 04
      What was the point of fighting a war after Tsushima?
      1. +4
        13 June 2024 13: 13
        What was the point of fighting a war after Tsushima?
        The main theater of military operations was still on land.
        Here are the plans of the Republic of Ingushetia and Japan for this war:
        The Russian war plan provided for using the available forces to hold back the enemy's advance until reinforcements arrived from Central Russia, gradually retreating north to the Liaoyang area, and also to hold Port Arthur. The Japanese plan provided for a sudden strike to destroy the Russian fleet, establish dominance at sea and, having secured its sea communications, quickly transfer ground forces to the mainland, capture Port Arthur and defeat the Russian army in the Liaoyang area. It was also planned to seize Korea and Fr. Sakhalin, and later throughout Manchuria, Primorye and the Ussuri region.

        After the end of the Second World War, the SA took less than a month to defeat the Kwantung Army. Another question is, what prevented the tsarist army from doing the same? In my comment above, I tried to show a possible reason why the war with Japan was not ended in favor of the Republic of Ingushetia. At that time, the Republic of Ingushetia had more ground forces (meaning the entire strength within the borders of the empire) than Japan.
        1. +4
          13 June 2024 13: 20
          The main theater was at sea; without dominance at sea, no successes on land would have yielded anything.
          The Japanese interfered.
          1. +3
            13 June 2024 13: 26
            For Japan, dominance at sea made it possible to maintain its ground armies on the continent; for the Republic of Ingushetia, the loss of the fleet was a nuisance, but it made it possible to squeeze Japan out of the continent again onto the islands, i.e. bring the situation to the starting point without territorial losses as a result of the war.
            Many people forget that:
            "For war, we need three things: money, money, and more money." hi
            1. +3
              13 June 2024 13: 41
              It’s interesting how the Russian army without a fleet would attack in Korea and try to recapture Port Arthur, and at that time the Japanese would occupy Kamchatka, the mouth of the Amur, etc.
              1. +4
                13 June 2024 13: 48
                In 1941, the Wehrmacht was not prevented from capturing Crimea by the absence of a fleet on the Black Sea.
                1. +2
                  13 June 2024 13: 51
                  The Wehrmacht had the Luftwaffe
                  1. +2
                    13 June 2024 13: 59
                    You forgot that the loss of Port Arthur led the 2nd Pacific Squadron to Tsushima. If the RI ground army had defeated the Japanese ground army, then Tsushima might not have existed.
                    1. +2
                      13 June 2024 14: 01
                      I started this rather stupid discussion with the question, what was the point of continuing the war after Tsushima?
                      Let's not change the input.
                      1. +2
                        13 June 2024 14: 03
                        I answered you, if the ground army of the Republic of Ingushetia had defeated the ground army of Japan, this would have allowed the Republic of Ingushetia to maintain the status quo in this war without territorial losses.
                      2. +6
                        13 June 2024 14: 10
                        A fairy tale about a white bull, how do you imagine this defeat, the Japanese fleeing in panic and surrendering in droves?
                        We would have pushed the Japanese as far as possible to Mukden, where they would have dug in, then what?
                        Korea for the Japanese, Kwantung for the Japanese, Sakhalin for the Japanese, we are waiting for Kamchatka.
                        After Tsushima there was literally nothing to catch.
                      3. +2
                        13 June 2024 14: 14
                        Remember Dunkirk? What saved the Allies then?
                        The Dunkirk evacuation, codenamed Operation Dynamo and also known as the Miracle of Dunkirk, or simply Dunkirk, was the evacuation of more than 338 Allied soldiers during World War II from the beaches and harbor of Dunkirk, in northern France, between 000 May and June 26, 4. The operation began after large numbers of Belgian, British and French troops were cut off and surrounded by German forces during the six-week Battle of France.
                      4. +1
                        13 June 2024 14: 18
                        In Dunkirk there were tanks, aircraft, etc.
                      5. +1
                        13 June 2024 14: 27
                        And the British had a fleet, but this did not help them.
                      6. +2
                        13 June 2024 14: 34
                        Yes, because the Germans had aviation and it helped them
                      7. +2
                        13 June 2024 14: 45
                        Then here’s an example: the Battle of Singapore in 1941.
                        On the same day, the world learned that 30 Japanese had stormed Singapore, capturing 000 soldiers of the British Empire. This was the largest defeat of the British Army in its entire history. Moreover, success was achieved by an army that itself was on the brink of disaster, lacking fuel and ammunition. In this case, everything was decided by the will.
                      8. +2
                        13 June 2024 15: 05
                        It was the fleet that helped the British
                        - held back German tanks with artillery
                        - carried out the evacuation (and there were many civilian volunteers)
                        - defended Great Britain from German landings
                      9. 0
                        13 June 2024 15: 41
                        The decision not to finish off the allies at Dunkirk is not the merit of the English fleet, it is Hitler’s decision:
                        In addition, Hitler believed that the loss of the largest European. ally and the return of demoralized soldiers to Great Britain will push the British. government to conclude a separate peace with Germany.

                        By this I wanted to say that a successfully carried out land operation on land can lead to victory over an enemy who has a fleet.
                      10. -1
                        13 June 2024 16: 12
                        Militarily, Russia could force Japan off the continent, our ground forces were immeasurably larger - even from Korea, which, admittedly, we didn't really need. Our economy was also stronger, Japan was essentially fighting on credit.

                        However, we would have to spend a lot of money and in the future we could no longer dominate that region without a fleet, even if we had Port Arthur. That is, we could have escaped military defeat, but this victory might not have given us anything, since the war at sea had already been lost.

                        IMHO.
                      11. +2
                        13 June 2024 17: 38
                        It really helped. Firstly, German tanks were afraid to approach the shore, and secondly, the fleet provided evacuation, which would have been impossible in the event of enemy dominance at sea.
        2. +2
          13 June 2024 17: 35
          Is it okay that there was a revolution at home? Continuing hostilities would mean the death of the regime.
        3. +1
          15 June 2024 12: 41
          Quote: Gomunkul
          After the end of the Second World War, the SA took less than a month to defeat the Kwantung Army. Another question is, what prevented the tsarist army from doing the same?

          6 pairs of trains per day through the most problematic sections of the Trans-Siberian Railway. That is, there is a huge army, there is ammunition, but it is almost impossible to bring all this to the Far East. And the Japanese took this into account when planning the war, that the Russian Empire as a whole is strong, but far away.
    2. +4
      13 June 2024 15: 09
      This situation (the French finance people said to stop and so they stopped) led to peace.
      But she doesn’t explain why the Russian army was losing before (well, they didn’t give loans to Russia for defeats - you lose there, and we’ll give you money)
      1. +2
        13 June 2024 15: 48
        Most likely, the French (under pressure from England and the USA) told the tsarist government, curtail military operations, because we do not intend to continue to credit you. The largest powers at that time did not want the spread of Russia's territorial expansion in the Far East. Japan was credited in this war by the USA and England, and the credits had to be repaid.
        Tokyo's financial situation was disastrous; during the war, the Japanese government issued external loans in the amount of 800,57 million yen (mainly on the stock exchanges of London and New York), as well as 6 internal loans in the amount of 783,46 million yen.
        1. +3
          13 June 2024 16: 50
          My answer is still the same
          This situation explains why Russia agreed to peace, but does not explain why it constantly lost
  11. +11
    13 June 2024 08: 50
    It’s the same with us now. What did Shoigu do to deserve an army general? No military education, no participation in the military base, not even military service. He was simply convenient and efficient and gave the “necessary” reports.
  12. +1
    13 June 2024 08: 51
    after the destruction of our fleet in Tsushima, the Russian government and Emperor Nicholas II decided not to continue the war... and the Japanese had no more than 400 thousand with reserves in Manchuria... our army in the Far East reached a strength of over 700 thousand and with the number of troops in the European part of the empire about 1,5 million, but they did not dare... a complete analogy with the SVO
  13. +3
    13 June 2024 10: 14
    all around are random people in military uniform...
    From my class, those who looked at life like this went to military schools:
    fed - well-fed, shod and dressed, the army will provide housing for the family, no need to think - there is an order, after 25 years - a good pension and do what you want...
    1. +2
      13 June 2024 13: 03
      as Napoleon responded to a letter from his younger brother where he said that he wanted to become an officer - there is a big difference between a peacetime officer who grinds paving stones on the parade ground every day and an officer in war who is responsible for the lives of his subordinates
  14. +8
    13 June 2024 10: 49
    ALL of the above takes place in ALL armies of the world at ALL times. For a community of people destined for war feels normal in war, but in peacetime it acquires ugly features. It's almost inevitable. And no one has yet come up with an effective solution, a more or less comprehensive solution. Too different laws and models of behavior determine these two states.
    1. +1
      13 June 2024 15: 28
      Quote: KVU-NSVD
      No one has yet come up with an effective solution, a more or less comprehensive solution. Too different laws and models of behavior determine these two states.

      You can try to introduce a discipline into military education that requires the ability to take initiative and a fighting character, and also take personal results in this discipline into account when promoting. Those. - introduce another fundamental selection criterion.
      Previously, war games were too expensive and technically difficult to implement. Now, in the digital era, you can try to implement fairly high-quality emulation. Judging by the scant footage from the LBS, the command is already working behind the monitors.
      1. +3
        13 June 2024 15: 48
        This is possible, for example, you can conduct research on the psychotypes of an ideal commander at various levels and take them into account when selecting for positions from cadets to generals, but all this works fine in theory - in the laboratory, and in combination with an almost guaranteed lifelong PPD - a possible battlefield will not work mass result. Because in the PPD one thing is valued in an officer, but in war another thing is valued. For some time after the war, front-line soldiers prepare for front-line shifts, but gradually this smoothes out and dissolves into peaceful everyday life. And nothing can be done about it. If an army does not fight, then it first relaxes, and then begins to decay (like a fighting organism, of course)
        1. +1
          13 June 2024 16: 38
          Quote: KVU-NSVD
          in the PPD one thing is valued in an officer, and in war another.

          What is PPD? As for the psychotype, this is a given, which does not change with conditions, and therefore, the identified qualities necessary during combat operations will also work in war. For example, resistance to stress, the type of reaction to unexpected force majeure, an increased degree of responsibility for an error - can be modeled (and trained) outside the database conditions, if the results will determine the future career, and not just pass/fail. As an introduction, you can create situations that actually existed and are well documented. In addition, real teams of future or current commanders can take part in the game, and then the peculiarities of interaction with the people of their team will also influence the result.
          1. +3
            13 June 2024 17: 08
            PPD is a point of permanent deployment (for example, a military camp). In a more extended version in the army it’s like this
            sometimes called place of duty. There is also a temporary dislocation point - a temporary deployment point, for example a field camp.
            On the second question. Yes, all this can be done and many are being tried to do. But the question is not only about selection. This is only the first step. But what about honest accounting of results when making appointments? Or with the fact that in peacetime, as positions increase, the importance of the candidate’s military talents decreases? Or with the fact that in a future war, officers may be required to have non-standard qualities that were not taken into account during selection. With large samples this is leveled out, but when do you have all the officers with the same brush? The problem is too multifactorial with too many unknowns
            1. +1
              13 June 2024 18: 28
              Quote: KVU-NSVD
              PPD is a point of permanent deployment (for example, a military camp). In a more extended version in the army it’s like this
              sometimes called place of duty.

              I see. Thanks
              Quote: KVU-NSVD

              in peacetime, as positions increase, the importance of the candidate’s military talents decreases? Or with the fact that in a future war, officers may be required to have non-standard qualities that were not taken into account during selection.

              You can come up with a certain suitability index, which will be the main factor in assignment to operational work. As for administrative talents, they also appear in peacetime, so the only question is the quality/integrity of the selectors, but the latter will be an eternal problem everywhere.
              About non-standard qualities - human nature is unchangeable, and such qualities can only be in demand if the very specifics of the war are different. If war ceases to be war, then the military will cease to be one. New technical skills are acquired, and they can hardly be classified as personal qualities.
              1. +1
                13 June 2024 18: 49
                such qualities can only be in demand if the very specifics of the war are different.

                So she basically is always different in modern history. In the event of a major conflict between comparable opponents, of course.
                1. +1
                  13 June 2024 19: 27
                  Quote: KVU-NSVD

                  So she basically is always different in modern history.

                  The means may vary, but the essence will always be the same - confrontation with military force. It's like in chess - maybe. different openings, tactics, strategy from game to game, but the essence is the same - defeat the enemy. And the set of qualities for this will also be the same, although some are better at tactics, others at strategy, but objectively you need both, and intrinsic motivation to victory, which depends on character.
    2. 0
      13 June 2024 18: 51
      Chechens - “destined for war” or not? In my opinion, even after the war they feel quite good as winners.

      It is true that there is a society that, having won a war, then treats the war as if it had lost. A
      after the war it’s ready...... to the losers, as if they didn’t lose, but won....

      In life, anything can happen... Heh... heh... in any of the "two states". The essence of society is always the same in any state
    3. 0
      15 June 2024 12: 45
      Quote: KVU-NSVD
      no one has yet come up with an effective solution, a more or less comprehensive solution

      I note that the Somali pirates were defeated by PMCs. And in Mali, too, PMCs performed very well.
      The main advantage of PMCs in the context of technological progress is that they can purchase the weapons and equipment that are needed now, and not those that are “highly approved.” And when making purchases, asking for the opinion of front-line soldiers, and not “ensuring the storage of equipment in an unheated warehouse” is the last of the real demands of the soldiers.
      1. +1
        15 June 2024 12: 49
        Yes . You're right . PMCs can do a lot and fight constantly. And accordingly, always in good shape. But how can we entrust the protection of the state to them? Would you trust?
  15. +3
    13 June 2024 13: 14
    Gentlemen-comrades forum members. Let's move on to our time in civilian life. Since the army is a reflection of our society, let me move on to what is happening now in civilian life. I will tell you about the specifics about techies. One to one - there are "eternal captains", some of them break through to the top - but there they are held back by "scoundrels" who have infiltrated positions at their expense and "defective managers" from the outside. All of the above applies to everything, from housing and communal services, health care and ending with government agencies. And in words, everything is in chocolate: hi
    1. ANB
      +1
      13 June 2024 20: 52
      . I'll tell you about the techies in specifics. One to one - there are "eternal captains", some of them break through to the top

      In IT the situation is gradually changing. Now a good programmer can earn more than a boss. At the same time, he has no problem changing jobs. But it’s much more difficult for a boss to do this.
  16. +4
    13 June 2024 16: 29
    1. The Russo-Japanese War was the first and to date the only one in which the outcome depended entirely on the navy.
    2. The military potential of the Russian Empire was superior to that of Japan, but was significantly inferior to that of Britain, Japan’s de facto ally.
    3. Incompetent command of court generals under the command of the chief of the Port Arthur garrison, Stoessel, who was in fact the tsar’s viceroy of the Manchurian Federal District.
    4. General Kondratenko, Admiral Makarov and other commanders were directly subordinate to or dependent on the garrison commander.
    5. The 2nd Pacific Squadron sent from Kronstadt to Port Arthur was bulky, overloaded, consisted of a motley crew of ships and was not led by the best commander.
    6. The empire's artillery weapons were inferior to those of Japan.
    7. The Japanese infantry units were dressed in camouflage, while the Russian ones, in white shirts, were clearly visible against the general background.
    1. +1
      13 June 2024 18: 00
      What are these stunning historical discoveries? and on all points except point 2
      1. +1
        14 June 2024 13: 40
        The 2nd Pacific Squadron was formed from ships of different classes, weapons and speed, overloaded beyond the permissible limit and was supposed to arrive at Arthur Port.
        By the time the squadron arrived, Japanese ground forces occupied all of Manchuria, Mukden, Dalny and Port Arthur.
        The squadron had nowhere to hide and must prepare for the inevitable naval battle on the way to Vladivostok.
        The progress of the squadron is determined by the slowest ship. The battleships had a speed of 18 knots, heavy cruisers of the Bayan type had 22 knots, light cruisers of the Aurora type had a speed of up to 25, and destroyers of the Novik type had a speed of up to 30 knots, which is comparable to the speed of modern warships.
        The squadron survived the first battle, but after licking its wounds, the Japanese squadron caught up with the Russian squadron and forced a second battle.
        Separate detachments of the Russian squadron (destroyers, cruisers, battleships, auxiliary vessels) sailed in separate columns on their own so as not to be subjected to fire from heavy Japanese guns aimed at hitting the striking force of the Russian squadron - the armored detachment.
        During the circumnavigation of the world from Kronstadt to the shores of Korea, the commander never taught the captains of the ships to strictly carry out orders, as a result, the formation of the battleships was disrupted, and the concentrated artillery fire of the Japanese battleships inflicted heavy damage on the overloaded battleships of the Russian squadron, which began to turn over on their keels one after another .
        The defeat of the battleships brought chaos to the remaining detachments, which attacked the Japanese cruisers and destroyers. Everything went awry, the battle formations were disrupted and each captain made his own decisions - some went to disarm in Qingdao and Shanghai, others even further - to Saigon, and only two or three ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron broke through to Vladivostok, but this did not affect outcome of the war.
        1. 0
          14 June 2024 17: 34
          Dear - please don’t make us laugh :-) here is a site for smart people...
          1. 0
            17 June 2024 08: 43
            Smart people on smart sites, and we are here with you
            1. 0
              17 June 2024 17: 41
              you eat like that fishmonger at the Chisinau market :-))))) commendable, but don’t you remember how that story with the rotten fish ended?
  17. +2
    13 June 2024 16: 30
    I believe that any reader, even if he has been in contact with the army for a short time at the level of conscript service, will agree: the qualities that allow an officer to climb the career ladder in peacetime (including the brilliant certification noted by Kuropatkin) are not always suitable in combat conditions .

    And vice versa: wartime officers become inconvenient for service in peacetime.
    I remember the characteristics of Balk’s cap-two:
    Captain of the 2nd rank S.Z. Succumbing to alcoholism, in peacetime, a captain of the 2nd rank Balk is in many cases an element for service not desirable, but his decisiveness and selfless courage shown in the war, his impeccably honest and handsome nature give the right to be condescending to his lack. Beloved subordinates, in wartime cap. 2 p. The beam will make them heroes, and in peace - it will make you willingly carry out any difficult work, any emergency work, surprising others with the speed of its execution.

    The life of S.Z. Balk is inextricably linked with the ship on which he sails; he has no shore attachments; as a commander, he is known in the navy for his daring control of his ship and his care for its regular and emergency supplies and structure. Cap. 2 r. The beam must be saved for wartime.
  18. 0
    13 June 2024 17: 45
    from Afghanistan after two Chechen campaigns

    Brilliant! good
  19. +2
    13 June 2024 18: 30
    Here is the epilogue from Denikin, this, of course, is just enough to take all this dregs seriously. wassat
    And after such antics, the author tries to assure that he is completely neutral in his assessments of the civil war. negative
  20. +3
    13 June 2024 18: 49
    I can’t imagine how, with such leadership, with an ass instead of a head, it was possible to win? - Yes, give them WW2 equipment, they would still have lost
    1. +1
      13 June 2024 19: 17
      I can’t imagine where normal leadership could come from in such a society? laughing

      After all, in the end they lost all the gains of their ancestors over 500 years, and their workers' party and their country... And they didn't understand...
  21. +1
    13 June 2024 19: 32
    Am I the only one who thinks the top photo is mirrored?
    Everyone’s sabers hang on the right, but in the photo with the Chinese they hang on the left.
  22. +2
    13 June 2024 19: 37
    He was a typical officer in his own way - his career was quite typical for many staff officers of the early twentieth century, who, being strict theorists of military affairs, had little knowledge of the real state of affairs in the army.

    In addition to militants, like Roman centurions and a couple of comrades like Marshal of France Monluc, who rose from the rank of a simple archer (or Suvorov, also from the lower ranks, even though he was enrolled in the regiment as a child), there were plenty of quite intelligent commanders who had never sniffed footcloth.

    Moltke did not even command a company. Napoleon graduated early as a lieutenant and then spent twice as much time on leave as in service. After the revolution, he generally jumped into the queens.

    Where do the officers of the Wehrmacht, which has grown 7 times since 1935, get their experience? Meanwhile, the French and British, participants in the colonial wars, were butchered in a couple of months. Apparently it's not just a lack of practice.
    1. 0
      13 June 2024 20: 28
      This is so.... Moreover, two decades before this, the Germans themselves were butchered.

      Things have been going too smoothly for them since 1933 to be explained by their own merits. In all fairness, the Germans should have been paying reparations from 1919 to the end of the 20th century...
    2. +1
      14 June 2024 11: 00
      Quote: Artem Savin
      Where do the officers of the Wehrmacht, which has grown 7 times since 1935, get their experience?

      And it depends on which officers. The backbone of the Wehrmacht consisted of officers of the Reichswehr, which its creator directly and unequivocally called “an army of commanders.” In fact, before the deployment of the Reichswehr into the Wehrmacht, the armed forces of the Reich were a large military educational institution in which future officers and non-commissioned officers were taught theory and tested it in practice. They also generated various ideas themselves, which were then tested at testing sites. Uv. D. Shein wrote that the prototype of the future Kampfgruppe (a regimental tank-infantry-artillery group with attached aviation) was tested by the Reichswehr back in the late 20s.
      10 years of continuous study - and the experienced officer and non-commissioned officer core of the future mass army is ready. True, for this it was necessary to know for sure that in the next 15 years there would be no wars or conflicts in Germany and that one could only study - but the guarantors of Versailles took care of this. smile
  23. +1
    14 June 2024 11: 47
    At the Budapest military station, Matusic brought Captain Sagner a telegram, which was sent by the unfortunate brigade commander, who was sent to a sanatorium. The telegram was unencrypted and had the same content as the previous one: “Quickly cook dinner and advance on Sokal.” To this was added: “The convoy is to be enlisted in the eastern group. The reconnaissance service is cancelled. The thirteenth marching battalion is to build a bridge across the Bug River. Details in the newspapers.”

    Captain Sagner immediately went to the station commandant. He was greeted warmly by a small, fat officer.

    “Well, your brigadier general has done a lot of things,” said the little officer, bursting into laughter. “But still, we were obliged to hand you this nonsense, since the division had not yet received an order not to deliver his telegrams to the recipients.” Yesterday the fourteenth marching battalion of the Seventy-fifth Regiment passed through here, and the battalion commander received a telegram: to give the entire team six crowns as a special reward for Przemysl. In addition, an order was given: each soldier must contribute two of these six crowns to a war loan... According to reliable information, your brigadier general was struck down by paralysis.

    “Mr. Major,” Captain Sagner inquired from the commandant of the military station. “According to the orders for the regiment, we are traveling along the route to Gedelle.” The team is supposed to get one hundred and fifty grams of Swiss cheese here. At the last station, the soldiers were supposed to be given one hundred and fifty grams of Hungarian sausage, but they received nothing.

    “And here you will hardly achieve anything,” the major answered, still smiling. “I am not aware of such an order for regiments from the Czech Republic.” However, this is none of my business, contact the supply department.

    - When do we leave, Mr. Major?

    - Ahead of you is a train with heavy artillery, heading to Galicia. We'll send him out in an hour, Mr. Captain. On the third track there is a medical train. He leaves twenty-five minutes after the artillery. On the twelfth track there is a train with ammunition. It leaves ten minutes after the sanitary one, and twenty minutes after it we will send your train. Of course, if there are no changes,” he added, smiling, which completely disgusted Captain Sagner.
  24. +1
    14 June 2024 13: 30
    Quote: Artem Savin
    Where do the officers of the Wehrmacht, which has grown 7 times since 1935, get their experience?


    Is it just a matter of experience? Experience is sometimes even a hindrance. Relearning is more difficult than learning innovations.
    You need to draw the right conclusions from experience, and not try to blindly reproduce it, turning a blind eye to new opportunities as a consequence of progress.
  25. +1
    14 June 2024 20: 36
    Alas, the principle of unity of command forms a certain type of relationship. Initiative of the subordinate, reproach to the superior. - I missed it, I didn’t think through it. And if such a demarche follows every day, then the boss must immediately be swapped with the subordinate. There is no talk here of the actual work that both serve. If elements of reasonable collegiality and division of responsibility are strictly suppressed, one should not expect a different attitude towards responsibilities.
  26. 0
    20 June 2024 07: 57
    RYAV, naval war. The very start of hostilities on land meant the loss of the war. But that's not even the main thing. The only point of this whole mess was to ensure fast and cheap export of Russian grain through an ice-free port. For this, first of all, the loyal attitude of Japan was necessary. Therefore, the war was lost long before it began.