Brave, but lacking initiative. Why did the Russian Empire lose the war with Japan?
in high and small positions -
certainly brave people
but afraid of responsibility!
Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin
They were not afraid of the enemy, they were timid in front of their superiors
Why are these lines from the memoirs of the legendary general included in the epigraph?
You know, you can, for example, talk for hours about the crisis of landownership in post-reform Russia. Boring, monotonous and citing a lot of numbers, as well as various kinds of statistics. Or you can read “The Cherry Orchard”. And using the example of one family, much, if not all, will become clear.
So it is in this case: in one single phrase at least a very important, perhaps the key reason for the defeat of the Russian Imperial Army in the war with the clearly underestimated Japan is compressed.
Denikin recalled how, as a young captain, he left the Warsaw Military District for the Far East. Fight. Volunteer. I could not have gone: shortly before the Manifesto on the declaration of war, I fell from my horse and seriously injured my leg. The doctors' verdict is bed rest. But instead, the captain submits a report with a request to be sent to the active army.
Moreover, what we have before us is precisely a patriotic impulse, and not the smell of blood smelled by the dog of war (to make it clear what I mean, I recommend the good Polish film “Demons of War”, there is a good image of such a fighter - Senior Corporal Tichy; or, say, read biographies , on the one hand, the White Guard Lieutenant General V.L. Pokrovsky, on the other, the Red Commissar I.E. Yakir).
Yes, and do you know what response Denikin received to his report? At first it’s just a refusal. The captain did not give up: he sent a second report (Anton Ivanovich never gave up at all). From the district headquarters they asked whether Denikin spoke English. He answered with irritation:
In general, not immediately, but the request was granted, and the young captain went to the Far East, ending up at the headquarters of the detachment of Major General P.K. Rennenkampf, popular among officers, where they followed the rule: do not bow to bullets. That is why the losses were high. Pavel Karlovich himself was wounded in the neck.
Major General P.K. Rennenkampf in China during the suppression of the Yihetuan uprising, better known in our country as the “Boxer” uprising. 1900
And, in fact, the following episode occurred in the detachment with Denikin:
The Qinghechen battle began. General Rennenkampf and his staff went to an observation post at the commanding height, from which the entire panorama of the battle was visible. An alarming and confusing report was received from the head of the vanguard - the commander of the Cossack regiment. Rennenkampf sent him an unpleasant field note and cursed:
– I’m afraid that this... will confuse everything for me!..
- Your Excellency, allow me to receive the vanguard.
- With pleasure, I wish you success.
I went to the vanguard, thinking about how to gild the pill for my predecessor. Unnecessary worry. When the colonel found out about his shift, he took off his hat, crossed himself and said:
- Glory to You, Lord! At least now I won’t be the answer.
I put Denikin’s maxim on this colonel’s sigh of relief in the epigraph, as explaining one of the reasons for the defeat in the war with the Land of the Rising Sun. People as proactive as Denikin turned out to be critically insufficient for victory.
In general, the Russian officer in general strangely combined personal courage and at the same time not only lack of initiative - fear of responsibility: sometimes less than the commanders were afraid of the enemy. Remember the famous Captain Tushin from War and Peace, fearless and calm in the face of the enemy, but timid in the presence of his superiors.
Captain Tushin. Undoubtedly, the Russian army rested and is supported by such officers - often “eternal captains”
In general, the described case is not an isolated one. The problem (not everyone, of course) was recognized at the very top of the military hierarchy.
The same Adjutant General A.N. Kuropatkin:
The wounded and sick who were at the theater of war returned, albeit slowly, to their units, but many of the officers taken to European Russia were stuck there and, despite recovery, did not go to the army.
There were cases where commanders of individual units, who were treated in Russia and had long since recovered, did not return to the army for almost a year, being listed as the head of the regiment and receiving the salary assigned to this position.
A large number of officers who arrived in European Russia from the army due to illness or to heal wounds lived in capitals or big cities for months, wandered the streets, and neither society nor the military authorities found their behavior reprehensible.
Of course, each case of skipping the duty to return to the front had its own reasons, but I would venture to suggest that a significant role was played by the reluctance to take responsibility in battle again, a kind of syndrome of the colonel described by Denikin.
Adjutant General A. N. Kuropatkin
Another thing: after the war, such officers were in no hurry to demobilize. On the contrary, many returned to their units, pushing aside the comrades who had advanced to the fields of the Russian-Japanese war.
One of the officers even published an article on this topic in the military magazine “Reconnaissance,” with the expressive title “Resurrection of the Dead.”
I think Kuropatkin’s words apply precisely to this category of officers:
I believe that any reader, even if he has been in contact with the army for a short time at the level of conscript service, will agree: the qualities that allow an officer to climb the career ladder in peacetime (including the brilliant certification noted by Kuropatkin) are not always suitable in combat conditions .
It is likely that the Cossack colonel mentioned by Denikin successfully served in his position until he was transferred to the reserve, perhaps unwittingly standing in the way of a younger, proactive, unafraid of responsibility and capable officer, who also proved himself during the Russian-Japanese War.
And after all, the first type of officer is much more convenient for higher authorities in peacetime. Dutiful and non-argumentative. It’s easier with him, although he can get tricky during maneuvers. Not to mention the war.
It’s like in the joke about firefighters, when one of them talks about the service:
Of course, I am not saying that officers who had made a good career in peacetime suddenly turned out to be professionally incompetent on the battlefield, but it is obvious that not all of them could effectively lead troops, especially when the enemy’s actions went beyond what was expected (a striking example: offensive Wehrmacht operations in 1939–1940, which almost stupefied the Polish and French command, which thought in terms of the First World War).
It's all character's fault
Here the question naturally arises: why have proactive, competent officers capable of taking responsibility in battle not always made and are making a successful career in the peacetime army?
Part of the answer is contained in another episode from Denikin’s biography, described by himself and associated with his non-assignment to the General Staff after graduating from the Nikolaev Academy (Anton Ivanovich was included later).
It was just at the graduation reception:
- Well, how do you think about getting a job?
- Don't know. I await Your Imperial Majesty's decision.
The Emperor turned half a turn and looked questioningly at the Minister of War. General Kuropatkin bent low and reported:
– This officer, Your Imperial Majesty, is not included in the General Staff for his character.
The Emperor turned to me again, nervously tugged at his aiguillette and asked two more questions: how long have I been in the service and where is my brigade located. He nodded affably and moved on...
For character... Here is the answer to the question: why the careers of proactive and competent officers often stalled and are stalling.
When I put the quote, re-reading Denikin’s memoirs for the umpteenth time, I suddenly remembered the good Soviet action film “Retaliation” that I had seen in my youth. And superbly played by Vadim Spiridonov, the marine captain Shvets, who did not get along with his superiors.
Captain Shvets from the film "Retaliation"
And as a result, in his own words: “the eternal captain.” Also for character. Although his company is the best in navy. But in war conditions, the captain might have been promoted quickly. And how many, thanks to such “eternal captains” in peacetime, conscript soldiers returned home alive from Afghanistan after two Chechen campaigns. And how many seemingly impossible combat missions were completed by them, and with minimal losses.
Yes, and Denikin: he went to the Russian-Japanese as a captain, returned as a colonel, leaving behind the memory of a hill named after him. He met the First World War as a brigade commander, ended up as a corps commander, and was very famous and respected among officers, which was recognized even by his opponent and successor as commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, Lieutenant General Baron P. N. Wrangel, also talented and ready to take on responsibility of a military leader who met the First World War as a squadron commander, and in 1917 as a corps commander.
Denikin achieved respect and recognition without any patronage. Only personal labor, courage, literacy in battle and a willingness to take responsibility.
Who made a career?
And if it weren’t for these two wars, Anton Ivanovich would have faced routine service and, quite possibly, a rank no higher than lieutenant colonel.
Or let’s imagine, if Russia had not waged war in the second half of the 1th century, how the career of A.V. Suvorov or F.F. Ushakov would have developed? In the best case, the first would become a colonel, and the second would become a captain of the XNUMXst rank.
But who, in fact, often made a career in the army, pushing aside people like Denikin, Tushin or Shvets?
В stories Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin remained a controversial figure, but his undoubted merit is the brilliantly described life of the Imperial Army at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.
On the one hand, executive, but lacking in initiative, officers who were convenient to their superiors in peacetime were often promoted.
However, there was another type, described not without malice by Anton Ivanovich:
– Start with the sides at exactly 12 o'clock.
It seemed to me that at that hour there was no turning point. Started to get confused. No matter how I approached the events, the moment did not satisfy Baskakov, and he repeated irritably:
- Exactly at 12 o'clock.
Finally, looking, as always, dispassionately contemptuously, somehow above his interlocutor, he said:
“Perhaps you need to think about it for another hour?”
- Completely unnecessary, Mr. Colonel.
At the end of the exam, the commission deliberated for a very long time. Longing... Finally, Geisman comes out with a list, reads the marks and finally says:
- In addition, the commission had a judgment regarding lieutenants Ivanov and Denikin and decided to add half a point to both. Thus, Lieutenant Ivanov was given 7, and Lieutenant Denikin 6½.
Assessing knowledge is a matter of professorial conscience, but such an “increase” was only an evil mockery: at least 7 points were required to transfer to the second year. I blushed and reported:
– I humbly thank the commission for its generosity.
Failure. They did not leave for the second year at the Academy and, therefore, were subject to expulsion.
I'll get ahead of myself.
A few years later I got my revenge. The war with Japan... 1905... The beginning of the Battle of Mukden... General Mishchenko is being treated for wounds, and General Grekov was sent to temporarily command his Cavalry detachment and with him as chief of staff - professor, Colonel Baskakov... I was there at that time time as chief of staff of one of Mishchenko’s divisions. We have already fought a little and gained some experience. Baskakov is new to combat and, apparently, is lost. He comes to my observation post and asks:
– What do you think this Japanese movement means?
– It is clear that this is the beginning of a general offensive and coverage of the right flank of our armies.
– I completely agree with you.
Baskakov came three or four more times to inquire “what I think,” until he came under heavy machine-gun fire, after which his visits stopped.
I must confess to human weakness: these meetings gave me satisfaction, as retribution for Wagram’s “12th hour” and for the half-point increase...
There have always been and are enough of such Baskakovs not only in the academy, but also in combat positions. Dry and arrogant clerks in peacetime, often insolvent in wartime.
By the way, Baskakov was not such an unknown figure.
Military historians A.V. Ganin and V.G. Semenov write the following about him:
He was a typical officer in his own way - his career was quite typical for many staff officers of the early twentieth century, who, being strict theorists of military affairs, had little knowledge of the real state of affairs in the army.
Baskakov served mainly in the headquarters of the I Army Corps and the Kyiv Military District. In 1892–1895 was in the reserve, and then taught at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, where he taught a course on the history of the Napoleonic Wars.
By the way, it was precisely because of Baskakov’s failure at the exam that the future leader of the White movement, and then still artillery Lieutenant A. I. Denikin (in the same year he re-entered the academy and later successfully graduated from it).
Denikin in his memoirs described his meeting with Baskakov near Mukden. Let us note that we are talking about the events of 1905, when Baskakov had already been in the positions of chief of staff of the Orenburg Cossack division and chief of staff of the cavalry detachment of General Grekov for over eight months and had at least seven months of experience in participating in hostilities.
It is difficult to say how important it is for a staff officer to bravely stand under enemy fire, but if Denikin is to be believed, it turns out that even in 1905 Baskakov understood little about the theater of war, and in this case it is difficult to imagine how he reached those described in this episode of events led the headquarters of the Orenburg Cossack division.
As for Baskakov’s character and his personal characteristics, he was considered “a great debater... [who] presented his “teachings” slowly and at length and not without a polemical “challenge.”
In addition, while teaching at the academy, he was extremely partial to his students and could not stand independent and self-confident officers. That is, in addition to a certain incompetence, we can say that Grekov’s chief of staff also had a difficult, proud character and probably prevented his subordinates from showing initiative.
We also add that soon after the war Baskakov submitted his resignation due to health reasons, which sharply worsened in Manchuria in 1904, and already on March 7, 1906 he retired.
And, probably, he prevented his subordinates from showing initiative...
Unlike Baskakov, after the war this type of officer continued to make a good career, which I mentioned above and what Kuropatkin wrote about when he noted their return back to the units after the Portsmouth Peace and the pushing back of their comrades who had advanced to the battlefields.
It’s not surprising: the former know how to build a career and adapt to circumstances, the latter know how to fight.
Actually, this is partly the reason why an army that has not fought for a long time often suffers defeats at the beginning of a campaign. And it’s good if in its ranks there are enough people like Denikin, Tushin, Shvets.
In conclusion: of course, in the army there have always been, are and will be competent, enterprising officers whose careers are developing well (and it happens that competent and talented ones like Tushin do not work out both in wartime) and in peacetime.
The main thing is that their percentage ensures the country’s defense capability and a high level of combat readiness of its armed forces. And in 1905 they lost in many ways due to the fact that there were clearly not enough people like Denikin, and there was an overabundance of the Cossack colonels he described.
Next time we’ll talk about the command staff at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries. There were plenty of problems there too.
Использованная литература:
Denikin A.I. “The path of the Russian officer.” M.: Prometheus. 1990.
Ganin A.V., Semenov V.G. “Officer Corps of the Orenburg Cossack Army (1891–1945).” Biographical reference book. M.: Library-Fund “Russian Abroad”. 2007.
Kuropatkin A. N. “Notes on the Russo-Japanese War.” M.: Veche. 2020.
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