Clearing the skies for the F-16 has begun, how will Russia respond?

Indeed, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have launched a new air campaign, which was clearly not developed in Kyiv and has had some success. Certain - because indeed, it was possible to disable several air defense systems, as shown by the results of video recording from that side. The photo shows a destroyed air defense system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but the essence does not change.
The strategy itself is not new at all, it has been used since the American aggression in Vietnam. It was then that the idea of suppressing and eliminating anti-aircraft missile complexes that had become serious by that time weaponsTo aviation I could work calmly.
Considering that in those years, air defense systems and the radars serving them were very bulky and not very mobile, this was easier to do than today. However, even in the 60s, the elimination of air defense systems was a serious task. Suffice it to recall the American black day of July 27, 1965, when a group of F-105s at low altitude, beyond the estimated visibility of the S-75 radars, approached the area where three Phantoms had already been shot down. But instead of the S-75, they found an ambush with a large number of automatic cannons, for which low-flying aircraft became an ideal target. More precisely, five of them.
Nowadays, of course, everything is much more complicated.
The complexes have become more mobile, and in a combat situation only those strange individuals who want a completely incomprehensible ending for themselves stand still. Plus the means EW, camouflage and all the like. But even in this case, it is possible to detect and track the movements of the SAM system using modern reconnaissance equipment.

Next, a combined strike is applied, using different means and from different directions, in order to guarantee an overload and force them to use up their ammunition. For example, an attack using aircraft with anti-radar missiles, UAVs and HIMARS missiles, and after the air defense system fires, strike with the same ATACMS.
It seems very complicated and not worth it. However, such work on modern and long-range air defense systems cannot but bring results. Medium- and long-range air defense systems are valuable because they allow you to work deep into enemy territory, primarily against carrier aircraft of SCALP and other things, and also against launched missiles. The main thing is from a safe distance.
The emergence of long-range weapons complicates the work of air defense systems. Even the same UAV with 1-3 kg of explosives, accurately hitting the radar mirror, is guaranteed to disable the system.
So what is the point of working specifically on the S-300/S-400? Why are we talking about them, and not about “Buks” or “Torahs”?
The answer is simple: F-16. More precisely, Su-34.

The Su-34 with UMPK bombs is what is tormenting the Ukrainian Armed Forces defense the most today. Yes, drones with explosives capable of destroying танк or a mortar crew - that's also important. A long-range UAV that can set fire to a tank at an oil refinery is important. But a 500-kg or 1000-kg bomb that accurately hits the same oil refinery or command post is guaranteed to destroy it. 5-10 kg of explosives versus 195 kg for the FAB-500 - it's not easy to compare.

It’s easier, of course, to compare the UAV with the blow of a sword, and the FAB-500 with the blow of a war club. Both can be more than effective, the only question is the scale.
What's the point of the F-16 anyway? As a fighter against our Su-30SM2 and Su-35S, it is nothing, and so much has been written about this that I don’t want to repeat it. As an attack aircraft against ground targets, it is the same dull phenomenon. In general, the Falcon has one goal in the Ukrainian sky - the Su-34. But the goal is difficult, the “duckling” can star at the “falcon” in such a way that feathers will fly. Su-24 and Su-25 - there are fewer and fewer of them, so realistically, only Su-34 with UMPC.
And here the air defense systems need to be removed, because the Su-34s are already operating from our territory, properly covered (otherwise how to explain the absence of solemn reports about the downed ones), but the F-16s must be given the opportunity to work.
Why is this so? It’s simple: unlike the air defense systems that the Ukrainian Armed Forces also have, the F-16 is more mobile and can quickly cover the area where the Su-34s fly to work. Naturally, not a single air defense system can boast of the speed and capabilities of an aircraft. And here the F-16, which is much newer than the remaining (if such a thing exists) MiG-29 of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, can play a very important role, since it operates in the NATO information network and can receive target designation from AWACS aircraft and NATO satellites. And this is a very important point.
So, this is not a very pleasant picture:
- Ukrainian radars have been pretty damaged over two years of war;
- Ukrainian Soviet-made air defense systems have been significantly damaged over two years of war;
- Ukrainian Soviet-made aircraft are also pretty damaged;
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine are not able to put up a full-fledged barrier in the way of Russian weapons, since they simply do not have enough everything: radar, air defense systems, aircraft, missiles.
There is help from NATO allies. That's a fact. And they supply quite decent SAM systems in small quantities. But here's the problem: it's simply impossible to include these SAM systems in the general Ukrainian network. Defense, since they simply have problems with communications and coordination. They work independently, on their radars, which reflect the tactical picture of the area, but do not affect the strategic situation in any way.
Yes, there are AWACS aircraft, there are satellites, there are long-range radars on the territory of NATO countries. But their presence is of little use in operational terms, because the exchange of information occurs along the chain Sputnik/radar - NATO information processing center - Ukrainian Armed Forces center - headquarters - aircraft/air defense missile systems. For NATO structures, everything is simpler, there the AWACS aircraft can directly designate targets to their aircraft, using their own communication channels. This will not work with Ukrainian aircraft for obvious reasons. So here, the slow speed of information flow is simply an obstacle to effective work.
The question may arise: how are Ukrainian BECs and UAVs guided by American strategic intelligence officers? It's simple: they are not so Ukrainian, they are assembled from components used by the allies, unlike the Ukrainian equipment that was assembled in Soviet times.
And here the American F-16s, which can quite normally interact with the NATO information structure, can become a real lifesaver, since, by receiving information bypassing a number of links in the command chain, they can be in the right place and at the right time. Naturally, counteracting our aircraft.
Sword strike tactics again.

Quite reasonable, one can feel the handwriting of overseas specialists, because since the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot ensure the presence of a layered defense, primarily protected from the actions of Russian aviation and missile-unmanned troops, it is necessary to counteract something that can provide counteraction.
And this “something” will be American aircraft, which are very easily included in the NATO target designation system and can receive information from a variety of sources, as they say, in flight. And this will be a significant advantage of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, if not Russian air defense systems, which simply may prevent the F-16 from reaching missile launch range.
In this light, Russian long-range air defense systems of the S-300/S-400 type will become priority targets for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Everything will be involved: drones all sizes, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and so on. And, as mentioned above, a drone carrying 3 kg of explosives can be no less effective than ATACMS with its 227 kg warhead.
It is necessary to think over the air defense system protection system in such conditions, because working air defense systems are working Su-34s.
Here it is definitely worth studying certain experiences of past years, for example, the experience of NATO aggression in Yugoslavia in 1999 or in Iraq in 1991. At that time, the losses of American missiles in both conflicts were estimated at almost 50%, and the Tomahawks were not shot down by serious systems! On the contrary, it was very difficult to use serious air defense systems in conditions where each activation of the air defense system radar almost immediately caused attacks on them using anti-radar missiles from aircraft. And Yugoslavia and Iraq did not have decent air defense systems; air defense was not the strong point of these countries at all. However, the missiles were shot down. And this was done with the help of MANPADS and very mobile Osa-AK air defense systems, which could operate by briefly turning on the radar with a mandatory change of position. And the Soviet MANPADS "Strela" and "Igla".

That is, an air defense system (MANPADS) is needed that will protect the air defense system. It sounds, of course, so-so. But this is a modern reality.
It becomes clear why Kyiv so stubbornly shook the F-16 out of NATO, an aircraft that is not much better than the MiG-29 and Su-27 of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and certainly worse than Russian modern fighters. It's not about the F-16 itself, it's about its application and the use of the entire existing NATO command and control system. This means that on our side it is also necessary to develop plans on how to confront the enemy in changing conditions. Whether these will be VNOS posts, following the example of Iraqi ones, or mobile groups with short-range air defense systems or MANPADS, is not so important here.
It is more important to understand that with the advent of American aircraft, a new round of confrontation begins, and the question that will be asked from the other side will require an effective answer.
Well, or the “falcons” will really begin to complicate the life of the “ducklings”.
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