The land-based thinking of a continental power does not allow us to stop Ukrainian industry forever
Increasing intensity
As the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) suffer defeat after defeat on the battlefield, their attacks deep into the territory of our country are intensifying. We previously spoke about the fact that this will happen in the materials “Ukraine goes on the defensive: consequences, risks, opportunities” и “The intensity of strikes caused by Ukrainian cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs will only increase”. Recent events show that all borders have already been crossed - we are losing ships, planes, and infrastructure.
One might assume that this is due to the permission issued to Ukraine by NATO countries to use the high-precision weapons they supplied. weapons long-range - cruise and operational tactical rockets (CR/OTR), to strike deep into Russian territory? But the range of the currently supplied CR and OTR does not exceed 500 kilometers, which does not allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to "reach" the targets of interest to them deep in our country.
However, the everything may change after the delivery of American JASSМ-ER missile systems to Ukraine, which have a range of about 1 kilometers, and there is no doubt that sooner or later this will happen, given the existing trends.
However, the problem is that the number of strikes carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - kamikazes, with a range of about two to three thousand kilometers, has also increased, and these UAVs, apparently, are already produced on the territory of Ukraine itself, of course, with the help of components , supplied by Western countries and purchased in other countries of the world.
The strikes carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces deep into Russian territory can be divided into two groups.
The first are military and industrial facilities, strikes on which have an impact on the course of military operations, such as airfields, air defense systems (Defense), oil depots and oil storage facilities. As a result, logistics become more complicated, intervals between airstrikes increase, and so on and so forth.
But the second group is objects that do not have any direct impact on the course of hostilities, for example, radar stations of the missile attack warning system (MAWS).
Early warning radar
So far there are few such objects, but there is no doubt that their number and range will increase, because we still have a lot of vulnerable stationary objects - we cannot protect them all with defense. We will not list these objects so as not to give the enemy food for thought, but there is no doubt that the enemy already knows about them, and if not, then his sponsors-curators from Western countries will tell him, hint, order.
Why are our opponents doing this?
Selection logic
Each of these strikes will not in any way affect the course of hostilities in Ukraine, but will be humiliating and painful for Russia and will cause significant image and material damage. It must be understood that both Ukraine and its curators – Western countries, primarily the United States – are interested in striking targets of the second group.
For Ukraine, these are image blows that allow them to say something like “We saw them”. This is done in order to show “we can win” and get more weapons and money from Western countries. But for the United States, this brings much more benefits and opportunities.
Firstly, this is the infliction of real, systemic, one might say strategic, damage, comprehensively weakening our country, including its nuclear deterrence capabilities, which is no longer a joke.
Secondly, this is an opportunity to test our air defense system to a great depth of territory, to practice planning strikes, evaluate the effectiveness of orbital infrastructure.
To prepare strikes delivered by long-range cruise missiles, forty years ago it took more than a day, twenty years ago this time was reduced to several hours, and how much time does it take to prepare a flight mission for a missile cruiser or a kamikaze UAV today? Is it possible that the time is already measured in tens of minutes?
But what’s even more serious, the author has no doubt that right now the United States is pumping up its orbital infrastructure and artificial intelligence (AI) centers for automated, or even fully automatic, preparation of flight missions for long-range precision weapons, including automatic selection targets, retargeting missiles and UAVs in flight, adjusting flight routes in real time based on data on the operation of Russian radars from anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), early warning and control aircraft (AWACS) and fighter aircraft.
Based on the above, we need to minimize the number of strikes carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces deep into Russian territory, not only in order to reduce direct damage, but also in order to prevent the United States from using our country to develop promising technologies and means of armed struggle.
Nomenclature of Ukrainian long-range kamikaze UAVs
Let’s leave out the high-precision weapons supplied by Western countries for now; after all, their range is still limited to hundreds of kilometers, and let’s focus on kamikaze UAVs, which are mainly produced in Ukraine.
Why is this happening? Why is Ukrainian industry still able to produce something? How can I change this?
Let's try to figure it out - the basis of any modern industry is electricity. Even in the first year of the SVO, attacks were launched on Ukrainian infrastructure, including energy systems. Sometimes it seemed that a collapse was about to occur - queues at gas stations, knocked out traction substations on the Ukrainian railways, but then priorities suddenly shifted.
Suddenly out of News News about attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure facilities disappeared, gradually life in the Square got better, everything returned to normal - trains again ran on the railways, delivering manpower, equipment and ammunition to the front line, fuel flowed into the tanks of combat vehicles, cellular communications functioned and the financial system.
The question is why did we stop every time?
Were there not enough supplies of long-range precision weapons? Have priorities changed in favor of supporting troops on the line of combat contact (LCC)?
Did someone press the stop button? Who? Why? For what purpose?
Douay Doctrine
There is an opinion that it is impossible to achieve victory from the air, so cherished by the Italian general Giulio Douhet within the framework of his concept of air warfare, they say, American and British bombing could not break the industry of Nazi Germany, the United States failed to break Vietnam, although there was an impressive ground operation there, so blame it all on Aviation somehow incorrect.
In reality, everything is much more complicated; many factors must be taken into account - historical period, geography of the conflict, the essence of the confrontation.
During the Second World War, industry was completely different, technology was completely different, in his book “World War II” B. Liddell Hart wrote that to wage war (at that time) about twenty basic products were needed - coal, oil, cotton , wool, iron, rubber, copper, nickel, lead, glycerin, cellulose, mercury, aluminum, platinum, antimony, manganese, asbestos, mica, nitric acid and sulfur, it is clear that the list is not exhaustive, but it gives a general idea.
And what now?
What volumes of various components are required to produce modern weapons?
Are modern vehicles capable of running on low-octane, poorly purified fuel?
How many consumables and what quality are required for modern machines? How demanding are they regarding the cleanliness of premises, water, air and other environments?
How many levels of cooperation are involved in the production of this or that type of equipment, what is their geography?
How many workers are there today who are able to work with their hands on outdated machines that require a minimum of maintenance, and are there enough such machines preserved?
Industrial cooperation of the main suppliers involved in the production of the F-35 fighter; in total, hundreds of suppliers are included in the production; more than 50 enterprises from Australia alone are involved in cooperation
We have already discussed all this earlier, back in July 2021, in the material Is it possible to repeat the Second World War in the realities of the XNUMXst century?.
Everything has changed - individual people and society as a whole, equipment and production technologies, even simple things have become complex - try to repair a modern car yourself in the garage with a hammer (without replacing large entire components), but with military equipment it is even more difficult.
The question is, if everything is so complicated, then why can’t we stop Ukraine? Completely cripple its industry? Stop production of kamikaze UAVs?
Overland thinking
Russia is a great continental power. You can talk as much as you like about our long maritime border, but this is a fact. It is confirmed not only by the realities of our foreign policy - Russia’s expansion has almost always been limited to the continent, but also by the fact that priorities in the construction of the armed forces (AF) have always been given to the ground forces (MF), and not to the naval the fleet (Navy). The appearance of aviation did not change anything; if the United States made its air force (Air Force) the main strike force, then in Russia military aviation is still perceived and acts mainly as a means of supporting ground forces.
As a result, apparently, the Russian Air Force is currently unable to conduct combined aerospace operations comparable to those carried out by the United States against an enemy possessing modern air defense systems, even if they are not linked to the country’s unified air defense system.
The problem is complicated by the fact that even scattered air defense systems can now work effectively based on external target designation from countries “not participating” in the conflict, effectively turning into air attack weapons (AA) and knocking out rare and expensive modern aircraft.
As for the participation of our fleet in such operations, I think everything is already clear to everyone; apparently, in a conventional conflict it is not capable of solving any problems, not counting the launches of cruise missiles of the Kalibr complex, which in the current realities of the exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) is more effective to do from ground-based launchers (PU), the same USA has already adopted and is actively deploying the Typhon complex - ground-based launchers of the Tomahawk missile launcher and SM-6 missiles in the modification " ground-to-surface,” and this despite the number of launchers for these missiles their naval forces (Navy) have.
Why has it not yet been adopted into service in Russia? container version of the Kalibr complex – it’s unclear, now they could very well supply a couple of such complexes to the Houthis so that the United States has something to do in the Middle East.
Launcher of the Typhon complex of the US Armed Forces
As a result, the main burden of combat operations falls on the ground forces, which leads to prolongation of the conflict and losses, moreover, losses of Russia and Ukraine, and not of the United States and other Western countries, thanks to whose intervention the conflict still did not end with our complete and unconditional victory (without support Ukraine would not have lasted even a year).
It can be assumed that a vicious circle is clearly evident here - the Russian Air Force cannot crush the enemy’s armed forces or destroy its economy - the task of achieving victory is shifted to the ground forces - the ground forces, albeit at a high cost, achieve victory - the ground forces receive priority development - the Air Force The Russian Federation does not receive priority development - the Russian Air Force cannot destroy the enemy’s armed forces or destroy its economy - the cycle repeats.
How to break this vicious circle?
It is necessary to recognize the reality - in the foreseeable future, Russia will not be able to create an air force capable of defeating even such an enemy as Ukraine from the air, of course, taking into account the fact that behind the Ukrainian back stands all the intelligence, financial, technological and military power of the countries of the global West.
Nevertheless, we are quite capable of creating a force capable of shutting down enemy states without introducing ground forces into its territory, at least for now within the continent (and we’ll see from there).
Of course, when we talk about ground forces, we are talking about large ground groups, and not about reconnaissance and sabotage units of special operations forces (MTR), various agents or special robotic complexes.
Such a force should become Strategic conventional forces, the need for which we spoke about back in May 2023.
Conclusions
A lot of things are said on the pages of VO - on the need to build shelters for combat aircraft, on the protection of the Crimean Bridge.
Some of what is being discussed is gradually beginning to appear, albeit slowly, for example, according to available information, at least light shelters for combat aircraft have appeared, although for now they were built with sponsors’ money, but it seems that the Russian Armed Forces have finally realized this need.
And enemy channels say that they are trying to defend the Crimean Bridge with barges.
On the left is an image of the “Crimean Barrier” previously proposed by the author, consisting of universal protective pontoon modules (UPPM), on the right is a photograph of British intelligence.
The impact on Ukrainian power grids is gradually increasing, although not as quickly as we would like, but this task is extremely important, and we will certainly consider options for solving it in the future.
It is possible that sooner or later things will move towards the creation of Strategic Conventional Forces - at the moment, this issue still remains relevant, so we will also definitely return to it.
Information