About towed artillery
It is customary to criticize towed artillery. The combat/travel conversion time is too long, automation is low, etc. Nevertheless, almost all armies in the world, with a few exceptions, do not completely abandon it in favor of self-propelled. They are in service in series of varying numbers, but they are released, infrequently, but new models of towed guns are being adopted. And it’s apparently not just a matter of lower cost.
To figure out whether towed guns are really needed, and perhaps necessary, we will simulate several real service and combat situations in which artillery is involved as an integral part of the armed forces.
For simplicity, we will compare towed and self-propelled howitzer systems of the ground forces without considering the mortars and artillery of the paratroopers and marines. I would like to make a reservation right away that I consider self-propelled and towed systems not as competitors, but as complementary types of artillery.
To start.
Moving
Mobilization of personnel and commissioning of equipment from long-term storage. The gun commander and gunner, who served on towed howitzers (BG), no matter what model, 5, 10, 20 years ago, being called up from the reserve, will restore their skills in a week or two of real combat training. Numbers for the BG can be prepared from conscripts who are not related to artillery quickly enough. An intelligent civilian driver will learn to put a panorama “on a peg” with a KamAZ or Ural, not counting other operations, within a period of days or weeks.
Of course, conscripts will acquire the skills to operate towed artillery much faster than self-propelled artillery.
A properly preserved complete BG is put into operation by the unit's l/s and technical services within tens of hours. At the same time, putting a self-propelled gun removed from storage in order will require qualified personnel; in the conditions of a repair enterprise, the repair period is far from days.
Division 2A65 in storage in the park. Photo from the author’s personal archive
In the spring of 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed several 2C19 early releases on the territory of the now Russian Kherson region adjacent to Crimea. It did not reach combat use then, but losses of self-propelled guns were recorded with the complete burnout of at least one unit. The incidents occurred as a result of errors in the operation of hastily introduced complex equipment by unprepared soldiers, and it was not a matter of belonging to a specific army. Increased attention, and therefore energy and time, for the operation of more complex equipment must be spent in any army in the world.
All this testifies to the mobilization value of towed artillery.
Next episode.
The artillery unit has been mobilized, combat coordination and other necessary measures have been carried out. Some of them move into the database area, for example, near Orekhov, Zaporozhye region - the example was chosen arbitrarily for clarity. To the railway station - conditionally: Millerovo or Feodosia, some arrived on platforms and in wagons. Next - about 200-300 km along roads.
To transport tracked self-propelled guns, specialized tractors with increased carrying capacity will be required; after unloading, the towed guns will be attached to their own tractors - and off they go; vehicle platforms will only be needed for SOB and reconnaissance MTLBs, if the SOB, radar and sound vehicle is not on wheels. Transporting self-propelled guns on tank carriers requires more time, fuel, and people.
The main dangers on the march are an attack by the DRG, aviation the enemy - unmanned or manned, as well as their own technical malfunctions.
Where will the enemy gunner aim when attacking vehicles on the march?
It is unlikely to be the thin silhouette of a towed howitzer. The defeat of a self-propelled gun on a platform or a tank tractor will in any case lead to the absence of a gun at the front at the right time, at least for a while. Defeat or failure due to a malfunction of the BG tractor is solved by replacing it with almost any army truck.
Thus, towed artillery has advantages in terms of movement in the operational and operational-tactical zones.
Further. Movements in the tactical zone and combat work itself.
Here, the advantages of BGs over wheeled and tracked self-propelled guns are sharply reduced, although not so catastrophically. Obviously, wheeled vehicles will move better on roads, and tracked self-propelled guns will move better off-road, but “a truck with a howitzer on a trailer stuck in the mud can be pushed out with the help of, if not a crew, then certainly a fire platoon(s). It will not be possible to rescue a tracked self-propelled gun in a similar situation without the use of additional tractors.
2A65 on wheels on tactics. Photo from the author’s personal archive
Placement at a firing position
Undoubtedly, the transfer from the traveling position to the combat position and back for towed systems requires a lot of calculation effort (“soldier, be vigilant, you were not given boots in order to drop the 2A36 base plate on them!”), and a little more time is spent on the transfer. However, the coherence of the crew’s work is “achieved through exercise,” and the selection and placement on the fire requires effort, time and attention from the crews of all systems - both towed and self-propelled. However, as in any situation and always.
OP topographic reference.
With timely and correct operation of artillery reconnaissance, the gun, platoon, and battery occupy positions that have been verified in engineering terms and plotted on a map (tablet) indicating the main direction, turning points, safe angles, etc. There are no particular differences in the operation of BGs and self-propelled guns here, as The orientation of the HE, the turnaround, and the construction of the fan for the BG and self-propelled guns are no different.
Of course, modern modifications of self-propelled guns with automation of all guidance processes from satellite positioning to the start of shooting according to the calculated ones with subsequent adjustments have undeniable advantages in speed, accuracy and ease of operation over previous generations of combat vehicles and self-propelled guns. Electronics, especially reliable ones, are very functional and convenient, but at the same time I remember the words of my OMS teacher, Ivan Ivanovich E. - “a bullet will hit your expensive unit, and you will be left in an open field with binoculars and a map, if you don’t lose it” . By the term “bullet”, the competent and ironic E. meant all kinds of damage and malfunctions of the material part.
In addition, it is quite possible to equip existing and future BGs with electronic units, to the extent possible and necessary, following the example of the same “axes”.
We got attached, calculated the data, zeroed in.
“Stop... Target... Shell... Fuse... Charge... Sight... Level... Turnover... Fire... Gun... Shot... Undershot 200... Move the gun 200 m forward...”
Zeroing and adjustment are identical for towed and self-propelled systems, regardless of whether signs of explosions are observed in the compass, binoculars, or camera drone or deviations are measured by a rangefinder (optical, quantum), radar or acoustics.
Directly BR in position
Inside the self-propelled gun (with the crew located in the turret and hull), rain, snow and wind do not hit the back of the head, there is light and heating, communications and mechanization (not always) of the main processes. At the same time, in the armored space there is noise, clanging, smoke, and limited possibilities for observing the outside, especially the airspace. And the tracked turret self-propelled guns themselves, of which we and everyone else have the majority, are, in fact, a movable metal structure with a high density of highly dangerous mechanisms, flammable and explosive substances.
If modern weapons get into the self-propelled guns with, we repeat, limited observation capabilities, it will, at best, lead to the need for restoration in a specialized repair organization.
The crew of a towed gun works in the fresh air with all the advantages and disadvantages of such work; one of the main advantages in modern conditions is the ability to continuously monitor the environment, and if an enemy drone, projectile, or mine is detected by ear, visually or technically, the crew has the opportunity to take cover in a timely manner from defeat.
A direct analogy arises with the placement of infantry on armor “on horseback” - in movement everyone is watching, in a dangerous situation - scattered, and then actions according to necessity and circumstances.
When placed in a firing position, especially a stationary one, a towed gun is much easier to camouflage; shells and charges are dispersed at safe distances, ideally in covered trenches, which contributes to better stability of the gun and crew.
Even in “pre-unmanned” times, it was practiced to “remove” 1–2 numbers from the BG crews for observation and protection of the perimeter of the firing position. Now this opportunity has acquired even greater value.
The gun parts, charges, and shells, including adjustable and active-reactive ones, are the same for self-propelled and towed howitzer versions. The firing range is the same, the rate of fire is comparable. The undeniable value of self-propelled guns, especially modern ones, is the best time dynamics when implementing a “hit-and-run” fire attack and the ability to use the “barrage of fire” mode. This is still a promising opportunity for us. All other fire capabilities for BGs and self-propelled guns are the same.
Counter-battery fight
CBB is a separate broad topic, but, in short, it is primarily reconnaissance, target designation, competent placement of firing positions with cover by both artillery and other fire weapons. And the maximum firing range of artillery systems - both towed and self-propelled, or a few “extra” minutes in the combat/traveling position, are, of course, important, but can and should be compensated by the correct organization of combat work.
Let us note in parentheses that firing at full charge at maximum range means the greatest wear on the barrel and gun mechanisms, increased loads on carriages and chassis, increased dispersion of projectiles and a corresponding decrease in accuracy. It's like a car's speedometer may say maximum speed, but how often is the car driven at it?
Combat stability, maintenance and maintainability
A direct or close hit from enemy large-caliber ammunition will result in the failure of any weapon. Weapons of lower power also do not increase the combat effectiveness of either the crew or the materiel. Considered an indisputable advantage 10–20 or more years ago, the bulletproof and anti-fragmentation armor protection of self-propelled guns with modern means of destruction - primarily loitering ammunition of all types - requires strengthening and addition.
And in the case of self-propelled guns, on the one hand, it is important that the reinforcements have something to attach to and the additions have something to power with energy, but, on the other hand, such reinforcements increase the already considerable mass and dimensions of the installation, making camouflage more difficult to one degree or another limit the functionality of the howitzer, and in an emergency increase the time to leave the combat vehicle.
Perhaps the open layout of modern self-propelled guns on a car chassis is one way out.
If a towed gun is hit by the same FPVdrone or in a swarm, the crew at least has the opportunity to timely detect the approaching ammunition and hide from destruction, and a hit by a warhead in most cases will not lead to the formation of secondary damaging factors. BG is several tons of high-quality metal and a relatively small amount of rubber and machine oil.
The list of operations for daily and periodic maintenance is much shorter for the BG compared to any self-propelled guns. Medium, major and restoration repairs, as noted above, in terms of labor intensity and duration for towed systems also differ significantly for the better.
Conclusions
Summarizing the situational comparison of towed and self-propelled guns, we come to the conclusion that towed systems have an undeniable advantage during mobilization deployment, if it is necessary to build up an artillery group in a short time, especially in the operational and operational-tactical zones.
Towed systems are less susceptible to breakdowns and damage, easier to maintain, repair, and restore. With almost equal fire capabilities to self-propelled guns, the shortcomings of the BG can and should be compensated for by the correct organization of combat work. Although, of course, it was smooth on paper...
Of course, included tank, mechanized formations, it is most advisable to use self-propelled guns made on standardized tracked chassis, which has been confirmed by practice since the time of the SA. We haven’t seen tank breakthroughs in modern times, but no one has canceled them yet.
The place of the BG is, first of all, as part of artillery regiments and brigades, including the RVGK, which are quickly moved under their own power to the necessary sectors of the front. Also, the place of the BG is in motorized rifle regiments on wheeled vehicles.
In the spring of 2014, during the “Crimean Spring,” KamAZ trucks with a 2A65 on a trailer were the first to arrive near Dzhanka along the Feodosia highway.
Currently, several systems are in service and used in combat simultaneously - D-20, D-30, 2A65, 2A36, their corresponding self-propelled guns and several types of HE shells with charges, not counting systems of caliber 85, 100, 120 mm. Such a large number of systems had and still has its reasons, but we are not talking about them now. During the database bоMost of these systems will use up their resources and will need to be replaced.
One of the 2A35 variants. Photo by the author
According to information from open sources, our armed forces consider guns of two calibers – 120 and 152 mm – promising. Apparently, in the 152 mm caliber, a system created on the basis of 2A64/65, taking into account combat experience, will become promising for mass production. Perhaps the barrel length will be increased to 52 klb, both for self-propelled and towed versions.
Technologically, making a 47-club barrel or a 52-club barrel is practically the same thing. I assume that this has not been done yet due to the high dispersion of existing shells at ranges corresponding to 52 klb.
The high consumption of projectiles during combat maintenance will make it possible to launch the production of a promising HE projectile for a promising howitzer. Will it be unified with the 2S35 projectile? I assume not. Due to its design features, the 2S35 “Coalition” is unlikely to become widespread; most likely, it will be used by individual units to solve the most important tasks and CBB. A towed version of the Coalition will also not be created.
The question of creating a promising artillery system for the Airborne Forces and Marines remains open, but this is a topic for another discussion.
Information