September 1919: betrayal or a chain of mistakes? The mystery of General Selivachev
World War I: General Selivachev in the foreground
The hero of Denikin's story
The army commander sat in the cabin of his carriage, thoughtfully looking at the laid out map. The thick colored line of the general Soviet front - in the sector of his army - turned into a dotted line of an indefinite outline: it was impossible to determine the exact location of the division; and the blue arrows depicting the directions of the white columns - straight, sharp - seemed to break the web of the front, straighten the wedge that had descended to the south and pierced deep into the position of the red ones. One arrow drawn from the side, from the east, to the intersection of the railway line, was always ahead of the movement of the headquarters echelon. They're about to take over...
The operation was completely and hopelessly ruined.
The army commander folded the map, leaned back in his chair, and thought. “This time, perhaps, we won’t be able to get out safely...”
The operation was completely and hopelessly ruined.
The army commander folded the map, leaned back in his chair, and thought. “This time, perhaps, we won’t be able to get out safely...”
The above lines are from the short story “Confession”, written by Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin. Anton Ivanovich was a good prose writer, and by no means only a talented and brave military leader who proved himself on the fields of the Russian-Japanese, the First World War and in the initial period of the Civil War, when he saved the Volunteer Army from destruction after the death of the general L. G. Kornilov from infantry.
The hero of the above quotation, not called by name in the work: Lieutenant General V.I. Selivachev, in August 1919, headed one of the two strike groups (Denikin was mistaken in calling him an army commander) of the Southern Front, which included the 8th and 13th yu army.
The second, Special, consisting of the 9th and 10th armies, was commanded by Colonel V.I. Shorin. We talked about the unsuccessful attack on Tsaritsyn by the 10th in the previous article: "August 1919: Battle of the Walls of White Verdun".
The 8th Army was commanded by Colonel A.I. Rataisky. At the head of the 13th was Captain A.I. Hecker. Obviously, the army commander is not a captain’s position at all, but the true leadership of the troops was carried out by the chief of staff of Hecker, a famous military theorist and later the author of a substantive stories First World War, Infantry General A. M. Zayonchkovsky.
As we see, no painters from the plow, only military professionals, a significant part of whom had behind them the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. However, not all of them turned out to be up to par. The same Rataisky, according to the memoirs of G.I. Teodorovich Okulova, a member of the RVS of the 8th Army:
He was already an old man, probably very tired. During the reports that the operational unit workers gave him, he often fell asleep.
From prisoner to commander
But these words cannot be applied to Selivachev. In August he turned 52. Behind us: the experience of the First World War and the Russian-Japanese. 1917 Vladimir Ivanovich met the corps commander, supported Kornilov’s speech, was arrested, released, and finally drafted into the Red Army, then again arrested on charges of belonging to a secret anti-Bolshevik organization.
In some ways, the biography is typical for a career military man. So, in 1918, Zayonchkovsky was arrested a couple of times, and in 1919, the former commander-in-chief of the Red Army, Colonel I. I. Vatsetis.
That is, when recruiting military experts to serve, part of the Bolshevik leadership - I.V. Stalin, for example - treated them with distrust, as a class alien element, and suspected them of sympathy for the enemy, sometimes not without reason.
Article "Wrangel as a commander: the assault on Tsaritsyn" I mentioned the commander of the 9th Army, Colonel N.D. Vsevolodov, who went over to the side of the whites, which largely predetermined the fall of Red Verdun, in which a year earlier, on the orders of Stalin (he was engaged in food issues there, but also intervened in the military), Colonel A was arrested . L. Nosovich.
Later, at the insistence of the People's Commissar of Military Affairs L.D. Trotsky, he was released, but six months later Nosovich still fled to the whites and wrote memoirs, including about the future leader of the USSR.
Trotsky, who patronized Selivachev and, apparently, did not completely doubt his loyalty to the Soviet government
But in the case of Selivachev, two details are interesting.
First: he arrived on the Southern Front almost immediately after leaving prison, without having commanded anything in the Red Army for a day.
Second: his appointment immediately to such a high position took place thanks to the patronage of Trotsky and despite the doubts of V.I. Lenin (I had to read about the latter’s skeptical attitude towards military experts, but the memoirs of a major general are in the Soviet Army: lieutenant general - V.D. Bonch-Bruevich corrects this kind of ideas).
The Bolsheviks in this case can be understood: they can’t win without military experts, and they don’t have much trust. The commissars, of course, looked after the former gold chasers, but, as we have seen, not always successfully.
Selivachev was immediately entrusted with a powerful group with an important strategic task, even in conditions when he did not prove, unlike Shorin (as I mentioned in the previous article, he had a successful Izhevsk-Votkinsk operation), his loyalty to the Soviet government was a matter of fact.
I think the appointment of Vladimir Ivanovich was influenced by the general military-political situation in the mid-summer of 1919: in an effort to implement the “Moscow” directive, the Armed Forces of Southern Russia in July successfully attacked in the Kamyshin, Balashov, Kiev and, most importantly, Kharkov-Kursk directions.
Hostile whirlwinds were approaching the red capital. The mood in the Soviet leadership is evidenced by Lenin’s letter “Everyone to fight Denikin,” excerpts from which I cited in the previous material.
Wresting the initiative from the enemy has become a matter of life and death for the Kremlin. That’s why they remembered Selivachev. At that time, it was not the best thing for a seasoned military professional to pace a prison cell.
The command of the Southern Front placed impressive forces at Selivachev’s disposal: on August 15, 1919, the 13th Army had 26 bayonets, 672 sabers, 1 machine guns, 633 guns. The 490th Army had 94 bayonets, 8 sabers, 25 machine guns, 359 guns.
Opposing them on a front of 410 km, the combined forces of the Volunteer and Don armies numbered 18 bayonets, 100 sabers, with 12 guns and 300 machine guns.
The group’s task was to strike in the direction of Biryuch - Valuiki - Kupyansk. We recall from a previous conversation that Shorin’s goal was primarily Tsaritsyn and, looking at the map, we shrug our shoulders in bewilderment: both fists of the Southern Front fought in divergent directions, exposing the flanks of both groups to the attack of the enemy, who had superior cavalry, and depriving them of operational cooperation.
Reason: the prevalence of political considerations over the actual military ones. This was expressed in the desire of the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, Colonel S. S. Kamenev, to break through to Novocherkassk and the Donbass with two powerful blows, albeit in divergent directions, to return the coal so necessary for the Soviet government, and also to separate the Kuban and Don Cossacks.
And if the task of Shorin’s Special Group was to capture Tsaritsyn as an important transport artery, with the subsequent development of an offensive against both the Don capital and the Headquarters of the All-Soviet Socialist Republic - Taganrog, then Selivachev’s goal was a strike in the Kharkov direction, with the subsequent separation of volunteers and Don people.
Before moving on to the operation itself, I will cite the lines published in A. Ganin’s work dedicated to Vladimir Ivanovich from Trotsky’s message to his deputy E. M. Sklyansky via direct wire for transmission to the Central Committee, dated August 14:
I visited the 13th and 8th armies again. A huge amount of work has been done. The ready striking force of both armies consists of thirty thousand bayonets, two thousand sabres, excellently equipped artillery, armored trains, armored detachments. The mood of the units is completely offensive. In all circumstances, success in this direction is guaranteed. Success will immediately affect the Ukrainian front by halting Denikin's offensive, which will give the 14th Army the opportunity to use all the material and organizational elements given to it to transform into a combat-ready army. I am leaving for the left flank to get acquainted with the main strike group.
As we see, “Lion of the Revolution” trusted his protégé, who, by the way, not only headed the strike group, but also took the position of assistant to the crew.
Malicious intent or mistakes of higher command?
The group’s offensive began on August 15 with a strike at the junction of the Volunteer and Don armies, and at first it was successful.
On the left flank of the latter, the 3rd Separate Don Corps of Lieutenant General M. M. Ivanov operated. His command did not have information about the enemy’s offensive plans and had the task of advancing to Korotyak and Ostrogozhsk.
The first days of success were especially important for the Reds against the background of the raid of the corps of Lieutenant General K. K. Mamontov that began on August 10 and caused a commotion in the rear of the Southern Front. It was necessary to transfer the 8st Infantry Division from the 31th Army against him.
Selivachev himself suggested that the local authorities rely on local communists when defending against the Mammothites (in modern language, forming terrorist defense units), which gave Ganin reason to see in the military leader a person ready to conscientiously serve the Reds.
I share this point of view. Otherwise, Selivachev would have shown interest in weakening the strike fist at the junction of the two white armies. And no one would suspect him of treason.
At the headquarters of the volunteer army commander, Lieutenant General V.Z. May-Maevsky, they expected an enemy attack in the direction of Kharkov, but suddenly the 13th Army turned southwest - towards Belgorod.
General Denikin with his daughter Marina. In emigration, Anton Ivanovich fully revealed his talent as a writer
Here is how Denikin wrote about this in the work mentioned above:
Only fifty miles separated the victorious red regiments from the important southern center when the army commander, unexpectedly for his headquarters, turned the army to the west.
This maneuver was discussed at an evening meeting of the department heads and, although it somewhat surprised everyone with its direction, did not raise any objections from the military experts... Only Comrade Guly, a communist, the chief of supply - recently a foreman of the Shosten gunpowder factory - allowed himself, and quite sharply, to criticize the army commander's directive.
- I just can’t understand, Comrade Army Commander: why the hell, if I may say so, turn off the straight road when everything is going smoothly and our people are about to capture this very city...
This maneuver was discussed at an evening meeting of the department heads and, although it somewhat surprised everyone with its direction, did not raise any objections from the military experts... Only Comrade Guly, a communist, the chief of supply - recently a foreman of the Shosten gunpowder factory - allowed himself, and quite sharply, to criticize the army commander's directive.
- I just can’t understand, Comrade Army Commander: why the hell, if I may say so, turn off the straight road when everything is going smoothly and our people are about to capture this very city...
By an important southern center we must mean Kharkov. Further, Anton Ivanovich in his story carries the idea of the Red commander deliberately exposing the left flank, which was exposed to attack by the Don cavalry.
But Selivachev did not deliberately lead his armies to defeat, but carried out the order of the commander of the Southern Front, Major General V.N. Yegoryev, reacting to it as follows:
I am at a loss about the direction given by the directive, and asked for clarification, believing that there was an error, you answered me that this was not an error. Do not refuse to look at the map again and listen to me. The general direction, if I understand it correctly, remains to the Belgorod - Kupyansk line through Volchansk, and then, again, if I understand this correctly, to Kharkov. Thus, if the first half of my strike group, i.e., the 13th Army, heads for Belgorod - Volchansk, then the second half should head for Volchansk - Kupyansk.
Accordingly, my answer to the question in the subtitle: command error. In pursuance of the directive, Selivachev took Volchansk, Korocha and Valuiki. An undoubted success. But at the same time, reports began to arrive at the group headquarters about the concentration of large enemy forces on the left flank.
Plus, the Whites held important transport hubs Belgorod and Kharkov, which allowed Mai-Maevsky to quickly maneuver his troops.
It should be noted that, despite the beginning of the August offensive of the Southern Front, volunteers continued to advance in the Kursk direction, which could not but cause concern for Selivachev.
And yet he continues to advance, trying to fulfill Yegoryev’s directive. In the last days of August, his troops took Kupyansk, finding themselves 40 km (the patrols reached 19 km) from Belgorod and Kharkov.
Denikin reacted promptly, ordering the concentration of the 3rd Kuban Corps of Lieutenant General A.G. Shkuro north of Belgorod with the aim of striking in the direction of Novy Oskol - at the base of the wedge of the red group, the length of which along the Korocha-Biryuch line was 200 km.
From the opposite side, the attack was carried out by the equestrian group of Lieutenant General A.K. Guselshchikov, separated from the 3rd Separate Don Corps. However, Selivachev quite successfully counterattacked the latter in a number of areas.
Nevertheless, the general situation for the Red strike group after the attack on both of its flanks by the Kuban and Don cavalry was unfavorable. There could no longer be any talk of any occupation of Belgorod and Kharkov. I had to retreat.
However, the Whites also did not have the strength to arrange Cannes for the enemy due to the insufficient number of infantry.
On top of that, Yegoryev ordered Selivachev to defend Voronezh, which Mamontov’s corps was approaching.
But the most interesting thing: in the first days of September, when the Reds were already retreating, leaving Kupyansk, and in some parts of the strike group panic began to spread just yesterday, Trotsky continued to trust Selivachev, proposing to appoint him commander of the Southern Front instead of Yegoryev, and subordinate the group to Colonel A. I. Egorov - the future commander and subsequently Marshal of the Red Army.
Kamenev did not object, but expressed doubts about Yegorov’s ability to direct the actions of two armies, and even at the stage of retreat.
During a critical period of struggle for the group, Selivachev personally went to the headquarters of the 8th Army in order to take over its leadership. This is an important detail. For after the sudden death of Selivachev on September 17, almost the entire staff went over to the side of the whites.
Ganin writes the following about this:
Did a White Guard conspiracy really take place at the headquarters of the 8th Army? Was Selivachev involved in it? Could he have become his victim? Unfortunately, the documents known to us do not yet allow us to unambiguously answer these questions.
The historian also cites in his book the text of his note, which was not published in the complete collected works of Lenin, with the following content:
Sklyansky only personally and especially secretly (Lenin). Should I send the following telegram to Sokolnikov in a particularly secure code: Take personally all measures to closely monitor Selivachev’s political integrity. Report your observations and their results more often.
The lack of communication with Selivachev from September 8 until his death (after which it suddenly improved almost immediately) made the Bolshevik leadership very nervous. The same Trotsky tried to the last to find his protégé and, on September 12, expected to appoint him commander of the youth.
The situation for the Reds was aggravated by the above-mentioned transition, almost immediately after the death of Selivachev, to the Whites of the headquarters of the 8th Army, led by its chief, Colonel A.S. Nechvolodov.
Accordingly, there is reason to assume the presence of a White Guard conspiracy at the headquarters of the 8th. The only question that remains unanswered is: was Selivachev involved in it?
His diaries have now been published - intimate and not written for prying eyes, they testify to the honesty and high morality of the military leader.
Yes, there is reason to suspect him of a critical attitude towards the Bolshevik government, but it is unlikely that he will betray it. In any case, the defeat of Selivachev’s group was the result of the mistakes of Yegoriev and Kamenev (the offensive of both strike groups in diverging directions and without sufficient operational communication with each other), as well as the actions of Mamontov in the red rear, rather than, as Denikin believed, the conscious steps of Vladimir Ivanovich . He was not that kind of person.
It also remains a mystery: was Selivachev poisoned or died from natural causes (acute gastric intestinal disease, presumably cholera)?
No autopsy or exhumation of the corpse was carried out. The general was buried in the village of Kostomarovka. Alas, the grave has not survived. Just as over the years, the memory, carefully preserved only among people close to the general, has been erased.
However, I think that Vladimir Ivanovich will have better luck with the people's memory in modern Russia. He deserves it. Because - and here I will express my answer to the question posed in the title of the article - Lieutenant General Selivachev was not a traitor.
Использованная литература:
Ganin A.V. The last days of General Selivachev: Unknown pages of the Civil War in the South of Russia. M.: Kuchkovo field. 2012.
Denikin A.I. Armed forces of the South of Russia. // White matter. Selected works in 16 books. M., 1996.
Directives of the Red Army Front Command. M; 1972. T 2.
Egorov A.I. The defeat of Denikin, 1919 // Civil War in Russia: The defeat of Denikin. St. Petersburg, 2003.
Kakurin N. E. How the revolution fought. M., 1990. T. II.
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