What's the answer? "Red line" or nuclear strike?
So they keep coming and ending up somewhere. “They” - it’s clear that they are unmanned aerial vehicles that are getting further and further from the hypothetical border of Ukraine and Russia.
Orenburg region - no, look at the map, it will become completely clear that not everything is as simple as we would like.
We can talk a lot about the fact that we are surrounded by enemies on all sides, but it is more worth looking at those who, through the mouth of Captain Zheglov, “His passport does not say that he is a bandit, but, on the contrary, it is written that he is a citizen, lives according to what Somebody Krivokolenny, 5, he has a residence permit.”
And it is completely clear that now, unfortunately, we have a little more of these citizens than are enough for life to become less calm. I’m not even talking about Orenburg; there have been events in less distant areas of the country before, but we won’t talk about them now. I sincerely sympathize with the FSB employees, because their work today is calmer in the cauldron of hell.
But here's another one UAV fell on May 26 in the Orenburg region, near the village of Gorkovskoye in the Novoorsk district. The next day, local media issued a very cautious message: the drone fell, civilian facilities were not damaged. I wonder, what about military facilities? What about them, I am especially interested in the condition of the over-the-horizon radar "Voronezh-M", which has been operating there since 2017. You could say it is the newest station.
In general, the attack is somehow not very logical. "Voronezh" in the Orsk region is watching missile situation from the Taklamakan Desert (China) to the Syrian sea coast. It is highly unlikely that anything could fly in our direction from this sector, but the European direction or the Arctic Ocean zone somehow look more reasonable.
Oil industry? Yes, in Orsk there is such an enterprise as Orsknefteorgsintez, one of the largest in Russia. Processes 6,5 million tons of oil per year. And since it has now become fashionable to send drones to the oil refining complex, one would think that the device was flying there. But no. No matter where the drone was flying from, if it was flying towards the plant, it would deviate from the course by 30 kilometers no matter which side you look at, even from Kazakhstan. That is, it is still a radar.
The possibility of an attack from the territory of Kazakhstan should also not be ruled out, and this is not a matter of claims against the Republic of Kazakhstan; they could have used the territory “in the dark,” as, for example, in the case of the truck bombing on the Crimean Bridge. There the cargo passed through so many countries...
Moreover, the attempt to disable the radar near Orsk happened almost immediately after the attack on a similar Voronezh-DM facility near Armavir, Krasnodar Territory. The sector of operation of this radar, from the south of Spain to Central Asia, slightly overlapped with the area of responsibility of the station near Orsk.
If you believe the telegram channel of Dmitry Rogozin, where photos of the radar station in Armavir were published, then there is damage to the casing there. In fact, it's really not critical. The drone will not take a large explosive charge, and small ones have nothing to do there; radars have (this has been said many times) a modular structure, so replacing a damaged part of the complex if repairs cannot be done can be done without any problems.
The question is: why does the Ukrainian Armed Forces practice attacks on Russia’s strategic military infrastructure, which is actually located hundreds and thousands of kilometers from the front line?
And why would Ukraine disable Russian radars that can track missile launches over vast distances? The whole point here is that these radars do not work in Ukraine, the distances are not the same and the tracking objects are also not the same.
And the first to be attacked was a radar in the city of Kovylkino in the Republic of Mordovia more than a month ago. This is the 29B6 “Container” radar, also an over-the-horizon early warning radar. And a drone was coming at him, but it didn’t hit him. “Container”... it is sparse, unlike “Voronezh”.
Transmitting part of the "Container"
Receiving part of the "Container"
In general, “Container” and “Voronezh” appeared almost at the same time, 2006-2013. This is the third generation of Soviet over-the-horizon tracking systems (after Dnepr and Daryal), which form a unified tracking and warning system.
"Voronezh"
In general, of course, the choice of Ukrainian drone pilots or saboteurs is strange. From a tactical point of view, it does not provide any advantages to the Ukrainian Armed Forces at all. No satisfaction at all, not even moral satisfaction, since a drone is nothing like that weapon, which is capable of displaying such a complex as an over-the-horizon radar.
This begs the question - why?
The answer is complex and simple at the same time. Someone, using the wrong hands, taking advantage of the conflict in Ukraine, is “testing the teeth” of our missile defense system. It is clear who benefits from this, and why Ukrainian (or Ukrainian?) resources are used is also no secret.
It is clear that the interest here is primarily American-British, and not Ukrainian. The Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have missiles capable of hitting targets at great distances. And it won’t happen simply because the aerospace rocket industry in this country has died. Well, since there are no missiles, then there’s nothing to talk about.
Let me emphasize that we are talking about medium- and long-range missiles, which are precisely what over-the-horizon radars in Russia operate against.
And the Americans, yes, they are very interested. And even during drone strikes with 5-10 kg of explosives, they receive very valuable information. To what extent the complex can be disabled, how long the repairs will take, how Russia will generally react to a strike on its strategic weapons system.
Indeed, very important information. And what is it like to ruin even ten of the most expensive drones to get it?
The interest here is more political than military. A test for the tooth, and nothing else. Under such circumstances, it is simply necessary to strengthen the protection of long-range detection and warning systems. On the one hand, this does not seem to be difficult, we have only 7 Voronezh-type radars of all modifications and 2 Container-type radars. That is, only nine. On the other hand, it will require very tight cover of both the complexes themselves and the calculations, which are no less valuable than the equipment they control.
Nine divisions Defense - these are nine divisions, no matter how you look at it. And they can be more useful in completely different places, like Belgorod, for example. But strategic complexes are no less important infrastructure.
And the very fact of an attack on it makes us think deeply about what is behind the drone attempts. After all, no one will develop and carry out an attack on missile defense systems solely to show off their capabilities. On the contrary, it is a 100% study of the enemy’s capabilities.
Agree, it is ridiculous to believe that in Kyiv it occurred to someone to organize the delivery of drones over such a considerable distance and try to hit the radar. It is clear that the order is a recommendation and support using the same low-orbit satellites owned by the United States.
Here you need to think about something else. More precisely, about two things at once.
The first is that three attacks have already been carried out on our strategic complexes. Two unsuccessful and one with a small degree of probability. But - three. Considering that we still have complexes in Kaliningrad, in the Leningrad region and so on, that is, in areas where there is a possibility of a Ukrainian drone with an explosive charge appearing, a fourth, a fifth, and so on can easily be added to the three attacks. So far, as they say, it won’t work.
The second is how to react to such things. Yes, it stems from the first, but it is clear that pretending that nothing is happening is a completely wrong way.
We need to react. Moreover, in such a way that those who try to carry out such operations once and for all understand the inferiority of their actions.
Let me digress with an example. In our region there have been many cases of attempts to set fire to relay cabinets on the railway. So many. I don’t know how much money and time the Southern Eastern Railway spent on installing surveillance cameras, but pyromaniacs began to appear. Mostly minors who did not have the proper IQ and were ready to burn cabinets for 10-15 thousand rubles that would come from the other side.
There are literally a few criminal cases that have not received wide publicity - and as if by magic, the number of people wishing to earn money in this way began to rapidly decline.
The real possibility of being caught and thrust into the millstones of justice (and the articles there are more than ugly) very sharply reduced the cost of 10 thousand rubles, which Ukrainians were ready to pay for arson.
In principle, with cabinets it’s the same “thousand pricks” tactic. Cabinets were on fire, schedules were disrupted, trains were idle. Military personnel. And with the radar it was about the same calico: one, two drones at a time, they were sent out for an hour, for a day, for a week. And so it will be, they, that is, the Americans, will study the very possibility of disabling such an important system in missile defense as the early warning system.
Why is also clear. Suddenly “blind” radars that “will not see” missile launches from the other side will cost any sacrifice. But in our case, everything is done by strangers, that is, by Ukrainian hands, and it seems like no claims can be made against anyone. It's still war.
Here we need “red lines” that are not disgusting to everyone; here, excuse me, we need red snot from those who carry and launch drones, tying them to other people’s satellites.
The answer is very necessary. Precisely so that they are afraid of the consequences. They were very afraid. Moreover, both performers and organizers.
The situation with the performers is not very good, they are more afraid of their military registration and enlistment offices than of the advancing Russian units, this is a fact that cannot be refuted by anything. But those who act on orders overseas must be afraid of the consequences of their launches. And those who direct the performers, the customers, should also be afraid of the consequences. It doesn’t matter from our side or from the performers who will receive an answer from our side.
The enemy must live in fear
We have already done a lot of harm to ourselves by drawing “red lines.” The media around the world have already openly laughed at our Foreign Ministry.
It is unacceptable. When your opponent respects you, that’s good. It's noble. When the enemy is afraid of you, it is more effective.
It is very difficult to say what the response to an attack on our strategic targets should be, but it should be terrible. So that next time no one would think of sending a drone, say, to Kaliningrad.
I don’t want to talk about the use of tactical nuclear weapons; this, of course, is overkill. And besides, it is possible to intimidate Ukrainians in this way. But there will be Kazakhs who with great pleasure will launch a drone towards Orsk again. Or someone in Transcaucasia.
It is necessary to make it clear that any encroachment on Russia’s strategic objects will lead to clearly fatal consequences. And so that everything is clear.
Over the past two years, so many “red lines” have been drawn, so many empty promises have been made, that it is simply shameful. And it was precisely the fact that our responsible officials made loud statements about “adequate tough responses” and all the words, without exception, remained just words, brought the situation to the point that it flew across the Kremlin.
Now our strategic radars are being “trained”. What's next? Probably, it is necessary to light up the Nudoli missile silo so that movements to rectify the situation will finally begin? Or according to the General Staff. It's hard to say what will be more valuable in tomorrow's world.
But we need to give those who are testing the strength of Russia’s strategic defense a slap on the wrist. If they don’t want to respect you, they will be afraid.
Information