“The most is 4 rubles.” How Stalin freed the ruble from the dollar

Golden chervonets “Sower” 1923
In Russia, the topic of liberation from dollar dependence and the creation of a single BRICS currency is regularly raised. In reality, you just need to remember your history: how Stalin freed the ruble from the dollar.
General situation
Currency reform 1922–1924 led to the creation of a stable monetary system. By decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of July 25 and October 11, 1922, the State Bank received the right to issue new banknotes - banknotes of large denominations. It was planned to put into circulation banknotes in denominations of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 25 and 50 chervonets. Money got its name from red gold (high-grade pure gold), which had a red, that is, red tint.
Subsequently, banknotes in denominations of 2 and 50 chervonets, which were provided for by the decree, were never put into circulation. The Soviet chervonets was equal to the 10-ruble gold coin of the Russian Empire weighing 7,74 g. The chervonets was 25% backed by gold, other precious metals, and foreign currency; 75% of it was provided by short-term government obligations and goods.
At the beginning of 1924, the final stage of the reform was carried out. In the spring of 1924, treasury notes in denominations of 1, 3 and 5 rubles began to enter monetary circulation. They stopped issuing Sovznak and began to withdraw them from circulation by buying them back at a fixed rate. Sovznaki of the 1923 model were bought from the population at the rate of one gold ruble in treasury notes for 50 thousand old ones (50 billion rubles in old banknotes). At the same time, high-grade silver coins in denominations of 1 ruble and 50 kopecks, as well as small change silver and copper coins, were put into circulation.
The successful completion of monetary reform in 1924 led to the creation of a single, stable Soviet currency. Without outside help, they eliminated the disorder of the monetary system on their own, which lasted 10 years. After the release of treasury notes and small change coins, before the withdrawal of sovznak, five types of banknotes were in circulation for some time: treasury notes, chervonets, small change coin, sovznak and transport certificates.
It should be noted that the Soviet government knew why it needed a hard ruble. And this differed from liberal economists who like to talk about the benefits of a “weak ruble” for Russia. In reality, the depreciation of the ruble is beneficial to the West and the East, which make it easier to buy Russian raw materials.
The depreciation of the ruble is also beneficial for large Russian capital. All this reinforces the raw material nature of the Russian economy (the “pipe” economy). And for the development of national production and domestic trade, a solid ruble is needed. The Russian communists understood this well.

Chervonets 1937 with a portrait of Lenin
1947 reform of the year
The Soviet monetary system withstood the test of war. Thus, the money supply in Germany increased 6 times during the war years (although the Germans brought goods from all over Europe and a significant part of the USSR); in Italy - 10 times; in Japan – 11 times. In the USSR, the money supply during the war years increased only 3,8 times.
However, the Great Patriotic War gave rise to a number of negative phenomena that needed to be eliminated.
Firstly, there is a mismatch between the amount of money and the needs of trade. There was a surplus of money.
Secondly, several types of prices have appeared - rations, commercial and market. This undermined the importance of cash wages and cash incomes of collective farmers by workdays.
Thirdly, large sums of money settled with speculators. Moreover, the difference in prices still gave them the opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. This undermined social justice in the country.
Immediately after the end of the war, the state carried out a number of measures aimed at strengthening the monetary system and increasing the well-being of the population. The purchasing demand of the population increased through an increase in wage funds and a decrease in payments to the financial system. Thus, in August 1945, the war tax on workers and employees began to be abolished. The tax was finally abolished at the beginning of 1946. They no longer held monetary lotteries and reduced the size of the subscription for the new government loan.
In the spring of 1946, savings banks began paying workers and employees compensation for unused vacations during the war. Post-war industrial restructuring began. There was some growth in the stock of goods due to the restructuring of industry, a reduction in the consumption of the armed forces and the sale of trophies.
To remove money from circulation, commercial trade continued to expand. In 1946, commercial trade acquired a fairly wide scope: a wide network of shops and restaurants was created, the range of goods was expanded and their prices were reduced. The end of the war led to a drop in prices on collective farm markets (by more than a third).
However, by the end of 1946, the adverse events were not completely eliminated. Therefore, the course on monetary reform was kept. In addition, the release of new money and the exchange of old money for new was necessary in order to eliminate money that went abroad and improve the quality of money.
According to the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR Arseny Zverev (managed the finances of the USSR since 1938), Stalin first inquired about the possibility of monetary reform at the end of December 1942 and demanded to submit the first calculations at the beginning of 1943. At first, the monetary reform was planned to be carried out in 1946. However, due to famine, which was caused by drought and crop failure in a number of Soviet regions, the start of the reform had to be postponed. Only on December 3, 1947, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to abolish the card system and begin monetary reform.
The conditions for the monetary reform were determined in the Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated December 14, 1947. The exchange of money was carried out throughout the Soviet Union from December 16 to 22, 1947, and in remote areas ended on December 29. When recalculating wages, money was exchanged in such a way that wages remained unchanged. The coin was not subject to change and remained in circulation at face value.
For cash deposits in Sberbank, amounts up to 3 thousand rubles were also subject to exchange one to one; for deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, savings were reduced by one third of the amount; for deposits over 10 thousand rubles, two-thirds of the amount was subject to withdrawal. Those citizens who kept large sums of money at home could exchange at the rate of 1 new ruble to 10 old ones.
Relatively preferential conditions for the exchange of cash savings were established for holders of government loan bonds: the 1947 loan bonds were not subject to revaluation; bonds of mass loans were exchanged for bonds of a new loan in a ratio of 3:1, bonds of a freely marketable loan of 1938 were exchanged in a ratio of 5:1.
The funds that were in the settlement and current accounts of cooperative organizations and collective farms were revalued at the rate of 5 old rubles for 4 new ones.
At the same time, the government abolished the card system (before other victorious states), high prices in commercial trade and introduced uniform, reduced state retail prices for food and industrial goods. Thus, prices for bread and flour were reduced by an average of 12% compared to current ration prices; for cereals and pasta - by 10%, etc.
Thus, the negative consequences of the war in the field of the monetary system were eliminated in the USSR. This made it possible to switch to trading at uniform prices and reduce the money supply by more than three times (from 43,6 billion to 14 billion rubles).
Overall, the reform was successful.
In addition, the reform had a social aspect.
The speculators were pinned down. This restored social justice that had been violated during the war. At first glance, it seemed that everyone suffered, because everyone had some money in their hands on December 15th. But the ordinary worker and employee living on his salary, who by the middle of the month no longer had much money left, suffered only nominally. He was not even left without money, since already on December 16 they began to issue wages in new money for the first half of the month, which they usually did not do. Salaries were usually paid monthly after the end of the month. Thanks to this issue, workers and employees were provided with new money at the beginning of the reform.
The exchange of 3 thousand rubles of deposit 1:1 satisfied the overwhelming majority of the population, since people did not have significant funds. Based on the entire adult population, the average deposit in a savings book could not be more than 200 rubles.
It is clear that the “Stakhanovites”, inventors and other small groups of the population who had super-profits lost part of their money to the speculators. But taking into account the general decline in prices, although they did not win, they still did not suffer much.
True, those who kept large sums of money at home could be dissatisfied. This concerned speculative groups of the population and part of the population of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, who did not know war and for this reason had the opportunity to trade.
At the same time, the whole world was amazed that just two years after the end of the war and after the crop failure of 1946, basic food prices were maintained at the level of rations or even reduced. That is, almost all food was available to everyone in the USSR.
For the West, this was a surprise, and an offensive surprise. The capitalist system has literally been driven into the mud up to its ears.
Thus, Great Britain, on whose territory there was no war for four years and which suffered immeasurably less in the war than the USSR, could not abolish the card system even in the early 1950s. At this time, in the former “workshop of the world,” there were strikes by miners who demanded that they be provided with the same standard of living as the miners of the USSR.

Arseny Grigorievich Zverev (1900–1969). People's Commissar, then Minister of Finance of the USSR in 1938–1960. (with a break in 1948). “His huge figure (he weighed almost one and a half centners) seemed to personify the strength of Soviet finances and the value of the ruble” (Viktor Dementsev, member of the board of the Ministry of Finance of the RSFSR in 1949–1963). Khrushchev's monetary reform in the USSR (1961) was planned without him, since he resigned due to disagreement with it.
Dedollarization
The Soviet ruble has been pegged to the US dollar since 1937. The ruble was calculated against foreign currencies based on the US dollar.
In February 1950, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, on the urgent instructions of I. Stalin, recalculated the exchange rate of the new ruble. Soviet specialists, focusing on the purchasing power of the ruble and the dollar (compared prices of goods), came up with a figure of 14 rubles for 1 dollar. Previously (before 1947) the dollar was worth 53 rubles.
However, according to the head of the Ministry of Finance Zverev and the head of the State Planning Committee Saburov, as well as Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the head of Albania Enver Hoxha, who were present at this event, Stalin crossed out this figure on February 27 and wrote:
The resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of February 28, 1950 transferred the ruble to a permanent gold basis, and the peg to the dollar was abolished.
The gold content of the ruble was set at 0,222168 grams of pure gold. On March 1, 1950, the purchase price of the USSR State Bank for gold was set at 4 rubles 45 kopecks per 1 gram of pure gold.
As Stalin noted, the USSR was protected from the dollar. After the war, the United States had dollar surpluses that it wanted to dump on other countries, shifting its financial problems onto others.
As an example of indefinite financial, and therefore political, dependence on the Western world, Stalin cited Yugoslavia, where Josip Broz Tito ruled. The Yugoslav currency was pegged to a “basket” of the US dollar and the British pound sterling. Stalin actually predicted the future of Yugoslavia: “sooner or later the West will “collapse” Yugoslavia economically and dismember it politically.” His prophetic words came true in the 1990s.
For the first time, national money was freed from the American dollar. According to the UN Economic and Social Council and the UN European and Far Eastern Commissions (1952–1954), Stalin's decision almost doubled the efficiency of Soviet exports. Moreover, at that time it was industrial and knowledge-intensive. This happened due to the exemption from dollar prices of importing countries that had lowered prices for Soviet exports.
This in turn led to increased production in most Soviet industries.
The Soviet Union also had the opportunity to get rid of imports of technology from the United States and other countries that relied on the dollar, and speed up its own technological renewal.
Stalin's plan to create a common non-dollar market
The transfer to the “Stalinist gold ruble” of most of the USSR’s trade with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), created in 1949, as well as with China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam and a number of developing countries, led to the formation of a financial and economic bloc. A common market emerged, which was free from the dollar and, therefore, from the political influence of the United States.
In the first half of April 1952, an international economic meeting was held in Moscow. At it, the Soviet delegation led by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Shepilov proposed establishing a common market for goods, services and investments. It was free of the US dollar and was created as a counterweight to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and US expansion. At this time, the Marshall Plan was already in full effect. The economies of most European countries became dependent on the United States.
Back in 1951, CMEA members and China declared the inevitability of close cooperation among all countries that do not want to submit to the US dollar and the dictates of Western financial and trade structures. The idea was supported by countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, India, Indonesia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Uruguay. These countries became co-organizers of the Moscow Forum.
Interestingly, the proposal was also supported by some Western countries - Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Iceland and Austria. A total of 49 countries took part in the Moscow meeting. During his work, more than 60 trade, investment and scientific and technical agreements were signed. Among the main principles of these agreements were: the exclusion of dollar payments; the possibility of barter, including to pay off debts; policy coordination in international economic organizations and in the global market; mutual treatment of maximum favored nation in loans, investments, credits and scientific and technical cooperation; customs and price benefits for developing countries (or their individual goods), etc.
The Soviet delegation proposed at the first stage to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on customs, price, credit and commodity issues. Then they planned to gradually unify the principles of foreign economic policy and create a “all-bloc” trade zone.
At the final stage, they planned to create an interstate settlement currency with a mandatory gold content (the ruble was already prepared for this), which led to the completion of the creation of a common market.
It is clear that financial and economic integration led to political integration. Not only socialist, but also people's democratic countries and former colonies, that is, developing states, would unite around the USSR.
Unfortunately, after the death of Stalin, the authorities of the USSR and most other CMEA countries moved away from the proposals of the great leader, gradually falling under the power of the dollar (and their elites - under the power of the “golden calf”).
They tried to forget about the great Stalinist project.
Moreover, in view of Khrushchev’s socio-economic and political adventures (How Khrushchev destroyed the USSR; Part 2), we had to greatly devalue the “Stalinist gold ruble” (by 10 times) and reduce its gold content. At the end of the 1970s, the gold content of the Soviet ruble was de facto completely eliminated.
Since the time of Khrushchev, Soviet foreign trade began to move into a subordinate position in relation to the dollar system. The cost of goods supplied from the Union to capitalist countries was calculated in conventional “foreign currency rubles” at the rate of 1 dollar = 0,6 foreign currency rubles.
In addition, the Soviet Union became a donor to developing countries and began to supply the Western world with cheap energy and industrial raw materials. And the gold reserves that were created under Stalin began to be rapidly lost.
The idea of “Soviet globalization” at the financial and economic level and freedom from the US dollar, independence from the US Federal Reserve System is now more relevant than ever.
Actually, there is no need to invent anything. Everything was already invented by Joseph Stalin and his associates. We just need to show political will and bring his plans to their logical conclusion.
Then Russia will be completely independent in financial and economic terms, will undermine the power of global capital, the Federal Reserve System, Western TNB and TNCs and will receive a powerful tool for restoring both the Russian world itself (including Little Russia and Novorossiya) and “Russian globalization” on the basis of social justice and human freedom.
Russia will receive a powerful tool for the development of the national economy and the well-being of the people.

Portrait of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin in the Kremlin. Time taken: 31.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. Author: American photographer and journalist Margaret Bourke-White
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