The enemy’s ability to strike deep into Russian territory is continuously increasing
Strikes deep into territory
As we expected, The lack of success on the battlefield has led to the fact that the main method of conducting combat operations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) has become air strikes..
The objects attacked by the enemy can be broadly divided into three groups: military objects, industrial objects and fuel and energy infrastructure, and civilian objects. In turn, attacking air defense systems can be divided into low-flying subsonic cruise missiles and kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as operational-tactical missiles (OTM) and guided/unguided rockets moving along a high-altitude ballistic or quasi-ballistic trajectory.
There are significant differences in the organization of counteraction to low-flying and high-altitude airborne attack systems: the former are more difficult to detect but are usually easier to hit, while the latter can usually be detected at a greater distance, but their high flight speed and sometimes maneuverability make them a difficult target for anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs).
We also previously spoke about increasing the effectiveness of the fight against low-flying explosive devices in the materials Waiting for the Helios-RLD UAV: for protection against low-flying air attack weapons и UAV "Sirius-PVO": hunter of air attack weapons.
UAV "Helios-RLD" - the main problem in the fight against low-flying IOS is their timely detection
Not everything proposed above can be implemented in the shortest possible time, but it is necessary to move in this direction, since there are no signs that the special military operation (SVO) will end in the near future; some sources even put forward the opinion that the appointment of a new Minister of Defense - an economist and financier, says that the end of the SVO should not be expected in the near future.
In addition to what was discussed above, it can be assumed that promptly changing the location of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), at least once a day, will significantly complicate the enemy’s task of laying out routes for low-flying air defense systems, bypassing the detection and destruction zone of these SAMs.
We have a different situation with high-altitude missiles moving along a high-altitude ballistic or quasi-ballistic trajectory.
If we are talking about unguided rockets with a range of several tens of kilometers, for example, such as the Grad-type multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), then here the defender has a chance promptly detect the fact of an attack, determine the location of the enemy MLRS and destroy it (them) as part of counter-battery warfare (CBW). Of course, this does not negate the need to repel an attack, but if the KBB task is solved successfully, then there may not be another attack.
However, with missiles of operational-tactical missile systems (OTRK), as well as with guided/unguided rockets with a firing range of over 100 kilometers, everything is much more complicated.
Firstly, solving KBB problems here is much more difficult - no matter how quickly the reconnaissance-strike circuit reacts, the launcher has a much greater chance of “escaping”.
Secondly, even if the OTR is damaged, its warhead (warhead) may detonate not in the air, when the warhead of the missile defense system is detonated, but after the OTR warhead falls to the surface. Yes, it is possible that the target - a military or industrial facility - will not be hit, but the detonation of a warhead on the surface can lead to the destruction of other, including civilian objects. If we are talking about cluster munitions, then the destruction of warheads often simply leads to their scattering at a higher altitude.
Elements of a cluster warhead pose a threat even after the destruction of the OTR in the air
In addition, having received a large number of missiles from its sponsors, the Kiev regime began to carry out massive strikes, which could involve up to several dozen missile launchers and tactical missiles, and it is very difficult to repel such attacks.
Passive protection
Two main options can be distinguished - these are various obstacles located on the intended flight route of the IOS, as well as shelters for potentially attacked objects. The former are suitable only for protection against low-flying EOS, while the latter are suitable for both protection against low-flying EOS and against EOS moving along a high-altitude trajectory.
Obstacles are various cables and nets placed on high-altitude masts or attached to balloons, as we previously discussed in the material Barrage balloons: guarding industrial facilities and the fuel and energy complex. Open sources often say that low-flying Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs attacking targets in the depths of our country move along river beds in order to avoid detection by radar stations. So why not string nets on masts or balloons at a height of approximately 15-20 (to allow river transport to pass through) to 50-100 meters?
The situation is similar with protected objects - well, the kamikaze UAV will not withstand a collision with the network - either the wings will come off, or the propeller will get tangled. Why industrial enterprises, primarily enterprises in the fuel and energy sector, are not protected in this way is a great mystery. But there are also much more unpleasant (for us) objects to attack, and there is no doubt that the enemy knows about them.
Networks and cables could potentially be stretched not only on balloons, but also between ordinary cell phone towers, the height of which can reach 100 meters; do we even know how to build them? Image invest-a.ru
As for shelters for potentially attackable objects, here we primarily mean shelters for airplanes and helicopters, as well as for any other “soft” equipment; we also talked about this earlier in the material Ukrainian UAV strikes on the airfield in Engels as an indicator of the extreme vulnerability of aviation at base points. Unfortunately, the situation is still far from being resolved. Maybe the latest changes at the top will have an impact on something?
After all, even easily erected hangars can significantly reduce losses - the enemy simply will not be able to track which hangar contains a target and which does not. The effectiveness of fragments, including elements of cluster warheads, will decrease. You can further increase protection with gabions - simple bags of sand and earth placed along the walls of easily erected hangars and equipment.
Gabions perfectly protect against bullets and shrapnel - by surrounding equipment and light shelters with them, you can significantly increase their survivability
What can we say about normal reinforced concrete shelters covered with earth on top - they can potentially reduce losses at airfields by an order of magnitude or more.
Not a single air defense system...
Of course, the question immediately arises, why not use more anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM)?
Of course, air defense systems can and should be used, but it is necessary to understand that we are now confronting the entire defense-industrial complex (DIC) of the countries of the Global West. Collectively, they can rivet as many missile launchers, kamikaze UAVs, OTR and shells for MLRS as we will never be able to produce missiles.
In addition, there is also a “cost-effectiveness” criterion, that is, if we shoot down missiles or anti-tank missiles with the help of very expensive missiles, then this is one thing, but if we use missiles with relatively cheap unguided MLRS or kamikaze UAV projectiles, then this counts is no longer going in our favor. By the way, Ukraine has a similar problem.
Are there other ways to defeat SVN?
Yes, for example, laser and microwave weapon, whose cost per shot should be no more than several hundred rubles. The deployment of laser weapon systems by Western and Eastern countries has already begun, however, the situation with laser weapons in Russia is shrouded in secrecy. In addition, in the next two to three years, the capabilities of laser systems Defense, will most likely be limited to kamikaze UAVs, then within five to ten years they will most likely learn to shoot down cruise missiles and MLRS shells and only then will they get to operational-tactical missiles, and all of the above targets have ways to increase their protection from the effects of submarines.
A 300 kW combat laser from Lockheed Martin is already being tested, and work is currently underway to increase its power to 500 kW
Formally Russia has adopted the Peresvet combat laser complex (BLK), but its capabilities are classified and one can only guess about them. True, the question arises - after all, if it is stated that the Peresvet BLK, at a minimum, should be able to “blind” satellites in orbit, can’t it at least blind the optical-electronic systems (OES) of American reconnaissance UAVs “hanging around” above Black Sea? After all, they are clearly used to guide Ukrainian air defense systems at targets in Crimea.
Of course, these UAVs also have a radar, but it will not completely replace the OES, and if the Peresvet BLK can physically damage American UAVs, then it’s for the better. According to the author, reconnaissance UAVs of NATO countries, especially those located over the neutral waters of the Black Sea, can and should be shot down in any way, even with the help of air defense systems, even fighters, even the Peresvet BLK. This is an effective way to increase the survivability of Russian Armed Forces facilities and civilian infrastructure on the territory of Crimea, and the United States will not do anything to us in response.
More abroad microwave weapons exist and are being tested, which are also already close to testing in combat conditions, but its main target is small-sized kamikaze UAVs, including the ubiquitous FPV-drones. Even hitting low-flying missiles with microwave weapons will be difficult, and targets such as OTR, not to mention unguided shells for MLRS, are impossible in principle.
There remain kinetic methods of destruction - we have already mentioned air defense systems, small-caliber artillery is only suitable for hitting low-flying missiles and kamikaze UAVs, and without shells with remote detonation on the trajectory, which, by the way, are very expensive, judging by German products, and the effectiveness of small-caliber artillery is questionable.
What else?
A-222 "Beach"
In the material "Coast" against "air": the use of the A-222 self-propelled artillery system as a highly effective air defense system We considered the possibility of using coastal self-propelled artillery systems A-222 "Bereg" to destroy various types of explosive devices using 130 mm caliber shells equipped with radar fuses.
The premise for considering such a possibility is that the A-222 Bereg uses the same artillery gun, as on the ships of the Navy fleet (Navy) of Russia, and these artillery systems, at least theoretically, should be capable of working against anti-ship missiles (ASM) and other air defense systems. And the ammunition load of the A-222 “Bereg” includes anti-aircraft shells with remote and radar fuses.
Combat vehicle of the A-222 "Bereg" complex
In comments to previously published material, doubts were expressed regarding the ability of the A-222 "Bereg" complexes to track high-speed air targets, but we do not need this, since the main targets considered for destruction with the help of the A-222 "Bereg" complexes, such as MLRS projectiles, including HIMARS, practically do not maneuver in the final part of the flight path. Accordingly, the A-222 “Bereg” complexes only require forward guidance to hit the projectile at the meeting point with the target, pre-calculated by the guidance means according to the data of the external radar that detects and tracks the airborne attack.
The question here is rather in the characteristics of 130 mm anti-aircraft shells, primarily their radar fuse - is it capable of reacting to such a fairly small target, with a small effective dispersion surface (RCS), like an MLRS or OTR shell, as well as in the power of the combat weapon? parts of a projectile to hit specified targets.
Currently, based on open data, the A-222 “Bereg” complexes are not involved in any way during a special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine, and they do not have a special niche - using them as “land” artillery systems is just a quick fix ruin the resource of the barrels, and the question is how many shells are there for these complexes, because the consumption of artillery shells on the line of combat contact (LCC) is estimated in hundreds of thousands - millions.
The A-222 "Bereg" complexes can potentially work against MLRS projectiles that have a fairly flat trajectory; the possibility of using the A-222 "Bereg" complexes to destroy missile launchers and kamikaze UAVs cannot be ruled out, provided that these complexes are placed on a hill for direct fire , for example, along the coastline of the Black Sea - in this case, the A-222 “Bereg” complexes could potentially be used to combat unmanned kamikaze boats (BEC).
As for the OTR, everything will depend on the angle of their approach to the target; most OTR in the final section descend almost vertically, in this case the A-222 Bereg complexes will not be able to fight even non-maneuvering OTR due to the limited elevation angles of the barrel (up to 50 degrees).
Can large-caliber artillery systems even work against such complex targets as cruise missiles and RS3O shells?
Yes, quite, even during the Second World War (WWII), large-caliber anti-aircraft artillery quite effectively used projectiles with radar fuses against German V-1 cruise missiles, and the existing cruise missiles were not far behind it in terms of flight performance characteristics (FTC), winning mainly accuracy of hits (well, and in terms of flight range).
Modern missile defense systems have less radar signature than the FAU-1, but the guidance of the A-222 “Bereg” complexes should be carried out by much more modern radars than those that the British had during WWII - after all, air defense systems operate quite successfully on missile defense systems , radar fuses of missile defense systems on the Kyrgyz Republic also fire.
V-1 – cruise missile
As for MLRS rockets, they are also successfully detected by modern radars and are hit by air defense systems, so in this case, the A-222 Bereg systems should be able to work against them, including guided projectiles of the HIMARS system. The speed of MLRS rockets is significantly higher than that of missile launchers, but they move along a high-altitude trajectory, that is, they can be detected in advance and attacked at a greater distance than missile launchers.
The problem is that we have quite a few A-222 "Bereg" complexes - only 6 units, and it is hardly advisable to produce an additional number of these rather complex and expensive machines just for the sake of using them as air defense systems, but potentially We also have other solutions, which we will talk about later.
Conclusions
It is hardly worth deceiving ourselves - the supply of long-range precision weapons is causing us significant damage, and the supply will continue and increase until we begin severely punish Western countries for them.
This means that in any case we will have to pay increased attention to active and passive defense against air attack weapons.
Information