How can Russia survive and win in the 21st century?



I


The evolution of large complex systems is irreversible, Alexander Zinoviev once remarked. And indeed, until the will to death mastered the system and it did not fall into the process of nichtoization, we can analyze the present and predict the future of such a system, based on the logic of its historical development, exploring its cycles, rhythms and regularity. In this case, of course, we must remember that Nassim Taleb calls "black swans" (that is, about accidents), and the influence of factors external to the system, for example, the global crisis, or the crisis of the whole, capable of bringing down its elements . Speech in this case is not about fixing the primacy of external factors, but about something else.

First, in the modern world, the line between external and internal factors has a dotted character.

Secondly, in any society with limited subjectivity, with limited sovereignty, the role and importance of external factors are very large. And the Russian Federation emerged and developed exactly how such a society.

Thirdly, during the period of imbalance (namely, the RF is in such a state), the system is redundantly opened to the outside world. As a result, chaotic processes begin to grow in it, which further exacerbates the imbalance. And this, in turn, further enhances the value of the external factor (especially if the chaos is targeted). Movement goes on vicious circle.

What should be emphasized in the history of Russia and its interaction with the West, with the capitalist system? What is the current situation in our country in the optics of these regularities? What, finally, forms of organization of power and society are capable of leading Russia out of a historical trap?

Neither the state nor the policy in the strictly scientific sense of these terms - with the exception of the periods 1905 – 1918 and 1988 – 2001 - did not exist in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union: there was a central sovereignty-autosubject-center.


II

Let's start with the internal regularities, first of all with the relationship between power and property. Russian history is represented by several power systems - the Moscow kingdom, the Petersburg empire, the post-reform (1861 – 1917) and the Soviet systems. Each corresponded to its own dominant group - the boyars, the nobility, the bureaucracy and the nomenclature. All of these groups (with the exception of the fourth) were functional central authorities - the center. (I prefer not to apply the term “state” to the Russian Empire and to the Soviet Union — neither the state nor the policy in the strictly scientific sense of these terms — except for the periods 1905 – 1918 and 1988 – 2001): there was no central sovereign power- autosubject - centerer.) The centerhead created them, and then weakened or even destroyed them - in the power plan. Nomenclature is a special case, it is the embodiment of pure power (power-for-itself-for-itself), which created itself and relied upon itself, that is, cratocracy.

If we compare these subordinate groups in their numbers, then each subsequent group surpasses the previous one: noblemen - boyars, post-reform officials - noblemen, nomenclature with sticking-layers - officials. Looking from the point of view of this regularity on the Russian Federation, it turns out that along the line of increasing the number of representatives of power groups, the old logic continues: there are more officials per capita in the Russian Federation than in the USSR.

When comparing the dominant groups along the line of ownership, a different picture emerges: each subsequent group (we are talking about the average representative) had less property. The nobles had less of it than the boyars. Reformed officials, who, in fact, were a salariate (that is, a community sitting on a salary - from salary, Engl.) - less than the nobles. The nomenclature did not have any ownership of the material factors of production (the real substance) and was the personification of power, “cleansed”, “freed” from property. Of course, property, on the one hand, and wealth, wealth, on the other hand, are “things” that do not always coincide. However, in general, the following two regularities of the development of systems in Russian history from the middle of the XVI century can be fixed.

The first. The number of dominant groups, their share in the population increased from system to system.

The second. Ownership, which was in the hands of representatives of the dominant groups (within the framework of the dominant structure) decreased from system to system. In addition, in general, we can talk about the depletion of these groups (at least when comparing the equivalent-comparable levels of power pyramids of various systems).


How can Russia survive and win in the 21st century?


The nomenclature did not have any ownership of the material factors of production (the real substance) and was the personification of power, “cleansed”, “freed” from property.


I call the other type of logic “frostbite – thawing”. The essence here is as follows. The history of all systems of power in Russia began with enslavement (to the service) by the power of all sectors of society. Then the government gradually released layer after layer from top to bottom. The end point of the process became unrest. By securing all sections of the population (and not just peasants) to serve in 1649, the 18 authorities in February 1762 of the year released the nobles, allowing them not to serve. And the next day, February 19, but in 99 years, in the 1861 year, the peasants. As a result, Russia crawled into a new confusion (its landmarks: the murder of Alexander II, the rise of the revolutionary movement, the revolution of 1905 and 1917, the civil war, NEP).

In 1929 – 1933, by enslaving, again, all strata — from peasants to nomenclature and sovintelligence, which they “attributed” to various “creative” unions — the authorities took the country out of turmoil. In 1953 – 1956, the nomenclature “released” itself, and in 1987 – 1988, the population as a whole. And a new turmoil began - sluggish and dispersed, unlike the first two, and developing against the background of the process of reproduction of the decomposition of the late Soviet society, the disposal of its assets by a narrow group closely connected with foreign capital.

While there is a redistribution, there is no need for new enslavement in one form or another: people were given freedom - freedom to survive or die (this is called “adaptation to market conditions”). When the population size will again find its value, most likely, an attempt will be made of a new consolidation in the most up-to-date technical form (chipization, etc.).

The post-Soviet twenties coincided with another phase of Russian history - a phase associated with the development logic that is determined by the peculiarities of creating a social product in natural-economic and historical conditions and which is translated at the level of power into the relationship of “monopoly – oligarchization”. As research by Leonid Milov and his school showed, the Russian economy (due to low yields, which practically did not grow in central Russia for a whole millennium - until the second third of the 20th century) created a small-scale social product.

This had two consequences.

Firstly, in order to increase income, the Russian peasant had to actively engage in non-agricultural types of labor.

Secondly, the yield, which remained at the same level, and, consequently, the volume and level of the social product, caused a quiet-gradual rate of evolution. As a result, at certain moments of development, as a rule, associated with a qualitative change in the state of the world system in which Russia was included, and as a result, with increased pressure from the West, compensatory-catching jerks were necessary, ruthlessly tearing social fabric according to the principle from the old world, shake off his dust from our feet. " Peter I (restructuring the world-system due to the completion of the Dutch capital accumulation cycle), the Bolsheviks (the completion of the British accumulation cycle) and in a milder form - the reforms of 1860-x - the first half of 1870-s (transformation of the European world-system into the world capitalism in the “long 50” - 1848 – 1867 / 73 years). During periods of jerking, Western influence sharply increased — right up to the deformation of the development of society: obviously, its external forms, and to a significant degree essentially, tops.

Because of the consistently low volume and level of the social product, one of the main tasks of the central government (centerhaver) in Russia was to limit and restrain the socio-economic appetites of all social groups, especially the upper ones. In our natural-historical conditions, this was the only possible, although not always legal and effective, protection of the interests of the middle and lower strata of society, and partly of the population as a whole. The centerhead thus solved the double problem.

First, it maintained a fragile - due to the low level of excess product - social balance (that is, among other things, ensured the dominance of the long-term interests of the ruling groups themselves as functional organs of the top over the mid-term and medium-term over the short-term).

Secondly, it prevented the oligarchization of power. Preserving the immanent qualities of the Russian government, only an alliance with the middle and lower ranks of the dominant groups and minimal protection of the population (Ivan Solonevich did not quite successfully called it “people's monarchy”) guaranteed self-preservation, self-reproduction and self-development of the Russian authorities with all its characteristics. Violation of the union / contract ultimately ruined this power, triumph over superconsumption, over-exploitation, and social irresponsibility of the upper classes, when not just short-term goals, but short-term goals turned out to be in the center.



In 1929 – 1933, by enslaving, again, all strata — from peasants to nomenclature and sovintelligence, which they “attributed” to various “creative” unions — the authorities took the country out of turmoil. In 1953 – 1956, the nomenclature “released” itself.


As a result of the social perspective, first a part of the society was deprived, and then the society - the system - as a whole. And this was well understood, or at least felt by society. It is the socio-historical pragmatism, and not the supposedly slavish nature of the Russian people or its dislike for freedom, that the broad sections of the population, first of all, its active middle, support the central government and autocracy against the attempts of the oligarchs of the nobles as the nobles.

Power in Russia (whether autocracy or communism) has always been, by definition, primarily a mechanism for accounting and control, systemic self-restraint of a society that existed in harsh climatic and complex geohistorical conditions. Under these conditions, the oligarchization of power inevitably led to the transformation of a certain part of the ruling groups into something similar to the classes of the Western type — capitalist or late feudal. A mutation of this kind led Russia to a social catastrophe.

The emergence and development in Russia on the basis of its “work system” (Karl Marx) of western-like classes that begin to live with the needs characteristic of a different “work system” is possible only on the basis of alienating not only the surplus product from the population, but also a significant part of the necessary, and consequently, any westernization, any western similarity of Russia means a regression of the system of Russian life, its decomposition and the will to death, the degradation of the population. The experience-based instinct prompted: oligarchization of power is the reverse side of the beginning of the alienation of the part of the necessary product by the tops (and vice versa), turning the tops into such a class (west-like) growth, a hump that this system could not bear without cracking. West-like reforms (and forms - the market, politics, civil society) - is, as a rule, an indicator of the decline of power in Russia. The fact that there is progress in the North Atlantic nucleus of the capsystem, we have a regression.

Until the middle of the 19th century, on the path of the Russian government in its autocratic variant to oligarchization and to the transformation of the upper classes into “their West-likeness”, besides the restrictions from above and below, there was another serious obstacle: the absence of a real mechanism of economic exploitation — a mechanism that would provide for it an economic the base. The reforms of 1860, and then foreign capital, first of all financial, as well as the global market, in which Russia was involved, provided such a mechanism for the first time in its history. And since the development of capitalist forms in Russia proceeded mainly from above, this could not but “economize” - and, consequently, oligarchise - power itself. Having resisted the boyars-noble oligarchies, the government began to oligarchise-rot from within, and this was one of the main reasons for its death.

This process led to the fact that the oligarchized power, in fact, entered into an alliance with the top and a significant part of the middle of society against the "rest" of the population. The economic gap between these two “zones” began to grow rapidly. Outwardly, and in part, in fact, this reproduced the West-like class situation, and in an ugly form. The development of capitalist forms in Russia and the oligarchization of power are two sides of the same process.

For the second time in Russian history, the centerer broke the “rule of the Russian government No. 1” - accounting and control over the tops - in the 1980 and especially in the 1990. Then a certain part of the nomenklatura (as well as a part of shadow businesses and criminality) turned into a class of proprietors, almost complete oligarchization occurred, and to a large extent the criminalization of power, and the latter began not only to exploit, but to rob people (Yeltsin), contributing to year a million people.

Uncontrolled (that is, not taking into account the capabilities of the system, lack of material substance in it), consumption of the upper strata and exploitation of the population created prerequisites for crises that the interested forces (including behind the cordon) turned into turmoil and revolution (1905, 1917 years).

The fateful turns and moments in Russian history took place exactly when the material substance was eaten away, the legacy (primarily material) of the previous era was exhausted and the question arose: at whose expense would the leap into the future be made, in whose interests - national or narrow class? Following this, the task of a big redistribution arose with the Leninist question “who — whom” —the Dilemma of the Great Redistribution. There were two such moments - in the 1560 and in the 1920.

The first case. When the legacy of the specific Horde Russia was consumed (first of all, the land fund for distributing estates was exhausted), power through the oprichnina created autocracy — a new, central (“state”) oriented form of power, which limited the appetites of the then “oligarchs” from several dozen clans of Rurik and Gedimi groups of the Rurik and Gedimi groups. .

The second case is the liquidation of Stalin’s ugly market-administrative system of NEP (the triangle “commander - head of trust - nepman as a huckster”) at the end of 1920, when it became clear that the pre-revolutionary legacy was devoured and ahead - the oligarchization of the company on the basis of corruption , raw material orientation of the economy, financial and political dependence on the West. That is, the whole set of post-Soviet "charms".



In 1987 – 1988, a new distemper began - sluggish and dispersed, in contrast to the first two, and developing against the background of the process of reproduction of the decomposition of the late Soviet society, the utilization of its assets by a narrow group closely associated with foreign capital.


The choice of the group of Joseph the Terrible, as well as Ivan the Terrible, coincided with the country's national objectives. Today, Russia is approaching the fateful Dilemma of the Great Divide for the third time for the third time. By the middle of the 2010s, the Soviet legacy will be eaten (exactly to the 100 anniversary of October). We find ourselves at the third fork in our history. The choice is small - either national or criminal-plutocratic (with the collapse of the country, criminal clan wars, neo-Charias and neo-chords, the establishment of full external control) development options. In other words, the further development of the Russian Federation can go one of two ways.

Either the central government will solve system-wide problems at the expense of expropriation and deprivation of the population, which is fraught with an explosion and disintegration of the country.

Or due to the expropriation of a huge parasitic layer of corrupt officials and plutocrats. This, in turn, is fraught with intra-elite war with the connection to it of crime and ethnocracies within the country and external forces.

III

The logic of Russian history is not limited to internal regularities. There are regularities due to two more factors.

First, the interaction of Russia and the West, or rather, the waves of Russian history, the history of Russian systems with the cycles / waves of the capitalist system.

Secondly, the functioning of Russia as an element of the world whole (world-system, world system, global system).

In the history of the capitalist system there were three cycles of capital accumulation - Dutch, British and American. And respectively three hegemony - the Netherlands, Britain and the United States. Surprisingly, they correspond to the three cycles of accumulation of power (the main substance of Russian history, playing a role in it, similar to the role of capital in the history of the West) in Russia - Moscow, St. Petersburg and Soviet. The end of one cycle in the West and the beginning of another were accompanied by world wars for hegemony. In these wars, it was Russia - from the Napoleonic wars (the last round of the British-French World War) to the Second World War (apparently - the Anglo-Saxon-German war for world hegemony, the hidden essence of which was the American-British rivalry; at the same time, the USSR fought with the Anglo-Saxons against the Germans, and in the internal Anglo-Saxon struggle acted with the United States against Great Britain) - played a decisive role in determining the winner.

As for the logic of interaction of Russia with large geo-economic integrity, the picture is as follows. From the middle of the 15th century (weakening of the Horde’s grip) to the mid-19th century (the Crimean War), Russia was a special, separate from other world-system. In the "long 50-e" of the XIX century, the European world-system has become a world system - the only one. At the time of the start of this transformation, two more world-systems remained - Russian and Chinese. The coincidence in time of the Crimean and Second Opium Wars is not accidental: the goal is to destroy the integrity existing at that time as a world-system. Anglo-French aggressors - the Western core of the world system - did not manage to drive Russia into the borders of the beginning of the 17th century and turn China into a colony, however, the world-systems Russia and China ceased to be and began to turn into elements of the world system: the Qing empire became semi-colonial, and Russia - financially dependent while maintaining great European status. This was the contradiction of the development model of Russia, which, fixing the way Russia was included in the world system, existed from 1860 – 1870-s to the turn of 1920-1930-s. Conventionally, I call it the "model of Alexander II" (as well as the model of a "white" or "tricolor" empire). It was in his reign that its foundation was laid, precisely because of his policies in 1860 – 1870, she became irreversible (while maintaining the autocratic regime), and if Alexander III tried, sometimes not without success, to slow down her action, then with Nicholas The second inertia took its toll and it was fully realized, leading to the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, to the war on the side of the Entente, to the collapse of the autocracy and the “model of Alexander II” itself. And this is also no coincidence.


Vladimir Makovsky. Night lodgers Xnumx


The reforms of 1860, and then foreign capital, first of all financial, and also the world market, in which Russia joined, for the first time in its stories provided a mechanism for economic exploitation.


Objectively, this model assumed the increasing penetration of foreign capital, occupying the most important positions within the country, strengthening the financial dependence of the country and its economy on Western capital and, as a result, weakening foreign policy positions and even limiting sovereignty and international subjectivity. I'm not talking about the formation of west-like (west-like) dominant groups with an appropriate way of life and the impoverishment of the broad masses. There was also an increase in socio-economic polarization, an increase in social tension and political instability. The result - a revolution, the collapse of the country, civil war. With the hands of the Bolsheviks, Russian history signed the verdict of the “model of Alexander II”, the “model of the white empire”, the essence of which was, among other things, the loss of imperialism. “The nineteenth century,” noted Mikhail Menshikov, “should be considered a century of gradual and at the end an alarmingly rapid decline of welfare in Russia.” And he further emphasized that if no “change of energies” happens, the country will be ruined and captured by Western capital. The “change of energies” took place in the form of a revolution, during which the international socialist phase and strategy (1917 – 1927 / 29 years) changed the imperial socialist (1927 / 29 – 1939 years). The victory of the latter became the foundation of a different model of Russia's development.

Another - or rather, alternative - model of development of Russia in the world: Russia is not an element of the world system, but an alternative world system, an anti-system in relation to capitalist, systemic anti-capitalism. This model, which can be conventionally called the “Stalinist” model, or the model of the “red empire”, is possible only on the basis of technical, economic and financial independence from the capitalist world. And consequently, on the basis of a powerful military-industrial complex (MIC), significant autarky in relation to the outside world, a mobilization economy, a high degree of central authority control over the tops (up to the sphere of consumption) and the population as a whole. The result of the implementation of this model is the restoration of Russia's great-power status in the form of the USSR, the bipolar (Yalta) world, the second place of the USSR in the world economy, progress in science, technology and everyday structures (including such an absolute record as the mortality rate of 6 per thousand in 1960-s ).

Since the second half of the 1950-ies began the erosion of this system. The change in the type of its relations with the world capsystem has become an integral element of such erosion. The Soviet nomenclature decided to integrate the USSR into the world market. This was partly due to the desire to join the Western system of consumption, partly due to the economic success of the 1950's, the Soviet elite gained confidence that it would be able to defeat the West in its field - on the world market acting under the laws of capitalism.

From the middle of the 1950 of the USSR, the sale of oil sharply intensified. At first, for political reasons (the strike of Khrushchev on the “reactionary Arab regimes” on the advice of Nasser), but quite soon the economic interests of certain segments of the nomenclature began to play the main role, especially as the USSR’s technical and economic progress in the peaceful sector began to slow down and the USSR began to offer the world market is mainly raw materials - oil and gas. To an even greater degree, this process was spurred on by the 1973 crisis of the year (“oil shock”) and rising oil prices.

As a result, the country began to gradually turn into a raw materials appendage of the West, and financial dependence on it increased. That is, the USSR "taxied" to the "model of Alexander II," which objectively contradicted both the state of the anti-system and the great-power status. In real history, this contradiction was resolved by the collapse of Soviet communism, the destruction of the USSR and the return of the Russian world in a new round of history to the “model of Alexander II”.

At the turn of 1970 – 1980-s, with the beginning of the neoliberal counterrevolution, the process of real globalization started in the West. A necessary condition for its further development (as well as solving a number of problems dangerous for the capsystem) was the elimination of systemic anti-capitalism, the destruction of the USSR and the elimination of the Russian hotbed of world development. The Russian Federation as the largest fragment of the USSR turned out to be an element of the global system that arose (including on the bones of the USSR), and the element is financially dependent, specializing in the supply of raw materials, and therefore having limited sovereignty.

Thus, at the turn of the XX – XXI centuries, Russia reproduced the “model of Alexander II” of the “watershed” era (1870 – 1920-s) only in a more rigid form and in much less favorable geopolitical conditions to maintain its great-power status. The epoch of the “watershed” was the struggle for hegemony in the capsystem, the era of confrontation between the two sovereign blocks. The West was not united, and this created a space for maneuver to Alexander III, Nicholas II, and later to Stalin. At the turn of the XX – XXI centuries, the West acts as a single bloc led by the United States - the only superpower. In other words, before Russia, as well as at the turn of the XIX – XX centuries, the same dilemma.


Boris Kustodiev. In the bed. Xnumx



The development of capitalist forms in Russia proceeded mainly from above, this could not “economize” - and therefore oligarchize - the very power that began to oligarchise-rot from within, and this became one of the main reasons for its death.


Either rejection of the commodity orientation, the acquisition of full sovereignty and the restoration of great-power status by what Menshikov called the "change of energy."

Either the deepening of commodity specialization, strengthening of financial and political dependence, loss of sovereignty and the division of the country by predators and aliens. Postponing the dilemma for a short time allows the presence of two factors - nuclear weapons and persistent Soviet human material.

Thus, alternating types / phases of development are clearly distinguished in the Russian history of the last centuries:

  • independent world-system (1450 – 1850 years);
  • dependent element of the world capitalism system (1860 – 1920-ies);
  • independent world system of socialism (systemic anti-capitalism) (1930 – 1980-s);
  • dependent element of the global system (1990-e - the beginning of the 2010-s).

    IV

    There is an interesting correlation between internal and external types / phases of the development of Russia. Thus, the phases of Russian history in which it acts as a dependent element of larger systems — the world and global, an element of the world and global market — are characterized by a sharp increase in the exploitation of the population by the “three-headed dragon” - the Serpent Gorynych: power, local capital and foreign (western) capital. And as we remember, the westernization of the upper ranks in Russia has always been carried out at the expense of alienating not only the surplus product, but also part of the necessary, which meant social regression. And it is natural. In a society with a strong economic basis (nature is a geographical factor and productive forces - and production), increased exploitation can become a factor of progress in a certain time perspective. In a society with a weak economic basis, this leads to a regression of the lower classes and at the same time to the degradation of the upper levels, to the decomposition of power (center-to-top), that is, to the decline and death of the system as a whole. In the phases in question, not only is there a progressive weakening of power, but its oligarchization and decay occur.

    The phases of functioning of Russia as a dependent element of world systems coincide with distemper and revolution in Russia or, at least, with pre-momentum. Increased exploitation drains the capabilities of socium, which creates a small social product in terms of volume and level, and squanders the material potential of the system; there is a devouring of the heritage of the previous epoch, hence the crisis phenomena, unrest (sluggish or turning into revolution) and the emergence of the Dilemma of the Great Redistribution (1565, 1929 years).

    The inclusion of Russia in the world system as a dependent element both times occurred in the conditions of not only Russian, but also the world crisis, its growth, which further deepened, expanded and accelerated the Russian crisis, sharpening the contradictions it exposed. At the same time, it was precisely the situation of world crises that allowed Russia to jump out of historical traps, create a new system, on the basis of which it would enter a new stage of development.

    So, after the Troubles of the early 17th century, Russia could be taken barehanded, but the Thirty Years War raging in Europe from 1618 to 1648 provided the Russians with time to inhale, and autocracy - locus standi (fulcrum, place to become, lat.) And field of employment.

    After the reforms of Peter the Great, which were carried out in a regime of almost pogrom and which were quasi-muted, initiated by part of the upper strata, Russia was in a difficult position. However, the European wars for various “legacies” took the threat by several decades, and by the end of the 1750-s, Russia was already strong again and could beat Frederick II.


    A still from the film “Oligarch” directed by Pavel Lungin. Xnumx


    In the 1980, and especially in the 1990, a certain part of the nomenclature (as well as some of the shadow businesses and criminals) turned into a class of owners, almost complete oligarchization occurred, and to a large extent the criminalization of power.


    After the civil war, economically destroyed Russia did not have an efficient army. But the tangle of contradictions 1920 – 1930-s in the West - between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans, between the Americans and the British, between the Rockefellers and the Rothschilds, as well as the man-made crisis of 1929 – 1933 - allowed Stalin and the forces behind them to use these contradictions to crush the left-wing globalism - adherents of the world revolution - and to begin “the building of socialism in one single country”. That is, to implement the project of the “red empire” on the basis of systemic anti-capitalism.

    In the 2010-s, the world is rapidly moving toward an unprecedented crisis that can destroy Russia, but it can also give it a chance to jump out of a historic trap, as has already happened. To do this, of course, we need political will and an understanding of the nature of the coming crisis and its prospects.

    V

    The world is about to cover a wave of financial and economic crisis of tremendous destructive power. In the Middle East, in fact, there is already a war that threatens to become at least regional, but the maximum is not excluded. The zone of military chaos is widening in Africa, from where scary news comes about armies of cannibals fighting with cold weapons and horrifying the population of the places where they roll. The climate is changing, and in a direction unfavorable to homo sapiens. Yes, and the man himself adds something from himself, using seismic weapons, launching unprecedented and indestructible bacteria that can rebuild the food chains of the world’s ocean so that it does not seem to be enough.

    All imaginable contradictions between:

  • globalization and de-globalization (disintegration of the world into macro-regions);
  • the continuing neoliberal development strategy and the growing anti-liberal course;
  • state bureaucracies and financial capital (pulling the strings of supranational bureaucracies);
  • the Rothschild and Rockefeller clusters (despite their symbolic creation of a common fund this year);

    The United States and China (and within these countries - between different clans: in the USA, for example, the clans that promoted Obama, and their opponents, in the PRC - the Beijing and Shanghai clans).

    Finally, last but not least, there is a contradiction (more precisely, contradictions) between out of the shadow due to the severity of the crisis and somehow closed (secret) societies claiming about themselves. Apparently, the "water truce" between them, which lasted several centuries, ended, and with it the time of silence, Silanum. There are a lot of “footprints” (footprints always remain - “who is not blind, he sees,” as Laurent Beria used to say): this is the arrest of Strauss-Kahn, the destruction of Gaddafi, and much more.

    In the coming years, we will face a wave resonance of crises - military, financial-economic, and natural-climatic. By the latter, I mean the attenuation of the Gulf Stream and the next (once in 11,5 – 12,5 millennia) restructuring of the planet with a duration of 2,5 centuries (XX - first half of XXII centuries, active phase: end of 1990's - first half of 2030's).

    The natural and climatic crisis (many experts even talk about the threat of a geoclimatic and geophysical catastrophe) is superimposed on the financial and economic crisis, which in fact is a manifestation of a systemic crisis of capitalism.

    From the crisis always go beyond someone's account. And now the North Atlantic power elites are planning to emerge from the crisis at the expense of the rest of the world, and above all at the expense of Northern Eurasia, that is, Russia - its wealth, its spaces, its population. This may be the logical conclusion of the development trends of the capitalist system from the third quarter of the XIX century.

    Here we come to a very important aspect of Russian and world development, without analysis of which we will understand little in the past and in the present. The bottom line is that the anti-Russian phase in the history of the capitalist system began in the 1880 – 1890s. At the same time, there was a qualitative change in the organization and internal struggle of supranational structures of world governance - a change associated with the Russian and German issues.


    Konstantin Makovsky. Kiss rite (feast of the boyar Morozov). Xnumx


    The uncontrolled consumption of the upper ranks and the exploitation of the population by it created prerequisites for crises that the interested forces (including those behind the cordon) turned into turmoil and revolution (1905, 1917 years).


    By the end of the XIX century, the world was almost completely divided - there were practically no free resource territories. The only huge territory with almost untapped innumerable wealth (source of raw materials) and a huge population (potential sales market) remained Russia. She also seemed to Western elites — especially after the defeat of the 1877 – 1878 war in the Crimean War, and the Russian diplomats gave up their positions to the British bluffing at the Berlin 1878 of the year — weak enough to succumb to pressure. It can be said that the whole world history from 1880-s to the present day revolves around the axis “the struggle for the North-Eurasian space”, “the struggle for the Russian resources - against Russia”. The subject of this struggle were the Anglo-Saxons - first the British, who were quickly joined by the "cousins" - the Americans. From the point of view of the West as a single financial and political whole, as the core of the world capsystem, in fact, the whole history of such a struggle against 1880 – 1890-s has an offensive anti-Russian, anti-Russian character. Here it is necessary to distinguish three stages.

    The first is 1880 – 1920's. The struggle was waged with economic and geopolitical goals: the establishment of economic control over Russian resources, the weakening of Russia. The maximum program is the division of Russia into spheres of economic influence. At the turn of 1910 – 1920-s, these tasks were almost completed, but Stalin’s team and those behind it managed to break the game of world globalists — left and right — to curtail the “world revolution” project and start rebuilding an empire not on “white "Or" tricolor ", not on autocratic capitalist, but on a" red "anti-capitalist basis.

    The second is 1930 – 1980's. The struggle against the USSR is not only as an object of economic desires and not only as a geopolitical adversary, but also as an alternative to capitalism model of social and historical development and as a competitor on the world market (as Margaret Thatcher admits, even in 1980-ies!).

    The third - from 1990-s - return to the type of struggle 1880 – 1920-s: Russia is the object of establishing control over its resources (the task is at least de facto dividing the country into spheres of influence) and a geopolitical opponent in the zone of the former USSR and a small number of regions of the world. At the end of the 1980s, the western tops turned out to be something that did not work out in the first quarter of the 20th century. However, the destruction of the USSR is only the first step towards the expropriation of Russian resources and spaces. The next step is to establish control over the world community.

    Conversations that Russia unfairly owned such wealth alone did not begin in the 1980 – 1990-s, but a century earlier. In the 1884 year, at a conference in Berlin, the Western powers made a decision: those countries that themselves cannot master their resources or do it too slowly should “open up to the world”, and if they don’t want to do it in good faith, then they must be forced to such a step. Formally, it was stated that we are talking about Africa, but Africa did not have to be “discovered” - it was already “opened” already without any special solutions. In fact, it was the “black mark” of Russia. However, Alexander III showed restraint and was not scared. Then the Western capital went the other way. With the help of his agent of influence (primarily Sergei Witte, associated with the Rothschilds and other representatives of Jewish, British and French capital), he managed to implant Russia on a financial igloo, rapidly accelerate the growth of its financial dependence on international capital, rigidly sticking to the French, and then British foreign policy interests. The resources of Russia began to gradually pass into the hands of foreign capital, and the country began to turn into a raw materials appendage of the West, losing to it politically.

    The political loss of Russia to the West at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries is associated not only with the economy. First and foremost, Russia lost in the battle of the elites, more precisely, in the organization of the ruling groups. She didn’t have a world-class organization like the Western European (with the Americans ’connection at the beginning of the 20th century) ruling elites, the organization that could influence and direct world processes.

    In the "long 50-e" of the XIX century, the European world-system has evolved into a world system. This has led to major shifts in the organization of dominant groups. Over the course of several decades, they have created powerful supranational structures for world coordination and management. That is, in essence, took shape in the form of a fundamentally new subject of historical development. This subject, relying on the financial and economic power of the largest Western banks (first of all, primarily Rothschild), the political power of states and control of the media, did not advertise their actions, worked in the shadow, using secret and secret societies of the past (Freemasonry) or creating over time New organizations - Anglo-Saxon political clubs, organizations such as the Rhodes "Group" ("We"), other structures of the Anglo-American establishment. Actually, the whole real (that is, not for the profane) history of the last one and a half centuries must be rewritten at an angle from the point of view of the activities of this particular subject, his political economy, and sociology.

    In the first third of the twentieth century, these closed supranational structures, which had previously and significantly influenced the governments of individual countries, states and their policies, were able to subjugate state-level structures by becoming over them (milestones: the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, man-made Great Depression 1929 – 1933's). The balance of forces in the symbiosis of "supranational structures (" backstage ") - the state" began to change significantly in favor of the former. And although the form of capital that emerged in 1920-ies, was called “state-monopoly capital”, there is no need to harbor illusions: supranational associations played a decisive role, with the first violin being the old aristocracy, financiers and major industrialists. Moreover, this trend has intensified in the course of the twentieth century. But already at the turn of the XIX – XX centuries, the supranational structures of world governance were strong enough to lead the world to a world war, in which their interests coincided with the geopolitical and economic interests of Great Britain, or rather the British Empire. The common interest was the crushing of Germany as a world economic competitor and the division of Russia. The means is a world war in which it was supposed to set off Germany and Russia. Thus, if Russia was the main resource target, then Germany was the main political and economic resource. Moreover, the political aspect was originally connected mainly not with the state of the Second Reich, but with German secret societies — lodges and actually German closed organizations such as Geheime Deutschland (“Secret Germany”).

    At the turn of 1970 – 1980-ies, with the beginning of the neoliberal counterrevolution, the process of real globalization started in the West, which required the elimination of systemic anti-capitalism, the destruction of the USSR and the elimination of the Russian hotbed of world development.


    VI

    From the middle of the 18th century, the German lodges developed in close contact - and if not under control, then under the direction - of the British continental lodges (not to be confused with insular). As noted by Raoul de Rennes, island lodges educate their members in a patriotic, traditionalist, national spirit. Continental British lodges orient their members to the fight against tradition for the sake of liberal and universal values. The activities of island lodges are of a much more secret nature, although at the highest level, lodges of both types can be managed by the same persons. For a century, the process of strengthening the German lodges under the British umbrella went on, the British encouraged the Prussians to gather German lands, hoping to create a strong counterweight to France and Russia in Europe (as was the case with Frederick II during the Seven Years 1756 – 1763 war), controlled by lodges. The French "brothers", also led by continental boxes, actively contributed to the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war and the triumph of the German "brothers". However, after the victory, the Germans abruptly changed the rules of the game.

    First, they, in fact, severed ties with the British continental boxes.

    Secondly, they united almost all German lodges into a single all-state union (“Secret Germany”), which covered the whole country.

    Thus, the Germans created at the same time both statehood (the Second Reich) and a closed (secret) organization focused on world governance. The second, more important, is overlooked, although it was a direct challenge to the British continental, and most importantly - island lodges.

    The British response was not long in coming. Already at the end of the Bismarck Decade, in 1888, it was decided to create an anti-German bloc in Europe from Russia and France, using the latter as a bait for Russia, and then, pushing Germany and Russia, destroy them both. In the preparation of the Franco-Russian alliance in the interests of the British, the Vatican played a significant role, which strongly owed the Rothschilds. The complication of the world situation — the German challenge and the preparation of the Anglo-Saxons for the solution of the Russian question, as well as the weakening of British hegemony — completed the second stage of the development of closed societies (1780 – 1870-s, first - mid-XVII century - 1780-s). To fight against Germany and Russia, new structures of this type were required.

    At the very end of 1890, the first psycho-historical blow was struck in Germany: in the pages of The Truth magazine (Truth), which belonged to Henry Lyabusher, a British statesman and politician, member of the Great Masonic Lodge of England, the Kaiser Son was published, and attached to it is a map. Instead of the Second Reich on the map - “German Republics”, instead of Austria-Hungary - “Austrian Republics”, next to it is the “Polish Republic”, and in the place of the Russian Empire there is the “Russian Desert”. All this, the pamphlet said, is the result of a revolution in Germany. Wilhelm, thrown from his throne, travels by train to the UK, his last shelter is the workhouse.

    In fact, the pamphlet and the map set forth a plan which, being a self-fulfilling forecast, was fully implemented in 1914 – 1918 for Germany and Austria-Hungary and began to be implemented for Russia until Stalin broke this scheme.

    Ironically, the presence of the German factor in the world secret and explicit policy allowed Russia, despite the two hardest "German" wars, to play on intra-Western contradictions, largely hampered the Anglo-Saxons against Russia (as well as the US-British rivalry 1920 – 1940- s) After 1945, the situation has changed. The Soviet Union was opposed by a united West with its supranational structures of world government — the USSR had none. At that time, the West developed its supranational structures and created new ones, adapting to the changing world and setting the task of “strangle the USSR in its arms” (strategy of the Trilateral Commission). The post-Stalinist Soviet elite (unlike Stalin, who understood who really opposes him under the mask of the “West”) did not realize what type of subject he was fighting against the USSR, perfecting the forms of his organization and methods of struggle, each time outstripping the Soviet opponent, at least one step. It was the presence of this global subject that helped the US state, which lost the economic game of the USSR at the end of 1960, did not collapse into 1970 (“the worst decade of American history”). And at the end of the 1980s, it allowed not only to withstand, but also to bring down the USSR by creating in it an economically interested layer in eliminating the systemic anti-capitalism of the stratum - the Soviet segment of the global corporatocracy.



    Apparently, the “water truce” between closed (secret) societies, which lasted several centuries, has ended, and with it the time of silence, Silanum. There are quite a few “tracks”: this is the arrest of Strauss-Kan, and the destruction of Gaddafi, and much more.


    The destruction of the USSR, in the form of which historical Russia existed, turned the page of the struggle of the West against the Russian alternative to world development — anti-capitalism — and turned the West to the solution of the task to dismantle capitalism at home and establish direct control over Russian space and Russia’s resources last. True, today this is hampered by China, which, again by the irony of history, gained power by taking advantage of the confrontation between the USSR and the USA and inviting them to be the last in the 1970-s to become their “workshop”. Nevertheless, on the whole, the situation at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries typologically returned to the situation at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. However, one very serious circumstance arose, which was not a hundred years ago and which radically changes the situation - Russian and global.

    VII

    I mean overlapping, overlapping several waves of crises at once, the main of which are the systemic crisis of capitalism and the looming geoclimatic crisis. Experts unanimously argue that in the conditions of the geoclimatic crisis and in the post-crisis world, the only stable and resource-secure zone will be Northern Eurasia, that is, Russia, which thus becomes the main "prize" of the 21st century.

    Wishing to receive this prize is enough. Among them are Americans, Europeans, Arabs, Chinese, Japanese, and the people of India should not be discounted. At the same time, Russia's weakness must be taken into account. And as the saying goes the American special forces, if you look like food, you will sooner or later be eaten. Forces of the same American special forces. And at the beginning of the XXI century, this is done almost without disguise. This is evident both in the statements of politicians and in the direction of research of the largest Anglo-American scientific structures, traditionally playing a significant role in the intellectual supply of world governance. At the end of 2011, the Brookings Institution and the London School of Economics completed a three-year work on the “Internal Displacement Project” - exploring the possibilities of mass relocation of the North Atlantic zone to calmer regions due to climate change. The project included a cyber seminar: “Preparing for relocation and resettlement associated with large climate migration and adaptation projects”. And this is just an open project and seminar.

    Control over Russian wealth will allow the North Atlantic elites, dismantling capitalism, to extend their domination (due to the development and consumption of the resources of Northern Eurasia) for a hundred years, if not more. In fact, the battle for Eurasia - the last Big Hunt of the capitalist era - has already begun: according to the logic of indirect actions, not in Northern Eurasia, but nearby, in the Middle East.

    At the same time, the North Atlanticists, as they usually do, will try to solve several problems at once - to fragment the Greater Middle East into several dozen states, to channel the energy of Islamism against Russia and the PRC. The latter will make it possible to deprive the Arab world of domestic economic and demographic power, and then turn it into a non-traditional ghetto that does not have the resources and technology.

    VIII

    What to do in this situation? What trends and world development options to use? There are two such macro trends.

    The first is globalization, about which we are told that it is supposedly inevitable, objective, the command of the times. What is objective is yes, in the sense that it expresses certain class interests. The rest is a lie. Globalization is a man-made process, its goal is to establish control of certain forces over the world, previously cleaned and unified for such domination. Henry Kissinger frankly stated that globalization is a new term (instead of imperialism) for American dominance.

    Globalization is a well controlled space from several centers of the North Atlantic and, possibly, Eastern Pacific, where civilization, national and cultural-historical differences are erased, where the monopoly on high technology, information and resources of some zones and groups and on raw materials specialization and poverty are firmly fixed. - others, where the tops and bottoms differ from each other almost like species (appearance, height, health, life expectancy). But in order to become globalized and conform to the designs of its designers, the modern world must undergo major changes - first of all, its population should be reduced by 80 – 90 percent (in fact, this task is no longer hidden, the UN and other international organizations have subscribed to it).



    Since 1880, the whole world history revolves around the axis “the struggle for the Northern Eurasian space”, “the struggle for the Russian resources - against Russia”.
    The subject of this struggle were the Anglo-Saxons.


    How this is planned to be achieved is another question. There is a lot of money - from GMOs and other genetic “tricks” and newer bacteria (such as those used in the Gulf of Mexico supposedly to destroy spilled oil) to completely traditional ways - wars (including new religious wars using, for example, Islamists), famine, new migration of nations. The important thing is that the globalitarian world is a world that is planned to be mopped up, and its population to selective forced culling. Russia and the Russians are among those whom globalization does not promise anything good.

    The second macro tendency is de-globalization, the disintegration of the single world into macroregional blocks. If globalization presupposes the preservation of the neoliberal course in the British style and the slow dismantling of capitalism, the disintegration of the world into macroregional blocs means the triumph of the anti-liberal course in the economy (and in politics too), accelerated dismantling of capitalism and the construction of a new social system. Such a system will be based on control over information, and in it the appropriation of intellectual labor, an intellectual product (control of behavior and resources, I’m not talking about) will play a system-forming role.

    At the same time, both trends are developing - globalization (mainly inertial) and deglobalization, which is gaining momentum. Intertwined, globalization and its antipode generate complex, sometimes strange and ugly forms that make it difficult not only to understand, but even to describe and perceive reality.

    The collapse of the global system has already begun; the outlines of the macroregional blocs have already arisen, for some of which - the press already writes about this - the former empires are guessed: Germanic (variants: the empire of Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Empire, the Third Reich), the British, Ottoman. Neo-imperial outlines acquire the United States and China. Behind these formations, it is quite possible that much more ancient than empires lurk, organizations of the order type. It is clear that the collapse of a united world will not be peaceful - there are too few resources on earth and too many contradictions. It is also clear that no matter which version of the “brief history of the future” (Jacques Attali) wins - globally liberal or deglobal-anti-liberal — the nature, form of organization and management style of the new ruling stratum will be qualitatively different. Yes, and the social system will be different from the current one. In this case, both options suggest a serious reduction in the population of the planet. In the struggle for the resources of the weak, they will mercilessly erase with the Eraser of History - physically.

    How to survive (minimum program) and win (maximum program) in a crumbling world? How to resist those in whose hands are power, property, information and the centuries-old experience of successful world games and world management, that is, a powerful organization? The organization can only be opposed by an organizational weapon - a more perfect one. And this also requires an adequate governmental and organizational (in the twentieth century, it was said: state-political) form.

    The form in question, on the one hand, should have the potential to resist globalization, stopping it at its gates, and then turning back and not allowing the waves of globalitarian “progress” to close over it. On the other hand, it must skillfully resist the macroregional blocks into which the world is being split, using them as allies in confronting globalists.

    This form, unfortunately, can not be a national state. It is largely deliberately undermined by globalization and globalists. In addition, the nation-state that has existed for 100 – 150 years has generated a number of contradictions that it cannot solve under current conditions. Finally, in the modern world, only a state with a population of at least 250 – 350 million people is able to function normally, to be economically independent. There are very few national states with such a population. In addition, some of them are poorly endowed with resources, others are militarily vulnerable, and still others are a combination of administrative and ethnopolitical units than a single state unit. The era of nation-states is over - and, in fact, has already ended. Something more is needed than a nation state, but something less than globomir. This average value can only be a macro-region, into the totality of which the global system that has not been fully formed is already falling apart - and this is the tendency that needs to be saddled.


    Pavel Ryzhenko. Farewell Sovereign with the troops. Xnumx


    The political loss of Russia to the West at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries is associated not only with the economy. First and foremost, Russia lost in the battle of the elites, more precisely, in the organization of the ruling groups.


    IX

    The new form in question seems to be imperous education (IPO), which the Eurasian Union can become - of course, if it is built seriously, responsibly and with long-term goals, and not for cutting the dough and creating favorable conditions for "our" oligarchs. The main thing is not to be afraid of the first part of the phrase - “impero”, the words “empire”. We are not talking about the restoration of an empire or something like the USSR - nothing can be restored in history, and the time of empires has passed. It is necessary to have a unitary supranational formation combining vertical hierarchical and network principles of organization, which is a super concern and a super state at the same time. The core of the IPO - more precisely, the outer contour of the core - should be the military-industrial complex, the army, special services and the scientific complex that has undergone fundamental changes. However, the military-industrial complex, the army and special services are subject to fundamental changes - in their present condition they are hardly able to respond to the challenges of our time. This applies to armies and intelligence agencies around the world. It is no coincidence that in the most developed countries, reforms of the army began (in the direction of strengthening the special forces) and special services (a focus on combating network structures). Well and, of course, requires a fundamentally new knowledge about the world and man - with new disciplines and forms of organization. In the XXI century, whoever manages to create such forms will win.

    The most powerful psychohistorical weapon in the world struggle for power, information and resources was and remains the real picture of the world. The problem, however, is that today neither the science of society and man in the form in which it was formed in the twentieth century (disciplines, methods, concepts), nor the special services in the form in which they developed in the twentieth century, do not give adequate picture of the world. Analytical units of special services are not ready to work with a huge array of open information, which today is often much more important than other secret information. They are not engaged in the analysis of long-term mass processes, regularities and laws of history, without which the analysis of modern processes and the prediction of future are impossible. However, less and less is engaged in such an analysis - and therefore social science knowledge oriented toward those sources that slip under his nose is becoming more and more de-theoretized. Virtually incapable of including in the research field an array of indirect data, it is limited to the level of phenomena (not entities), not to mention the hidden reality. A new type of knowledge is needed, a new (in preparation) type of his personifier (and therefore a new type of education), a new form of rational knowledge organization.

    I call this knowledge and its forms cognitive-intelligence, or cognitive-analytical. The purpose of such knowledge and its structures is not only the process of knowledge, but also the provision of cognitive, conceptual security of society. Cognitive-analytical structures should work closely with what can be conventionally called the "service of imperial security." But this is all - the external contour of the IPO. The internal contour, internal core should be a structure of the Neo-Orden type, combining vertical hierarchical and network principles and focused on activities at the world management level. Without the presence of such structures, there is nothing to sit at the world card table - the experience of the USSR demonstrated this with all obviousness. The Soviet Union lost, first of all, not for economic or military reasons, but because the Soviet elite did not have a high-quality, self-centered (neo) order-like organization, with the result that part of the elite from a certain moment began to attempt to integrate into other structures and look for owners there - in vain, strangers in such structures do not take.

    In contrast to the West, in the history of Russia, in fact, there were no organizations directing the course of world historical development. The exceptions are the Comintern, which was largely an international left-globalization, not a Russian organization, and Stalin’s “red empire” that existed for a very short historical period, and for the most part was in a state of defense - however, it was active and very successful.



    As noted by Raoul de Rennes, island lodges educate their members in a patriotic, traditionalist spirit. Continental British lodges orient their members to the fight against tradition for the sake of liberal and universal values.


    It must be said that in Russian history there is generally no tradition of creating closed order-type structures. The only attempt of this kind was slandered by the enemies of Russia and simply the imbeciles of the oprichnina science. The role and importance of this organization in our history has yet to be comprehended - as well as the Bolshevik party (in the strict sense of the word) and Stalin's personal intelligence. Having existed for all 7 years and turned into a Gosudarev court, the oprichnina did not become an order, but nevertheless created one of the most important principles of the Russian government, if not the most important - the oprichnaya opposing the oligarchic and neutralizing it (primarily metaphysically - well, and when necessary, it is not only "meta"). I suppose that only the introduction of something similar to a neo-primary is necessary for the creation of both a neo-root and an IPO - the principle should be materialized, structured. Only structures of the neo-original type, operating strictly in accordance with the law, can crush corruption and crime, solve the problem of the “fifth column”, ensure the return of society to systemic self-restraint, which is determined by the level and volume of the social product created. Someone will say: how is it practically possible? Can we even expect this, given today's realities? And who, I will answer the question with a question, at the beginning of 1560's, expected that Ivan IV would introduce the oprichnina, turn into a formidable - Terrible! - reign and fall upon a part of the ruling elite? Who in 1920-s expected that Stalin, using the oprichny principle, would eliminate the Leninist and Trotskyist teams, would fall upon the guardsmen of the cardinals of the world revolution and stop the process of decomposition of the authorities eaten by the NEP? Why did they do it, insanely risking and balancing on a razor blade - historical? Life made. The logic of circumstances, which, as the same Stalin noted, is stronger than the logic of intentions. But the circumstances were simple: the wasted legacy of the previous era and the need to make a choice - at the expense of whom to make a breakthrough into the future. Hence - the split of the elite, oprichnina, etc. And if neo-primordial life is destined to be born, it will also arise from and through the split of the dominant groups against the background of the exhaustion of the Soviet legacy in terms of the wave resonance of the Russian and global crises.

    The time of parties and states leaves irrevocably, if not already gone. However, even during their heyday, both of them, as a rule, were only functions, tools or just the facades of closed structures - lodges, clubs, societies, etc. In the coming epoch, screens and facades are no longer as necessary as before, masks are increasingly being dropped, and those that were previously in the shadows are entering the arena. However, no matter how obvious the presence of new and old closed societies in the world of the XXI century, they still need the external form. And the most likely form of this kind for the entire crisis period of the XXI century, apparently, will be the IPO.

    At the same time, the complicated reality, the demands of the new era, the exceptionally high stakes of the World Game, dictate the need to form a new type of closed structures of world governance - a new stage in their development begins. Among other things, it will require from the neo-Orden structures a sharp increase in their participation in wars of meanings and for meanings, in the creation of new semantic constructions instead of gone or gone - ideologies, religions, projects. Neo-Orden structures will have to create their own traditions, and possibly new civilizations. But this is already beyond the crisis of the XXI century, it is closer to the “noon of the XXII century” - a very far prospect. First you need to survive the crisis and get out of it the winner or one of the winners.

    Of course, the attempt to create neo-Orden structures is an insecure thing. This means a direct conflict with the current “masters of history,” as Benjamin Disraeli called them, who knew firsthand what he was talking about. We have already mentioned above how the British lodges and clubs punished the Germans for their attempt to create closed structures of world government. In Russian history at the end of 1940, the very beginning of 1950, Stalin, relying on personal intelligence and the potential of the USSR, made an attempt to enter the world game as a completely independent force (the course to undermine the dollar, the application for the creation of an alternative world market). I have no doubt that this was one of the reasons for the leader’s assassination: at the very end of 1940, as part of Liote - the indefinite program of struggle against the Soviet Union - MI-6 and the CIA created How to make Stalin Stalin. "

    After Stalin’s death, an application for an independent world game was attempted by Beria relying on his special committee (the course for the reunification of two Germanies, some other events). His fate is also known - I suppose, and it is connected not only with the internal struggle for power.

    In accordance with the cyclical pattern of world history, the Russian Federation, together with the world, enters a military era, a new era of wars - not world, not global (like the cold war), but world-wide, focal. The main prize of these wars is Northern Eurasia, Russia: resources, space, but without people. That is, without us. And the era begins, which looks like a return to the distant past, but on a modern technical basis - the era of futuroarchy with neo-empires, neo-Ordinians and many others, "which our sages have not dreamed of." Coming Very Serious Game - on the departure from the History.

    Let's play?
  • Author:
    Andrei Fursov
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