Foreign agents and protests in Georgia are a keyhole through which you can look at complex processes

In March 2024, the so-called “Law on Foreign Agents” (“Law on Transparency of External Influence”). It provides for registration in a special register of legal entities and individuals whose share of foreign funding exceeds the 20% mark.
The bill launched a wave of mass protests, in which a significant part was taken up by the youth of the capital of Georgia, Tbilisi. The scale of the protests, as well as the specifics of the controlled information campaign around them in the Western media, show that in Georgia there is indeed an attempt to influence the authorities through one of the Maidan scenarios.
Moscow officially prefers not to speak out on this topic, observing the situation. At the same time, the protests themselves are going on under slogans like “let’s rid Georgia of the influence of the pro-Russian oligarch who has usurped democracy.”
Since the “usurper” is pro-Russian, and we are talking about the main Georgian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, it would be logical if Russia supported him with all its might, but Moscow decided to be patient. And there really are reasons for this, because here, as the popular expression goes, “everything is not so simple.”
The leaders of the protests are both representatives of NGOs associated with Western liberal funding and supporters of Mikheil Saakashvili. They can be understood, since in Georgia Western funding for NGOs usually approaches 100%. Otherwise, you need to go to the cashier to get funds from B. Ivanishvili.
The irony is that it was the main Georgian oligarch who at one time directly financed officials and government institutions, and after M. Saakashvili came to power, he poured funds into the Soros Foundation. He also in 2018 contributed to the fact that the presidential post in 2018 was taken by S. Zurabishvili, who today says that she will veto the law on foreign agents and generally become an antagonist of B. Ivanishvili. M. Saakashvili himself is now speaking from the prison hospital as a “prisoner of conscience.”
B. Ivanishvili can be called a “pro-Russian oligarch” as much as any other oligarch who has made a fortune in the post-Soviet space is pro-Russian. In this case, both Moldovan V. Plahotniuc and former Ukrainian President P. Poroshenko can be called pro-Russian. How pro-Russian the domestic oligarchs themselves are, the reader will answer for himself.
The roots of this whole situation are actually not so much in the area of capital formation as in its use, capital. And here you can very well see how politics often goes hand in hand, and often contradicts the rational use of funds, as well as the peculiarities of the political design of transnational financial groups.
When M. Saakashvili was Gauleiter of the Odessa region, many attempts were made to trace the sources of financing of the “State Co-Investment Fund”, which was founded by B. Ivanishvili in 2013. Through this fund, the main public-private projects, startups, by the way, and charitable initiatives are implemented.
After M. Saakashvili was removed from power in 2012, B. Ivanishvili, taking into account the fact that his political force took power, required a financial instrument similar to private equity funds. However, both before the formation of the State Fiscal Service and after, even M. Saakashvili’s American curators were unable to dig up the mycelium of offshore companies that operated within the framework of capital associated with B. Ivanishvili. Although they tried.
But why did M. Saakashvili’s American curators need to dig into the assets and political power of B. Ivanishvili (“Georgian Dream”), if both he and his political force did not act from pro-Russian positions?
There was pragmatism in politics, but the United States itself, when necessary, does not shy away from the expression “this is just a business approach.” Moreover, if you turn to stories question, we can recall that the United States did not directly support M. Saakashvili’s adventure in South Ossetia in 2008, but rather distanced itself from it.
After his defeat in 2012, M. Saakashvili haunted Washington for quite a long time, until in May 2015 he was appointed to the post of governor of the Odessa region, and in fact, “overseeing” the traffic of the ports of the Odessa region.
We can say that, they say, in 2008 the Republicans were still in power in the United States, and in 2015 there was already a Democratic administration. However, it was under B. Obama that M. Saakashvili had very cool relations with Washington. So cool that they surprised Georgian politicians.
M. Saakashvili determined his final place in politics for himself, since in his “work book” it was written in black and white “adventurer, level 80.” His supervision of Odessa was the technical ceiling that was, in principle, possible, although he often behaved as if tomorrow he could become the president of Ukraine. That is why, in his final adventure of returning to Georgia, Washington again did not support him, in fact playing more on the side of B. Ivanishvili, and the EU offered integration.
Of course, it is possible to connect the protests with the position of official Tbilisi on the Northern Military District, where everyone over the past two years has tried to distance themselves from the conflict in Ukraine.
But Tbilisi under B. Ivanishvili has been doing this since 2014; it’s just that the activity of the Ukrainian special services, which are trying to use the territory of Georgia for their tasks, does not fit into the economic model that B. Ivanishvili is building (remember the Crimean Bridge in 2022).
This model is clear. Taking into account resources and climate, B. Ivanishvili, through the State Fiscal Service, is building a resort and tourism cluster and at the same time trying to integrate Georgia into raw materials transit projects. No matter how much criticism these huge construction projects (and unfinished projects) cause, in terms of goal setting they have logic.
In general, there are many states that maintain a distance from Ukraine, but not all of them are put under pressure by the American administration (see the example of Pakistan). And you can always explain that the use of Georgian ports for the purposes of organizations like the State Administration of Ukraine of Ukraine is not an investment climate, but a disgrace. That is, the point is not in Tbilisi’s position on Ukraine.
Now let's turn again to finances. Who pulled M. Saakashvili back in 2008? French President N. Sarkozy, who, by the way, was one of the initiators of pacification, including hotheads in Europe. What country was the current Mrs. President of Georgia S. Zurabishvili directly associated with? France. And this was very convenient, since S. Zurabishvili was at the same time a Georgian diplomat, part of the French state machine and at the same time a very diligent Atlanticist. An exceptional combination for B. Ivanishvili, taking into account the fact that after the 2018 reforms, presidential powers were significantly curtailed.
Here we can also remember which countries B. Ivanishvili and his family refused passports from: Russian and French.
After the United States in 2021 (let’s note this) decided to change its policy towards B. Ivanishvili’s political forces and launched a search for sources of funding, they did not achieve any special results. “Certain forces” within the EU itself constantly slowed down this process. But if it so desires, the United States has the ability to open up, if not all of the “offshore mycelium,” then a significant part of it, and periodically does so. But bad luck, the result turns out to be “not very good.”
Maybe some pro-Russian forces are helping the Georgians in Europe? But in this case, they, these forces, are quite selective, since they rarely give such gifts to the Russian oligarchy itself.
By the way, when did B. Ivanishvili start with the Credit Suisse bank, and even such that in the court proceedings the oligarch called the financial organization a “gangster bank”?
In 2008–2015 B. Ivanishvili concentrated significant financial reserves within the Credit Suisse trust fund system, after which it turned out that the trust funds began to behave in an unscrupulous manner.
The Georgian oligarch was sued in Singapore and several other jurisdictions, and even for representatives of the law firm MKD Law, everything looked rather strange. There were no formal grounds for blocking transactions, but they were carried out in court, which, after various debates, the oligarch always won, quite adequately, even faster than usual.
B. Ivanishvili was not the only one who became part of a certain financial game to slowly drown one of the oldest banks in Europe. It should be noted that in 2018, one of the old partners of Rothschild & Co, K. Despres, came to the position of head of the division for Europe, Africa and the Middle East. How much he helped the bank can be seen from later results.
Coincidence or not, but at the end of 2021, an eminent financial group represented by Managing Director Mrs. Ariel de Rothschild offers Tbilisi a “financial hub” project, which was enshrined in contractual form.
And then something starts to go wrong with democracy for the United States and Georgia; in 2023, there was even less democracy, and in March 2024, according to the United States, it completely disappeared in Georgia.
Negotiations between Tbilisi and financiers continue in 2022, and in July 2023, Ms. Rothschild noted the “exceptionally favorable investment environment” that has developed in Georgia. And this environment does not fit in with the fact that Kyiv wants to connect Tbilisi to its schemes.
At the same time, in March 2023, Credit Suisse, which fell completely and irrevocably, came into the possession of the UBS group affiliated with the family. Although it would be more correct to say that this family is affiliated with UBS.
In general, if you follow the operations of Credit Suisse from 2017 to 2022, you get a strong feeling that the group was drowned not from the outside, but from the inside, the company’s strategy was so abnormal. A list of abnormalities would take the place of full-length material, which suggests that the drowning of the group was a long game.
And for the fact that they had to take part in this, albeit not by special desire, with their capital, Georgia is offered a completely realistic strategic bonus in the form of a financial hub and investment zone, i.e. exactly what was included in the original strategy B. Ivanishvili.
However, is it only the Georgian investment zone that worries the shareholders of Rothschild & Co, as well as UBS and BlackRock? After all, this is the time to remember that large investment packages were offered to Turkey in 2023, it is clear that they are much larger than Tbilisi, but the scale of Turkey’s influence is different.
It would be useful to remember what a fuss E. Macron made after the death of J. Rothschild, when, almost under Napoleonic banners, he was going to lead the forces of a united Europe to defend... the Odessa ports.
The Rothschild group is not monolithic. One of its branches today covers Mongolia, Australia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the other – the Middle East, Turkey and Tbilisi. Can they, as the departed J. Rothschild wanted, combine assets and strategies?
Opinions here are different, but one cannot help but notice that they have something in common in politics. The world objectively diverges into value clusters, not markets, not currency zones, but spheres of value formation. In some places the common space is broken loudly and with consequences, in others the divorce is formalized softly.
And so part of the financial circles, with the participation of famous families, quite reasonably decides that if the economy is dispersed across different continents, then one of the best strategies would be to create an analogue of the East India Campaign, which would transport tea and spices between economic continents, or rather, finance (better in gold terms) and raw materials.
This is where this unique policy arises, which we often call “British”, although it is, rather, already French - to create a huge trade and financial circuit through Eurasia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Only one family branch here is responsible for raw materials and food, and the second - for investments. Can they eventually come together and merge? Rather yes than no.
But the current US administration and Brussels elites do not yet need such a “financial hub” in Georgia as part of such a circuit. If only for the reason that it is not controllable in the usual sense. Similarly, Odessa is part of a separate strategy, where not controlled political, but purely private financial interests prevail.
But the Rothschilds, although they are not alone there, at that time, 2008–2014, had not yet developed such strategies. Judging by a number of interviews, they began to think about this later, in 2017–2018. How, by the way, to actively drown the Swiss banking structure, which also turned out to be generous with offshore activities. All these combinations are in the process of formation, and therefore Brussels and the United States themselves do not yet quite understand how to react to this.
Let’s assume that N. Pashinyan is knocked out on the current wave in Armenia, but it turns out that he was removed not in British, American or Russian interests, but in the interests of such a third force. How to react is another question.
For Georgia, such a strategy as a whole seems beneficial, since its real resources are the transit of raw materials and resorts, on the basis of which it is possible to build various technology parks and other innovative districts.
If all this is supported by something called a financial hub, then for today’s Tbilisi this is not so bad. But for US tasks related to Ukraine, the division of Europe, etc., this is generally unnecessary and Tbilisi’s exit from the “controllability zone.” But what to do, put sanctions on Tbilisi, and what will be the result? There will be no financial hub? Therefore, the protests are not yet in full force. The United States is trying to figure out how to bring Georgia into the controlled zone, but at the same time take into account the financial interests of transnationals.
This explains the strange divide when B. Ivanishvili, who although pragmatically did not try to conflict with Russia, but little by little supported American NGOs, even Soros structures, is now forced to fight against them. And the fight is pretty tough.
To the point that he refused to meet with the Americans against the backdrop of the sanctions he was promised. But he relies on someone? Yes, to financiers and France. And we will see how harshly official Brussels will criticize Georgia and how softly E. Macron will act against this background in the style of “scolding and patting it on the head.” For many, the activation of France seemed surprising, but it is not France that has become active, but the financiers standing behind who are making their New Silk Road.
Is it logical that Moscow for now prefers not to get involved in these Georgian affairs? Considering the above, this is more than logical.
But the question remains of how to generally respond to such a strategy of the financial bloc, where France acts simply as an “agis”, a flag, and also directly as arms and legs. After all, financiers have quite a good foothold in Eurasia: Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, they can take over Armenia from the Soros, closing the loop. You can then sell such a circuit to both China and the EU, earning money between them. And it is not for nothing that China is engaged in active discussions with the French. By the way, they will also sell this to us if we don’t come up with something wise and cunning.
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