Was Alexander III the Peacemaker?
From criticism to apologetics
Tsar Alexander III, as is known, remained in stories under the nickname Peacemaker. He owes them the absence of wars throughout the thirteen years of his reign. Local border conflicts far from Europe, like the Afghan one in 1885, do not count.
In general, it must be said that somewhere in the 1990s, the derogatory characterization of the emperor that was common in the USSR was replaced by an almost enthusiastic one.
Hence the popularity of phrases attributed to Alexander III, such as:
“Russia has only two allies: the army and fleet. "
Или:
“Europe can wait while the Russian Tsar fishes.”
They also like to remember the fork, allegedly tied in a knot and thrown by the monarch to the Austrian envoy sitting next to him at one of the receptions, who decided to threaten Russia and hinted at the mobilization of two or three corps.
In addition to the fork, the stunned diplomat allegedly received:
“The same will happen to your buildings.”
However, the peaceful years of his reign were not at all the merit of Alexander III, but a consequence of the political situation in Europe that had developed even before his ascension to the throne, within the framework of which, from the Berlin Congress to the First World War, armed conflicts on the continent between the leading powers were virtually excluded.
The only thing is that the Bosnian crisis of 1908 aggravated the situation in Europe, but it is worth talking about it separately; For now, I will note that it is somewhat rash to assert that it almost led to a major war on the continent.
The reason for the relatively long peace for Europe was the balance of power that took shape as a result of four wars in the second half of the 19th century.
Four wars as a prologue to a long peace
First: Franco-Austrian 1859, more often called Franco-Austro-Italian, which, strictly speaking, is incorrect, since the Kingdom of Italy appeared on the map two years later.
At the same time, on the side of the Second Empire proclaimed in 1852 by Napoleon III, the Kingdom of Sardinia, which included, in addition to the island of the same name, also Piedmont located in the north-west of the Apennines, came out.
The decisive battle took place at Magenta. The Austrians, largely due to the persistence of parochialism in appointments to senior command positions and due to the reluctance of Emperor Franz Joseph to withdraw troops from the Russian border (although Alexander II did not even think about invading), were defeated.
As a result, Sardinia found itself one step away from the unification of Italy under its auspices, which, in turn, Napoleon III did not really want, but, having taken Nice and Savoy for himself, he reluctantly accepted. Unlike Vienna, which decided to defeat the Sardinians in 1860.
But here Alexander II already intervened, hinting to his Austrian brother that he would not allow his troops to invade Piedmont. Franz Joseph was not ready to fight on two fronts (by the way, he was not going to fight with us in the Crimean War, contrary to popular belief) and therefore retreated.
So, not least thanks to Russia, the Kingdom of Italy appeared on the map in 1861. However, Austria retained Venice, which is why the Italians considered the unification incomplete and accepted O. Bismarck’s proposal to enter into an alliance with Berlin directed against Vienna.
Iron Chancellor
The Austro-Italo-Prussian War of 1866 became, if we leave out the Austro-Danish-Prussian War of 1864, which did not significantly affect the balance of power in Europe, the second significant event in the period under review.
The outcome of the campaign was decided by the battle of Königratz, which demonstrated the military genius of G. Moltke the Elder - by the way, not only a German, but also a Russian field marshal - as well as for the first time in the General Staffs of leading European states they were able to appreciate the importance of railways in the operational deployment of troops, in which The Prussians were significantly ahead of the enemy.
However, the Italians were not lucky in the war; their army was defeated at the Battle of Kustotz. Franz Joseph was forced to cede Venice, but to Napoleon III, who graciously handed it over to Victor Emmanuel II. At the same time, the French retained Rome.
The main result of the war was the liquidation of the German Confederation, patronized by Vienna, which indicated the loss of Austria's dominance in Central Europe. Bismarck confidently, and with the benevolent neutrality of Russia, which was burdened by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, moved towards the unification of Germany with iron and blood. France stood in the way.
The reason for the war was found by Napoleon III himself, who was outraged by the German pretender to the Spanish throne and became a victim of the phantom of the Spanish-Prussian alliance.
However, the southern neighbor, which had long been a shadow of its former power, did not pose a threat, and in the event of an armed conflict, the Prussians could not help the weak Spanish army, due to the dominance of the French fleet at sea - the next in size and technical equipment after the English.
Paris got involved in the war, overestimating its strength. As a result, Metz and Sedan drew a line under the great power aspirations of France in Europe. From now on, it could conduct independent and successful military operations only in the colonies. Actually, the current appearance of France was formed on the ruins of the defeated empire.
Napoleon III and Bismarck after the Battle of Sedan. Painting by Wilhelm Kamphausen
Realizing that the Third Republic, created to replace it in 1870, would not accept the loss of coal-rich Alsace and Lorraine and would sooner or later try to take revenge, Bismarck decided to finish it off. It was 1875, and the French had not yet restored their military potential, although they worked tirelessly on it.
But here, as in the story with the anti-Sardinian plans of Austria, Russia intervened again, five years ago having favorably reacted to the defeat of Napoleon III, as the guarantor of the Treaty of Paris.
Russia achieved its cancellation in 1870 through a note from A. M. Gorchakov. The formal reason was the repeated violation of the articles by the signatories themselves; in fact, St. Petersburg took advantage of the disappearance of the French Empire from the map. The Italians also benefited from the defeat of Napoleon III: French troops left Rome.
The proclamation of the Second Reich on January 18, 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles and the subsequent restoration of France in the guise of the Third Republic, but without geopolitical ambitions threatening the interests of Russia, established a favorable balance of power in Europe and partly neutralized the role of Great Britain on the continent, with which St. Petersburg had tense relations developed, largely due to clashes of interests in Central Asia.
Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles. Painting by Anton von Werner
In the event of a repeated defeat of the French troops, Germany was excessively strengthened, with an even greater decrease in the political weight of Austria, the already insignificant Italy, and minimization of France. Such an imbalance in favor of the Second Reich did not suit either Russia or Great Britain.
And Alexander II, with the approval of London, made it clear to William I that he would not allow a new campaign against France. Berlin conceded. Another question is whether the Germans really intended to fight? In any case, in his memoirs, Bismarck denies that Berlin has such plans, but he does this after the fact and already in retirement, so his reasoning must be treated with a certain degree of caution.
From now on, the main task of the chancellor was to prevent the rapprochement of Paris and St. Petersburg, as well as Paris and Vienna, by diplomatic methods. But, let me emphasize once again, after 1875 Bismarck intended to do this exclusively peacefully, in particular, reassuring Russia regarding its concerns about the prospects of German ambitions in the Balkans. This is his famous:
“The region is not worth the bones of even one Pomeranian grenadier.”
To London, Bismarck also demonstrated his unwillingness to infringe on British interests on the continent, while he feared a rapprochement between Russia and England, despite the significant contradictions between them.
But the Elysee Palace did not calm down. France needed guarantees of non-aggression by the Germans. Britain could not provide them - due to the weakness of the land army, small and intended for wars in the colonies; and due to the then policy of “Brilliant Isolation”.
Relations with Austria have traditionally been difficult. Although, I repeat, Bismarck took into account the possibility of a rapprochement between Paris and Vienna, directed against Berlin, and tried to prevent this.
However, those at the Elysee Palace were more willing to see themselves as guests in the Winter Palace than in Schönbrunn (the residence of the Austrian emperors). It seemed to many then that geography itself, in the presence of the Franco-Russian alliance, neutralized Germany’s aggressive plans at their very beginning.
The apparent difficulty for Paris was the Union of Three Emperors that had taken shape by that time: Alexander II, Franz Joseph and Wilhelm I.
It is curious that according to the text of the document signed by the first two (Wilhelm I would join the treaty a little later) in Schönbrunn on May 25, 1873, the goal of the emperors was not to prevent a European war, but to postpone its possibility.
That is, in leading European capitals there were no illusions about the reality, in the long term, of an armed conflict. Another thing: hardly anyone could imagine its duration, colossal scale and destructive nature.
The General Staffs of the leading powers thought of the coming war in terms of short-term campaigns, following the example mentioned above. Politicians, including Bismarck, during the period we are considering, saw it as a matter of a separate future.
The document signed in Schönbrunn, in a sense, represented a vestige of the past, since it was maintained in the outdated spirit of the Holy Alliance, based on the defense of the principle of the legitimacy of monarchies and conservative values.
But by that time, the position of the former seemed unshakable, and revolutionary steam seemed to have been released on the barricades of European capitals back in the middle of the century. The defeat of the Paris Commune, many thought at the time, ruled out a revival of radicalism in the coming decades.
However, Bismarck considered the Union as a means against the rapprochement of the states surrounding Germany, primarily France and Russia. And he tried to demonstrate his political viability in 1876, when the Bulgarians launched an anti-Ottoman uprising, which was extremely harshly suppressed by Istanbul.
Realizing that Russia could intervene, especially given the popularity of pan-Slavist ideas in its society (Bismarck saw them as the basis of the expansionist policy of Alexander II), the chancellor initiated the emperors’ speech with the “Berlin Memorandum” of 1876, which called on the Porte to carry out reforms in the Balkans , and without encroaching on its territorial integrity.
Through this document, Berlin did not show concern for the southern Slavs, but sought to prevent an armed conflict between Russia and Austria, because the latter was not going to indifferently look at the strengthening of St. Petersburg’s position in the region, which it considered its sphere of influence. Moreover, both sides appealed to Germany, which sought to maintain smooth relations with both Vienna and St. Petersburg.
The memorandum met with understanding in Paris and Rome, but frightened London. He kept imagining the specter of Russia establishing control over the straits, with its subsequent entry into the Eastern Mediterranean and a threat to British interests in Egypt.
The foreign policy of St. Petersburg was presented to London in the form of two huge claws: one stretched towards the Bukhara Emirate and the Kokand, with Khiva, khanates; the other - to the straits. And both are towards British possessions.
Feeling the support of England, the Porte rejected the demands set out in the memorandum.
Peaceful ways to solve the problem were exhausted, and the Russian army crossed the Danube, with Austrian neutrality, for which it was promised Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the Reichstadt Agreement of 1876. Thus began the fourth war - the last in a series that influenced the political appearance of Europe and the balance of power in it, which lasted until the First World War.
As is known, despite the miscalculations of the tsar’s brother, who did not shine with military leadership talent (that’s why he was appointed commander-in-chief; for the same related reason, his full namesake would lead the army thirty-seven years later) Nikolai Nikolaevich the Elder, the war ended with the Peace of San Stefano, revised at the Berlin Congress .
Berlin Congress: everyone is against Russia?
We have a negative assessment of the latter, due to the alleged isolation of Russia.
But this is a simplified vision. For already within the framework of the aforementioned Reichstadt Agreement, Austria opposed the autonomy of Bulgaria, and at the congress itself, Russia unequivocally demanded unconditional support from Germany, and in some places in a rather harsh tone, reflected in one of the letters of Alexander II to Wilhelm I.
In addition, an understanding of the inevitable, sooner or later, division of the Porte's heritage already existed at the Congress of Vienna, and the parties agreed to cut the Balkan pie together. Petersburg tried to do this unilaterally.
A month before the congress, the Russian Ambassador to England, Count P. A. Shuvalov and the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Marquis R. Salisbury, signed an agreement in London that essentially abolished the articles of the San Stefano Peace, which was only confirmed in Berlin.
Berlin Congress. Painting by Anton von Werner
But, most importantly, none of the congress participants intended to fight. And just as Napoleon III became a victim of unfounded fears of the specter of the Spanish-Prussian alliance, so Alexander II was afraid of the non-existent phantom of a new Eastern (Crimean) war.
From whom did the military threat to Russia come? From the then weak France, only in Russia and seeing the guarantor of its own security? Germany? But she tried to defend her interests strictly diplomatically and did everything to level out the contradictions between Austria and Russia, trying to maintain generally friendly relations with both.
And Franz Joseph had enough internal problems and had no time for war. England? So in London, Salisbury and Shuvalov agreed on everything. Finally, what threat did Her Majesty’s fleet pose to Russia?
Another thing is that, yes, in general Russian diplomacy was not up to par. Because she could play on the harsh criticism of British Prime Minister B. Disraeli, who supported Porto, from British public opinion, including his main rival and opposition leader, W. Gladstone; to win over France and Italy to a greater extent, again playing on the latter’s contradictions with Austria.
After all, just as pan-Slavist sentiments were strong in Russia, so in Italy the ideas of irredentism, that is, the unification of all lands inhabited by Italians, were popular. And some of them were under Austrian rule - Trieste in particular.
However, despite the ambitions and disputes, none of the leading powers were ready for a major war or wanted one. So the peaceful years of Russia are not at all the merit of Alexander III and his diplomacy.
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