Hot Black Sea Pebbles
The proximity of conflict zones determines combat readiness fleet
The radical reduction of the Russian Armed Forces, which led to a decrease in their combat capabilities, especially strongly affected the Navy (the fate of the Northern Fleet is described in the newspaper "VPK", No. 2, 2013). In this regard, the Black Sea Fleet found itself in a particularly difficult situation. The role was played not only by ill-considered "reforms", but also by the painful process of determining the status of the Soviet legacy and its division between the newly independent states - Russia and Ukraine. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has lost most of its ship repair and shipbuilding facilities. A significant part of its naval staff today is unable to fully solve tasks as intended. At the same time, an analysis of the current international situation shows that military tension on the southern border of Russia is growing at a high rate.
According to a number of experts, the likelihood of a world war remains, which, of course, will not bypass the Black Sea region. At any moment, smoldering or new armed conflicts can flare up here, capable of adding oil to the world fire. The threat of destabilization of the situation in the regions adjacent to the borders of Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains. After the defeat in August 2008, the aggressor, using the support of the United States, Israel and other guardians of Tbilisi, managed to replenish the potential of his armed forces and is ready to make a new attempt by military means to "restore his territorial integrity." There is a war against sovereign Syria. Using international terrorists and political adventurers, the West and Islamic fundamentalists claiming to create an Islamic caliphate are fighting against the legitimate Syrian government. Washington and Tel Aviv do not stop declaring the need by any means, including force weapons, stop the Iranian nuclear program.
All these processes create a real threat of our country being drawn into military conflicts in the region. The Black Sea Fleet, as an integral part of the Navy, is the most important means of ensuring Russia's security in the southern direction. Will he be able to solve the tasks assigned to him to protect Russian interests in the Black Sea?
Capable remnants
Let's evaluate the combat strength of the Black Sea Fleet. According to open sources, at the beginning of 2013, this operational-strategic formation includes two submarines and 41 surface ships. Marine aviation has 34 aircraft and about 40 helicopters for various purposes.
The submarine forces have only two submarines - one 877 "Varshavyanka" and one 641B "Som". The first of them is in service and is capable of solving the tasks assigned to it. The fate of the second is not finally determined. It is undergoing a long overhaul. By today's standards, its combat capabilities are extremely low, and the expediency of returning to service is questionable. In addition, it is planned to enter into the structure of this naval association two submarines of project 877, which are to be transferred from the Northern Fleet.
The core of the surface forces is the Moscow guards missile cruiser, the Kerch large anti-submarine ship, three patrol ships, four small missile ships, seven small anti-submarine ships, 11 minesweepers, seven large landing ships, and six missile boats.
18 Su-24M attack aircraft (according to the classification of the Navy, actually front-line bombers) Su-12M, from four to seven seaplanes of Be-12 anti-submarine aviation, one AN-24PP electronic warfare aircraft and four Su-XNUMX MR reconnaissance aircraft are of combat importance in the composition of naval aviation.
The helicopter fleet consists of 30 Ka-27PL shipborne anti-submarine missiles and eight Mi-8-based electronic warfare helicopters.
The most important component of the coastal forces is a separate coastal missile and artillery brigade, which includes three mobile missile regiments (armed with coastal anti-ship missile systems "Redut" and "Rubezh") and a coastal mobile artillery division (130-mm artillery complex "Bereg").
The Marine Corps is represented by a separate regiment.
The condition of the Black Sea Fleet's ships is much better than that of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. This is due to favorable climatic conditions and the presence of a developed infrastructure and ship repair facilities in the main base of the association - Sevastopol.
Nevertheless, from 20 to 50 percent of the ships of this fleet need repairs (current, medium or capital) and are unusable or of limited use for solving tasks for their intended purpose.
The nature of the activities of the Chernomorites suggests that the "Moskva" GRKR and two patrol ships can be attributed to the number of combat-ready ships in the distant sea and ocean zone.
Of the ships in the near sea zone, up to two small missile ships, up to four small anti-submarine ships, up to seven minesweepers, up to five large landing ships and up to four missile boats are possibly combat-ready.
There is currently only one combat-ready submarine in the fleet.
The situation with the aircraft and helicopter fleet is hardly better than the general state of affairs in the RF Air Force. Therefore, it can be assumed that in the Black Sea aviation up to 12 Su-24M, up to three Be-12 seaplanes, up to two Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, up to 18 Ka-27PL and up to five electronic warfare helicopters are in flightable condition.
With the outbreak of hostilities, the Black Sea Fleet will interact with the 51st Air Defense Corps, which, in the overall air defense system, covers bases, basing points and fleet forces in its area of responsibility. For this purpose, up to two fighter aviation regiments (50-60 Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft) and up to two anti-aircraft missile regiments can be detached from its composition.
To solve the problems of combating large surface ships of a potential enemy, the fleet can be supported by up to two squadrons of long-range aviation.
Low grade
Based on the existing ship composition and taking into account the peacetime operational stress coefficient (according to the experience of the Soviet Navy - 0,25), the Black Sea Fleet has very limited capabilities to support Russia's foreign policy activities and implement its international obligations, including the fight against piracy.
Under favorable conditions, the merger can carry out no more than one campaign within one and a half to two years of a ship group consisting of up to three combat and auxiliary ships led by a missile cruiser, as well as one or two campaigns per year of one patrol or large landing ship both independently and and with one or two auxiliary vessels. To maintain a favorable operational regime in the near sea zone, up to six exits of ship groups of up to three small anti-submarine ships or minesweepers can be carried out annually. It can be stated that this naval formation is incapable of independently ensuring the solution of the peacetime tasks assigned to it.
Trends in the development of the international situation in the region of the fleet's responsibility dictate an increase in the intensity of cruises by its ships three to five times, depending on the degree of tension.
This can be achieved by carrying out the required volume of repair work with the commissioning of ships and supply vessels for the fleet, as well as by building up the ship's personnel, primarily submarine forces.
With the outbreak of hostilities, the Black Sea Fleet will be able to form:
a grouping of strike forces to combat enemy surface ships, capable of operating in the far sea zone, consisting of one missile cruiser and up to four escort ships;
a grouping of strike forces for operations in the maritime zone adjacent to our coast, which may include up to two naval strike groups of small missile ships, up to two strike groups of missile boats and up to 18 naval attack aircraft, as well as missile and artillery units of the coastal forces of the fleet;
a grouping of anti-submarine forces for operations in the near sea zone, including up to two search and strike groups, one non-nuclear submarine, 3-4 anti-submarine aircraft and up to 30 anti-submarine helicopters.
The fleet will be able to assist the coastal flank of the army with the forces of a marine regiment and up to seven landing ships capable of landing up to two battalions of marines on an unequipped coast.
These forces are capable of during the first week of hostilities (under favorable conditions):
in a distant sea zone or in areas of the Black Sea remote from our coast, destroy one naval strike group of large surface ships, including one enemy missile cruiser, or defeat two or three naval groups (strike or search and strike) of destroyer / frigate-class ships;
in the Black Sea areas adjacent to our coast, destroy up to four naval strike groups, consisting of two or three surface ships of the destroyer / frigate classes or missile boats, destroy up to two submarines, land one tactical assault force of up to two with a battalion of marines.
Turkish factor
Currently, only Turkey in the region has a fleet capable of effectively opposing Russia. An analysis of the military-political situation that is taking shape here allows us to conclude that there are two options for dragging our country into a war in which the Black Sea Fleet will have to tackle the tasks of repelling external military aggression. This is a possible confrontation with a single Turkish side or with the NATO bloc as a whole.
The likelihood of a military clash between Russia and Turkey without the involvement of the Alliance with it is hypothetically quite possible. This may happen against the background of an escalation of the military conflict in one of the hot spots in the Caucasus or the Middle East. Already today, Moscow and Ankara have serious differences in their positions on the methods of resolving the Syrian confrontation. The Russian side has its own interests in Cyprus, which do not fully correspond to the Turkish position on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Russia and Turkey have different opinions on the Karabakh issue. At the same time, the participation of the NATO bloc in these conflicts is not obvious.
Therefore, the enemy of the Black Sea Fleet can only be the Turkish Navy, which has 15 submarines, 19 URO frigates, up to 25 minesweepers and about 20 missile boats. These forces are likely to be supported by tactical aviation. Of the 440 Turkish Air Force attack aircraft, 100 or more machines can be used for operations against ships and facilities of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea.
Comparing the capabilities of the fleets, it can be assumed that in the course of hostilities the Turks will lose up to 20 percent of their surface ships and boats, as well as up to 15 percent of their submarines.
At the same time, the decline of the Russian side will amount to ships of the main classes and boats - up to 30 percent, submarines - up to 50 percent, aviation - up to 40 percent, and coastal troops - up to 50 percent. That is, by the end of the first week of hostilities, the losses of the Black Sea Fleet may reach a critical value, while the Turkish Navy will retain its combat capability. The task of conquering superiority even in the coastal zone for Russia will become intractable.
If NATO is involved in the conflict, it is likely that a naval group (more than three strike groups of URO cruiser / URO destroyer class ships) will enter the Black Sea, which will be supported by the US Navy's carrier-based aviation (two aircraft carrier strike groups) from the Eastern Mediterranean region. The Black Sea Fleet will not be able to inflict serious damage on the enemy, having itself sustained losses in which it will lose its significance as an operational formation.
After that, the opposing side will be able to solve the tasks of landing tactical and even operational landings on the Black Sea coast of Russia or its allies without hindrance, to deliver strikes from the sea to the facilities of the Armed Forces and the economy of our country.
The analysis carried out shows that, in the existing composition, the Black Sea Fleet is incapable of solving the tasks of protecting the interests of Russia and repelling military aggression in the southern direction.
What to do?
From the above, an obvious conclusion suggests itself: it is necessary to significantly increase the combat capability of the Black Sea Fleet.
Certain successes can be achieved by repairing the existing ship stock, which will make it possible to increase the number of combat-ready ships to 85–90 percent. It is necessary to increase the composition of the submarine forces quantitatively and qualitatively to at least 11–12 modern non-nuclear submarines. The expediency of being a part of this naval association GRKR "Moscow" raises certain doubts. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, this ship of the oceanic and distant sea zone will be locked up in a closed maritime theater, where its capabilities of striking the formations of large surface objects cannot be fully realized. The number of ships of the main classes should be increased to 10–12 units by redeploying them from other directions or building new ones.
Significant changes must take place in the aviation component. It is necessary to increase the number of assault aviation by two or three times and include at least one fighter regiment in its composition. This is due to the small size of the Black Sea theater, where aviation will definitely play a decisive role. Building up the capabilities of anti-submarine aviation is extremely important. The existing Be-12 aircraft cannot effectively fight modern low-noise submarines. Therefore, an urgent need should be the revision and adoption of the A-40 anti-submarine aircraft complex with the subsequent inclusion of at least 20 such machines in the fleet aviation. It is important to build up reconnaissance aircraft to at least 12-14 Su-24MRs.
The implementation of these measures will increase the combat capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet and allow it to fully protect Russia's interests in this region.
It is necessary to do this, since tender sand and round stones can become hot at any time. There is something ...
The radical reduction of the Russian Armed Forces, which led to a decrease in their combat capabilities, especially strongly affected the Navy (the fate of the Northern Fleet is described in the newspaper "VPK", No. 2, 2013). In this regard, the Black Sea Fleet found itself in a particularly difficult situation. The role was played not only by ill-considered "reforms", but also by the painful process of determining the status of the Soviet legacy and its division between the newly independent states - Russia and Ukraine. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has lost most of its ship repair and shipbuilding facilities. A significant part of its naval staff today is unable to fully solve tasks as intended. At the same time, an analysis of the current international situation shows that military tension on the southern border of Russia is growing at a high rate.
According to a number of experts, the likelihood of a world war remains, which, of course, will not bypass the Black Sea region. At any moment, smoldering or new armed conflicts can flare up here, capable of adding oil to the world fire. The threat of destabilization of the situation in the regions adjacent to the borders of Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains. After the defeat in August 2008, the aggressor, using the support of the United States, Israel and other guardians of Tbilisi, managed to replenish the potential of his armed forces and is ready to make a new attempt by military means to "restore his territorial integrity." There is a war against sovereign Syria. Using international terrorists and political adventurers, the West and Islamic fundamentalists claiming to create an Islamic caliphate are fighting against the legitimate Syrian government. Washington and Tel Aviv do not stop declaring the need by any means, including force weapons, stop the Iranian nuclear program.
All these processes create a real threat of our country being drawn into military conflicts in the region. The Black Sea Fleet, as an integral part of the Navy, is the most important means of ensuring Russia's security in the southern direction. Will he be able to solve the tasks assigned to him to protect Russian interests in the Black Sea?
Capable remnants
Let's evaluate the combat strength of the Black Sea Fleet. According to open sources, at the beginning of 2013, this operational-strategic formation includes two submarines and 41 surface ships. Marine aviation has 34 aircraft and about 40 helicopters for various purposes.
The submarine forces have only two submarines - one 877 "Varshavyanka" and one 641B "Som". The first of them is in service and is capable of solving the tasks assigned to it. The fate of the second is not finally determined. It is undergoing a long overhaul. By today's standards, its combat capabilities are extremely low, and the expediency of returning to service is questionable. In addition, it is planned to enter into the structure of this naval association two submarines of project 877, which are to be transferred from the Northern Fleet.
The core of the surface forces is the Moscow guards missile cruiser, the Kerch large anti-submarine ship, three patrol ships, four small missile ships, seven small anti-submarine ships, 11 minesweepers, seven large landing ships, and six missile boats.
18 Su-24M attack aircraft (according to the classification of the Navy, actually front-line bombers) Su-12M, from four to seven seaplanes of Be-12 anti-submarine aviation, one AN-24PP electronic warfare aircraft and four Su-XNUMX MR reconnaissance aircraft are of combat importance in the composition of naval aviation.
The helicopter fleet consists of 30 Ka-27PL shipborne anti-submarine missiles and eight Mi-8-based electronic warfare helicopters.
The most important component of the coastal forces is a separate coastal missile and artillery brigade, which includes three mobile missile regiments (armed with coastal anti-ship missile systems "Redut" and "Rubezh") and a coastal mobile artillery division (130-mm artillery complex "Bereg").
The Marine Corps is represented by a separate regiment.
The condition of the Black Sea Fleet's ships is much better than that of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. This is due to favorable climatic conditions and the presence of a developed infrastructure and ship repair facilities in the main base of the association - Sevastopol.
Nevertheless, from 20 to 50 percent of the ships of this fleet need repairs (current, medium or capital) and are unusable or of limited use for solving tasks for their intended purpose.
The nature of the activities of the Chernomorites suggests that the "Moskva" GRKR and two patrol ships can be attributed to the number of combat-ready ships in the distant sea and ocean zone.
Of the ships in the near sea zone, up to two small missile ships, up to four small anti-submarine ships, up to seven minesweepers, up to five large landing ships and up to four missile boats are possibly combat-ready.
There is currently only one combat-ready submarine in the fleet.
The situation with the aircraft and helicopter fleet is hardly better than the general state of affairs in the RF Air Force. Therefore, it can be assumed that in the Black Sea aviation up to 12 Su-24M, up to three Be-12 seaplanes, up to two Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, up to 18 Ka-27PL and up to five electronic warfare helicopters are in flightable condition.
With the outbreak of hostilities, the Black Sea Fleet will interact with the 51st Air Defense Corps, which, in the overall air defense system, covers bases, basing points and fleet forces in its area of responsibility. For this purpose, up to two fighter aviation regiments (50-60 Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft) and up to two anti-aircraft missile regiments can be detached from its composition.
To solve the problems of combating large surface ships of a potential enemy, the fleet can be supported by up to two squadrons of long-range aviation.
Low grade
Based on the existing ship composition and taking into account the peacetime operational stress coefficient (according to the experience of the Soviet Navy - 0,25), the Black Sea Fleet has very limited capabilities to support Russia's foreign policy activities and implement its international obligations, including the fight against piracy.
Under favorable conditions, the merger can carry out no more than one campaign within one and a half to two years of a ship group consisting of up to three combat and auxiliary ships led by a missile cruiser, as well as one or two campaigns per year of one patrol or large landing ship both independently and and with one or two auxiliary vessels. To maintain a favorable operational regime in the near sea zone, up to six exits of ship groups of up to three small anti-submarine ships or minesweepers can be carried out annually. It can be stated that this naval formation is incapable of independently ensuring the solution of the peacetime tasks assigned to it.
Trends in the development of the international situation in the region of the fleet's responsibility dictate an increase in the intensity of cruises by its ships three to five times, depending on the degree of tension.
This can be achieved by carrying out the required volume of repair work with the commissioning of ships and supply vessels for the fleet, as well as by building up the ship's personnel, primarily submarine forces.
With the outbreak of hostilities, the Black Sea Fleet will be able to form:
The fleet will be able to assist the coastal flank of the army with the forces of a marine regiment and up to seven landing ships capable of landing up to two battalions of marines on an unequipped coast.
These forces are capable of during the first week of hostilities (under favorable conditions):
Turkish factor
Currently, only Turkey in the region has a fleet capable of effectively opposing Russia. An analysis of the military-political situation that is taking shape here allows us to conclude that there are two options for dragging our country into a war in which the Black Sea Fleet will have to tackle the tasks of repelling external military aggression. This is a possible confrontation with a single Turkish side or with the NATO bloc as a whole.
The likelihood of a military clash between Russia and Turkey without the involvement of the Alliance with it is hypothetically quite possible. This may happen against the background of an escalation of the military conflict in one of the hot spots in the Caucasus or the Middle East. Already today, Moscow and Ankara have serious differences in their positions on the methods of resolving the Syrian confrontation. The Russian side has its own interests in Cyprus, which do not fully correspond to the Turkish position on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Russia and Turkey have different opinions on the Karabakh issue. At the same time, the participation of the NATO bloc in these conflicts is not obvious.
Therefore, the enemy of the Black Sea Fleet can only be the Turkish Navy, which has 15 submarines, 19 URO frigates, up to 25 minesweepers and about 20 missile boats. These forces are likely to be supported by tactical aviation. Of the 440 Turkish Air Force attack aircraft, 100 or more machines can be used for operations against ships and facilities of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea.
Comparing the capabilities of the fleets, it can be assumed that in the course of hostilities the Turks will lose up to 20 percent of their surface ships and boats, as well as up to 15 percent of their submarines.
At the same time, the decline of the Russian side will amount to ships of the main classes and boats - up to 30 percent, submarines - up to 50 percent, aviation - up to 40 percent, and coastal troops - up to 50 percent. That is, by the end of the first week of hostilities, the losses of the Black Sea Fleet may reach a critical value, while the Turkish Navy will retain its combat capability. The task of conquering superiority even in the coastal zone for Russia will become intractable.
If NATO is involved in the conflict, it is likely that a naval group (more than three strike groups of URO cruiser / URO destroyer class ships) will enter the Black Sea, which will be supported by the US Navy's carrier-based aviation (two aircraft carrier strike groups) from the Eastern Mediterranean region. The Black Sea Fleet will not be able to inflict serious damage on the enemy, having itself sustained losses in which it will lose its significance as an operational formation.
After that, the opposing side will be able to solve the tasks of landing tactical and even operational landings on the Black Sea coast of Russia or its allies without hindrance, to deliver strikes from the sea to the facilities of the Armed Forces and the economy of our country.
The analysis carried out shows that, in the existing composition, the Black Sea Fleet is incapable of solving the tasks of protecting the interests of Russia and repelling military aggression in the southern direction.
What to do?
From the above, an obvious conclusion suggests itself: it is necessary to significantly increase the combat capability of the Black Sea Fleet.
Certain successes can be achieved by repairing the existing ship stock, which will make it possible to increase the number of combat-ready ships to 85–90 percent. It is necessary to increase the composition of the submarine forces quantitatively and qualitatively to at least 11–12 modern non-nuclear submarines. The expediency of being a part of this naval association GRKR "Moscow" raises certain doubts. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, this ship of the oceanic and distant sea zone will be locked up in a closed maritime theater, where its capabilities of striking the formations of large surface objects cannot be fully realized. The number of ships of the main classes should be increased to 10–12 units by redeploying them from other directions or building new ones.
Significant changes must take place in the aviation component. It is necessary to increase the number of assault aviation by two or three times and include at least one fighter regiment in its composition. This is due to the small size of the Black Sea theater, where aviation will definitely play a decisive role. Building up the capabilities of anti-submarine aviation is extremely important. The existing Be-12 aircraft cannot effectively fight modern low-noise submarines. Therefore, an urgent need should be the revision and adoption of the A-40 anti-submarine aircraft complex with the subsequent inclusion of at least 20 such machines in the fleet aviation. It is important to build up reconnaissance aircraft to at least 12-14 Su-24MRs.
The implementation of these measures will increase the combat capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet and allow it to fully protect Russia's interests in this region.
It is necessary to do this, since tender sand and round stones can become hot at any time. There is something ...
Information