Fables reformers
The events of the last weeks of last year, related to the release from office of a number of officials and officials of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, are still in the center of public attention. Sensational exposures in the military department had to respond to politicians, even to the top officials of the state. However, the logic of the reasoning of other high-ranking dignitaries is as follows: yes — they were caught stealing, yes — they failed. For which he was fired. But in general, military reform led in the right direction.
Most of the positive assessments of the reforms of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation come from people who are not well versed in military affairs and defense construction. They operate on data that they receive from the same high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defense. That is why the mistakes made are often presented as good luck, the disadvantages are given as advantages.
Thus, myths about the achievements of military reform were born. It is not easy to check them, because the only uncompromising expert on the effectiveness of military-strategic, military-economic and military-technical measures held in the state is war. Fortunately, we have the opportunity to tackle the “mythology” of a new look without resorting to the results of such a bloody examination.
Why broke spears
The first myth is about the successful improvement of the organization of the Armed Forces. First of all, I mean the transition from a five-tier to a three-tier organizational structure.
This legend is verified by simple arithmetic. In the recent past, the Russian army did not even have five, but nine levels of the army hierarchy. This is a grouping of troops in a theater of military operations (theater of operations), a front (in peacetime - a military district), a combined arms army or army corps, a motorized rifle division or brigade, a regiment, battalion, company, platoon, branch. As a result of the transition to a new look, we have a grouping of troops in the theater of operations, a grouping of troops in the strategic direction, closed to the operational-strategic command (USC), army, brigade, battalion, company, platoon, division. Only eight instances. "Savings" occurred only at the regimental level - it allegedly disappeared. But this is only at first glance. In the subordination of USC, new operational units appeared - the commands of the Air Force and Air Defense. And they, in turn, consist of the East Kazakhstani airborne brigades, which include nothing more than regiments (anti-aircraft missile, radio). So there was a loss. It turns out that the new organizational structure has as many levels of the military hierarchy (as well as administrative instances) as the old one has eliminated. And it was worth breaking spears ?!
One of the arguments in favor of the transition from divisional to brigade structure was the experience of advanced countries. However, here too, the reformers confused something. In the US armed forces, both divisions (mechanized, armored, infantry, etc.) remained. The divisional structure also forms the basis of the ground forces of the People’s Liberation Army of China.
If we remember that a war involves an armed clash with the enemy, then the combat potentials of opposing military formations should be mutually comparable. In other words, a brigade is fighting a brigade of the opposing side, and not with its division or army. But this just does not work. For some reason, the standard defensive (offensive) zone of our "compact" ground brigade turned out to be equal to the zone of use of the "non-compact" mechanized division - 20 kilometers along the front. In the event of a military conflict with an enemy, the structure of the armed forces of which coincides with the American one, in this zone the Russian side will converge - two motorized rifle battalions, two tank battalion, two artillery battalions and one rocket battery, with the opposite - two heavy brigades, two brigade groups, one army brigade aviation, one artillery brigade. We will put 170 tanks against 84 enemy tanks. Against his 394 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers - 263 of their own. On the battlefield, 16 thousand soldiers and officers of the mechanized division will meet with 4,5 thousand soldiers and officers of the motorized rifle brigade of the Russian Ground Forces. And to what has been said, we will add that against 118 army aviation helicopters, which are nominally located in the American army division (including 24 shock ones), we will not field anything due to their categorical absence in the brigade's staff of a new look. To this we add on trifles: a threefold superiority of the alleged enemy in artillery and mortars, sixfold in multiple launch rocket systems, etc.
Despite these figures, some warlords were busy hanging pasta on the sensory organs of Russian citizens. Some compare the effectiveness of our new brigade with our old division. Others - with similar compounds of the alleged adversary. And (lo and behold!) The comparison results fully justify the brigade-battalion structure of the troops. It looks like an old joke that a Soviet person’s salary is small but good.
But the most popular "trump card" in favor of the transition from the division to the brigade allegedly resulted in higher combat readiness, mobility and compactness of the latter. Here you can not argue. However, if we put such criteria as compactness and mobility at the forefront, then it would be worthwhile to fight at all with platoons or separate crews. A single BMP or tank is much smaller and faster than the compound. However, then it is not clear: why in the most highly mobile branch of the troops, which are considered to be airborne troops, the “clumsy” divisions were not abandoned? Preserved divisions in the Strategic Missile Forces, the Navy.
Along with the level “economy”, it is presented as an achievement that the Russian Armed Forces have become three-dimensional. By this they allegedly compare favorably with the Soviet ones, which included five types: the Ground Forces, the Navy, the Air Force, the Air Defense Forces of the country, the Strategic Missile Forces.
Let us remind the forgetful reformers that, along with three types (SV, Air Force, Navy), the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation include three independent branches of service (Strategic Rocket Forces, Airborne Forces, EKR Troops). What is the genus different from the species? By changing the sign of the main command to the command and lowering the rank and salary of the commander and some officials of his staff in military rank and salary. That's all. Therefore, with a certain "rounding" of concepts, we can consider the modern Russian Armed Forces six-species.
Blazers on the front line
The second legend was the declared optimization of the command and control system. There are several aspects to consider.
First of all, it is a mirror reflection of the considered organizational structure, since the number of management units corresponds to the number of floors of the organizational vertical. And there, as was shown above, there are no significant progressive innovations.
In addition, the “optimization” of the states in the control bodies of some military formations is unlikely to improve the quality and efficiency of decision-making and planning of military operations, setting tasks for subordinates and monitoring their implementation. We confirm this with numbers.
The staff of the Stryker US Army Mechanized Brigade consists of 124 people. The management of our motorized rifle brigade of the new look - 87 people. The first thing that causes bewilderment: in this number of managers - 25 people of civilian personnel. And in the state of wartime. Given the presence of these functionaries in the 15-kilometer zone from the front line within the reach of virtually all means of defeating the enemy, what is their status in the domestic legal field and under international humanitarian law? For information: in the wartime states neither the rifle brigade 1944-th, nor the motorized rifle brigade 1999-th was provided for a single civilian cell. They are not in the mechanized brigade of the American army.
This "saving" on the personnel of the management body of the brigade of the new appearance with respect to the similar in status connection of our overseas opponents could be justified by the highest degree of automation of management processes and better organized communications in the Russian army. But such a hypothesis is unrealistic to even allow. And not only in the Ground Forces, but also in the most high-tech types of the Armed Forces. Let us recall how the aviation was controlled by the air force during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in August 2008. The mobile phone and the powerful commander-in-chief mot addressed directly to the pilot, bypassing the entire management chain, ignoring the system of command posts. With such an organization of control, neither staffs nor combat crews are really needed ...
The next aspect is that any control system is the more effective, the simpler and clearer it is designed. But fearing to admit and correct the mistakes made, all new solutions were “gently embedded” in the old multi-layer management structure. The structure being created was becoming increasingly cumbersome and tricky. Especially from these "rationalizations" suffered troops and forces leading the struggle in the aerospace sphere.
At one of the military-scientific conferences, the commander of the Armed Forces armies, affecting the problems of managing the air defense duty personnel, rightly noted that he was in charge of performing the complex of combat duty tasks in this sphere in the airspace of the entire state only in the central part of Russia. The remaining troops and air defense forces (ASD) are subordinated to other persons: directly to the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, and operatively to the commander of the military districts (USK). Multiplicity and powerlessness are equally destructive. All this gives rise to irresponsibility. Repeat today a case similar to the flight of Matthias Rust, even finding candidates for "switchmen" will not be easy.
In addition, the Armed Forces have been living without documents regulating their combat activities for more than a decade and a half. The random vector of reform causes the same shyness in the documentary base. A whole generation of officers grew up on temporary manuals, combat manuals and manuals, innumerable refinements and additions to them. But this is the legal foundation of the commander and headquarters management activities. It was easy to imagine how the work on writing the relevant projects was organized. At a meeting in October 2011, one of the high-ranking officers of the General Staff addressed the assembled scientists: “Work on the statutes of the United States, French, German, and English. Think about it, and you will have thoughts ... ”And this is in the winning army that defeated Napoleon and Hitler, who had the most advanced tactics, operational art and strategy of warfare! Of course, the thoughts of those present did not appear with this approach ...
Among other things, the system of military concepts is endlessly confused. Some effective civilian manager (apparently from the peasants) needed instead historical names of military formations of the Air Force to introduce aviation bases of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd categories. Reminds of the fruit and vegetable storehouses of the recent past. Was it not under this impression that one aviation general, after being transferred to the reserve, headed the Tver Agricultural Academy? And perhaps soon the spring plowing of the land will be called a field battle, the harvesting of root crops will turn into an offensive operation, and the next ranks will be assigned to the successful farmers?
Misunderstanding of how the troop formation management body differs from the troop formation itself has led to awkward tautologies. For example, the person controlling the actions of the operational association of the Air Force is now called the “commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Command”. Who and why did it take to break what is habitual and works into alien and dead?
Staff repression
Fable number three: the personnel policy was reasonably carried out. Recall the latest "achievements" of the leaders of the military department in this field of activity.
Within two years, about 200 thousands of officers and ensigns were fired from the Armed Forces. And first of all the specialists of an average command, staff and engineering levels were subjected to personnel repressions (and how to call it differently). The current majors and lieutenants in the 90s were 17 year olds. The state has convinced young people that they are in demand, and gave legal guarantees of the procedure established by law for military service - from taking the oath to dismissal upon reaching the age limit.
It is unlikely that at least one of the current mature and experienced officers would choose the profession “to defend the Motherland”, knowing that in 15 years they will be thrown out of the ranks of the Armed Forces. And those who remained to serve turned out to be in a completely different legal field, which did not correspond to the situation in which they decided to devote their lives to military service to the power.
But the matter is not even in the broken fates of tens of thousands of loyal Russian servicemen. These deceived people will convince their children, nephews and grandchildren that they should not believe the state and devote their lives to military service, that the state will first lure, and then certainly wipe their feet about them.
The processes occurring in the army gave the most negative result, which is called demoralization. And there are a number of reasons to consider it not accidental, but deeply thought out.
How can it be explained that thousands of officers who have reasons for lawful dismissal from the ranks of the Armed Forces have been “in possession” for several years? They partially receive a monetary allowance, but at the same time have the right not to perform any official duties. They occupy regular cells in units and subunits and therefore (as servicemen) are not eligible to receive a pension, get a job. They expect the release of apartments, which (as it turns out) have long been stolen by defense officials.
Military courts are full of lawsuits from military personnel whose rights are infringed (various underpayments, insecurity by type of allowance, abuse, misinterpretation of laws, etc.). Many of them had the feeling that they and the Ministry of Defense were on different sides of the trenches and are waging an irreconcilable struggle with each other. When was it?
Extra science
The fourth legend: the system of training military personnel has been reorganized and the mechanism of military research has been streamlined.
Nowhere are mistakes so costly as in matters of education, training and placement of specialists. Human resources - the key to the viability of any organization. The way the Defense Ministry showed concern for the preservation and enhancement of the gold fund of the Armed Forces undermines the foundations of national security.
For several years, recruitment of cadets to military schools and students to military academies was suspended. This is due to an excess of officers. But those who are now commanding regiments and brigades know that the troops are a real personnel failure. Instead of excess, there is a shortage of junior and middle-level officers. As a result, inexperienced officers are appointed to higher positions, who have not seen training grounds and have not had time to take part in serious military exercises.
A number of graduates of military schools in view of the lack of positions for professional purposes, it was proposed to make a disgraceful choice - to take a sergeant position or resign from the ranks of the Armed Forces. Is such an insult is not a time bomb? Is a young man with a broken officer's fate will be a patriot of such a state?
Probably, military schools in the country were really more than necessary. In terms of reform, 40 of them was reduced and 10 of enlarged military training and research centers was created. However, no one heard a clear rationale for their required number and profile. But for some reason, the reformers suffered the most sensitive blow to high-tech universities. World-class brand schools were destroyed - the N.A. Zhukovsky Air Force Engineering Academy, the Y.A. Gagarin Air Force Academy. The intrigues around the only university in the world engaged in the training of integrated specialists in the East-Kazakhstan region, the Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy K. Zhukov, do not stop. Is it possible to call such high-precision hits an accident?
Inflicted irreparable damage to scientific and pedagogical personnel. The faculty of military academies and colleges has been reduced seven (!) Times. These are not bus drivers or even lawyers who can be quickly recruited or trained as needed. A teacher of a military school is a piece product combining invaluable military experience, knowledge and culture. Among those left behind are doctors and candidates of science. They are not only skilled Methodists, but also carriers of the glorious traditions of the school. And this potential is easily dispersed in dacha plots, security companies, civilian universities ... It will take decades to grow a replacement for them. Is this not anti-state policy?
In the remaining military schools of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, the staff categories for those who teach the younger generation of homeland defenders have been drastically reduced. Today, the teacher (and in the military school, and in the military academy) is a major. Where does he come from? If from the troops, then from the post of the company commander (or approximately equal). To train a cadet (future lieutenant), he will probably be a reputable teacher. But captains, majors and lieutenant colonels, officers from the positions of commanders of battalions, divisions, squadrons, their deputies, and chiefs of staff enter the military academy. The position of a graduate of the military academy is deputy regiment commander. And the range of service steps for which she is preparing is up to the deputy commander of the division. What will he learn in the field of tactics, operational art, management, all-round support for military operations, an officer who himself did not eat his way and that in these posts?
An academic two-year education has replaced the three-year relatively recently. And immediately the difference was felt: the level of theoretical and practical readiness of officers to fulfill their duties in the post of mission decreased. The general military outlook narrowed. But the reformers are not embarrassed. Their plans were steeper - to move from a two-year academic education to a ten-month refresher course. This means that instead of a well-educated, erudite, cultural, trained professional, system manager, we will have a narrowly focused artisan who somehow cope with the functional responsibilities of his position.
The training of military personnel and the organization of scientific research are practically removed from the competence of the main headquarters and commands. The military authorities only indirectly affect the scientific and educational complex. The customer of its products was the Ministry of Education. Civilian officials charged with determining the required number and profile of military specialists, developing state educational standards, advanced planning of scientific research, problems of military security and military art are as far and alien as commanders of the regiment of global warming or artificial insemination of rabbits.
The academic and teaching staff need to be replenished from somewhere. For decades, the role of such an “incubator” of young talents in the RF Armed Forces was carried out by the adjuncts created at universities and research institutes. But in order for an officer to be ready to formulate a scientific task and independently (under the guidance of an experienced scientist) write a qualifying work (Ph.D. thesis), a certain initial level of knowledge is necessary. The level of this minimum is rather high, and only a few graduates of military academies, after three (especially two) years of study, could be admitted to study in adjunct. Absentee candidates of a scientific degree, who approved the topic of the thesis, worked without interruption from their official duties, but had the same starting platform - an academic education. The upcoming transfer of military academies to ten-month courses for students means that the training of military scientists and qualified teachers in the country is curtailed once and for all.
Housing chaos
The following myth: the Ministry of Defense shows unprecedented care for servicemen who are not provided with housing.
To begin with, any comparison of the work of the recently dismissed minister in this area with his predecessors will be biased. Indeed, under Mr. Serdyukov, more than 350 billion rubles were spent on the construction of apartments for officers. There were no such financial injections into the housing complex with all the post-Soviet departmental authorities taken together, so it is difficult to assess their care for homeless subordinates. With these funds built 100 thousands of apartments. But the queue for housing has progressed slowly. Apartments and entire houses intended for military personnel, for various reasons, were not occupied, left to the left. Officers were fired more than housing. As a result, this promise to provide the army with permanent and temporary housing until the 2011 year remained unfulfilled.
Beyond Reason
The sixth fable about raising by several times the monetary allowance of the officers of the Russian army.
At one time, along with a rather modest financial support, the Russian legislator established significant social benefits for the serviceman: free travel to the place of vacation and return, reimbursement of the cost of travel in public city and suburban transport, benefits for medical and sanatorium-resort services, a certain calculation formula pensions, severance payments, etc. The adopted laws “On the status of military personnel”, “On the procedure for military service” and others were quite progressive mi
But as officers served, their privileges were bashfully abolished by the state. Each loudly announced increase in the monetary allowance was accompanied by a quiet infringement of servicemen on other rights and opportunities. The one-time cash benefit (three salaries issued at the end of the year), annual material assistance (two salaries) have already been abolished. The severance pay for retirement from the twenty-fold salary has turned into a sevenfold. The Defense Ministry's military pensioners had a discriminatory 0,54 reduction factor in the calculation of pensions, which was avoided by other civil servants wearing shoulder straps (judges of military courts, military officers of military prosecutor’s offices, officers of military investigative bodies, etc.).
And what was the cost of the abolition of the ex-Minister of the right to free travel to the place of vacation. For example, if an officer serving in the center of Russia decided to undergo treatment in a sanatorium in Kamchatka, then at a cost of a voucher of about 25 thousand rubles (privileges to purchase vouchers for existing military personnel are also canceled), uncompensated expenses for his way will cost him about 20 thousand rubles one side. Taking into account the way back, this will be already 60 – 70 thousands! And if you go with your family - three together, the four of them ... The amount goes over the scale. It is not surprising that, with such a material barrier, military sanatoriums turned out to be unclaimed officers and much of them were either closed or sold out.
And with the very increase in the money allowance, something did not grow together. As it is often practiced, the idea to significantly improve the material situation of servicemen overshadowed the military-political leadership on the eve of the presidential election. The corresponding order of the Minister of Defense of 30.11.2011 of the year No. 2700 secured a new procedure for providing money allowances for military personnel. And during the two pre-election months, the Defense Ministry did not stint on payments. But after the election, it turned out that “erroneously” overpaid the servicemen for some items of monetary allowance. In particular, it happened with the premium for the conscientious and effective performance of official duties. Instead of the interest ordered by up to 25 during the first months of 2012, in some parts and institutions, the premium was paid in the amount of 35 percent. It would seem that the defense ministry was mistaken - his problem. No, in the following months, to compensate for cost overruns, the military personnel’s budget was limited to 15 percent premium.
The total amount of money allowance for the officer was also lower than expected. For example, the promised 50 thousand rubles to the lieutenant resulted in real 36 thousand rubles (unless, of course, this military school graduate serves on a submarine or in the Far North region, if he is not a war veteran, etc.).
Not without completely inexplicable distortions in the system of military labor. For example, the "weight" of the sports category "Candidate Master of Sports" in monetary terms for a teacher of the physical training department turned out to be higher than the similar "weight" of the scientific degree "Candidate of Science" for a teacher of the department of tactics or operational art. The premium to the master of sports is higher than the doctor of science. But an 22-year-old graduate from a physical education university can come to a military academy or college as a teacher of physical training, and an officer who has passed through certain military positions, “completed” combat missions at training grounds, graduated from a military academy and defended a thesis can become a teacher of operational-tactical disciplines. How far away from the realities of military life should be the author who issued the relevant proposals to the minister (and the head of the military department himself) to allow such mistakes.
Parenting Outsourcing
Another myth: there was a humanization of the soldiers' service.
By itself, military service is anti-human by definition. The profession of a soldier, sergeant, officer, general is to physically destroy the enemy or control the people who destroy him. Killing an enemy on the battlefield is legally legal and blessed by the Church. But if you didn’t kill, they will kill you, outrage your family and homeland. Therefore, we must be stronger than the enemy, stronger and smarter. To achieve such an advantage is the highest humanity of the state that called on a citizen for military service. In order to educate a winning warrior, he must be taught to overcome difficulties, and not to create greenhouse conditions of service. A soldier must be able to sleep a little, get enough to eat other things ... On the other hand, to overcome, overcome, endure, and other changes ...
Of course, all daily and combat activities should be carried out within the framework of the law. A soldier must be protected from non-statutory relationships and abuse. He is not obliged to dig the beds in the cottage of the commander, to repair his apartment. A soldier must be protected as much as possible from activities not related to combat training.
But when an afternoon nap and two days off a week are normalized for a young guy, when a light sports suit is issued for physical training (and you will have to fight in field uniforms, berets, with a gun and with full display), I involuntarily have a question: This pampered young man will be able to protect my country, my family in a difficult time of trials? Will he be able to sacrifice himself by fulfilling the oath, or will he run before the battle to seek protection in the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers?
Speaking about the humanization of military service, the introduction of outsourcing is noted as one of the achievements. By the decision of Serdyukov and his team, service (feeding, cleaning, energy supply, repair of equipment) of military units was transferred to third-party commercial organizations. It was motivated by the need to rid the troops of economic work.
Contrary to the approving perception of outsourcing in society, I would like to make a number of fundamental objections.
Probably, the authors of the idea, as well as the statesmen who supported them, naively believe that the Russian army is the Kremlin company of the guard of honor and the military units of the Moscow garrison. But do they know that, for example, units and subunits deployed far from settlements, in the taiga and tundra, in the steppe and swamp, where no Slavyanka gets to (and why does it need these problems) are on combat air defense duty? ? And take the Strategic Missile Forces or the ships of the Navy fleet...
One gets the impression that we are building an army convenient for peacetime (for parades, concerts and demonstration inspections of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), and not for the armed defense of the state and the people. Attempting to “steal” all small military camps in one place, to consolidate them and organize a single outsourcing there is not only unrealistic, but also harmful. After all, the troops are distributed throughout the country on the basis of operational expediency, and not from the convenience of economic activity and window dressing. And the violation of this operational structure (combat order, system of deployment) is fraught with serious consequences in the event of war.
In addition, when emergency situations occur in the country, along with units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are involved in the aftermath of natural and man-made disasters. We note, not hard workers from “Slavyanki” for money, but soldiers and officers for free. This is normal. And the State Duma’s deputies called for this in December 2012, when the center of Russia was subjected to severe winter trials. But why, say, to clear the snow in the territory of the native military unit for the same defenders of the Motherland should be shameful? Even in Soviet-era pioneer camps, the morning began with the cleaning of the territory. And the children did not get any worse from this.
Finally, the most important thing. In order for a military unit to perform its task effectively in wartime, its combat activity must be fully ensured. It is clear that civil servants in the line of fire will not. So, in peacetime, you must have those who will cook dinner, bring ammunition, repair equipment, dress, cut, treat, etc., from among the staff of units and units.
Waiting for a break
Thus, even a cursory analysis of the "achievements" of the military reform of recent years allows us to conclude that they are all from the field of mythology.
Was the military reform of Serdyukov - Makarov doomed to failure a priori? An affirmative answer to the question follows from an interview given by the Chief of General Staff to the correspondent of “MIC” in April 2011: “We had no time for experiments. Therefore, we went for a cardinal reform even in the absence of a sufficient scientific and theoretical base ... "In the midst of transformations, when the irreversible processes of breaking the old system were already running, he admitted:" The most important thing is that we don’t have an answer to the question: how to arrange priorities in the construction of the Armed Forces? No comments.
And in this sense, you will not envy the new Minister of Defense with his team.
On the one hand, being a decent man and responsible for the assigned area of work, Sergey Kuzhugetovich, of course, will appreciate the inheritance he inherited. And make an effort to change the situation. Alas, redecoration is not enough, it will only deepen the crisis. So, a new global military reform is inevitable.
On the other hand, will the new minister receive freedom of action or will he be tied up, forced to continue the line of the predecessor?
I remember that Army General Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov, who was appointed Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 1996, found himself in a similar situation. He had to make a choice: either to implement the Yeltsin team, which was lobbied by the team, but unacceptable by the general and destructive for the country the concept of military reform, or resign. As a decent man, he ended his career, and now we know about the zigzags of military reform that followed Igor Nickolaevich’s departure.
In any case, the Armed Forces of Russia had a chance. A respected person with favorable initial positions was allowed to manage the military department. The main one of these positions is the unconditional credibility of the army and navy personnel, which the predecessor did not initially have.
I would like to believe that this trust will continue and that the historical chance given to us will be used and the long-awaited turning point will come in the development of the military complex of the state.
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