The greatest battle of the Second World War

63
The greatest battle of the Second World WarIn Stalingrad, the course of the world stories made a sharp turn

In the Russian military history, the battle of Stalingrad has always been considered the most prominent and significant event of the Great Patriotic and World War II. The highest evaluation of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Battle of Stalingrad is given by modern world historiography. “At the turn of the century, Stalingrad was recognized as the decisive battle not only of the Second World War, but of the era as a whole,” emphasizes the British historian J. Roberts.

During the Great Patriotic War there were other no less brilliant victories of the Soviet weapons - and by its strategic results, and by the level of military art. So why among them stands out Stalingrad? In connection with the 70 anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, I would like to reflect on this.

The interests of historical science, the development of cooperation between nations require the liberation of military history from the spirit of confrontation, to subordinate the research scientists to the interests of a deep, truthful and objective coverage of the history of the Second World War, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This is due to the fact that some people want to falsify the history of the Second World War, to "war" the war on paper.

Much has been written about the Battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, there is no need to retell its course in detail. Historians and the military rightly wrote that its outcome was due to the increased power of the country and the Red Army by the autumn of 1942, the high level of military art of its command cadres, the massive heroism of Soviet soldiers, the unity and dedication of the entire Soviet people. It was emphasized that our strategy, operational art and tactics in the course of this battle took a new major step forward in their development, were enriched with new positions.

PLANS OF THE PARTIES FOR 1942 YEAR

When discussing plans for the summer campaign in March 1942 at the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command (UGK), the General Staff (Boris Shaposhnikov) and Georgy Zhukov suggested that the main course of action should be considered a transition to strategic defense.

Zhukov considered it possible to take private offensive actions only in the Western Front. Simon Tymoshenko suggested, in addition, to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction. To the objections of Zhukov and Shaposhnikov regarding this proposal, Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin declared: “We should not sit idly in defense, not wait until the Germans strike first! It is necessary to deliver a number of preemptive strikes on a broad front and to feel the readiness of the enemy. ”

And further: “Zhukov proposes to launch an offensive in the western direction, and on the other fronts to defend. I think this is half measure. ”

As a result, it was decided to undertake a series of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkiv region, on the Lgov and Smolensk axes, in the areas of Leningrad and Demyansk.

As for the plans of the German command, at one time it was believed that it set as its main goal the capture of Moscow by a deep detour from the south. But in reality, according to the directive of the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of Hitler's Armed Forces of Germany No. 41 from 5 on April 1942, the main goal of the German offensive in the summer of 1942 was to master the Donbass, Caucasian oil and by disrupting communications deep in the country to deprive the USSR of the most important resources coming from these areas.

First, when striking in the south, conditions were created for achieving surprise and more favorable opportunities for success, because our Supreme Command in the 1942 year again awaited the main attack of the enemy in the Moscow direction, and here the main forces and reserves were concentrated. The German Kremlin disinformation plan was not solved either.

Secondly, in the case of an offensive on the Moscow area, German troops would have to break through a previously prepared, deeply echeloned defense with the prospect of conducting protracted military operations. If in the 1941 year near Moscow the German Wehrmacht failed to overcome the resistance of the Red Army retreating with great losses, then in the 1942 year the Germans were all the more difficult to rely on the seizure of Moscow. At that time, in the south, in the Kharkiv region, as a result of a major defeat of the Soviet troops of the German army, our significantly weakened forces opposed; It was here that was the most vulnerable part of the Soviet front.

Thirdly, when the main attack was delivered by the German army on the Moscow direction and even at the worst, the capture of Moscow (which was unlikely), the retention by the Soviet troops of economically important areas in the south created the conditions for the continuation of the war and its successful completion.

All this suggests that the strategic plans of Hitler’s command basically correctly took into account the current situation. But even with this condition, the troops of Germany and its satellites would not have been able to advance so far and reach the Volga, if not for the major mistakes of the Soviet command in assessing the direction of a possible enemy strike, inconsistency and indecision in the choice of method of action. On the one hand, in principle, it was supposed to go over to strategic defense, on the other - a number of unprepared and unsecured materially offensive operations were undertaken. This led to a dispersal of forces, and our army was unprepared for either the defense or the offensive. Oddly enough, but the Soviet troops were again in the same uncertain position as in 1941 year.

And in the 1942 year, despite the defeats of the 1941 year, the ideological cult of the offensive doctrine continued to press so much, underestimating the defense, its false understanding was so deeply rooted in the minds of the Soviet command that it was embarrassed as something unworthy for the Red Army and was not fully resolved use.

In the light of the parties ’plans discussed above, an important aspect is clearly clarified: the Stalingrad strategic operation was an interconnected part of the entire strategic action system of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942. In many military-historical works, the Stalingrad operation was considered in isolation from other operations conducted in the western direction. This also applies to Operation Mars 1942 of the year, the essence of which is most distorted, especially in American historiography.

The main remark boils down to the fact that the main decisive strategic operation in the autumn and winter of 1942 – 1943 were not operations in the south-west, but offensive operations conducted in the western strategic direction. The reason for this conclusion is the fact that less effort and resources were allocated for solving problems in the south than in the western direction. But in reality, this is not quite the case, for the southern strategic direction should be taken as a whole, and not just the troops near Stalingrad, including troops in the North Caucasus and troops from the Voronezh direction, which were practically directed towards the south. In addition, we must take into account the fact that the offensive actions of our troops in the west did not allow the German command to transfer forces to the south. Our main strategic reserves were located southeast of Moscow and could be transferred to the south.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON STANDING TO STALINGRAD

The second group of questions relates to the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and follows from the need for a more objective, critical assessment of defensive battles and operations on the approaches to Stalingrad. During this period, there were most of all omissions and shortcomings in the actions of our command and troops. Military-theoretical thought remains to be clarified how our army managed to restore in the catastrophically difficult conditions in the summer of 1942 an almost completely broken strategic front in the south-west direction. It is known that only from July 17 to September 30, 1942, the Supreme Command headquarters sent 50 infantry and cavalry divisions, 33 brigades, including 24 tank.

At the same time, the Soviet command did not plan and did not set the task for the troops to stop the advancing enemy only after withdrawing to the Volga. It has repeatedly demanded that the enemy be stopped at a number of lines even at the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Why did it fail, despite the large number of reserves, to the courage and mass heroism of officers and soldiers, skillful actions of a number of formations and units? There were, of course, many cases of confusion and panic, especially after heavy defeats and large losses of our troops in May – June of the 1942 year. In order for a psychological breakthrough to occur in the troops, a serious shakeup was needed. And in this respect, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227, which gave a sharp and truthful assessment of the situation and permeated with the main demand - “Not one step back!”, Played its overall positive role. It was a very harsh and hard-to-limit document, but forced and necessary in the prevailing conditions.

Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus preferred captivity to suicide.

The main reason for the failure of a number of defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad was that in the organization of strategic defense, the Soviet command repeated the mistakes of 1941 of the year.

After each major breakthrough of the German army, instead of a sober assessment of the situation and decision-making on defense at one or another profitable turn, where retreating troops would retreat and fresh connections from the depth would be pulled in advance, orders were given at any cost to keep the occupied lines even when it was impossible . Reserve connections and incoming replenishment on the move were sent into battle, as a rule, for putting poorly prepared counterattacks and counterstrikes. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity to beat them in parts, and the Soviet troops were deprived of the opportunity to properly consolidate and organize the defense on the new frontiers.

The nervous reaction to each retreat exacerbated the already difficult, complex situation and condemned the troops to new ones.

It should also be recognized that German troops were quite skillful in conducting offensive operations, widely maneuvering and massively using tank and motorized formations in open, tank-accessible terrain. Having met resistance in one or another sector, they quickly changed the direction of the blows, trying to get to the flank and rear of the Soviet troops, whose maneuverability was much lower.

Setting unrealistic tasks, setting deadlines for the commencement of hostilities and operations without taking into account the minimum required time to prepare for their conduct made itself felt even when drawing many counterattacks and counterstrikes during defensive operations. For example, 3 September 1942, due to the difficult situation in the Stalingrad Front, Stalin sent a telegram to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters: “Ask the commander of the troops north and north-west of Stalingrad to immediately strike the enemy and come to the aid of the Stalingrs.”

There were many such telegrams and requirements. A person who has a little sense in military affairs can easily understand their absurdity: how can troops without minimal training and organization take and “strike” and go on the offensive. The defense activity was of great importance for wearing down the enemy, disrupting and delaying his offensive actions. But counterstrikes could be more effective with more thorough preparation and material support.

During defensive battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad, air defense was extremely weak, and therefore had to act in conditions of significant superiority aviation enemy, which made it particularly difficult for the troops to maneuver.

If at the beginning of the war, staff inexperience affected, then after heavy losses in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, the problem of cadres was even more acute, although there were many commanders who had time to harden and gain combat experience. Many mistakes, omissions and even cases of criminal irresponsibility on the part of the commanders of fronts, armies, commanders of formations and units were made. In their totality, they also seriously complicated the situation, but they didn’t have such decisive significance as the miscalculations made by the Supreme Command's headquarters. Not to mention the fact that too frequent changes of commanders and commanders (only in July – August 1942 changed three commanders of the Stalingrad Front) did not allow them to get comfortable with the situation.

The stability of the troops was adversely affected by the fear of encirclement. Political mistrust and repression against military personnel who, during the retreats in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, were surrounded, played a detrimental role in this regard. And after the war, the officers who were surrounded, did not accept to study at military academies. It seemed to the military-political bodies and the bosses of the NKVD that such an attitude toward the "riots" could increase the resistance of the troops. But it was the opposite - the fear of encirclement reduced the stubbornness of troops in defense. It did not take into account that, as a rule, the most steadfastly defended troops came to the environment, often as a result of the retreat of their neighbors. This is the most selfless part of the military was subjected to persecution. Nobody was held accountable for this wild and criminal incompetence.

FEATURES OF THE STALINGRAD ADJUSTABLE OPERATION

From the experience of the second phase of the Battle of Stalingrad (from November 19 1942 to February 2 1943), when the troops of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts carried out a counter-offensive, important conclusions and lessons were drawn up on the preparation and conduct of offensive operations to surround and destroy the enemy.

The strategic plan of this counterattack was to concentrate and destroy the Nazi group by concentrated strikes of the Southwestern (Nikolai Vatutin), Donskoy (Konstantin Rokossovsky) fronts from the north and the Stalingrad front (Andrey Eremenko) from the region south of Stalingrad in the general direction to Kalach troops and their satellites (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian troops) east of Stalingrad. Long-range aviation and Volzhskaya also participated in the operation. flotilla.

Different points of view are expressed about who owns the initial idea of ​​a counter-offensive with the environment and the destruction of the main forces of the enemy. Khrushchev, Eremenko, and many others claimed this. Speaking objectively, this idea in its general form, as many war veterans recall, literally "flew in the air," for the very configuration of the front already prompted the need for strikes against the flanks of the enemy group under the command of Friedrich Paulus.

But the main, most difficult task was how to concretize and implement this idea taking into account the current situation, how to collect and concentrate the necessary forces and means in time and organize their actions, where exactly to direct the blows and with what tasks. It can be considered an established fact that the main idea of ​​this plan, of course, belongs to the Supreme Command Headquarters, and above all George Zhukov, Alexander Vasilevsky and the General Staff. Another thing is that she was born on the basis of proposals, meetings and conversations with generals and officers of the fronts.

In general, it must be said that the level of military art of command personnel and staffs and the combat skills of all personnel in the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was significantly higher than in all previous offensive operations. Many methods of preparing and conducting combat operations, having appeared here for the first time (not always in complete form), were then used with great success in 1943 – 1945 operations.

At Stalingrad, the massive use of forces and assets in the areas chosen for the offensive was carried out with great success, although not to the same extent as in the operations of 1944 – 1945. So, on the South-Western Front, on the 22 km breakthrough section (9% of the entire strip width) of 18 rifle divisions, 9 was concentrated; on the Stalingrad front in the 40 km sector (9%) of the 12 divisions - 8; in addition, 80% of all tanks and up to 85% artillery were concentrated in these areas. However, the density of artillery was only 56 guns and mortars on 1 km breakthrough area, whereas in subsequent operations - 200 – 250 and more. In general, the secrecy of preparation and the suddenness of the transition to the offensive was achieved.

Essentially, for the first time during the war, not only careful planning of operations was carried out, but also painstaking work on the ground with the commanders of all degrees in preparing combat operations, organizing interaction, combat, logistics and technical support was carried out to the required extent. Intelligence was able, albeit incompletely, to uncover the enemy’s fire system, which made it possible to carry out a more reliable fire attack than was the case in previous offensive operations.

For the first time, an artillery and air offensive was fully applied, although the methods of artillery preparation and attack support were not yet clearly worked out.

For the first time before the attack on a broad front, in the bands of all armies, reconnaissance by advanced units was carried out in order to clarify the location of the front edge and the enemy's fire system. But in the bands of some armies, it was carried out in two or three days, and in the 21 and 57 armies - five days before the onset of the offensive, which in other circumstances could reveal the beginning of the offensive, and the obtained data on the enemy's fire system - significantly outdated .

At Stalingrad, for the first time, during a major offensive operation, new infantry battle formations were applied in accordance with the requirements of Commissar of Defense Order No. 306 — with a single-echelon building not only of subunits, units, but also formations. Such a construction reduced the loss of troops, allowed a more complete use of infantry fire weapons. But at the same time the absence of second echelons hampered the timely escalation of efforts to develop the offensive in depth. This was one of the reasons why rifle divisions of the first echelon failed to break through the enemy defenses; already at the depth of 3 – 4 km, tank corps had to be brought into battle, which, under the prevailing situation, was a necessary measure. The experience of these and subsequent offensive operations has shown that in the regiments and divisions, when there is an opportunity, it is imperative to create second echelons.

Significantly increased the volume of logistics of the troops. On three fronts, 8 million artillery shells and mines were concentrated on the beginning of the counteroffensive. For example: in 1914, the entire Russian army had 7 million shells.

But if to compare with the needs of fire destruction, then the November 1942 offensive operations of the year were relatively insufficiently supplied with ammunition - on average, 1,7 – 3,7 ammunition; South-Western Front - 3,4; Donskoy - 1,7; Stalingrad - 2. For example, in the Byelorussian or Vistula-Oder operations, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was up to 4,5 ammunition.

In the second stage of the Stalingrad battle, connected with the actions of the troops to destroy the enemy’s surrounded grouping and the development of an offensive on the external front, two questions arise on which different opinions are expressed.

First, some historians and military experts believe that a large gap between the environment of the enemy grouping and its destruction was a serious flaw in the Soviet counter-offensive operation at Stalingrad, while the classic position of military art states that the environment and the destruction of the enemy should be one continuous process, which later was achieved in the Belarusian, Yasso-Chisinau and some other operations. But what managed to be done at Stalingrad was a great achievement for that time, especially if we remember that the attack near Moscow, near Demyansk and other areas could not even surround the enemy, and near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the Soviet troops surrounding the enemy, themselves were surrounded and suffered defeat.

On the one hand, during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, all necessary measures were not taken to dismember and destroy the enemy in the course of his entourage, although it is necessary to take into account the large size of the territory in which the surrounded enemy was located and the greater density of his groups. On the other hand, the presence of large enemy forces on the external front, which sought to unblock Paulus, surrounded by 6, did not allow concentrating sufficient forces for the rapid elimination of the enemy troops surrounded at Stalingrad.

In Stalingrad, the battle went for every house.

The Supreme Command was belatedly decided to unite the control of all troops engaged in the destruction of the surrounded group in the hands of one front. Only in the middle of December did 1942 of the year receive a directive on the transfer of all troops involved at Stalingrad to the Don Front.

Secondly, how justified was the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the direction of the 2-th Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky to defeat Erich Manstein’s faction on the Kotelnikovo direction. As is known, initially the 2-I Guards Army was intended for action as part of the South-Western Front, then, with a change in the situation, it was decided to transfer it to the Don Front to participate in the destruction of the enemy's surrounded grouping. But with the appearance of the enemy group of armies “Don” under the command of Manstein, the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the request of General Eremenko, a new decision was made - to transfer the 2 Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front to act on the Kotelnik direction. This proposal was also supported by Vasilevsky, who was at that time at the command post of the Don Front. Rokossovsky continued to insist on the transfer of the 2 Guards Army to the Don Front in order to accelerate the destruction of the surrounded enemy grouping. Against the transfer of the 2 Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front, Nikolay Voronov also spoke. After the war, he called this decision a “terrible miscalculation” of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

But a careful analysis of the situation at that time, involving the enemy’s documents that became known to us after the war, shows that the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2 Guards Army to defeat Manstein was apparently more expedient. There was no guarantee that the 2 Guards Army would be able to quickly get rid of the surrounded Paulus grouping into the Don Front. Subsequent events confirmed how difficult it was to destroy the enemy's 22 divisions, numbering up to 250 thousand. There was a large, insufficiently justified risk that a breakthrough of Manstein’s group and a strike against Paulus’s army could lead to the unblocking of the enemy’s surrounded grouping and disrupting the further advance of the troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STALINGRAD BATTLE FOR THE COURSE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In world historiography there is no common understanding of the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for the course and outcome of the Second World War. After the end of the war, claims in Western literature appeared that it was not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the victory of the Allied forces near El Alamein that was the most significant turning point during the Second World War. Of course, for the sake of objectivity, it must be admitted that, under El Alamein, the Allies won a major victory, which made a significant contribution to the cause of defeating the common enemy. But still the battle of El Alamein can not be compared with the Battle of Stalingrad.

If we talk about the military-strategic side of the matter, the Battle of Stalingrad took place on a vast territory, almost in 100 thousand square meters. km, and the operation at El Alamein - on a relatively narrow African coast.

At Stalingrad at certain stages of the battle on both sides participated more than 2,1 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, 2,1 thousand tanks and more than 2,5 thousand combat aircraft. The German command for the battles at Stalingrad attracted 1 million 11 thousand people, 10 290 guns, 675 tanks and 1216 aircraft. While under El Alamein, Rommel’s African corps had a total of 80 thousand, 540 tanks, 1200 guns and 350 airplanes.

The battle of Stalingrad lasted 200 days and nights (from 17 July 1942 of the year to 2 February of 1943 of the year), and the battle of El Alamein - 11 days (from 23 of October to 4 of November 1942), not to mention the incompatibility of tension and severity of the two of these battles. If at El Alamein the fascist bloc lost 55 thousand people, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand guns, then at Stalingrad the losses of Germany and its satellites were more in 10 – 15. About 144 thousand people were taken into captivity. Destroyed 330-thousandth group of troops. The losses of the Soviet troops were also very large - irretrievable losses amounted to 478 741 people. Many of the lives of soldiers could be saved. But still our sacrifices were not in vain.

The military-political significance of the events that took place is incomparable. The battle of Stalingrad took place on the main European theater of military operations, where the fate of the war was decided. The operation near El Alamein took place in North Africa on a secondary theater of operations; its influence on the course of events could be indirect. The attention of the whole world was then riveted not to El Alamein, but to Stalingrad.

The victory at Stalingrad had a huge impact on the liberation movement of the peoples of the whole world. The mighty wave of the national liberation movement spread to all countries that fell under the yoke of Nazism.

In turn, the major defeats and the huge losses of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad dramatically worsened the military-political and economic situation of Germany, put it before the deepest crisis. The damage of enemy tanks and cars in the Battle of Stalingrad was equal, for example, to their six-month production by German factories, to guns to four months, and to mortars and small arms to two months. And in order to make up such heavy losses, the German military industry was forced to work with extremely high voltages. Sharply exacerbated the crisis of human reserves.

The catastrophe on the Volga left its mark on the morale of the Wehrmacht. In the German army, the number of cases of desertion and disobedience to commanders increased, and military crimes became more frequent. After Stalingrad, the number of death sentences handed down by Hitler’s justice to the German soldiers increased significantly. The German soldiers began to fight with less persistence, began to fear attacks from the flanks and the environment. Among the politicians and representatives of senior officers opposition sentiment to Hitler was manifested.

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad shook the fascist military bloc, had a depressing effect on the German satellites, caused panic and intractable contradictions in their camp. The ruling leaders of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, in order to escape from the impending catastrophe, began to look for excuses to get out of the war, ignored Hitler's orders to send troops to the Soviet-German front. Since 1943, not only individual soldiers and officers have surrendered to the Red Army, but also entire units and units of the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies. Relations between the military of the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies sharpened.

The crushing defeat of the fascist hordes at Stalingrad had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey. They abandoned their intentions to go to war against the USSR.

Influenced by the successes achieved by the Red Army at Stalingrad and in the subsequent operations of the 1942 – 1943 winter campaign of the year, Germany’s isolation in the international arena intensified and at the same time the international prestige of the USSR increased. In 1942 – 1943, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Austria, Canada, Holland, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, and resumed previously broken diplomatic ties with Luxembourg, Mexico and Uruguay. Relations with the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland in London have improved. The formation of military units and formations of a number of countries of the anti-Hitler coalition — the French aviation squadron “Normandy”, the 1 Czechoslovak Infantry Brigade, and the 1 Polish Division named after Tadeusz Kosciusko began on the territory of the USSR. All of them subsequently joined in the fight against the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front.

All this suggests that it was the battle of Stalingrad, and not the operation near El Alamein that broke the back of the Wehrmacht and marked the beginning of a radical change in the Second World War in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. More precisely, Stalingrad predetermined this radical change.
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

63 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +16
    25 January 2013 09: 15
    I agree with the author of the article.
    In my opinion, it is worth paying special attention to how the West is strenuously giving out its small local successes for victories of a global scale and significance. To compare the trivial by the standards of the Soviet-German front, not even a front-line, but an army operation with a full-scale front-line operation, this is not even funny, but we need to constantly show on this and similar examples the deceit and uncleanness of our then allies, and at the same time allow less rental on television screens blatantly-Saxon propaganda, and how they were saviors.
    1. +6
      25 January 2013 10: 36
      Operation under El Alamein is where belay
      Do not start our offensive, all this coalition of allies would have been thrown into the Atlantic.
      1. +6
        25 January 2013 12: 20
        Quote: Alexander Romanov
        Operation under El Alamein is where


        Somewhere in the hellish important sands of North Africa soldier
        1. +6
          25 January 2013 12: 57
          where Rommel drove the Allies with one of his tank divisions
          1. +3
            25 January 2013 15: 07
            Quote: Poppy
            where Rommel drove the Allies with one of his tank divisions

            With breaks for breakfast, lunch and file o-block! lol
            1. Beck
              +6
              25 January 2013 19: 00
              Well, what is El Alamein generally to remember next to Stalingrad. He was not standing near. And Churchill recognized the Battle of Stalingrad as a major milestone.

              Under El Alamein, who would not win, would nothing change? Hong Kong British passed to the Japanese - what changed during the war? Well, even if the Germans would have won under Alamein, and then what? Through Bl.Vostok to Iran, or what to shove? So the soles of the boots would not be enough.

              In general, the dispersal of forces is one of Hitler's main strategic mistakes. Well, in a fig, it was necessary to wage war in eastern Europe to keep troops in Norway, Africa, Cyprus, and Greece. Therefore, when the British intelligence services reported to the British government about the readiness of the plan for the assassination of Hitler, the government reasonably rejected the operation, citing the fact that Hitler's future strategic mistakes would be more useful than just killing.

              Another mistake Hitler was declaring war on the United States. Churchill in 1940 begged Roosevelt to enter the war. Roosevelt could not do this in the same way. Since after WWI, the US Congress and Senate issued a law banning the use of US forces outside of America. That is, it was possible to use troops only when defending the United States itself. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hitler himself declared war on the United States. And Rooseveltat’s hands were untied.

              But this is so by the way.

              And to mention Alamein at least somehow near Stalingrad is blasphemous.
              1. +2
                25 January 2013 20: 12
                It is impossible to compare in any case, but if Rommel won, the Arabs and Bedouins would rise against the colonialists, that is, on the German side. The Germans would block the Suez Canal, and Turkey is nearby.
                The Soviet command was afraid that the 22nd German division might interfere with the offensive. But ... the division’s tanks were camouflaged in haystacks and the mice actively gnawed the wiring of German cars. Of the 100 combat vehicles, only 30 were ready for battle. This affected the combat readiness of the 48th tank corps .
                Sadly, about 20000 of our compatriots fought against the Red Army in the Wehrmacht (according to German historians, more than 52000). Most of them were not captured, the Red Army shot traitors on the spot.
                1. Yankes
                  -3
                  25 January 2013 22: 32
                  true .... the Germans would have fought for us from the south ..... together with the Turks, didn’t go to the fortuneteller ..... and the Red Army would have fled further to Siberia .....
                  1. Marek Rozny
                    +2
                    25 January 2013 22: 56
                    The relationship between Nazi Germany and Turkey is a well-researched topic. Turkey categorically refused to enter the war against the USSR even at the moment of the triumph of the German army. But at the same time, she demanded that Germany not touch the Turkic-speaking regions of the Soviet Union, giving them independence, at least formal. Also, the Turks provided assistance to Soviet prisoners of war from among Turkic nationalities as far as possible. She willingly granted Turkish citizenship to all who wished the Soviet Turks who moved from concentration camps to Turkestan organizations under the so-called volunteer legions to shelter them from German and Soviet jurisdiction. She (not the Western countries) did not extradite a single former citizen of the USSR of Turkic nationality to Moscow, but helped to settle in her new homeland.
                    The idea that Turkey was ready to enter the war against the USSR was empty speculation.
                    At the same time, I add that there was no unnecessary discussion branch that the Turkestan and Volga-Tatar legions created from Soviet prisoners of war of the Kazakhs, Tatars, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmens categorically refused to fight against compatriots and distinguished themselves by the destruction of German officers of their battalions and massive transitions to side of the Red Army and partisans. Realizing that the Turkestans would not fight against their own, the Germans sent them to fight with the Yugoslav partisans. But even there, Turkestans left whole units to local partisans. As a result, the angry Germans sent them to the Atlantic Wall to fight against the British and Americans. However, there, as soon as possible, the Horde destroyed the German commanders and eventually surrendered to the Allies. Also whole units.
                    The Germans many times sent recruited prisoners of war with espionage assignments to the territory of the Kazakh SSR with the aim of sabotage, as well as the preparation of mass uprisings of the local population against the Soviet regime (especially at a time when the Wehrmacht was already in Stalingrad - almost a stone's throw from Kazakhstan). However, almost all saboteurs after landing went straight to the nearest NKVD to surrender and work for Soviet intelligence. In only one case, the saboteur was a traitor and had a firefight with local police. In all other cases, the saboteurs themselves immediately went to report to the Soviet state security bodies about their appearance. Then they fought a double game with the Germans in favor of the USSR.
                    Returning to the topic of Turkey - it was ready to establish friendly and allied relations with the newly formed Turkic states - "Big Turkestan" (Central Asia and Kazakhstan) and Idel-Ural (Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Chuvashia). Naturally in case of Germany's victory over the Soviet Union. But Turkey did not provide any assistance to Germany and was not going to provide it.
                    1. Beck
                      +1
                      26 January 2013 12: 27
                      Quote: Marek Rozny
                      Relations between Nazi Germany and Turkey


                      I agree. Turkey was taught the 1MB experience when it sided with Germany against the Entente. This turned into the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In order not to fall into a similar situation for the second time, Turkey kept military neutrality in WW2.
                  2. rolik
                    +1
                    26 January 2013 03: 26
                    Yankes,
                    Although I’m not a doctor, the diagnosis is clear. Acute cretinism, weighed down by a lack of education, and a lack of paternal slap in the face for the deuces in history
              2. mda
                mda
                +1
                25 January 2013 20: 40
                Quote: Beck
                Through Bl.Vostok to Iran, or what to shove?

                The British thought Rommel could ... and built fortifications in India
                1. Beck
                  +3
                  25 January 2013 20: 52
                  Quote: mda-a
                  The British thought Rommel could ... and built fortifications in India


                  So he did not pay his debts.

                  I agree plans were huge and strategic calculations were distant. But with such a dispersion of forces and means, I think it would not be realistic to ensure, at least in material and technical terms, a trip through the East, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan to India.
                  1. mda
                    mda
                    0
                    26 January 2013 15: 57
                    Quote: Beck
                    So he did not pay his debts.

                    The tsar requires a lot, but in order to go to the tsar’s palace, you need to bribe the guard there whoever else meets, but you still have to pay taxes and it turns out that I don’t have a penny.
                    1. Beck
                      +2
                      26 January 2013 16: 43
                      Quote: mda-a
                      The tsar requires a lot, but in order to go to the tsar’s palace, you need to bribe the guard there whoever else meets, but you still have to pay taxes and it turns out that I don’t have a penny.


                      Oh, you are dear, dear man. Oh, I’ve come up with a story, I’ll take the faithful servants of the king-priest with a bribe. The shadow on the fence is not a city. Healed the money. He put the money in the box, and buried the box in a hidden cache. But now I started a song - poor I, but an indecent I, not marked by God, not noticed by the king.

                      And now for serious. You can’t pay your debts per month. I’ll set you on the Finnish police and tax authorities.
                      1. mda
                        mda
                        0
                        27 January 2013 19: 30
                        Quote: Beck
                        Oh, you are dear, dear man.

                        am I cunning? I'm telling the truth! Honest European
                        Quote: Beck
                        Oh, I’ve come up with a story, I’ll take the faithful servants of the king-priest with a bribe.

                        But what can you do? Corruption ...
                        Quote: Beck
                        Now I started a song - poor I, but an indecent I, not marked by God, not noticed by the king.

                        So I said that I have no money left.
                        Quote: Beck
                        And now for serious. You can’t pay your debts per month. I’ll set you on the Finnish police and tax authorities.

                        And I, and I ... will set Onishchenko against you!
          2. +1
            25 January 2013 18: 28
            And he stopped the Allied offensive with EIGHT (!!!) anti-aircraft guns "akht-akht" !!!
            (Book: Lidnell-Garth "World War II")
            1. Yankes
              0
              25 January 2013 22: 38
              not eight ....... and eight or eight anti-aircraft guns ... laughing
          3. 0
            26 January 2013 07: 49
            A towel laughing
      2. mda
        mda
        +1
        25 January 2013 20: 39
        Quote: Alexander Romanov
        Operation under El Alamein is where

        This is in Egypt at the "gates" of Alexandria
    2. +3
      25 January 2013 15: 30
      I will add an article with maps of those tragic days.
      Click image for larger version

      July 17 - November 18, 1942


      Counterattack of November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943
  2. +7
    25 January 2013 09: 16
    Without begging the merits of the defenders of Stalingrad, I still consider it the most outstanding victory in the battle of Kursk. That's where the opponents came together equal to each other. There were more of our soldiers there, but the Germans had experience, technical and tactical superiority.
    But at the same time I’ll say: GLORY TO HEROES OF TAKEN-OFF PAULUS FOR THE CAUSE PLACE !!! ETERNAL MEMORY OF HEROES DEFENSE STALINGRAD !!!!!!!! We are the descendants of these heroes and must suppress all statements that the USSR did not win the second world war. If Hitler could destroy the USSR of England, a year would remain on the strength, the United States 2-3 years! Victory in the Second World War was forged on our territory by our soldiers. And the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad became that prologue.
    1. +1
      25 January 2013 10: 14
      Quote: PROXOR
      but the Germans had experience, technical and tactical superiority.

      In the middle of the 43rd year, I would not say so categorically.
      1. 0
        25 January 2013 10: 26
        Quote: Vladimirets
        In the middle of the 43rd year, I would not say so categorically.

        And I would. The Wehrmacht already in 1940 worked out the tactics of quick offensive combat. Often, enemy tanks passed defense lines without encountering resistance because either artillery or aviation had cut it. Stronger intelligence, the presence of experienced commanders not repressed by repression worked out tactics of interaction between the military branches. That is why, on the southern front of the Kursk arc, the Germans miraculously did not break through the 3rd line of defense. The blow of the 5th tank Rotmistrov was already a step of despair. The 5th tank lost 2/3 of the vehicles, which would force the enemy to withdraw.
        1. +7
          25 January 2013 11: 15
          You wrote:
          Quote: PROXOR
          the Germans had experience

          In the middle of the 43rd year, our experience was also rich, this is not the 41st

          Quote: PROXOR
          technical

          if you speak for a war of tanks, then the creation by the Germans of tigers and panthers (of which there were not very many) suggests that the main German tanks T3 and T4 obviously lost to the mass T-34.
          Quote: PROXOR
          tactical superiority.

          The creation on the Kursk Bulge of anti-tank fortified areas, layered defense, which knocked out an armored fist, is this not a tactical superiority?
          Quote: PROXOR
          The blow of the 5th tank Rotmistrov was already a step of despair

          A step, then a step, then the Germans had nothing to introduce at all, so who turned out to be more competent?
          1. -1
            25 January 2013 12: 08
            Quote: Vladimirets
            In the middle of the 43rd year, our experience was also rich, this is not the 41st

            Not 41st But not 44th !!! It was a debut in fact! Such a large-scale operation by the Soviet troops was carried out for the first time.
            Quote: Vladimirets
            if you speak for a war of tanks, then the creation by the Germans of tigers and panthers (of which there were not very many) suggests that the main German tanks T3 and T4 obviously lost to the mass T-34.

            Therefore, with that few, 3 tank armies suffered up to 60% of losses. Katukov himself wrote that even 34 in his tracks, could not stop the enemy.

            Quote: Vladimirets
            tactical superiority.

            The defense has a long view. The Germans are concentrating their forces on a certain area, destroying the anti-tank missiles, in fact, on a separate area, a 3-fold superiority of protinik over defending was created. The main task was to knock out the tanks. BUT WHAT TO PUNCH OUT THAT !!!! 45 did not interrupt. 34ke had to go on board and could penetrate from 500 meters. ZiS-6 forehead pierced God forbid from 300-400 meters. Only the Hypericum and 85mm remain. And there were not as many as many think. Everything was used, even the captured 88mm from under Stalingrad.

            Quote: Vladimirets
            A step, then a step, then the Germans had nothing to introduce at all, so who turned out to be more competent?

            This is logical. While the Voronezh Front of Malinovsky attacked the 9th Army of the Model on the flank and rear, all reserves were thrown there to save the situation. Manstein, with the last blow, brought all his tank divisions into battle. Naturally, the Germans no longer had the strength to attack. Logistical superiority does not give the key to victory. Example: on June 22, 1941, the Red Army had approximately 1300 T-34, KV-1, and KV-2 tanks, which is comparable to the number of Wehrmacht tanks t-3 and t-4. The result is sad. The mechanized corps burned in the fire of the first weeks of fighting!
            The 5th tank attack was suicide. They attacked between the river and the railway tracks. Part of the plateau was blocked by a ravine. The tank army, which usually introduced all its brigades at once into battle, this time was forced to introduce brigades in turn. Which once again says that it was a step of despair to save the situation. Our tankers, ETERNAL GLORY AND MEMORY OF THEM !!!!!, turned the elite Wehrmacht tank units with fur inside !!!! The battle at Prokhorovka for a total remained a draw. But Manstein lost his main strike force in that massacre. We, too. But replenishment was already coming from the Steppe front.
            1. Kubanets
              +2
              25 January 2013 12: 38
              Malinovsky was never a com of the Voronezh Front And at the time of the Battle of Stalingrad he led the 2 Guards Army
              1. +1
                25 January 2013 12: 43
                Quote: Kubanets
                Malinovsky was never a com of the Voronezh Front And at the time of the Battle of Stalingrad he led the 2 Guards Army

                Oops. I sprinkle ash on my head. Rokossovsky, Konstantin Konstantinovich !!!!!
          2. +3
            25 January 2013 13: 00
            in the year 43, the T-34-76 was already inferior to the German tanks, hence the huge losses
            1. +1
              25 January 2013 13: 05
              Quote: Poppy
              43 year T-34-76 was already inferior to the tanks of the Germans,

              Wide statement, don’t you? Did everyone lose?
          3. Avenger711
            -1
            25 January 2013 13: 13
            The layered defense didn’t knock anything out, they simply rolled it to dust in the weakest place, then there was a crisis and the burning of tank armies with the notorious Prokhorovka in a week, where there was no flank counterattack. And this despite the fact that the defense lines themselves are in the north. and south. the faces were very short. Moreover, the Red Army already had a numerical advantage.

            That is, the whole operation, based essentially on the fact that it was possible to ensure an abnormally high density of troops in defense, did not justify itself, in fact, it was necessary to attack immediately, then it would not have been necessary to throw counter-attacks.
            1. +5
              25 January 2013 14: 32
              Quote: Avenger711

              The layered defense didn’t knock anything out, they simply rolled it to dust in the weakest place, then there was a crisis and the burning of tank armies with the notorious Prokhorovka in a week, where there was no flank counterattack. And this despite the fact that the defense lines themselves are in the north. and south. the faces were very short. Moreover, the Red Army already had a numerical advantage.

              That is, the whole operation, based essentially on the fact that it was possible to ensure an abnormally high density of troops in defense, did not justify itself, in fact, it was necessary to attack immediately, then it would not have been necessary to throw counter-attacks.

              I do not agree about the offensive. Let's consider.
              Upcoming ALWAYS suffer greater losses than the defenders (if the defense is built)
              In the north, an enemy strike could be expected in a narrow stretch of 80 km wide. Rokosovsky knew and used it 100%.
              In defense, the Wehrmacht is even more dangerous. A capable 88mm gun can penetrate the T34 from a distance of 2 km, we would have lost all the tank units of the southern phase of the Kursk Bulge. Therefore, the tactics of exhausting the enemy fully paid off. and by the way. Rokosovsky possessed the overwhelming advantage. He had 1600 tanks against 1000 Models. Vatutin had only 1700 tanks against 1450 Manstein. A small numerical superiority was reduced to nothing, distributing forces along the entire front. Both Model and Manstein had the opportunity to concentrate their forces on a narrow section.
              1. Avenger711
                -1
                25 January 2013 17: 37
                Where did you get the idea that attackers always suffer big losses ?? You probably didn’t even play a strategy game on your computer, and you just don’t have a clue about how the attack really goes.

                Seen enough of the idiotic Soviet Kins, where stupid German assault rifles fleeing to the position of our brave soldiers, who are being shot like in a shooting gallery.

                In reality, just a hail of shells collapses on the position of the defenders. Just imagine that you are in the trenches on the defensive, but do not shoot the Fritz calmly, but lie deaf with wet pants, trying to hide from the endless stream of land and fragments, and it is possible that 3-4 battalions of enemies run right behind the breaks in your battalion . Do you really want to be in that position? No? But it is just typical of a defender. You just methodically destroy, those who survive, finish off the infantry with tanks. It’s generally trifling to break through the first line of defense; artillery solves this task with a bang. The question is how to turn a wedge into a breakthrough, because the defender begins to tighten reserves and counterattack. If he manages to quickly gather strength, then the breakthrough will be liquidated at the cost of heavy losses, if not, then a threat to the environment and a catastrophe is quite possible.

                The technique at the tactical level is well described, for example, here http://www.poteryww2.narod.ru/kritika/kritika_6.html

                Particularly emphasized is "the main thing - more fire", its own artillery even the terrible 88 mm will level the ground, by the way, guns with a caliber of more than 50 mm are not difficult to bypass, because in battle, after a few shots, only move a tractor.

                And 1: 3 is not a loss ratio, with such a ratio of forces the attacker simply rolls the defender into the asphalt. And the more the striker has a numerical superiority, the lower his losses will ultimately be.

                In the north, an enemy strike could be expected in a narrow stretch of 80 km wide


                Have you thought about how much time it takes to enter into battle the infantry formation of those years, which is 30 kilometers away?

                Vatutin had only 1700 tanks against 1450 Manstein. A small numerical superiority was reduced to nothing, distributing forces along the entire front. Both Model and Manstein had the opportunity to concentrate their forces on a narrow section.


                And you yourself don’t see why the defense is fatal? Even with a numerical superiority, Vatutin had a shit, he was just beaten in parts, and his own opinion on this was unambiguous, the defense was an erroneous decision that led to a dispersal of forces. It always leads to it and therefore is permissible only in secondary areas that cannot be attacked since the enemy is linked by battles somewhere else.
              2. +1
                25 January 2013 17: 41
                the word "always" is in vain it is written so large, this is a mistake)
                Prokhorovka is not a step of despair, it is a battle in an unplanned and uncomfortable place, miscalculation is possible, a case .. but it is not a step of despair
                listen to the words of Vladimirets he is right
                1. Avenger711
                  0
                  25 January 2013 22: 00
                  Exactly. Instead of the flank, a head-on hit with sad consequences.
              3. Yankes
                -1
                25 January 2013 22: 55
                on the north front the average daily losses were much higher than on the south .. so it was hotter than in the south .....
          4. +2
            25 January 2013 17: 15
            Vladimirets,

            A step, then a step, then the Germans had nothing to introduce at all, so who turned out to be more competent?


            After Prokhorovka, the Germans maintained their combat readiness and readiness to continue the offensive, and Vatutin already tearfully requested Stalin's 2-3 tank corps. Hitler’s order to withdraw from the battle the SS tank corps and the defeat at Orel and the northern face of the arc, that is what objectively forced the Germans to stop the offensive.
            The creation on the Kursk Bulge of anti-tank fortified areas, layered defense, which knocked out an armored fist, is this not a tactical superiority?

            Read carefully about the offensive of Model’s troops on the northern edge of the arc.
            German dive bombers mowed anti-tank defenses and minefields, the first days unhindered making 6 sorties per day! The average life of the VET regiment in those days is one hour! This is according to the recollections of eyewitnesses. They gnawed through the defense, despite the strongest VET, despite the fact that there were no tigers, the usual T-3 and T-4 and a handful of Ferdinands. It was the coherence of the actions of all military branches that helped the Germans. And yet they ran out of steam, since Rokossovsky was not Vatutin, he did not send his tanks into empty frontal attacks.
        2. +1
          25 January 2013 12: 59
          Yes, there the Germans went through the defense, which was prepared for almost a year, for 17 !!! hours
          countered only by the counterattack of an entire tank army
          1. +4
            25 January 2013 13: 05
            Quote: Poppy

            Yes, there the Germans went through the defense, which was prepared for almost a year, for 17 !!! hours
            countered only by the counterattack of an entire tank army

            For 17 hours, Manstein broke only the first line. In response, Vatutin sent 1 tank Katukov into a counterattack! It was the first tank, or rather its loss, that prompted Zhukov to request a bet to transfer to 5th Rotmisterov Vatutin.
          2. +1
            25 January 2013 13: 06
            Quote: Poppy
            there the Germans went through the defense, which was prepared for almost a year, for 17 !!! hours

            The first line, but at what cost.
            1. Avenger711
              -1
              25 January 2013 22: 01
              The minimum, mostly obviously shells paid, not by people.
        3. Avenger711
          +1
          25 January 2013 13: 18
          What repressions did you fall from the moon, or from the XX Congress? As a result of the disclosure of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy, the quality of training military commanders, on the contrary, increased, because instead of the shot, illiterate nominees of the Civil era, people of the same age came to their place, but they did not command armies at 25 years old, simply because there was no one else, but they had served normally from the school to the general ranks and in the academies having unlearned. The shortage of officers before the war was the result of the swelling of the army in the 39th, when the staff increased and a lot of posts appeared that had to be filled by someone.
          1. +2
            25 January 2013 14: 39
            Quote: Avenger711

            What repressions did you fall from the moon, or from the XX Congress? As a result of the disclosure of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy, the quality of training military commanders, on the contrary, increased, because instead of the shot, illiterate nominees of the Civil era, people of the same age came to their place, but they did not command armies at 25 years old, simply because there was no one else, but they had served normally from the school to the general ranks and in the academies having unlearned. The shortage of officers before the war was the result of the swelling of the army in the 39th, when the staff increased and a lot of posts appeared that had to be filled by someone.

            That you are respected from the moon. Case in point. Both Rokosovsky and Gorbatov were both under investigation. But they did not give evidence and were released, but such units. Yet again. An officer who has completed a higher military educational institution is empty without combat experience. It was such officers who commanded under the Charter at 41m. So far, Zhukov did not issue an order in which he demanded verbatim: To attack the enemy with poorly fired areas, bypassing strongly fortified heights. So you can learn all the science, but it is nothing when an officer gets into battle. BATTLE EXPERIENCE is very expensive. As an example. The Japanese contingent in Manchuria did not have serious combat experience. The more well-trained Soviet army did not leave the enemy half a chance.
            1. Avenger711
              +1
              25 January 2013 17: 57
              A lot of people were under investigation. However released. In total, for all reasons, including illness and criminal activity, about 40 thousand people were fired from the army. This is a few percent of the number of officers, of which some were restored.

              If they had commanded badly at 41, then in the conditions of a general lead in deployment and the actual betrayal of General Pavlov (for reference, during the war there were a lot of people who could not cope with their tasks, but they were shot by units, the others found another job, but why in the same 11 people of several regiments sat in the Brest Fortress, who then simply surrendered in bulk, although putting the troops on combat alert began approximately on the 15th, this is an occasion for questions to Pavlov and there are many such examples in Belarus), then P SMAI now would not have been.

              Before Khalkhin-Gol, the situation was very bad, as is usually the case in the backyards. Zhukov simply acted quickly and decisively, would sit on the defensive along Gareyev and merge with the Japanese how to drink. At the same time, the same 82nd Infantry Division, which was sent to strengthen in battles, proved to be very bad.
      2. Yankes
        -1
        25 January 2013 22: 42
        rkka has always had a quantitative superiority .. but not a qualitative one ....
    2. borisst64
      +2
      25 January 2013 10: 42
      Quote: PROXOR
      still consider it the most outstanding victory in the battle


      Military historians have always singled out the greatest operation of the Second World War, in terms of the number of troops involved, in the depth and width of the front, in the duration of the planned actions - this is the Byelorussian operation Bagration.
      And the opinion of war veterans (at least military leaders) that the most significant victory is near Moscow. In my opinion, Stalingrad is important in that it broke the spirit of German soldiers. A soldier who does not believe in victory eventually loses.
      I am also surprised that Gareev eventually raises the question of Al-Alamein, about which they are not even discussing in the West.
      1. +4
        25 January 2013 10: 49
        Quote: borisst64
        Military historians have always singled out the greatest operation of the Second World War, in terms of the number of troops involved, in the depth and width of the front, in the duration of the planned actions - this is the Byelorussian operation Bagration.
        And the opinion of war veterans (at least military leaders) that the most significant victory is near Moscow. In my opinion, Stalingrad is important in that it broke the spirit of German soldiers. A soldier who does not believe in victory eventually loses.

        Operation Bagration is the greatest, because by 44th we had succeeded in planning operations and misinforming the enemy. 4 front, more than 2 soldiers, having sold 500 at the Wehrmacht. We concentrated tremendous forces on the Belorussian balcony, and the enemy was waiting for our strike in Ukraine. Operation Bagration is the crown of our offensive tactics in WWII. Throw at least half of our forces from Ukraine, and our armies would hit the wall.
        Belarus is marshy. And the maneuver of the tank units was constrained. And the tanks as well known and played a major role in those years.
        1. Kubanets
          +1
          25 January 2013 12: 45
          So they threw it but it was too late The result-capture of Lviv And the interpretation of PROXOR in Ukraine is unclear at that moment the Wehrmacht was languishing from idleness?
          1. 0
            25 January 2013 12: 53
            Quote: Kubanets
            So they threw it but it was too late The result-capture of Lviv And the interpretation of PROXOR in Ukraine is unclear at that moment the Wehrmacht was languishing from idleness?

            If you have studied history, then you are well aware of where the Bagration operation began. I can get into the manuals and state everything verbatim, but you can do it yourself. The point is simple. When it came to the command of the Wehrmacht that the Red Army launched a general attack on Belarus it was already too late. When the first tank divisions moved north from Ukraine, Rokosovsky and Gorbatov began to implement the second part of the Bagration plan. The same move with two major hits. The Wehrmacht simply could not bring all the tank units into battle because they were on the march. Therefore, it turned out that the Red Army interrupted these combat-ready units separately.
    3. mnn_12
      +1
      25 January 2013 16: 24
      All the same, I think that the battle of Moscow should be put in the first place. There was an end to the blitzkrieg and the Nazis lost control over what was happening. I really wanted to take Moscow, we did everything we could but did not reach the goal. Esli was not Moscow would not be everything else.
    4. Yuri
      +1
      26 January 2013 00: 01
      Quote: PROXOR
      Victory in the Second World War was forged on our territory by our soldiers.

      Our grandfathers !!!
    5. Beck
      +2
      26 January 2013 13: 46
      Under Alamein, the battle was for strategic initiative.

      Near Stalangrad was the Battle for LIFE or DEATH.

      Our Fathers and Grandfathers defended LIFE for all of us.
  3. +4
    25 January 2013 09: 20
    The great battle, the great feat of the people of the USSR.
  4. +4
    25 January 2013 10: 15
    One goal is clearly visible here, review the results of the second world war! We will never allow this!
    The greatest feat of our people is not subject to revision.
    1. Yankes
      -2
      25 January 2013 23: 17
      you just need to know the truth .. but unfortunately it is terrible .....
  5. avt
    +4
    25 January 2013 10: 18
    The city should be renamed to Stalingrad!
    1. -3
      25 January 2013 10: 50
      What for? What kind of fashion went bad?
      1. avt
        +6
        25 January 2013 11: 22
        Quote: PROXOR
        What for? What kind of fashion went bad?

        Absolutely due to why there is a Stalingrad street in Paris! What is not clear here? The Great Feat was accomplished in STALINGRAD, and not in Tsaritsyn, and not in Volgograd, and there is nothing to complex here, they say they don’t understand. Everyone will understand everything correctly!
        1. +1
          25 January 2013 12: 44
          Quote: avt
          Absolutely due to why there is a Stalingrad street in Paris! What is not clear here? The Great Feat was accomplished in STALINGRAD, and not in Tsaritsyn, and not in Volgograd, and there is nothing to complex here, they say they don’t understand. Everyone will understand everything correctly!

          Well then, you have to ask the residents.
    2. Yankes
      -1
      25 January 2013 23: 18
      do not .. this is blasphemy ..... a tyrant and a despot must be erased from the pages of history forever .....
  6. Avenger711
    0
    25 January 2013 10: 32
    And in the 1942 year, despite the defeats of the 1941 year, the ideological cult of the offensive doctrine continued to press so much, underestimating the defense, its false understanding was so deeply rooted in the minds of the Soviet command that it was embarrassed as something unworthy for the Red Army and was not fully resolved use.


    Author, kill yourself against the wall and never, you hear, never again dare to write about strategy! In war, there is only one acceptable way to fight - the fastest concentration of troops and the creation of problems for the enemy through active offensive actions. The outstanding military leaders of all time speak of this, the modern commanders of toy armies on chessboards and computer monitors will say the same. Either you choose the most convenient place and time for the battle and impose your will on the enemy, or he chooses and imposes his own on you. This is a general rule of confrontation between the two parties.
    The overwhelming majority of defensive operations in the history of wars ended in defeats, and losses could be catastrophic.

    The article is a fat minus.
    1. +2
      25 January 2013 13: 02
      absolutely right
    2. Yankes
      -1
      25 January 2013 23: 20
      defense will always win ..... if only it is normal ..... and in the red army cells were digging ....
  7. fenix57
    +2
    25 January 2013 10: 47
    Only the GREAT PEOPLE could win such a war. "The fact remains that during the most difficult period of the war for our country - in the summer and autumn of 1941 - there were no lend-lease supplies to the USSR yet. The German fascist armies were stopped on the approaches to Leningrad and Moscow exclusively with our weapons." Those interested follow the link http://file-rf.ru/analitics/418 I read and mat after mat in my head. Critters.
  8. +4
    25 January 2013 10: 50
    Eternal Glory to the Victors! Eternal memory of the fallen in the battles for the homeland!
  9. +5
    25 January 2013 11: 23
    I don’t even know what to say except that it’s just a deep bow to the veterans and the fallen in battle defending their homeland, their families!
    Thank you very much for your feat !!! Everlasting memory...
  10. +3
    25 January 2013 11: 28
    Yes, to be honest, for me it was already clear ... Such an article would have been published in the Western press ...
    1. Marek Rozny
      +3
      25 January 2013 16: 53
      in the west, Rezun and Briton Beaver in favor.
      1. Avenger711
        -1
        25 January 2013 17: 59
        Almost no one knows Rezun in the west.
        1. Marek Rozny
          +3
          25 January 2013 18: 15
          The concept of Rezun is very well known in the historical circles of the West and on its basis the local journalists and historians riveted articles and books - mother, do not worry. Even if some European did not hear the name of Rezun, he is usually familiar with his version of who is the aggressor and who is the victim. The Poles generally shot an entire television series from one of his books.
          So in vain underestimate the influence of the Rezunov theory.
          But I’m generally silent about Anthony Bivor - he is like the most important expert on Stalingrad and, in general, on the subject of World War II. A bunch of awards and prizes for their opuses, in which there are simply a lot of mistakes and inaccuracies. Yes, and the tone of the books is appropriate.
  11. Kubanets
    +3
    25 January 2013 12: 55
    Ivanenko Aleksey Avdeevich Lieutenant commander of a machine gun company was awarded the Order of the Red Star in August 42 for battles at the Kotluban station near Stalingrad And a week later he was wounded and evacuated to the hospital Glory to the Heroes of the Ancestors
  12. +2
    25 January 2013 14: 53
    It is a pity that Hitler did not begin to enslave the world from America .... We would then open a second front when we thought it necessary.
  13. +1
    25 January 2013 15: 07
    Yes, we must talk about our victories everywhere and always, and the more often the better.
    And at the expense of renaming Volgograd? Then, to return the city to its historical name, like many Russian cities.
  14. toguns
    +1
    25 January 2013 15: 07
    recourse and I would call the battle for Moscow, if not for it, then there would be no Kursk Bulge and Stalingrad.
    and judging by martial art and tactics, then of course Operation Barbarossa to Moscow and Operation Bagration.
  15. Marek Rozny
    +2
    25 January 2013 16: 52
    What cannot be taken away from Gareev is clarity of presentation and compressed presentation of convincing materials. Pros.
    Thank you for the article posted!
  16. +3
    25 January 2013 17: 42
    Near Stalingrad, my grandfather, his kingdom of heaven, received his first wound. I was young, stupid, and sometimes pushed him. The wound was in the back. At that time he considered it not a heroic wound. He said that they did not have time to dig in, and the Germans began to hit with mortars. He hid his head, but nowhere to ass. Here is a piece of shrapnel and cut off. I now understand that there are no injuries heroic or non-heroic. And still ashamed of his boyhood.
    Now the youngest defenders of Stalingrad are 88-90 years old. Give them the god of health and another years of life.
    And to the lost eternal glory.
    1. +1
      27 January 2013 20: 35
      Quote: vlbelugin
      Near Stalingrad, my grandfather, his kingdom of heaven, received his first wound.

      Father rarely spoke of war. But he once said that of the two formations of the battalion in Stalingrad, only a few remained. He fought from the very beginning.
  17. AlexMH
    +1
    25 January 2013 20: 26
    I disagree with what is stated in the article on a number of points. It is unfair to speak of the "inflexibility" of the Soviet command during the Battle of Stalingrad, just in the writings of German generals it is written that during the retreat in the summer of 1942, Russian units timely left bypassed positions, as a result of which they managed to avoid large encirclements (except for the very first disaster under Kharkov), and the number of prisoners was small compared to 1941 (which indirectly speaks about the higher morale of the units). As correctly noted, at the strategic and operational level, the command from our side was better than in 1941 - take, for example, the rapid transfer of units to Stalingrad in August-September and the defensive maneuver in winter, when Manstein was stopped at the turn of the river. Myshkov. For 41, it was rather possible to expect not the transfer of an entire army to the direction of the main attack of the Germans, but calls to the existing units "Do not allow!" and "Hold!" And Stalin's de facto refusal to carry out the "Big Saturn" to guarantee the elimination of the encircled group, taking into account the insufficient mobility of Soviet troops so far, was quite reasonable. As for the "turning point" in the war - everyone looks for it wherever he wants, Stalingrad is much more famous in the West than the Battle of Kursk, but from a strategic point of view, Germany's hopes of winning the war were cut short by the Battle of Moscow, after which the blitzkrieg turned into a war of attrition , which Germany could not win. However, the Battle of Stalingrad dealt a blow precisely to the morale of the German troops. if the defeat near Moscow was perceived by them as a "failure", and only more perspicacious officers understood that this was the beginning of the end, then the Battle of Stalingrad was precisely a "catastrophe" for the Germans.
    1. vardex
      0
      26 January 2013 03: 09
      Yes, it was the Germans who lost their spirit near Stalingrad, our fighters showed the Fritz where the hole in the bread was, not the weapon but the warrior’s spirit, determination, and faith in statesmen, commanders, won the war.
      A half-lying article, in short, you can not read.
      The main purpose of this article is to humiliate the IVS ........
  18. +1
    25 January 2013 21: 24
    El Alamein, compared with Stalingrad, is simply a battle of local importance.
  19. Yankes
    -2
    25 January 2013 22: 19
    Yes, Hitler blunted with Stalingrad ... why didn’t he understand him ..... 100% if only 4 went south, then the red ones died before spring 43 ....
  20. +2
    25 January 2013 23: 31
    Yankes, well, don’t worry so much, not only Hitler, but you, too, blunted your conclusion.
  21. +1
    26 January 2013 01: 58
    The father still celebrates February 2, as well as May 9. During the bombing on August 23, he lost his grandparents with whom he lived. Policemen collected people like him and took them to the main ferry, where the ferry is now, and transported them to "Crete", as the island in the middle of the Volga is called, and next to the ferry there was a battery and there were only girls there. Father was on that island until September 12 and saw how the entire battery was killed by the bombs and how these 2-18 year old girls fought there to the end. Father then from mid-20 to the end of the war worked at the Saratov aviation and returned to Stalingrad in June 43. Of course, he saw the burning city and the destruction of his area too, but what he saw with his own eyes upon his return was just so scary that, according to him, the photographs that were exhibited on the Panorama did not convey even 1945% of the horror that was then in the city.
  22. +1
    26 January 2013 02: 38
    they took the 6th army, let the allies boast about it. Imagine if the 6th Army, together with the 4th Panzer attacked the Allies)) The Negroes fleeing the jeeps from much less pressure. The Germans were able to fight then, especially our glory, grandfathers and great-grandfathers, were able to break such a machine. All sorts of eternal capitulants, such as Czechs, can’t understand this, they’ll scum. Interestingly, take the Kursk Bulge as an example, well, who could withstand the onslaught of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps? We could and glory! They also defeated it later, and every fool can bazaar

    but about the loss, the eternal memory of people that we are not cheap German now. Paulus recalled that the battalions burned in Stalingrad like matches and did not stay away from the German battalion per day and 100 people. This is for those who bazaar about big losses, the Germans lost a HUGE amount of their soldiers. The Russians in the defense are excellent soldiers, steady and skillful, they have proved to everyone, it is simply proved to everyone in practice, what can I say
    1. Marek Rozny
      +2
      26 January 2013 22: 13
      Soviet soldiers. and not "Russians". both of my grandfathers were not Russian soldiers.
  23. avt
    +2
    26 January 2013 10: 11
    Quote: barbiturate
    they took the 6th army, let the allies boast about it. Imagine if the 6th Army, together with the 4th Panzer struck the Allies))

    And the Hans showed them once - what war is and how they fight on the Eastern Front! In the Ardennes! Do not be lazy, find the book by D.Kraminov, "The Truth About the Second Front" by the "correspondent" went with the allies from the landing in Normandy to the end of the war.
    1. +1
      26 January 2013 16: 12
      And ours had to launch a major offensive ahead of schedule, so that the Germans would begin to withdraw divisions from the western front and transfer them to the East.
      1. avt
        0
        27 January 2013 14: 44
        Quote: Thunderbolt
        And ours had to launch a major offensive ahead of schedule, so that the Germans would begin to withdraw divisions from the western front and transfer them to the East.

        Exactly ! The entire 6th SS Panzer Army!
  24. +2
    26 January 2013 15: 37
    It would be interesting to read articles about how our "allies" fought. It seems that they suffered more. In fact, lend-lease can be viewed as feeding the flame of the warriors for the mutual destruction of the Germans and Russians.
    1. +1
      26 January 2013 16: 09
      That's what advertising of US cartridges clung to the Battle of Stalingrad
  25. 0
    27 January 2013 14: 30
    Gareev is a "defender". But his defencism is smoothly flowing into a permanent retreat to advantageous positions. It is clear that with such a major military historians there should be a corresponding minister of defense.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"