In Stalingrad, the course of the world stories made a sharp turnIn the Russian military history, the battle of Stalingrad has always been considered the most prominent and significant event of the Great Patriotic and World War II. The highest evaluation of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Battle of Stalingrad is given by modern world historiography. “At the turn of the century, Stalingrad was recognized as the decisive battle not only of the Second World War, but of the era as a whole,” emphasizes the British historian J. Roberts.
During the Great Patriotic War there were other no less brilliant victories of the Soviet weapons - and by its strategic results, and by the level of military art. So why among them stands out Stalingrad? In connection with the 70 anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, I would like to reflect on this.
The interests of historical science, the development of cooperation between nations require the liberation of military history from the spirit of confrontation, to subordinate the research scientists to the interests of a deep, truthful and objective coverage of the history of the Second World War, including the Battle of Stalingrad. This is due to the fact that some people want to falsify the history of the Second World War, to "war" the war on paper.
Much has been written about the Battle of Stalingrad. Therefore, there is no need to retell its course in detail. Historians and the military rightly wrote that its outcome was due to the increased power of the country and the Red Army by the autumn of 1942, the high level of military art of its command cadres, the massive heroism of Soviet soldiers, the unity and dedication of the entire Soviet people. It was emphasized that our strategy, operational art and tactics in the course of this battle took a new major step forward in their development, were enriched with new positions.
PLANS OF THE PARTIES FOR 1942 YEAR
When discussing plans for the summer campaign in March 1942 at the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command (UGK), the General Staff (Boris Shaposhnikov) and Georgy Zhukov suggested that the main course of action should be considered a transition to strategic defense.
Zhukov considered it possible to take private offensive actions only in the Western Front. Simon Tymoshenko suggested, in addition, to conduct an offensive operation in the Kharkov direction. To the objections of Zhukov and Shaposhnikov regarding this proposal, Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin declared: “We should not sit idly in defense, not wait until the Germans strike first! It is necessary to deliver a number of preemptive strikes on a broad front and to feel the readiness of the enemy. ”
And further: “Zhukov proposes to launch an offensive in the western direction, and on the other fronts to defend. I think this is half measure. ”
As a result, it was decided to undertake a series of offensive operations in the Crimea, in the Kharkiv region, on the Lgov and Smolensk axes, in the areas of Leningrad and Demyansk.
As for the plans of the German command, at one time it was believed that it set as its main goal the capture of Moscow by a deep detour from the south. But in reality, according to the directive of the Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of Hitler's Armed Forces of Germany No. 41 from 5 on April 1942, the main goal of the German offensive in the summer of 1942 was to master the Donbass, Caucasian oil and by disrupting communications deep in the country to deprive the USSR of the most important resources coming from these areas.
First, when striking in the south, conditions were created for achieving surprise and more favorable opportunities for success, because our Supreme Command in the 1942 year again awaited the main attack of the enemy in the Moscow direction, and here the main forces and reserves were concentrated. The German Kremlin disinformation plan was not solved either.
Secondly, in the case of an offensive on the Moscow area, German troops would have to break through a previously prepared, deeply echeloned defense with the prospect of conducting protracted military operations. If in the 1941 year near Moscow the German Wehrmacht failed to overcome the resistance of the Red Army retreating with great losses, then in the 1942 year the Germans were all the more difficult to rely on the seizure of Moscow. At that time, in the south, in the Kharkiv region, as a result of a major defeat of the Soviet troops of the German army, our significantly weakened forces opposed; It was here that was the most vulnerable part of the Soviet front.
Thirdly, when the main attack was delivered by the German army on the Moscow direction and even at the worst, the capture of Moscow (which was unlikely), the retention by the Soviet troops of economically important areas in the south created the conditions for the continuation of the war and its successful completion.
All this suggests that the strategic plans of Hitler’s command basically correctly took into account the current situation. But even with this condition, the troops of Germany and its satellites would not have been able to advance so far and reach the Volga, if not for the major mistakes of the Soviet command in assessing the direction of a possible enemy strike, inconsistency and indecision in the choice of method of action. On the one hand, in principle, it was supposed to go over to strategic defense, on the other - a number of unprepared and unsecured materially offensive operations were undertaken. This led to a dispersal of forces, and our army was unprepared for either the defense or the offensive. Oddly enough, but the Soviet troops were again in the same uncertain position as in 1941 year.
And in the 1942 year, despite the defeats of the 1941 year, the ideological cult of the offensive doctrine continued to press so much, underestimating the defense, its false understanding was so deeply rooted in the minds of the Soviet command that it was embarrassed as something unworthy for the Red Army and was not fully resolved use.
In the light of the parties ’plans discussed above, an important aspect is clearly clarified: the Stalingrad strategic operation was an interconnected part of the entire strategic action system of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1942. In many military-historical works, the Stalingrad operation was considered in isolation from other operations conducted in the western direction. This also applies to Operation Mars 1942 of the year, the essence of which is most distorted, especially in American historiography.
The main remark boils down to the fact that the main decisive strategic operation in the autumn and winter of 1942 – 1943 were not operations in the south-west, but offensive operations conducted in the western strategic direction. The reason for this conclusion is the fact that less effort and resources were allocated for solving problems in the south than in the western direction. But in reality, this is not quite the case, for the southern strategic direction should be taken as a whole, and not just the troops near Stalingrad, including troops in the North Caucasus and troops from the Voronezh direction, which were practically directed towards the south. In addition, we must take into account the fact that the offensive actions of our troops in the west did not allow the German command to transfer forces to the south. Our main strategic reserves were located southeast of Moscow and could be transferred to the south.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON STANDING TO STALINGRAD
The second group of questions relates to the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (from July 17 to November 18, 1942) and follows from the need for a more objective, critical assessment of defensive battles and operations on the approaches to Stalingrad. During this period, there were most of all omissions and shortcomings in the actions of our command and troops. Military-theoretical thought remains to be clarified how our army managed to restore in the catastrophically difficult conditions in the summer of 1942 an almost completely broken strategic front in the south-west direction. It is known that only from July 17 to September 30, 1942, the Supreme Command headquarters sent 50 infantry and cavalry divisions, 33 brigades, including 24 tank.
At the same time, the Soviet command did not plan and did not set the task for the troops to stop the advancing enemy only after withdrawing to the Volga. It has repeatedly demanded that the enemy be stopped at a number of lines even at the distant approaches to Stalingrad. Why did it fail, despite the large number of reserves, to the courage and mass heroism of officers and soldiers, skillful actions of a number of formations and units? There were, of course, many cases of confusion and panic, especially after heavy defeats and large losses of our troops in May – June of the 1942 year. In order for a psychological breakthrough to occur in the troops, a serious shakeup was needed. And in this respect, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227, which gave a sharp and truthful assessment of the situation and permeated with the main demand - “Not one step back!”, Played its overall positive role. It was a very harsh and hard-to-limit document, but forced and necessary in the prevailing conditions.
Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus preferred captivity to suicide. The main reason for the failure of a number of defensive battles on the approaches to Stalingrad was that in the organization of strategic defense, the Soviet command repeated the mistakes of 1941 of the year.
After each major breakthrough of the German army, instead of a sober assessment of the situation and decision-making on defense at one or another profitable turn, where retreating troops would retreat and fresh connections from the depth would be pulled in advance, orders were given at any cost to keep the occupied lines even when it was impossible . Reserve connections and incoming replenishment on the move were sent into battle, as a rule, for putting poorly prepared counterattacks and counterstrikes. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity to beat them in parts, and the Soviet troops were deprived of the opportunity to properly consolidate and organize the defense on the new frontiers.
The nervous reaction to each retreat exacerbated the already difficult, complex situation and condemned the troops to new ones.
It should also be recognized that German troops were quite skillful in conducting offensive operations, widely maneuvering and massively using tank and motorized formations in open, tank-accessible terrain. Having met resistance in one or another sector, they quickly changed the direction of the blows, trying to get to the flank and rear of the Soviet troops, whose maneuverability was much lower.
Setting unrealistic tasks, setting deadlines for the commencement of hostilities and operations without taking into account the minimum required time to prepare for their conduct made itself felt even when drawing many counterattacks and counterstrikes during defensive operations. For example, 3 September 1942, due to the difficult situation in the Stalingrad Front, Stalin sent a telegram to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters: “Ask the commander of the troops north and north-west of Stalingrad to immediately strike the enemy and come to the aid of the Stalingrs.”
There were many such telegrams and requirements. A person who has a little sense in military affairs can easily understand their absurdity: how can troops without minimal training and organization take and “strike” and go on the offensive. The defense activity was of great importance for wearing down the enemy, disrupting and delaying his offensive actions. But counterstrikes could be more effective with more thorough preparation and material support.
During defensive battles on the outskirts of Stalingrad, air defense was extremely weak, and therefore had to act in conditions of significant superiority aviation enemy, which made it particularly difficult for the troops to maneuver.
If at the beginning of the war, staff inexperience affected, then after heavy losses in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, the problem of cadres was even more acute, although there were many commanders who had time to harden and gain combat experience. Many mistakes, omissions and even cases of criminal irresponsibility on the part of the commanders of fronts, armies, commanders of formations and units were made. In their totality, they also seriously complicated the situation, but they didn’t have such decisive significance as the miscalculations made by the Supreme Command's headquarters. Not to mention the fact that too frequent changes of commanders and commanders (only in July – August 1942 changed three commanders of the Stalingrad Front) did not allow them to get comfortable with the situation.
The stability of the troops was adversely affected by the fear of encirclement. Political mistrust and repression against military personnel who, during the retreats in 1941 and in the spring of 1942, were surrounded, played a detrimental role in this regard. And after the war, the officers who were surrounded, did not accept to study at military academies. It seemed to the military-political bodies and the bosses of the NKVD that such an attitude toward the "riots" could increase the resistance of the troops. But it was the opposite - the fear of encirclement reduced the stubbornness of troops in defense. It did not take into account that, as a rule, the most steadfastly defended troops came to the environment, often as a result of the retreat of their neighbors. This is the most selfless part of the military was subjected to persecution. Nobody was held accountable for this wild and criminal incompetence.
FEATURES OF THE STALINGRAD ADJUSTABLE OPERATION
From the experience of the second phase of the Battle of Stalingrad (from November 19 1942 to February 2 1943), when the troops of the South-Western, Don and Stalingrad fronts carried out a counter-offensive, important conclusions and lessons were drawn up on the preparation and conduct of offensive operations to surround and destroy the enemy.
The strategic plan of this counterattack was to concentrate and destroy the Nazi group by concentrated strikes of the Southwestern (Nikolai Vatutin), Donskoy (Konstantin Rokossovsky) fronts from the north and the Stalingrad front (Andrey Eremenko) from the region south of Stalingrad in the general direction to Kalach troops and their satellites (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian troops) east of Stalingrad. Long-range aviation and Volzhskaya also participated in the operation. flotilla.
Different points of view are expressed about who owns the initial idea of a counter-offensive with the environment and the destruction of the main forces of the enemy. Khrushchev, Eremenko, and many others claimed this. Speaking objectively, this idea in its general form, as many war veterans recall, literally "flew in the air," for the very configuration of the front already prompted the need for strikes against the flanks of the enemy group under the command of Friedrich Paulus.
But the main, most difficult task was how to concretize and implement this idea taking into account the current situation, how to collect and concentrate the necessary forces and means in time and organize their actions, where exactly to direct the blows and with what tasks. It can be considered an established fact that the main idea of this plan, of course, belongs to the Supreme Command Headquarters, and above all George Zhukov, Alexander Vasilevsky and the General Staff. Another thing is that she was born on the basis of proposals, meetings and conversations with generals and officers of the fronts.
In general, it must be said that the level of military art of command personnel and staffs and the combat skills of all personnel in the preparation and conduct of offensive operations at the second stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was significantly higher than in all previous offensive operations. Many methods of preparing and conducting combat operations, having appeared here for the first time (not always in complete form), were then used with great success in 1943 – 1945 operations.
At Stalingrad, the massive use of forces and assets in the areas chosen for the offensive was carried out with great success, although not to the same extent as in the operations of 1944 – 1945. So, on the South-Western Front, on the 22 km breakthrough section (9% of the entire strip width) of 18 rifle divisions, 9 was concentrated; on the Stalingrad front in the 40 km sector (9%) of the 12 divisions - 8; in addition, 80% of all tanks and up to 85% artillery were concentrated in these areas. However, the density of artillery was only 56 guns and mortars on 1 km breakthrough area, whereas in subsequent operations - 200 – 250 and more. In general, the secrecy of preparation and the suddenness of the transition to the offensive was achieved.
Essentially, for the first time during the war, not only careful planning of operations was carried out, but also painstaking work on the ground with the commanders of all degrees in preparing combat operations, organizing interaction, combat, logistics and technical support was carried out to the required extent. Intelligence was able, albeit incompletely, to uncover the enemy’s fire system, which made it possible to carry out a more reliable fire attack than was the case in previous offensive operations.
For the first time, an artillery and air offensive was fully applied, although the methods of artillery preparation and attack support were not yet clearly worked out.
For the first time before the attack on a broad front, in the bands of all armies, reconnaissance by advanced units was carried out in order to clarify the location of the front edge and the enemy's fire system. But in the bands of some armies, it was carried out in two or three days, and in the 21 and 57 armies - five days before the onset of the offensive, which in other circumstances could reveal the beginning of the offensive, and the obtained data on the enemy's fire system - significantly outdated .
At Stalingrad, for the first time, during a major offensive operation, new infantry battle formations were applied in accordance with the requirements of Commissar of Defense Order No. 306 — with a single-echelon building not only of subunits, units, but also formations. Such a construction reduced the loss of troops, allowed a more complete use of infantry fire weapons. But at the same time the absence of second echelons hampered the timely escalation of efforts to develop the offensive in depth. This was one of the reasons why rifle divisions of the first echelon failed to break through the enemy defenses; already at the depth of 3 – 4 km, tank corps had to be brought into battle, which, under the prevailing situation, was a necessary measure. The experience of these and subsequent offensive operations has shown that in the regiments and divisions, when there is an opportunity, it is imperative to create second echelons.
Significantly increased the volume of logistics of the troops. On three fronts, 8 million artillery shells and mines were concentrated on the beginning of the counteroffensive. For example: in 1914, the entire Russian army had 7 million shells.
But if to compare with the needs of fire destruction, then the November 1942 offensive operations of the year were relatively insufficiently supplied with ammunition - on average, 1,7 – 3,7 ammunition; South-Western Front - 3,4; Donskoy - 1,7; Stalingrad - 2. For example, in the Byelorussian or Vistula-Oder operations, the supply of ammunition to the fronts was up to 4,5 ammunition.
In the second stage of the Stalingrad battle, connected with the actions of the troops to destroy the enemy’s surrounded grouping and the development of an offensive on the external front, two questions arise on which different opinions are expressed.
First, some historians and military experts believe that a large gap between the environment of the enemy grouping and its destruction was a serious flaw in the Soviet counter-offensive operation at Stalingrad, while the classic position of military art states that the environment and the destruction of the enemy should be one continuous process, which later was achieved in the Belarusian, Yasso-Chisinau and some other operations. But what managed to be done at Stalingrad was a great achievement for that time, especially if we remember that the attack near Moscow, near Demyansk and other areas could not even surround the enemy, and near Kharkov in the spring of 1942, the Soviet troops surrounding the enemy, themselves were surrounded and suffered defeat.
On the one hand, during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, all necessary measures were not taken to dismember and destroy the enemy in the course of his entourage, although it is necessary to take into account the large size of the territory in which the surrounded enemy was located and the greater density of his groups. On the other hand, the presence of large enemy forces on the external front, which sought to unblock Paulus, surrounded by 6, did not allow concentrating sufficient forces for the rapid elimination of the enemy troops surrounded at Stalingrad.
In Stalingrad, the battle went for every house. The Supreme Command was belatedly decided to unite the control of all troops engaged in the destruction of the surrounded group in the hands of one front. Only in the middle of December did 1942 of the year receive a directive on the transfer of all troops involved at Stalingrad to the Don Front.
Secondly, how justified was the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the direction of the 2-th Guards Army of Rodion Malinovsky to defeat Erich Manstein’s faction on the Kotelnikovo direction. As is known, initially the 2-I Guards Army was intended for action as part of the South-Western Front, then, with a change in the situation, it was decided to transfer it to the Don Front to participate in the destruction of the enemy's surrounded grouping. But with the appearance of the enemy group of armies “Don” under the command of Manstein, the Supreme Command Headquarters, at the request of General Eremenko, a new decision was made - to transfer the 2 Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front to act on the Kotelnik direction. This proposal was also supported by Vasilevsky, who was at that time at the command post of the Don Front. Rokossovsky continued to insist on the transfer of the 2 Guards Army to the Don Front in order to accelerate the destruction of the surrounded enemy grouping. Against the transfer of the 2 Guards Army to the Stalingrad Front, Nikolay Voronov also spoke. After the war, he called this decision a “terrible miscalculation” of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
But a careful analysis of the situation at that time, involving the enemy’s documents that became known to us after the war, shows that the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters to send the 2 Guards Army to defeat Manstein was apparently more expedient. There was no guarantee that the 2 Guards Army would be able to quickly get rid of the surrounded Paulus grouping into the Don Front. Subsequent events confirmed how difficult it was to destroy the enemy's 22 divisions, numbering up to 250 thousand. There was a large, insufficiently justified risk that a breakthrough of Manstein’s group and a strike against Paulus’s army could lead to the unblocking of the enemy’s surrounded grouping and disrupting the further advance of the troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts.
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STALINGRAD BATTLE FOR THE COURSE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
In world historiography there is no common understanding of the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad for the course and outcome of the Second World War. After the end of the war, claims in Western literature appeared that it was not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the victory of the Allied forces near El Alamein that was the most significant turning point during the Second World War. Of course, for the sake of objectivity, it must be admitted that, under El Alamein, the Allies won a major victory, which made a significant contribution to the cause of defeating the common enemy. But still the battle of El Alamein can not be compared with the Battle of Stalingrad.
If we talk about the military-strategic side of the matter, the Battle of Stalingrad took place on a vast territory, almost in 100 thousand square meters. km, and the operation at El Alamein - on a relatively narrow African coast.
At Stalingrad at certain stages of the battle on both sides participated more than 2,1 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, 2,1 thousand tanks and more than 2,5 thousand combat aircraft. The German command for the battles at Stalingrad attracted 1 million 11 thousand people, 10 290 guns, 675 tanks and 1216 aircraft. While under El Alamein, Rommel’s African corps had a total of 80 thousand, 540 tanks, 1200 guns and 350 airplanes.
The battle of Stalingrad lasted 200 days and nights (from 17 July 1942 of the year to 2 February of 1943 of the year), and the battle of El Alamein - 11 days (from 23 of October to 4 of November 1942), not to mention the incompatibility of tension and severity of the two of these battles. If at El Alamein the fascist bloc lost 55 thousand people, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand guns, then at Stalingrad the losses of Germany and its satellites were more in 10 – 15. About 144 thousand people were taken into captivity. Destroyed 330-thousandth group of troops. The losses of the Soviet troops were also very large - irretrievable losses amounted to 478 741 people. Many of the lives of soldiers could be saved. But still our sacrifices were not in vain.
The military-political significance of the events that took place is incomparable. The battle of Stalingrad took place on the main European theater of military operations, where the fate of the war was decided. The operation near El Alamein took place in North Africa on a secondary theater of operations; its influence on the course of events could be indirect. The attention of the whole world was then riveted not to El Alamein, but to Stalingrad.
The victory at Stalingrad had a huge impact on the liberation movement of the peoples of the whole world. The mighty wave of the national liberation movement spread to all countries that fell under the yoke of Nazism.
In turn, the major defeats and the huge losses of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad dramatically worsened the military-political and economic situation of Germany, put it before the deepest crisis. The damage of enemy tanks and cars in the Battle of Stalingrad was equal, for example, to their six-month production by German factories, to guns to four months, and to mortars and small arms to two months. And in order to make up such heavy losses, the German military industry was forced to work with extremely high voltages. Sharply exacerbated the crisis of human reserves.
The catastrophe on the Volga left its mark on the morale of the Wehrmacht. In the German army, the number of cases of desertion and disobedience to commanders increased, and military crimes became more frequent. After Stalingrad, the number of death sentences handed down by Hitler’s justice to the German soldiers increased significantly. The German soldiers began to fight with less persistence, began to fear attacks from the flanks and the environment. Among the politicians and representatives of senior officers opposition sentiment to Hitler was manifested.
The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad shook the fascist military bloc, had a depressing effect on the German satellites, caused panic and intractable contradictions in their camp. The ruling leaders of Italy, Romania, Hungary and Finland, in order to escape from the impending catastrophe, began to look for excuses to get out of the war, ignored Hitler's orders to send troops to the Soviet-German front. Since 1943, not only individual soldiers and officers have surrendered to the Red Army, but also entire units and units of the Romanian, Hungarian and Italian armies. Relations between the military of the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies sharpened.
The crushing defeat of the fascist hordes at Stalingrad had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Japan and Turkey. They abandoned their intentions to go to war against the USSR.
Influenced by the successes achieved by the Red Army at Stalingrad and in the subsequent operations of the 1942 – 1943 winter campaign of the year, Germany’s isolation in the international arena intensified and at the same time the international prestige of the USSR increased. In 1942 – 1943, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Austria, Canada, Holland, Cuba, Egypt, Colombia, Ethiopia, and resumed previously broken diplomatic ties with Luxembourg, Mexico and Uruguay. Relations with the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland in London have improved. The formation of military units and formations of a number of countries of the anti-Hitler coalition — the French aviation squadron “Normandy”, the 1 Czechoslovak Infantry Brigade, and the 1 Polish Division named after Tadeusz Kosciusko began on the territory of the USSR. All of them subsequently joined in the fight against the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German front.
All this suggests that it was the battle of Stalingrad, and not the operation near El Alamein that broke the back of the Wehrmacht and marked the beginning of a radical change in the Second World War in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. More precisely, Stalingrad predetermined this radical change.