Soviet Tanks BT-7 abandoned by the Red Army due to the impossibility of evacuation
In modern textbooks on stories The main reasons for the failure of the Red Army in the first stage of the war are also the low moral and political readiness of Soviet soldiers and an extremely small percentage of experienced officers of any level in the army, because many of them were shot during the Stalinist purges. The commanders who replaced them often did not even have a general education, let alone a military one.
To stop the mass desertion and surrender, to restore the combat capability of the Soviet army, Stalin managed only with mass executions and threats to kill the members of the families of the fighters.
To stop the mass desertion and surrender, to restore the combat capability of the Soviet army, Stalin managed only with mass executions and threats to kill the members of the families of the fighters.
History is written by people, and therefore quite often it is subjective. Practically all the books and stories about that terrible war were written under the control of the “upper echelons”, which did not allow sufficiently objectively to cover the events that had occurred, for the truth was contrary to the point of view of the personalities at the helm of the country. Meanwhile, a completely different opinion appeared today, according to which, even before the start of the war, the Soviet government, together with the highest army command, worked out certain measures, which later allowed the German forces advancing to stop and give due repulse to the offensive in all directions and win the war. Supporters of this point of view accuse the adherents of the “theory of catastrophe” of excessively politicizing events and suggest abstracting from specific names, looking at the situation that arose at the beginning of the German attack, “without faces”.
The situation at that time could be represented as follows. In the military confrontation came together two great forces. Their capabilities, including the availability of trained human resources, high-tech military equipment and trained commanders, are comparable. True, one of them already has vast experience in conducting combat operations, the industrial potential of the occupied territories, troops mobilized and concentrated in the right place. How will events develop if this country attacks another, trying to crush an opponent with lightning-fast and decisive action? It is unlikely that anyone will seriously expect that the attacked side, having tightened their strength, will smash the impudent aggressor in the first weeks or months of the war. More logical would be the version of the feasible deterrence of the attacking forces with the simultaneous deployment of military facilities and the phased training of army units outside the battle zone.
According to Western researchers, the economic, military, and human potential of the USSR exceeded the capabilities of Germany, including its allies. The war industry of the Soviet Union produced more aircraft and tanks, and natural resources were many times richer. Even the loss of a number of territories in the country at the beginning of World War II did not change anything.
Events between the USSR and Germany developed similarly to the above. It is unclear what supernatural forces the Soviet Union should have applied to immediately destroy the Germans. Now many are of the opinion that the first months of the Great Patriotic War turned into a terrible failure and catastrophe for us. The further the events of those years become, the more this war is covered as two events torn in time: the 1941 fiasco and the victory of 1945. Previously, heroic events related to the defense of the hero-cities took a well-deserved place in this period, laying the foundation for future victories and being one of the brightest pages of our history. Today, all references to them have faded into the background, giving way to condemning the initial miscalculations and defeats, replaced by which suddenly a great victory came from nowhere.
If we recall the long-term events of the 1812 war of the year, then when describing the retreat of the Russian troops and the surrender of Moscow to the French, for some reason the emphasis is not placed on the mistakes and mistakes of the government, and the Russian generals are not accused of negligence and incompetence. When German troops unexpectedly attacked France in the First World War, they managed to reach the capital in a short period. Few of the French were looking for the guilty in the offices of power. All a priori admitted the guilt of the attacking side, who had a clear advantage and who used the element of surprise when attacking through Belgium.
Supporters of the new theory believe that the counting of military equipment in the first days of the war is insufficient, since it is only weaponrun by people. The main criterion for the balance of forces from their point of view is the number of personnel of the troops. Germany attacked the Soviet Union, having more than five million soldiers against a two millionth contingent of Soviet troops located in the western part of the country. By the summer of 1941, the German troops had already gained considerable military experience, having achieved brilliant victories and crushing almost all of Europe under them. What could the Red Army have opposed to it in the first days of the fighting if universal military service was introduced in the USSR two and a half years before the start of the war?
The situation around the state of our units in the border districts at the time of the attack of the German troops is very controversial. Stalin’s confidence that Hitler will not dare to break the non-aggression pact in the summer of 1941 is well known. Therefore, Joseph Vissarionovich forbade taking any action that could be the reason for the outbreak of war. However, a number of experts claim that 18 on June 1941 of the year Zhukov sent telegrams to the commanders of five western districts about the possibility of an attack by Germany and an indication to bring the entrusted troops to full alert. Military historian Alexey Isaev says that only some units located near the border did not have time to react. The statement that the Germans found the Soviet soldiers sleeping is a myth. Numerous testimonies of the surviving Germans confirm that already in the first hours of the war the border fortifications and covering armies gave them a fierce rebuff.
Two abandoned Soviet heavy tank KV-2. The towers are deployed to the marching position, the machine guns are removed: the tanks are clearly abandoned due to malfunctions or lack of fuel during retreat
Based on the situation that arose after the perfidious attack, the Soviet army tried to withstand the onslaught of the enemy by all the available forces. From the very first days, Hitler’s command plans for a blitzkrieg were completely destroyed. The Germans did not succeed in overthrowing the South-Western Front, which, although it was retreating with battles, was slowly and clearly retaining its main forces. Later, Hitler's troops were briefly stopped near Smolensk. Yes, our troops lost this bloody battle, but the delay in the offensive mixed the cards to the aggressor. Participating in the battles near Smolensk, the Army Group Center could not immediately advance to the capital, as it had an open right flank. I had to spend the valuable time again on regrouping forces, leaving part of the troops under Kiev. As a result, the German offensive on Moscow took place much more later than the German command expected. And the Red Army received the necessary time for the preparation and concentration of troops. The balance of forces, finally, the ensuing attack by the bloodless fascists on the capital was already completely different. By this time, the Soviet Union had already deployed its military machine, which turned out to be enough to not only win the main battle of the war, but also to switch to a counter-offensive later.
According to the memoirs of the fascist prisoners, the results of the first battles, despite the successes, involuntarily made them think. The war on Soviet soil turned out to be very different from the war in the West. Parts of the Red Army were upset, disorganized, defeated after defeat and retreating, but despite everything that usually happened in other countries, the strength of their resistance not only did not decrease, but only increased.
But such a development has already taken place during the Patriotic War of the 1812 year, and during the French-German confrontation in the First World War. At the initial stage, the attacked troops had to, while losing battles, retreat into the interior of the country in order to later confidently win the whole war. It was only important to resist, to maintain the backbone of the army. And the time they received at the expense of deterring the enemy’s forces and temporary retreat was spent on the deployment and buildup of military power. Perhaps that was exactly what the Soviet command decided to do, paying a high price to gain strength for further successful warfare.
A widespread fiction is a statement about the destruction in the first hours of the war of practically the entire Soviet military aviationnot having time to take off from airfields. Indeed, a massive bombing of a number of air units was undertaken, and the number of attacks on some air bases reached seven to eight times, as a result of which they were badly damaged. However, the defeat did not happen, most of the aircraft retained their combat effectiveness, and the further losses of the pilots were associated with defeats in air battles.
It is not known what was going on in the minds of the German soldiers after they, having lost the battle near Moscow, were driven away from our capital, but the war turned into a lingering form advantageous to the anti-Hitler coalition. And after the opening of the Second Front, the victory of Germany became practically unattainable. The death of all the victorious Wehrmacht troops was only a matter of time.
There is a widespread theory of the plan for the invasion of Soviet troops in Western Europe, prepared by Stalin in the context of the strictest secrecy. According to this, the fascist troops simply outstripped the Soviet Union, counterattacking literally at the last moment. Without trying to confirm or disprove this statement, it is worth paying attention to specific historical facts indicating that in the event of an attack, the command of the Red Army did not expect to stop the Germans right on the border. The fact that there were some other plans is evidenced by actions aimed at systematically evacuating industry from the border area to the interior of the country, which allowed more large industrial enterprises to be transported to the rear of 1360, which then supplied the necessary equipment and weapons for the country's needs. Particularly noteworthy is the export of even such large equipment as turbine units for power plants, which made it possible to provide the necessary power supply for new production facilities deployed in the Urals and Siberia. Even before the war, additional branches of railway tracks were prepared for evacuation, and in the depth of the country platforms for the future location of evacuated enterprises were built. Of course, this goes against Soviet propaganda, but you can't raise the morale of soldiers and civilians by telling them that the border areas are condemned to prolonged occupation. It was thanks to the measures taken for several years ahead of time that the main tasks were accomplished, which the USSR leadership at the first stage of the war probably set for itself: to preserve production facilities and to start work of evacuated enterprises at a new place in optimal time.
The operational plans of the Soviet General Staff on preparing the attack on fascist Germany have not yet been declassified, but their meaning and goals can be traced to some extent in the secret report Commissar of Defense sent to Stalin in the summer of 1940: “On the fundamentals of the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the West and in the East , Which was published in Russia in the 90s.
Some experts, using the results of the analysis of the numerical comparison of certain types of weapons, as well as the widely reported information that the Soviet Union was aware of the attack and was preparing for it, are trying to shift the blame of the first military setbacks on the country's leadership. It is difficult to judge who really missed and overlooked the real intentions of the Nazis, naively believed Hitler. But to say that during the first months of the war there was a terrible catastrophe, and even more so to blame someone for the lost battles, at least, unreasonably. The tragedy was only that the fascist leadership decided to attack the USSR, unleashing the bloodiest war in the history of our people. The Germans managed to achieve significant operational and one-time successes, but in general, they lost the initial period of the war, because the goals set by the command were not achieved, according to which by the fall the war should have ended in an unconditional victory for Germany. It is impossible to present the first months of the Great Patriotic War as our greatest shame. You can not separate them from the rest of the war period, as an event that is not a guarantee of further success. Successes, which are mistaken only for national achievement, contrary to the mediocre leadership of the Stalinist elite.
Even those who have at least a remote understanding of the tactics and order of warfare, it is very difficult to imagine how the masses, who do not have military experience and knowledge, could form divisions themselves, develop plans for combat operations and produce the necessary types of weapons. At the same time, the government did not just calmly look at the “heroic attempts” of its people, but tried by its actions to prevent it. Any sane person will not be able to take such information seriously, and meanwhile, documentaries and even very famous feature films are made on the basis of such plots. Such views on World War II were not born in the West, although, perhaps, with their support. Propaganda is carried out by domestic cultural figures, journalists and politicians.
Of course, Western works on war also consider temporary failures of the Soviet troops. However, from their point of view, this is not a terrible humiliation of the Soviet military machine and terrible miscalculations of command. On the contrary, in the articles of foreign historians, there is a perception that only Hitler made a catastrophic mistake, in fact signing the verdict with his own hand to his belligerent power by attacking the USSR. You can find information that in the first months of the war, Western observers fearfully stated that their worst fears, that Germany would succeed in taking possession of the USSR, were as easy as other countries begin to gain ground. But the more events developed, the louder the voices became that expressed the hope that the Red Army would become that liberating force that could cleanse the world of fascism. And they were not mistaken. Reaching the winter only to Moscow, the German troops lost their superiority, the initiative was, albeit temporarily, intercepted by our army, and hopes of victory remained only the dreams of the Wehrmacht generals.