Is the "honeymoon" in Russian-Ukrainian relations really over and what the confrontation between Moscow and Kiev may lead to
Is the so-called “honeymoon” in Russian-Ukrainian relations really over, as the former president of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko said about this? What can lead to a confrontation between Moscow and Kiev? Would not a further increase in the price of Russian gas lead to a collapse of the Ukrainian economy and the loss of power by the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych and his government? All these questions today we will discuss with our guests.
In the Kiev studio of Radio Liberty - Sergey Vysotsky, a columnist for the Ukrainian magazine Focus. And in Moscow with us political scientist Andrei Okara.
Andrei, when Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential elections in Ukraine, drove into his residence at Bankova, how big were the expectations from his victory for the Russian leadership? I would like to remind you that both Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin abstained from participating in the inauguration ceremony of their closest political ally. Yanukovych, Ukraine were shocked by this decision. Only the Russian ambassador to Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov, represented the country for the inauguration, which is difficult from the point of view of clan distributions to be attributed to Vladimir Putin's closest associates. Is it possible to assert that even then, in Moscow, they understood that Viktor Yanukovych is a stranger who will necessarily act against the interests of Moscow?
Andrey Okara: If Moscow and the Kremlin would have the opportunity to do everything exclusively in accordance with their dreams, then, probably, the real pro-Russian president of Ukraine would not be Yanukovych, but Putin, let's say. Or, in general, Ukraine would not exist, and there would exist Little Russian provinces in the Russian Federation. But politics is the art of the possible, and in this possible it is necessary to choose not between the ideal and the absolutely ideal (remember, in socialism, good struggled with the best), but one has to choose from the available material. And at the time of the conclusion of the well-known gas agreements at the beginning of 2009 of the year, which were signed by Tymoshenko and Putin, I fully admit, then Yulia Tymoshenko seemed to be the best president of Ukraine and Putin, and Medvedev. However, as of the beginning of 2010, this opinion has changed a bit, and out of two evils, Yanukovych began to seem like a lesser “evil”.
That is, the attitude towards Yanukovych has always been not as the ideal of the Russian dream, but as the lesser of the evils. Yushchenko in Russia (in particular in the Kremlin) was always perceived in a devilish aura, it was like a man from hell, therefore any alternative politician, and especially one who, it seems, propagates pro-Russian ideas, and seemingly, for which there are certain means informal pressure, well, it must be pro-Russian. But the special "pro-Russian", one hundred percent compliance with the economic and political interests of the Russian Federation (more precisely - the Kremlin), in general, was not expected from it. Moreover, even during the time of Yushchenko, various analytical reports that existed in Russian political circles always noted that Yanukovich, despite his external “pro-Russian” character and the lack of ideological “pro-Ukrainian” economic nationalist, that the Donetsk elite are people with which is very difficult to negotiate on economic issues, because they themselves agree with anyone about it.
"Honeymoon", of course, passed. And in the past, the cadre intelligence officer Putin to come to the inauguration of Viktor Yanukovych, with his background ... well, one can understand Vladimir Vladimirovich, as well as Dmitry Anatolyevich, that they did not come. But in this situation, the further, the more contradictions in Russian-Ukrainian relations are manifested, the more difficult it is for the Kremlin to think about what to do with Ukraine further, the more severe the confrontation. Moreover, it was believed that Azarov is a completely pro-Russian man who is in no way affiliated with Ukraine, and suddenly Azarov becomes the spokesman for Ukrainian economic self-awareness. This was not exactly what the Kremlin expected from Azarov.
Vitaly Portnikov: Sergey, do you think that the Ukrainian leaders themselves understand that they are disappointed in terms of the approach to the problems of the country in the Kremlin? And are they able to somehow reformat their position? Or maybe they do not need it?
Sergey Vysotsky: It seems to me that someone obviously understands, someone probably understood before, but someone still does not understand. Here, the question is not so much in some kind of objective reality, but a question in the self-esteem of a person who is in power. From the point of view of Viktor Yanukovych, he is a great politician who independently won all his victories, he is the master of his independent country. Someone calls this “summer cottage”, Yanukovych’s relationship is called “summer resident’s attitude to his land”, someone calls it differently. However, he has a sense of master of some space. And it is clear that he will be happy to drink tea with his neighbors, but he is not ready to sacrifice his site for their benefit. And I think that he just might not understand why they believe that he should demolish his fence and give his backyard business to their undivided property.
Who is more puny, like Azarov, I think, may well understand this. Azarov, who is one of the ideologues of the single economic space in Ukraine, as I recall, actively defended it and promoted it back in 2005-2006. That is, it is quite long story relations of Nikolay Yanovich with the SES. He would be happy, perhaps, to go to integration projects of Russia, but he has some specific frameworks in which he can act, these frameworks are set by the president, and the president is not enthusiastic about these ideas. People surrounded by the president, like Andriy Klyuyev, can understand this, but they can be restrained in their attitude towards Russia is different - that they have their own business in Russia. And for them to drastically change the policy of the state, to go to sharp movements, to start the next “trade wars” with Russia - this is to put at risk, above all, their own business interests. Because there is information (albeit at the level of rumors) that a number of Ukrainian high-ranking officials, including in the Party of Regions, have, if not property, then established schemes, commercial channels of communication with the Russian business. Therefore, one should not take the structure of the Ukrainian government and the Party of Regions homogeneous. Someone understands, someone does not understand. But I understand for sure that none of them, except for some kind of dense Soviet dinosaurs, are, so to say, ready to cede their economic and commercial independence to someone else.
In principle, Russia always acts in Ukraine as a factor of domestic policy. At least from the 2004 year, from the moment when Yanukovych, in the opinion of Putin and Medvedev, surrendered the Maidan, surrendered power, he was probably not considered a pro-Russian or friendly president in the Kremlin. But in Ukraine and in the eyes of a certain part of Ukrainian society, he always looked like that. And it was a kind of Ukrainian domestic political myth. Because in the understanding of people, and this is a patriotic and nationalistic segment of Ukrainian society, Russia is not a certain commercial project, which it is, probably, to a greater degree, but a certain imperial project. And if a person speaks in elections that “we will introduce a second state language, Russian,” it means that he is integrated into an imperial project to expand, restore the influence of the Soviet Union, the former empire.
And about Yanukovych, rather, there was not an external myth, not the external expectations of someone in Moscow, but the internal myth that he was pro-Russian. But the past year has shown us that he is not pro-Russian, he is protecting his personal interests. And the biggest and most interesting question now is in relations with Russia: how far can it go in upholding these interests. In fact, Viktor Fedorovich fell into a very difficult position, and this position, the farther, the more, begins to resemble the position of Alexander Lukashenko. When, as a result of a sufficiently harsh reprisal of the political opposition, and we see a fan of criminal cases, when the branches of the state economy are monopolized, the state’s financial flows begin to flow along very strange channels and settle in the pockets of some people close to Bankovaya, it’s clear that the fact that we will be able to use, as Kuchma used, multi-vector ... At the time of Kuchma, this word was invented - the multi-vector nature of Ukrainian foreign policy. That is, he played the EU card in front of Russia, then in front of the EU played the card of Russia, somehow balanced on all these interests.
Now, unfortunately, Victor Fedorovich causes persistent displeasure in Brussels and in Washington. And Brussels and Washington are some kind of financing channels. And in the current economic situation, external financing Ukraine is vital. And if the internal policy of hard “tightening the screws”, rigid holding of elections (and the forceful scenario of holding elections-2012 is being prepared) goes on, then we can say that Viktor Fedorovich, with all his independence, with all his interests and with all his self-consciousness as the master of conciliar Ukraine, will have to look for alternative financing channels. On the example of Alexander G., we see that these channels are easily located in Moscow for some concessions to the Moscow business: give us the gas transmission system, and we will give you a loan, give us everything, and we will lower the duties to you. And this is absolutely vicious for him, I think, the way. If he realizes this all, if his environment, in which, I know, there are sober-minded people who understand all this, will convince him that he needs to change his internal policy and start returning at least to Kuchma’s balancing policy on interests, well, then maybe not all is lost. And if this awareness does not come, then I find it difficult to say where our financial and commercial interaction with the Russian Federation will go. Everything can end up very bad for the country.
Vitaly Portnikov: This is a very interesting question: Yanukovych has no other way, like Lukashenko, he needs to make concessions to Moscow, and he does not want to make concessions to Moscow, and he cannot even. Here the dilemma arose. Or is it a dead end?
Andrey Okara: This is an antinomy, when it is imperative to do something, but if you do something, it will be undermining your own sovereignty. And the art of politics is precisely that one has to act in such conditions. It is precisely this that makes politics different from business or from economics, in the broad sense of the word. Great politicians know how to find a way out in a dead end situation. But the “collective Yanukovich”, Ukraine under the leadership of Yanukovich, signed the Kharkiv agreements more than a year ago, and this gave the Kremlin a lot of positive emotions. This was largely a test for Yanukovych, it was a test of his loyalty, his handling and his following in the necessary fairway. And after that, certain hopes for him and his loyalty and controllability continue to be present. There is an opinion that Yanukovych is ready to give up the very serious interests of Ukraine and in relations with Russia, too, and not only in relations with the West and with China. I think that Ukraine still has resources that can be sold off, and with some money from the sale it can be extended for some time, at least that time, which is laid in one presidential term. That is, the country before the 2015 of the year will probably still stretch if it sells off the resources it has left, and even stretches very well. You can still increase pensions, and people will thank the authorities for taking care of them.
Sergey Vysotsky: As it seems to me, the question is that the interests that Yanukovych is ready to pass are not only his interests. Some commercial issues concern those people who brought him to power. And the main difference between Ukraine and Belarus is that Ukraine has an established business elite, big business ...
Andrey Okara: There are oligarchs in Ukraine, but they are not in Belarus. But this is not about passing interests related to the business of Akhmetov or Yuri Vasilyevich Enakievsky, but to sell off agricultural land, to somehow create a gas transportation consortium to sell the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline for scrap ". There is Kharkov plant "Turboatom". Akhmetov, as I understand it, has nothing to do with Turboatom. There is a lot more in Ukraine that can be "sawed" and preserve this political regime. You correctly say that there are no big oligarchs in Belarus, but there are major officials there who completely depend on Lukashenko, and this is the highest elite class there. In Ukraine, differently, however, maneuvers exist. And in Russia there is a historically suffered system of ensuring the loyalty of the elites of the conquered peoples. For example, Akhmetov’s loyalty to Yanukovych can be ensured not only in the format of the relationship between Yanukovych and Akhmetov, but, for example, in the triangle "Yanukovych - Akhmetov - Kremlin". For example, the Kremlin can become the guarantor of Akhmetov’s interests, and they will be able to very effectively cut Ukraine into pieces and increase the lifetime of this political regime. In my opinion, a very effective strategy.
Vitaly Portnikov: Sergey, do you agree with this opportunity?
Sergey Vysotsky: Rumors about a certain interaction Akhmetov with large Russian businessmen about Ukrainian property have been around for a long time.
Andrey Okara: Yes, there were rumors, but in this situation it is not about Akhmetov’s relations with Russian oligarchs, but about those political and economic opportunities ... After all, in the post-Soviet space, property and power are not different categories, they are a universal single category: you have property, it means that you will have power, and you have power, it means that you will take away property from someone and you will be an oligarch. In this situation, the hypothetical resource that the Kremlin can guarantee and provide to “collective Akhmetov” ... That is, the Ukrainian oligarchs have enough of this resource in order to ensure their loyalty to the highest Ukrainian political power, to the political regime this regime will act entirely in the interests of the Kremlin.
Sergey Vysotsky: We have already climbed into the domain of abstract hypotheses, but it is impossible to prove them or disprove them.
Andrey Okara: This is not a hypothesis, but a possible strategy.
Sergey Vysotsky: I have a feeling that our wonderful oligarchs cannot but understand that if they allow the country under any state guarantees, on some backstage agreements of their Russian colleagues, then their business will end up being consumed, it will be destroyed as their business .
Andrey Okara: Therefore, part of their business is diversified geographically, and certainly their treasures, that is, those funds that do not participate in business, are diversified. Akhmetov bought an apartment in London.
Vitaly Portnikov: Every decent oligarch has an apartment in London.
By the way, the story of "Sea Breeze" is also indicative. At one time, the Party of Regions did everything possible to disrupt these teachings for legal reasons. Then the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine did not adopt the necessary law on the admission of foreign troops on the territory of Ukraine. The Party of Regions did not just fight against the exercises, it had a legal reason for not complying with the legislation. And this marked the rule of then-President Viktor Yushchenko - total disrespect for the law. This gentleman and now manifests itself in the same way. He said that Ukraine could not fulfill the contract that was signed by Putin and Tymoshenko. And this is his real attitude towards politics. This is a man for whom (perhaps, as for his successor Yanukovych) the right does not exist. But the Party of Regions grabbed hold of it, organized demonstrations in the Crimea, and radical forces participated in it. And in Russia it was so highlighted that the Party of Regions was precisely against the teachings themselves, against NATO. And now, when everything is legally legal, the exercises are being held for the second time during the presidency of Yanukovych, irritation has arisen. Or is it still not in the "Sea Breeze"?
Sergey Vysotsky: I don’t know how much the matter at Sea Breeze is. “Sea Breeze” is a reason, but it seems to me that this is not only a reason for reporting on the “First” Russian channel. Anyway, internal phobias remain. I do not think that from the Russian side there is a bare calculation in this note. Just by inertia you need something to answer America. There is no need to exclude the inertia of the Russian system, the Russian anti-American rhetoric. Probably, there is also an interest in showing Yanukovich not a friend, let's say, through Russian national channels, well, there are Russian internal complexes that are satisfied by such protest notes against Sea Breeze. Although it is not clear how these teachings harm the geopolitical interests of Russia, and even in the Black Sea. Any fleet in the Black Sea has lost its strategic importance. You can go to Georgia to win, but nothing more.
Vitaly Portnikov: Andrew, when the ships of the Black Sea fleet Russia actually went from the Ukrainian territory towards Georgia, then no one even warned Ukraine about their actions, and this was considered normal from the Russian point of view. And now, when the exercises are held in territorial waters that are not connected with Russia in any way, and such exercises are carried out in the usual way, Russia is outraged that Ukraine acts in an anti-Russian way. Although it is in no way bound by any obligations that would not allow it to admit an American missile cruiser to the Black Sea.
Andrey Okara: “Ukraine is a country that emerged by chance, a part of which is our so-called territories, and a part is Central Europe. And we would have won the war without Ukraine, because we are the victorious people, ”such a point of view exists in the Kremlin. And when Russia is at war with Georgia, even without warning Ukraine about the withdrawal of its ships, this is normal. Moreover, when the Russian Navy participates in joint exercises, including with the participation of the United States, this is normal. And when Ukraine participates in something similar, it is the anti-Russian policy of Ukraine, the anti-Russian essence of Ukraine as a geopolitical entity, which arose by chance as a result of the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.
Vitaly Portnikov: I would like to play the role of lawyer Vladimir Putin and say that he was absolutely right, in my opinion, when he told Nikolay Azarov that all the claims regarding the formula of Russian gas and so on, they are not related to economic calculations, but purely political. What Nikolai Azarov and Viktor Yanukovych need to prove that Yulia Tymoshenko committed some illegal actions almost changed her homeland when she made Ukraine actually adhere to the standards that exist in Russian gas trade with all European countries. Leonid Kuchma never followed these standards, he was looking for easier ways, these standards were not followed by Viktor Yushchenko, who brought RosUkrEnergo to the Ukrainian market. And of course, Viktor Yanukovych does not want to adhere to these standards. Moreover, all the presidents of Ukraine assure the Ukrainian population that it is better to live for free than to pay honestly. That is, it is a whole state morality. Ukraine is doing everything possible not to pay according to the rules. And when she is told that Russia will spend her money and build gas pipelines so as not to conduct gas through its territory ... Which, maybe from the point of view of the Russian economy, is not very correct, but quite legitimate. It's like with the ship: what they want, they do. For some reason, Ukraine is offended because it believes that gas must go through its gas transmission system. That's what's weird.
Sergey Vysotsky: I absolutely agree. But this is again a question of residual phobias not only in Moscow, but also in Kiev.
Andrey Okara: The peculiarities of Russian-Ukrainian relations are that they are very deeply psychologized, they have some kind of complex role structure. That is, it is not just a relationship between two subjects of international law, it is not a relationship between two UN members, but it is a relationship between countries that have a lot of mutual emotions, both positive and negative, a lot of mutual claims based on emotions, emotional factors. And this relationship is not rationalized. And it is in this vein that mutual claims arise, offenses and from an economic point of view, irrational ideas, for example, the construction of the “South Stream-2” across the Black Sea. Well, this is a few Sochi Olympics, probably, this is up to 30 billion dollars, just so that the gas does not go through Ukraine. Accordingly, the Ukrainian attitude towards Russia is also not rational, not based on the agreement of two equal subjects of international law, but based on some kind of mutual complicated feelings. And this format of relations, as it seems to me, is irrational and ineffective for Russia and for Ukraine neither politically, nor economically. Yulia Tymoshenko really tried to rationalize gas relations, but only the numbers that were included in this agreement raise many questions. But these questions are not for us, but for Yulia Vladimirovna and Vladimir Vladimirovich.
Vitaly Portnikov: If Ukraine developed itself normally, as a civilized state, then there would be no problems with Russia.
Sergey Vysotsky: If there was a pan-European gas price formula, there would be a normal industry, which would not think about how to minimize your taxes and take a VAT somewhere or launch barter schemes between the closest coal-producing enterprises at a price below the cost price.
Andrey Okara: I would think about how to reduce their volatility.
Sergey Vysotsky: And everything would develop in a pan-European, global trend. I would think how to save, how to recycle raw materials. The main problem of Ukrainian industry is that we still produce raw materials from raw materials. We have almost no products in large industry with a high degree of surplus value. We will sell “Turboatom” - and we will lose everything, because “Turboatom” does at least the turbines.
Andrey Okara: Please note that the political elite is the main brake on reducing the energy dependence of the Ukrainian industry. Because these people are enriched by the gross turnover of gas. And the more gas goes back and forth, the more it is burned, the richer they become. That is, in this situation, we just have a clear model, when the elite is financially interested in that the country does not develop, and degraded.
Vitaly Portnikov: Question from Igor with "Facebook": "Wow, not the ship! This is the main shock unit in the Mediterranean. And the Monterey systems can control Russian ballistic missiles. And all this says that Yanukovych is able to pull trumps from his sleeve in negotiations with a partner like Russia. ”
Andrey Okara: I totally agree. At first, the United States tried to build a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland, but now we are talking about Romania, the west coast of the Black Sea and other countries that have not yet been named. Allegedly, this is a missile defense system against possible intercontinental missiles that can launch from the territory of Iran. But if you look at the map, it turns out that all the hypothetical American missile defense objects that can be built in the future are not captured by Iranian missiles, not missiles flying from the Middle East, but they capture just Russian missiles. And the fact that America defends its interests in negotiations and in a tough confrontation in this aspect with Russia is logical. But we must understand that this is not about the mythical threat from Iran, but about the very real opposition of the nuclear potential with Russia.
Sergey Vysotsky: Andrew, I disagree with you. The mythical threat from Iran, in my opinion, is not so mythical. The regime in Iran before its fall, in the case of the acquisition of technology, carriers, missiles and the atomic bomb, will be enough foolish, sorry, shmulnut. Where will Russia be? According to their mansions in Cap-Ferrat? Or destroy Sardinia, London bombed, where all the apartments? What kind of military threat can emanate from the present-day Russia to the Western world, if the whole real, correct life of the Russian elite, of the officials, and of businessmen takes place just in the West. “Russia is a kind of space where we make money in order to spend it in London, in Milan, in the right and good places. How are we all going to bomb something ?! ”.
Andrey Okara: Now the fragile peace on our planet largely depends on the parities of mutual destruction of Russia and the United States. If this parity does not exist, that is, if there is a situation in which the US nuclear forces can guaranteedly destroy all Russian objects carrying nuclear charges, then in this situation the international and geopolitical and geo-strategic parities will be very thin. And then we wake up in a completely different world.
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