The United States is creating a new nuclear bomb

A B-2 bomber drops a practical B61-12 aerial bomb during testing. The B61-13, which is intended to convince Congress to allow the B83-1 to be retired, will look the same and will be the main armament of the new B-21 bomber.

The Biden administration has decided to create a new medium-class nuclear bomb, called the B61-13.

The decision to develop a new version of the B61-13 was made shortly after the previous version (the B61-12 nuclear bomb) entered service, began full-scale production last year, and is now entering the nuclear arsenal. The Biden administration has said it will not increase the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenal and that any new B61-13 bombs will come from cutting back on planned B61-12s.

According to Defense Department officials, the B61-13 hull will carry the W61-7 nuclear launcher from the B61-7 bomb, but the bomb will be modified with new safety and control features, as well as a steerable tail kit from the B61-12 for improved accuracy (CAO) compared to with an old B61-7 free fall bomb.

While Defense officials insist that the B61-13 project is not a new development, Pentagon press materials are more straightforward: B61-13 "will provide us with additional flexibility, providing the President with additional capabilities against some of the more complex and broad-based military targets."

Like the B61-7, the B61-13 will be designed to be delivered by strategic bombers: the future B-21 and, until it is retired, the B-2. The aerial bomb is not intended for fighter-bombers. However, the decision to create the B61-13 appears to have less to do with military needs and more to do with a political agreement to get rid of the last high-yield (megaton) munitions in the US arsenal - the B83-1 aerial bomb.

Initially this weapon was scheduled to be phased out under President Obama, but the retirement of the obsolete bomb was reversed in 2016 by the Trump administration. Since then, the B83-1 has become the center of a battle between the Biden administration, which wants to retire it, and congressional hardliners who want to keep the B83-1 in service.

Change of plans

The case with B61-13 is strange.

For the past 13 years, the US Department of Defense's advertising campaign for the expensive B61-12 program has been that it will replace all other free-fall nuclear bombs.

Representatives of the Ministry of Defense announced that by reusing the W61-4 “physical package”, adding new safety functions and ammunition control functions, as well as increasing accuracy using a controlled tail kit, this will be a combination of four existing types of free-fall bombs B61-3/4/ 7/10 in a single type of guided bomb. They also assured that the B61-12 would be able to perform all missions with less collateral damage than high-power free-fall bombs. Improving the bomb's accuracy is the main functional change, with the addition of a tail kit, replacing the parachute braking system of the old weapon.

The Biden administration has argued that by reducing the number of types of bombs, it could reduce the total number of bombs in the arsenal by 50 percent and save a significant amount of money. Moreover, the argument goes, using a B61-12 "physical package" with the least amount of fissile material would reduce the risk of WMD proliferation through theft.

When the B2016-61 was retired in 10, there was an obvious desire to reduce the number of types of nuclear weapons from four to three, and then to a single nuclear bomb for the Air Force. But the Obama administration planned to use it to replace the heavy-duty B83-1 and eventually the penetrating B61-11 Bunker Buster.

The Biden administration has decided to create a new nuclear bomb, the B61-13, to convince hawks to get rid of the old B83-1 bomb.

The Trump administration had other priorities, with the Nuclear Posture Review deciding to retain the B83-1 (for reasons that remain unclear and appear to have to do with both reversing any decisions of the previous Obama administration and new military priorities) , and also keep the B61-11 in service.

When the Biden administration took office, the Nuclear Posture Review decided to continue decommissioning the B83-1, but said nothing about the B61-11. The Republican-controlled House disagreed and used the intervening years to preserve B83-1 at all costs.

Privately, however, Air Force and NNSA officials disagreed.

The high-yield free-fall bomb is no longer needed, and maintaining the B83-1 will cost a lot of money that could be better spent on other programs.

Moreover, NNSA's production schedule is tight, and adding the B83-1 life cycle extension program could jeopardize much more important programs. Although the B61-13 program will add financial burden.

B61-13. Characteristics

Oddly enough, the name B61-13 had already been used for another type of nuclear weapon: a future bomb intended to replace the B61-12 in the late 2030s and 2040s. These weapons were first described in the NNSA stockpile management plan in 2015.

The designation B61-13 was previously assigned to another nuclear bomb back in 2015.

The new B61-13 bomb will be the 13th modification of the B61. Modifications of the B61 differ in weight, power, safety and control features, as well as delivery platforms. Five such modifications remain in the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Energy (B61-3/4/7/11/12).

According to Defense officials, the B61-13 will have the same maximum yield as the B61-7 (360 kilotons), a significant increase over the 50-kiloton B61-12 bomb.

The “physical package” W61-7 is heavier than the “physical package” W61-4, 140 kg versus 117 kg, but it is also more powerful, 340–360 kt versus 45–50 kt. Therefore, the B61-13 bomb is slightly heavier than the B61-12 - 363 kg versus 340 kg.

Like the B61-12, the B61-13 will also likely have limited soft-ground penetration capabilities, which will be improved by the addition of a steerable tail kit and a stronger nose cone made from special high-alloy steel. The high power and accuracy of the B61-13 will allow the bomb to hit underground, highly protected targets with a yield equivalent to a ground blast weapon, greater than one megaton.

State Department officials insist that the B61-13 bomb production plan is not driven by new developments in hostile countries or new military requirements.

Detonating a B61-13 precision-guided munition as close to the target as possible will increase the likelihood that the target will be destroyed, and a highly protected target could hypothetically be destroyed with one B61-13 instead of two B61-12s. The Defense Department says the B61-13 "will provide us with additional flexibility, providing the President with additional capabilities against some of the more complex and broad-based military targets."

Once the B61-12 and B61-13 are produced and stockpiled, the older versions are replaced, and the B83-1 is retired, the changes to the nuclear bomb arsenal will look something like this:

Although it was previously reported that the B61-12 would also allow the B61-11 to be retired from service, the B61-13 production plan appears to only be intended to replace and retire the B83-1. There is currently no life extension program for B61-11. Perhaps there is no replacement for the B61-11, and its tasks will be performed by the B61-13.

Representatives of the Ministry of Defense explain that the new B61-13 aerial bomb will not lead to an increase in the total number of warheads in the arsenal. The Biden administration plans to partially reduce the number of B61-12s produced, so once the B61-13 enters service, the total number of new bombs will ultimately be the same.

The B61-12 production plan initially included 480 bombs for both strategic bombers and fighter-bombers. Since strategic bombers will now carry both B61-12 and B61-13 bombs (in addition to the new LRSO cruise missiles), and since the actual number of targets requiring high-yield bombs is likely to be small, it seems likely that the number of bombs The B61-13 will be very limited - perhaps around 50 units - and production will begin at the end of the B61-12 schedule, not until 2025.

Unlike the B61-12, some of which will be transferred to Europe for use by NATO fighter-bombers, all B61-13 will supposedly be stored in the United States for use by the new B-21 bomber and B-2 bomber (until replaced by the B-21). . However, since the B61-13 will use the same mechanical and electronic interface as the B61-12, fighters designed to deliver the B61-12 will also be capable of delivering the B61-13. But the current plan is supposedly that the B61-13 aerial bomb is intended only for strategic bombers.

The B61-13 will look identical to the B61-12 (above), but its body contains a much more powerful nuclear bomb from the B61-7 aerial bomb, it is intended for bombers, but technically can be used by fighters.

It is difficult to see a military need for ammunition as powerful as the B61-13 in the arsenal. Most likely, this is a political decision with the goal of having counter-force weapons as a counterweight to Russian high- and medium-power warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs and medium-range missiles.

Defense officials say the decision has nothing to do with current events in China, Russia or other potential theaters of war. The administration's decision is also allegedly not the result of the rigorous study of potential targets mentioned in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. "B61-13 is a decision of principle," they explain.

The military does not need an additional, more powerful aerial bomb. In fact, Air Force officials have privately stated that "the importance of the military mission of nuclear bombs is diminishing because of the risk of putting bombers and their pilots in harm's way from heavily defended targets—especially as long-range missiles become more effective."

As such, the military need for the B61-13 munition remains somewhat of a mystery, especially given that the LRSO will be armed with B-52 bombers and that the United States has thousands of other nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

What appears to have happened instead is that after defense hardliners blocked the administration's plans to retire the B83-1, the administration likely agreed to keep the B61-7 bomb in the arsenal as a modern variant of the B61-13 bomb. , which is simpler and cheaper to maintain, so they can finally begin retiring the B83-1.

Hack and predictor Aviator

Thus, the B61-13 will become the second “political” weapon in recent times. The first was the low-yield warhead W76-2/Mk4A, deployed at the end of 2019 on Trident submarines. The next target for behind-the-scenes and other battles in Congress between Democrats and Republicans could be the SLCM-N sea-launched nuclear cruise missile.

Comments

[Wildcat]

In fact, Air Force officials have privately stated that "the importance of the military mission of nuclear bombs is diminishing because of the risk of putting bombers and their pilots in harm's way from heavily defended targets—especially as long-range missiles become more effective."

The military privately states that the Air Force should have carriers of missile launchers with nuclear weapons - for launching outside air defense zones (B52 and B1), against targets with known coordinates. And aircraft capable of penetrating air defense zones with nuclear weapons, identifying, identifying and destroying targets are the B2 and soon the B21 (at least a hundred), against targets with unknown coordinates, primarily the PGRK. The status of the F35 for missions with nuclear weapons is unclear, IMHO, this is also a “penetrating” aircraft.
The fleet, oddly enough, sticks to “only strategic nuclear weapons” and naval/marine F35s with nuclear weapons do not even train, IMHO.

The B61-12 production plan initially included 480 bombs

- I personally will never believe in so many bombs. Having an advantage in numbers over potential adversaries in everything from aircraft to ships, the Americans have fewer B61s.
Tales from the Federation of American Scientists.
This is despite the fact that over the past 15-20 years, the ability of aircraft to overcome air defense has changed dramatically, and as a “decapitating/disarming” weapon, the “B61/B83 and stealth” weapon complex will actually be noticeable only when the bombs go off.

the decision was made to continue decommissioning the B83-1, but nothing was said about the B61-11. The Republican-controlled House disagreed and used the intervening years to preserve B83-1 at all costs.

B83 is large and, most likely, can only be used with B2 (other aircraft are questionable). Accordingly, 650 bombs for 20 aircraft is too much. But B83 is a “bunker destroyer” (we look at which ones in the English-language Wikipedia ourselves), so they want to keep it,

[bayard]

I think the riddle with “gravity” (free-falling, but controlled) bombs is easily solved - the United States is simply currently unable to produce new warheads, except for a limited number (several dozen) per year. And these new warheads are used to rearm strategic delivery vehicles - the same Trident-2. Therefore, in order to somehow preserve some potential of tactical nuclear weapons, they are forced to sort through the charges of old free-falling bombs that are still suitable for such a bulkhead. Although it is obvious that nuclear warheads are needed for new missile launchers. But apparently their turn will not come soon. That is why tales about “new”, “gravity” bombs are used... in old casings, but with new shanks.
A new radiochemical plant in the USA was launched several years ago and has not yet reached its planned capacity, and first of all it is necessary to replace nuclear warheads for SLBMs and ICBMs... which also still need to be developed/created/tested/brought into serial production. That’s why with tactical nuclear weapons so far everything is exclusively ... “traditional\innovative\gravitational”.
All other reasoning is from the evil one.
And since there is a war going on, albeit not a hot one, we must remember that war is a WAY OF DECEPTION.
As for the return potential, it exists, it is really great, but it must be sent for reprocessing, purification from the produced isotopes, and only then the production of new nuclear warheads. And this is a factor of time, technology, PERSONNEL and production capacity. Trump spoke a lot about the fact that the United States wasted a lot of time and lost competencies. During his presidential term, he secured sufficient funding for this project. But too much time has been lost.
In the Russian Federation, these technologies not only were not lost, but also developed, new nuclear warheads with greater specific power appeared. So a missile launcher with nuclear warheads weighing 0 - 400 kg. can have a capacity of up to 450 Mt. Lighter warheads of anti-ship missiles such as Onyx and Zircon can carry nuclear warheads with a yield of up to 2 Kt.+. And now the BD CR (with a range of up to 500 and 5500 km) can also be carried by Su-7500M tactical bombers. They have confirmed their characteristics and are entering service with the Burevestnik global/unlimited range nuclear missile launcher.

The Russian Federation has been paying priority attention to the development of strategic nuclear forces for the last 20+ years, so the strategic nuclear forces of the RF Armed Forces are very fresh, modern and in good working order. But not enough attention was paid to the development of the Ground Forces, Aviation and Navy. Which is now rapidly catching up.
So the real strategic (and even more so tactical) potential of the Russian Federation is not just head and shoulders above... perhaps even several heads superior to the considerably degraded nuclear potential of the United States. If restrictions on the number of strategic nuclear forces are lifted, increasing the number of strategic delivery vehicles will not be difficult. ICBMs and SLBMs are being mass-produced in Russia and production has not stopped, new types of nuclear warheads have been created... It is likely that underground nuclear tests at the Novaya Zemlya test site will soon be resumed. Moreover, the United States has already carried out its tests of a low-power nuclear warhead literally the other day... However, passing off these tests as a kind of "chemical explosion" ... "with a slight release of radioactive materials."

[solar]

I think the riddle with “gravity” (free-falling, but controlled) bombs is easily solved - the United States is simply unable to produce new warheads today

The same charges can be used in different carriers. For example, the W49 warhead was used in

The W49 is an American thermonuclear charge used as equipment for a number of warheads of the PGM-17 Thor, SM-65 Atlas, PGM-19 Jupiter (Mk 3 warhead) and HGM-25A Titan I ballistic missiles. ... The W49 design is described as a modification of the design B28 (Mk.28) air bombs.

The W7 warhead was used for MGR-1 Honest John missiles, for MGM-5 Corporal missiles, for BOAR unguided missiles, for ADM nuclear mines, for Mark 90 Betty depth charges. They also planned to use MIM-14 Nike-Hercules for the missile defense system.

[sergeyketonov]

Good afternoon. From my article "Submarine Ballistic Missiles":
Products of the 2000s - 100 kg (95 kg) 3G32 small class (150 kt) and 200 kg (230 kg) 3G37 medium class (500 kt) power for R-29R, R-29RMU and R-30, 450 missiles -kilogram high-class (2Mt) capacities for equipping ICBM warheads are designed taking into account modern requirements for increased safety at all stages of the life cycle, reliability, and security. "
These are just my assumptions and calculations; if everything had developed as in the late 1980s in the USSR, then such charges should have appeared through evolution. The first (low power) seems to have been confirmed indirectly, the presence of such ammunition was confirmed. Soviet scientists and designers took leaps and bounds in the late 1980s towards the level of 6 kt/kg, the technical limit for existing three-stage schemes, and should have reached it in the 90s, but you yourself understand the collapse of the USSR, the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, I pray to God, so as not to affect these works. There are also indirect signs of medium-class warheads for the R-29 RMU 1 and 2 missiles and the Yars ICBM. If four old Soviet 29-2800 kt warheads (500 kg) can still fit into the throw weight of the R-550RMU (450 kg), then they certainly won’t fit into the Yars. We can only guess that they are most likely new and their weight should not exceed 250 kg. Regarding warheads of a high power class (2 Mt), my assumptions and calculations have not yet been confirmed, but according to my calculations, such charges should exist. Listen carefully to the president’s speech on March 1, 2018; it contains indirect signs of the existence of such charges. In any case, I do not believe that the old 15F174 warheads (A-134 charge - 750 kt) will be installed on the Sarmat; most likely there will be new ones in the same weight of 450 kg. The throwing weight of "Sarmat" and "Voevoda" are most likely the same - 8800 kg. And as for the Avangard, from the thrown weight, pull out the breeding unit with the platform, filled with fuel and oxidizer - 4300 kg, so the weight of more than two Avangards will not fit into the Sarmat, and judging by the photo of the Avangard. several years ago it was published on the pages of VO, the diameter of the base is no less than 1500 mm. so in terms of dimensions too.

[bayard]

Quote from sergeyketonov

The throwing weight of the Sarmat and the Voevoda is most likely the same - 8800 kg. And as for the Avangard, from the thrown weight, pull out the breeding unit with the platform, filled with fuel and oxidizer - 4300 kg, so the weight of more than two Avangards will not fit into the Sarmat, and judging by the photo of the Avangard. several years ago it was published on the pages of VO, the diameter of the base is no less than 1500 mm. so in terms of dimensions too.

Good day .
Judging by the starting weight and the engine used, the Sarmat should really correspond to the parameters of the Voevoda, although it is stated to have a throw weight of 10 tons. But in the case of “Vanguards” as a combat load, I think you are mistaken in your calculations - the “Vanguard” itself is a maneuvering / planing unit, so it hardly requires such a large expansion stage as for inertial / “gravity” ones blocks of the usual type. And the “cartoons” shown show a rocket with three “Vanguards”. And according to weight estimates, the Sarmat is quite capable of pulling three Avangards.
It just seems to me that there will be few Sarmatovs and Avangards, I think no more than 10-15 missiles - to hit the highest priority and protected targets. The rest will probably come with ordinary blocks, because 10 - 15 nuclear warheads are much more than 3 Avangards with approximately the same charge power. In addition, even the good old “Voevoda” was designed to overcome a layered missile defense system (more dense than the current American one) with many heavy and light (inflatable metallized spheres) decoys, with active jammers and detonation of the breeding stage to create a cloud of fragments\ false targets. Even from one old “Voevoda”, American missile defense system computers will sweat false targets from identifying real ones. And on “Sarmat” they probably came up with something more intricate. So I am for the classic use of heavy-class ICBMs - to inflict maximum possible damage on the enemy.
And as for the technical state of the American strategic nuclear forces... a few years ago it was very interesting to read Trump’s report to the US Congress on this topic... there you can literally hear the alarm bell - a complete loss of combat readiness in a few years if urgent measures are not taken. Measures were taken, but too late. So, until the end of the decade, they will only have to change nuclear warheads on strategic carriers... Taking into account the constant increase in the capacity of the new radiochemical plant.
I think England’s strategic nuclear forces are not in the best condition either. But France has fresh warheads and I think that everyone is combat ready today.
And there is another owner of a large number of nuclear weapons, which is always forgotten - this is Israel. According to rough estimates by specialized specialists, they have up to 500 nuclear warheads on very modern media. And in light of the unfolding conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, this also needs to be remembered and well understood.

[Wildcat]

The United States is simply currently unable to produce new warheads, except for a limited number (several dozen) per year. And these new warheads are used to rearm strategic delivery vehicles - the same Trident-2. Therefore, in order to somehow preserve some potential of tactical nuclear weapons, they are forced to sort through the charges of old free-falling bombs that are still suitable for such a bulkhead. Although it is obvious that nuclear warheads are needed for new missile launchers. But apparently their turn will not come soon.
...
The Russian Federation has been paying priority attention to the development of strategic nuclear forces for the last 20+ years, so the strategic nuclear forces of the RF Armed Forces are very fresh, modern and quite serviceable... So the real strategic (and even more so tactical) potential of the Russian Federation is not just superior... perhaps even several heads exceeds the considerably degraded nuclear potential of the United States.

I would like to know where you got this information from?
Especially about the fact that “the real strategic (and even more so tactical) potential of the Russian Federation is not just head and shoulders above ... perhaps even several heads superior to the considerably degraded nuclear potential of the United States”?
Is this the same source that spoke about “70% of the Russian Federation’s weapons are new”?

[bayard]

Quote: Wildcat

Is this the same source that spoke about “70% of the Russian Federation’s weapons are new”?

From one of the leading experts in the industry responsible for this. And he has the rank of academician.
And 70%... Firstly, this statistic was proclaimed for the Little Cozy Army. The Ground Forces of which numbered “as much as” 280 thousand. And 70% are not only new, but also modernized weapons. I think that’s how it was. Now the ground component of the RF Armed Forces numbers more than 1 million bayonets, in addition to the Russian Guard. Next year by the end of spring there will be at least 1,5 million, excluding the Airborne Forces, Marine Marines, volunteer formations and the Russian Guard.
Minus is not mine.

[Vladimir_2U]

There is an understanding that the amers fussed with nuclear weapons due to, if not the failure, then the obvious incomplete viability of the concept of a highly professional, expensive army with high-precision conventional weapons.

[Wildcat]

There is an idea that the amers, in terms of compliance with the START treaties, came up with “training ICBM silos" removed from the list of carriers of nuclear weapons B52 "honest word - the equipment has been removed" and B1 "there is a partition in the bomb bay, there is no need to touch it, but the rocket is larger doesn’t fit" and other interesting things. So, despite the control under the START treaties, the big question is what amers have with strategic nuclear weapons (but even their treaty limits were greater than ours).
“They” had no control over non-strategic nuclear weapons at all, so draw your own conclusions.

By the way, among the official tricks was the “1 carrier - 1 charge” test for aviation, which is not even funny for B2, B1 and B52. At the same time, “their nuclear weapons aircraft” are larger, they have more bases, tanker aircraft and bases closer to our territory. And in this part, a good question: how is the F35 with nuclear weapons, refueled over Norway, fundamentally different from the B2 in terms of delivering a nuclear strike? B2 is 16 charges, and F35 is 1-2 charges?

There was hope that Bongo would write about the “returnable/real potential” of US nuclear weapons, but...

Regarding US non-strategic nuclear weapons, all we know is from the source “Federation of American Scientists” and press releases. And then, as in the joke, “they began to take the gentlemen at their word and they started playing for money.” map" ".

[Vladimir_2U]

These are not very cunning amers, these are “ours” who have merged control and accounting. Dear partners who will never deceive you. Well, this does not cancel the incomplete validity of relying on conventional high-precision.

[Wildcat]

These are not very cunning amers, these are “ours” who have leaked control and accounting

These are not “cunning amers”; it was at least somehow possible to agree on START, to everyone’s happiness.
Unfortunately, the efforts of the last 50 years have been “covered with a copper basin” (let’s not point fingers at who is to blame), and we can already find out, for example, that: "The United States has deployed a launcher for medium- and shorter-range missiles in the Baltic Sea for the first time. It is located on the Danish island of Bornholm, Kommersant reports.
This is the Raytheon Standard SM-6 system, which can be used to launch missiles previously prohibited under the Russian-American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). "https://www.bfm.ru/news/534644
Again we wanted the best, but it turned out as always: “Don’t make our Iskanders laugh, I mean, don’t make our Typhons laugh.”
But local optimists cannot be appeased: “our potential is higher.”

But they could not agree on tactical nuclear weapons, and all the data on US tactical nuclear weapons is “one old lady said,” in the sense of “the Federation of American Scientists.”

Almost nothing is known about our tactical nuclear weapons and the nuclear industry in general; “whoever says the correct answer will get 10 years.” Optimists, IMHO, believe that "the real strategic (and even more so tactical) potential of the Russian Federation is not just head and shoulders above... perhaps even several heads superior to the considerably degraded nuclear potential of the United States"Pessimists, IMHO, believe that there is probably a correlation between an excellent, magnificent, incredibly wonderful state, for example, the SV/Navy/Air Force and the “nuclear shield.”
Personally, I am an even more radical pessimist, for example, attacks by Ukrainian Armed Forces drones on bomber bases simply shock me. We need, IMHO, to invest a lot of effort into our nuclear weapons and their stability. About other issues, for example, the CON of our SSBNs, etc. let Timokhin/Klimov/Andrey from Chelyabinsk write - read it from them.

[FoBoss_VM]

Clean cut of money. A bomb for banana republics where only MANPADS are available for air defense at best.

[sergeyketonov]

Good afternoon. Ivan, at first glance it all seems so simple - a plane with a free-fall bomb is an anachronism of the 20th century. But, in reality, everything is not so simple. Imagine the situation: the S-400 air defense system has to repel an attack from two targets. The first is the AGM-86B ALCM strategic missile launcher with the W-80-1 nuclear warhead. flying on a PMV directly at an air defense missile system, target ESR - 0,1 sq. meters, the second target is an F-35 fighter with one or two B61-12 bombs, in the internal compartments also flying on the PMV, the ESR of the target (frontal) is from 0,001 to 0,0001 sq. meters, the first crew of the air defense missile system will see with its radar equipment at a range of -30-32 km, the second at a distance of 6-8 km, unless of course the EPR of the F-35 declared by the Americans corresponds to reality. The F-35 is a very dangerous enemy and NATO already has about 1000 of them. In a couple of years, there will be 180 B61-12 bombs at European NATO air bases. The F-35, in combination with the B61-12 bomb, is a very dangerous enemy, no less, and perhaps more dangerous, than the strategic Tridents and Minutemen.

[Wildcat]

The F-35, in combination with the B61-12 bomb, is a very dangerous enemy, no less, and perhaps more dangerous, than the strategic Tridents and Minutemen.

The Minutemen's launch will very likely be detected. The launch of the Tridents is less likely (especially considering the hypothetical “low trajectory”), but most likely it will also be detected. IMHO, satellites and ZGRLS work in this part.
How to establish that the conditional 100 F35 with 1-2 B61 took off for impact? No way.
Considering that neither the USSR, nor even more so the Russian Federation, has a “full radar field” over its territory, the word “no way” must be written in bold and capslocked.
I hope that B2, B52, B1 are somehow tracked, at least by Stirlits; but, IMHO, it is impossible to track an F35 with nuclear weapons.

In a couple of years, there will be 180 B61-12 bombs at European NATO air bases

what will happen in Europe, IMHO, is for the allied F16 and Tornado (in the future, Germany will have the same F35, for example). "European B61s" will be given to the Europeans at the "hour of H" in order to "bind" them with blood and atomic weapons.
The Americans, IMHO, will not complicate the situation - it is easier to operate from their bases, providing flights with in-flight refueling, and at the same time removing carriers from impact. It’s strange that the Navy and Marines are not mastering the B61 on their F35s, although who knows...

[sergeyketonov]

I already wrote something here. The Americans stopped firing Trident missiles at short ranges. In 1989, experimental firing at a range of 2000-2200 km along HT trajectories gave unsatisfactory accuracy results. for W-76/Mk4 warheads - 6400 -7600 meters, and for W-88/Mk5 - more than 4800 meters. Our early warning systems detect the launch of Tridents from any area. any ocean, just like the Minutemen.

[Wildcat]

About six months ago, a similar question was discussed in the comments of Timokhin/Klimov’s article.
We were only able to find a mention in an English-language article that the “low trajectory” option for Trident was theoretically considered, but it did not come to actual launches, probably due to the issue not being resolved with precision.