Operation Spark. To the 70 anniversary of the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad
By the beginning of 1943, the situation of Leningrad surrounded by German troops remained extremely difficult. The troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet were isolated from the rest of the Red Army. Attempts to deblokade of Leningrad in 1942 year - Luban and Sinyavinskaya offensive operations were not successful. The shortest path between the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts - between the southern coast of Lake Ladoga and the village of Mga (the so-called Schlesselburg-Sinyavino ledge, 12-16 km), still occupied parts of the 18 of the German army. Shells and bombs continued to burst on the streets and squares of the second capital of the USSR, people died, buildings collapsed. The city was under constant threat of air raids and shelling. The lack of land communication with the territory under the control of the Soviet troops caused great difficulties in the supply of fuel and raw materials for factories, did not allow to meet the needs of the troops and the civilian population in food and basic necessities. However, the position of Leningrad in the winter 1942-1943. it was still somewhat better than the previous winter. Electricity was supplied to the city through a cable laid under water, and fuel through an underwater pipeline. The city was supplied with necessary products and goods on the ice of the lake - the Road of Life. In addition, in addition to the highway, an iron line was constructed directly on the ice of Lake Ladoga.
By the end of 1942, the Leningrad Front under the leadership of Leonid Govorov included: 67th Army - Lieutenant-General Mikhail Dukhanov, 55th Army - Lieutenant-General Vladimir Sviridov, 23rd Army - Major General Alexander Cherepanov, 42- I am the Army - Lieutenant General Ivan Nikolaev, Primorsky Task Force and the 13th Air Army - Colonel General aviation Stepan Rybalchenko. The main forces of the LF - the 42nd, 55th and 67th armies, defended themselves at the turn of Uritsk, Pushkin, south of Kolpino, Porogi, the right bank of the Neva to Lake Ladoga. The 67th Army operated in a 30 km strip along the right bank of the Neva from Porogi to Lake Ladoga, having a small bridgehead on the left bank of the river, in the Moscow Dubrovka area. The 55th Infantry Brigade of this army defended the highway from the south, which ran along the ice of Lake Ladoga. The 23rd Army defended the northern approaches to Leningrad, located on the Karelian Isthmus. It should be noted that the situation on this sector of the front was stable for a long time, even a soldier's saying appeared: “Three (or“ there are three neutral ”) armies do not fight in the world — Swedish, Turkish and 23rd Soviet”. Therefore, the formations of this army were often transferred to other, more dangerous directions. The 42nd Army defended the Pulkovo Frontier. The Primorye Operational Group (POG) was located on the Oranienbaum bridgehead.
The LF operations were supported by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Vladimir Tributs, who was based at the mouth of the Neva River and in Kronstadt. He covered the coastal flanks of the front, supported the ground forces with his aircraft and naval artillery fire. In addition, the fleet held a number of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, which covered the western approaches to the city. Leningrad was also supported by the Ladoga military flotilla. Leningrad's air defense was carried out by the Leningrad Air Defense Army, which interacted with aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the front and navy. The military road along the ice of the lake and the transshipment bases on its shores protected the compounds of the separate Ladoga air defense region from the Luftwaffe attacks.
The Volkhov front under the command of Army General Kirill Meretsky at the beginning of 1943 included: 2-I shock army, 4-I, 8-I, 52-I, 54-I, 59-I armies and 14-I air army. But they took direct part in the operation: 2-I attack army - under the command of Lieutenant-General Vladimir Romanovsky, 54-I army - Lieutenant-General Alexander Sukhomlyn, 8-I army - Lieutenant-General Philip Starikov, 14-I air force - General Lt. Aviation Ivan Zhuravlev. They operated in the 300 km lane from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen. On the right flank of Lake Ladoga to the Kirov Railroad were part of the 2 th shock and 8 th armies.
The German command after the failure of attempts to take the city in 1942 year, was forced to stop the fruitless offensive and give the troops the order to move to defense. The Red Army was opposed by the 18-I German army under the command of Georg Lederman, who was part of Army Group North. It consisted of 4 army corps and up to 26 divisions. German troops supported the 1-th Air Fleet of Colonel-General Alfred Keller. In addition, in the northwestern approaches to the city opposite the 23 of the Soviet army, there were 4 Finnish divisions from the Karelian Isthmus task force.
German defense
The Germans had the most powerful defense and tight grouping of troops in the most dangerous direction - the Shlisselburg-Sinyavinsky ledge (its depth did not exceed 15 km). Here between the city of Mga and Lake Ladoga, 5 German divisions were deployed - the main forces of the 26th and part of the divisions of the 54th army corps. They included about 60 thousand people, 700 guns and mortars, about 50 tanks and self-propelled guns. Each village was turned into a strong point, prepared for a round-robin defense, the positions were covered by minefields, wire fences and fortified by pillboxes. There were two lines of defense: the first included the constructions of the 8th state district power station, the 1st and 2nd Gorodoks and the houses of the city of Shlisselburg - from Leningrad, Lipka, Workers' settlements No. 4, 8, 7, Gontovaya Lipka - from the Volkhov front , the second included workers 'settlements No. 1 and No. 5, Podgornaya, Sinyavino stations, workers' settlement No. 6, Mikhailovsky settlement. The defensive lines were saturated with nodes of resistance, had a developed network of trenches, shelters, dugouts, and weapons of fire. As a result, the entire ledge resembled one fortified area.
The situation for the attacking side was exacerbated by the woodland and marshland in the area. In addition, there was a large area of Sinyavino peat that was cut by deep ditches. The territory was impassable for armored vehicles and heavy artillery, and they were needed to destroy the enemy fortifications. To overcome such a defense, powerful means of suppression and destruction, a tremendous strain of the forces and means of the attacking side were required.
Plan and prepare the operation. Shock groups of the Soviet army
Back in November 1942, the LF command submitted to the Supreme Commander their proposals on the preparation of a new offensive near Leningrad. It was planned in December 1942 of the year - February 1943 of the year to conduct two operations. In the course of the "Shlisselburg operation" it was proposed by the LF forces, together with the troops of the Volkhov front, to break through the blockade of the city and build a railway along Lake Ladoga. During the "Uritskoy operation" were going to break through the land corridor to the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The bid approved the first part of the operation - breaking the blockade of Leningrad (Directive No. 170696 of December 2 1942). The operation received the code name "Iskra", the troops were to be in full combat readiness for January 1 1943.
The plan of the operation was set out in more detail in Directive No. 170703 of the Supreme Command Rates from December 8. The LF and VF troops received the task of smashing the German grouping in the Lipka, Gaitolovo, Moscow Dubrovka, Shlisselburg areas and, thus, to lift the complete blockade of Leningrad. By the end of January 1943, the Red Army was supposed to reach the line of the river Moika-Mikhailovsky-Tortolovo. The directive also reported on the holding of the “Mginskoy operation” in February with the aim of defeating the German group in the area of Mga and ensuring a strong railway connection between Leningrad and the country. Coordination of the front was entrusted to Marshal Clement Voroshilov.
Almost a month was allotted for preparation of the operation. Much attention was paid to the interaction between the troops of the two fronts. In the rear, training fields and special camps were set up for practicing offensive actions of formations in wooded and swampy areas and storming the enemy's echeloned defense. The connections of the 67 Army developed methods of forcing the Neva across the ice and aiming a crossing for tanks and artillery. In the LF, at the direction of Govorov, artillery groups were formed: long-range, special-purpose, counter-mine and a separate group of guards mortar units. By the beginning of the operation, thanks to the reconnaissance efforts, the command was able to form a fairly good idea of the German defense. In December, a thaw occurred, so the ice on the Neva was weak, and the marshland was difficult to reach, therefore the Headquarters, at the suggestion of the Commander LF, postponed the start of the operation on January 12 on 1943. In early January, the State Defense Committee sent the Volkhov Front to reinforce George Zhukov.
For the operation as part of the LF and VF fronts, shock groups were formed, which were reinforced by armored, artillery and engineering units, including from the Betting reserve. On the Volkhov front, the shock group was composed of the Romanovsky 2 shock army. It consisted of 12 rifle divisions, 4 tank, 1 rifle and 3 ski brigades, Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough, 4 individual tank battalions: 165 thousand, 2100-2200 guns and mortars, 225, 400 thousand men, 12-1 guns and mortars, 5, 8, 2, 2-2 guns and mortars. From the air, the army was supported around 8 aircraft. The army received the task of penetrating enemy defenses on the 2885 km section from the village of Lipki on the shore of Lake Ladoga and up to Gaitolovo, reaching the line Workers' settlements No. XNUMX and No. XXUMX, Sinyavino, and then developing the offensive before connecting with units of LF. In addition, the troops of the XNUMX Army: XNUMX rifle divisions, a marine brigade, a separate tank regiment and the XNUMX individual tank battalion, delivered an auxiliary strike in the direction of Tortolovo, the village of Mikhailovsky. The offensive of the XNUMX shock and XNUMX army supported about XNUMX guns and mortars.
On the LF side, the Dukhanov's 67 Army was to play a major role. It consisted of 7 rifle divisions (one Guards), 6 rifle, 3 tank and 2 ski brigades, 2 separate tank battalion. The artillery of the army, the front, the Baltic Fleet (88 guns with a caliber 130 — 406 mm) supported the offensive — around 1900 trunks, the 13 air army and naval aviation — around 450 aircraft and around 200 tanks. The units of the 67 Army were to cross the Neva on the 12 km section between the Nevsky Pyatachok and Shlisselburg, concentrating their main efforts in the direction of Marino, Sinyavino. LF troops breaking through the German defenses on the Moscow Dubrovka, Shlisselburg, were to connect with the WF units at the turn of the Workers' villages No. 2, 5 and 6, and then develop an offensive to the south-east and reach the line on the Moika River.
Both strike groups numbered about 300 thousand people, about 4900 guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and more 800 aircraft.
Start of the Offensive. 12 January 1943 of the year
On the morning of January 12, 1943, the troops of the two fronts simultaneously launched an offensive. Previously, at night, aviation dealt a powerful blow to the positions of the Wehrmacht in the breakthrough zone, also on airfields, command and control points, communications and railway junctions in the enemy rear. Tons of metal fell on the Germans, destroying its living force, destroying fortifications and suppressing morale. In 9: 30 in the morning, the artillery of the two fronts began artillery preparation: in the offensive zone of the 2 shock army, it lasted 1 hour 45 minutes, and in the 67 army sector - 2 hour 20 minutes. For 40 minutes before the start of the movement of infantry and armored vehicles, attack aircraft were attacked by assault aircraft in groups of 6-8 airplanes in advance.
In 11: 50 under the cover of the “fiery rampart” and the fire of the 16-th fortified division of the first-echelon of the 67-th army went on the attack. Each of the four divisions - 45-I Guards, 268-I, 136-I, 86-I infantry divisions, were reinforced by several artillery and mortar regiments, anti-tank artillery regiment and one or two engineering battalions. In addition, 147 supported light tanks and armored cars, whose weight could withstand ice. The particular difficulty of the operation was that the Wehrmacht’s defensive positions were on a steep icy left river bank that was higher than the right bank. The fire means of the Germans were arranged in tiers and covered all the approaches to the shore with multilayer fire. To break through to the other side, it was necessary to reliably suppress the firing points of the Germans, especially in the first line. At the same time, it was necessary to take care not to damage the ice on the left bank.
The first to the other side of the Neva were the assault groups. Their fighters selflessly made passages in the barriers. Behind them crossed the river infantry and tank units. After a fierce battle, the enemy defense was hacked in the area north of the 2-th Town (268-Rifle Division and 86-th separate tank battalion) and in the Marino area (136-I division and the 61-th tank brigade). By the end of the day, Soviet troops had broken down the resistance of the 170 of the German infantry division between the 2 Township and Shlisselburg. 67-I army captured the bridgehead between 2-Gorodok and Shlisselburg, construction began crossing for medium and heavy tanks and heavy artillery (completed 14 January). On the flanks, the situation was more difficult: on the right wing, the 45-I Guards Rifle Division in the Nevsky Pyatachka area was able to capture only the first line of German fortifications; on the left wing, the 86-Infantry Division was unable to force the Neva near Shlisselburg (it was transferred to a bridgehead in the Marino area to strike Shlisselburg from the south).
In the offensive zone of the 2 shock (went on the offensive at 11: 15) and the 8 th army (in 11: 30) the offensive developed with great difficulty. Aviation and artillery could not suppress the main firing points of the enemy, and the swamps, even in winter, were impassable. The most fierce battles were behind the Lipka, Workers' Settlement No. 8 and Gontovaya Lipka points; these strong points were on the flanks of the bursting forces and even in full surroundings continued the battle. On the right flank and in the center - 128-I, 372-I and 256-I infantry divisions, could by the end of the day break through the defense of 227-th infantry division and advance 2-3 km. The strongholds of Lipka and Working Village No. 8 on this day could not be taken. On the left flank, only the 327-Infantry Division was able to achieve some success, which occupied most of the fortifications in the “Round” grove. The attacks of the 376 Division and the forces of the 8 Army did not succeed.
The German command, on the very first day of the battle, was forced to put operational reserves into battle: the connections of the 96 Infantry Division and the 5 Mountain Division had been sent to the aid of the 170 Division, two regiments of the 61 Infantry Division ("Major General Hüner's group ") Were introduced into the center of the Schlesselburg-Sinyavino overhang.
Fights 13 - January 17
On the morning of January 13, the offensive continued. The Soviet command to finally turn the tide in their favor began to enter into the battle the second echelon of the advancing armies. However, the Germans relying on strongholds and a developed defense system offered stubborn resistance, the battles became protracted and fierce.
In the offensive zone of the 67 Army on the left flank, the 86 Infantry Division and the battalion of armored vehicles, supported by the 34 Ski Brigade and 55 Infantry Brigade (on the ice of the lake) from the north, stormed the approaches to Shlisselburg. By the evening of 15, the Red Army men reached the outskirts of the city, the German troops in Shlisselburg were in a critical situation, but continued to fight hard.
In the center of the 136-th Infantry Division and 61-I tank tank brigade developed an offensive in the direction of the workers' village number 5. To ensure the left flank of the division, the 123 Infantry Brigade was brought into battle, it had to advance in the direction of the workers' settlement No. 3. Then, to ensure the right flank, the 123 Infantry Division and the tank brigade were brought into battle, they were advancing in the direction of Workers' Settlement No.6, Sinyavino. After several days of fighting, the 123-I rifle brigade seized Working Village No. 3 and reached the outskirts of the settlements No. 1 and No. 2. The 136 Division made its way to Workers' Settlement No. 5, but could not immediately take it.
On the right wing of the 67 Army, the 45 Guards and 268 Rifle Divisions were still unsuccessful. The air force and artillery could not eliminate the firing points in the 1-m, 2-m Gorodok and 8-th GRES. In addition, German troops received reinforcements - the formations of the 96 th infantry and 5 th mountain rifle divisions. The Germans even made fierce counterattacks, using the 502 heavy tank battalion, armed with the Tiger I heavy tanks. Despite the introduction of the second echelon of the 13 th infantry division, the 102 th and 142 th infantry brigades, the Soviet troops failed to turn the tide in this sector in their favor.
In the band of the 2 shock army, the offensive continued to develop more slowly than in the 67 army. The German troops, relying on the strong points - the Workers villages No. 7 and No. 8, Lipke, continued to put up stubborn resistance. 13 January, despite the introduction into the battle of the forces of the second echelon, the troops of the 2 th shock army did not achieve any serious success in any direction. In the following days, the army command attempted to expand the breakthrough in the southern sector from the grove "Round" to Gaitolovo, but without significant results. The 256-Infantry Division was the most successful in this area, in January 14 it occupied Working Village No. 7, Podgornaya Station and reached the approaches to Sinyavino. On the right wing, the 128 I ski brigade was sent to the aid of the 12 Division, it had to go to the rear of the Lipka stronghold on the ice of Lake Ladoga.
On January 15, in the center of the offensive line, the 372 Rifle Division was finally able to take on the workers' villages No. 8 and No. 4, and the 17-2 went to the village No. 1. To this day, the 18-I Rifle Division and the 98-I tank tank brigade 2 UA have been fighting hard for several days on the approaches to Working Village No. 5. He was attacked from the west by units of the 67 Army. The moment of connection of the two armies was close ...
To be continued ...
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