The changing face of war: fourth generation
From the editors.
The article, published in 1989, offered to the attention of Russian-speaking readers, marked the beginning of a discussion about "fourth-generation wars". Since then, this topic has received rapid development in numerous articles and books that continue to be published in the United States and other countries. This article is interesting because it has formulated many of the questions that have become the subject of further discussion. Familiarity with it is necessary for understanding the current state of Western military thought.
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: FOURTH GENERATION.
William C. Lind,
Colonel Keith Nightingale (US Army),
Captain John F. Schmitt (US Marine Corps),
Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (US Army),
Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (US Marine Corps Reserve)
Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, pp. 22-26.
The main task of a soldier in peacetime is to use this time effectively to prepare for a future war. For this, he must predict what this war will be like. This is not an easy task, and it eventually becomes more and more complex. As the German General Franz Ole-Wettler wrote:
In former times, a commander could have been sure that the impending war would resemble wars in the past and in the present. This gave him the opportunity to analyze past experience and draw from him suitable tactics. Today the commander of the troops is deprived of this opportunity. He knows with certainty only one thing: he who fails to adapt the experience of the past war to a new reality is doomed to defeat in the next war.
Central question
If we take a look at the development of military affairs in modern times, we will see three clearly different generations. The US Army and Marine Corps are currently trying to make the transition to the third generation. In general, this transition is a change for the better. However, the third generation war at the conceptual level was developed during the German offensive in the spring of 1918. Today it is already more than 70 years old. This raises some interesting questions. Is it time for the fourth generation to appear? If so, what are its characteristics? These issues are crucial. The one who first recognizes, understands and implements a change of generations can get a decisive advantage. Conversely, a nation slowly adapting to this shift is facing the threat of a catastrophic defeat.
The aim of our work is not so much to give answers as to raise these questions. Nevertheless, we offer some preliminary answers. In order to take the first steps towards understanding what these answers might be, you need to put the questions themselves in historical context.
Three generations in the history of wars
Although the development of military affairs as a whole is a continuous evolutionary process, the modern era has experienced three turning points in which the changes were of a dialectically-qualitative nature. Accordingly, the process of development of this sphere in modern times falls into three clearly distinguishable generations.
The war of the first generation reflected the tactics of the times of the smoothbore musket - linear tactics and tactics of the columns. These types of tactics arose partly in response to technological requirements — a linear construction maximized firepower, a tough drill was needed to achieve maximum rate of fire, etc. - partly as a result of certain social conditions and ideas - for example, the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both élan1 revolutions and the low level of training of soldiers recruited by conscription. Although the tactics of the first-generation war were outdated due to the replacement of a smooth-bore musket with a breech-loading rifled weapons, its rudiments are still alive today, in particular, manifested in the frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Within the first generation, operational art did not exist as a concept, although it was practiced by individual commanders (the most famous example is Napoleon).
The second generation of wars was a response to the rifle, charged from the breech, barbed wire, machine gun and the possibility of firing from closed positions. Tactics were based on the use of fire and movement, and it remained basically linear. The defensive side still sought to prevent any admission of the enemy through the defensive line, and from the offensive side-spread chain moved forward by dashes of small groups. Probably the most important change from the tactics of the first generation of war was the emphasis on artillery fire from closed positions; second generation tactics can be summarized by the French dictum: "Artillery is winning, infantry takes." Massive firepower has replaced the military mass. The tactics of the second generation of war remained the basis of military doctrine in the United States until the 80-ies of XX century. and is still practiced by most American units on the battlefield.
Although ideas played a role in the development of second generation war tactics (in particular, the idea of dispersal in the lateral direction), the main driving force behind the changes was technology. They showed themselves in a qualitative aspect - for example, in the development of heavier artillery or the emergence of bomber aviation - and in quantitative terms - in the ability of an industrial economy to wage war at the expense of spending the material part (Materialschlacht).
The second generation of wars was accompanied by the formal recognition and adoption of operational art - initially it happened in the Prussian army. And again, these changes were caused by both new ideas and technologies. Ideas mainly stemmed from the study of Napoleonic campaigns by the Prussians. Technological factors include the discovery made by Moltke, which consists in the fact that modern tactical firepower requires a battle to surround, as well as a desire to use the possibilities of railway transport and telegraph.
The third generation of warfare also responded to the build-up of firepower used on the battlefield. However, here the main driving force was primarily ideas. The Germans, realizing that they could not win the First World War by increasing the material means of warfare because of a weaker industrial base, created a radically new tactic. The tactics of the third generation war, based on maneuver, and not on the depletion of the enemy, became the first truly non-linear tactics in history. The offensive was based on a detour and penetration into the rear of the enemy in order to deprive him of his ability to resist, and not on the desire to get close and destroy him. The defense was organized to a greater depth and often encouraged the penetration of the enemy, making him vulnerable to a counterattack.
Although the basic ideas of third-generation tactics were developed by the end of 1918, the advent of new technical means - namely, tanks - brought to life a major innovation at the operational level during the Second World War. This innovation was blitzkrieg. Within the framework of the Blitzkrieg concept, the role of the foundation of operational art has shifted from a place factor (as in the Liddel Garth’s concept of indirect actions) to a time factor. This fundamental change was truly realized only recently in the work of retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd, namely, in his “OODA theory” (“observation-orientation-decision-action”).
Thus, we see two main catalysts of change that led to previous generations: technology and ideas. What gives us an understanding of these past changes when we try to look ahead and see the potential transition to the war of the fourth generation?
That goes from one generation to another.
The previous generational shifts, especially the transition from the second generation to the third, were marked by an ever stronger emphasis on some central ideas. At least four of them, in all likelihood, will pass into the fourth generation and, moreover, will have an even stronger influence.
The first such idea is an “order-oriented order” order (2 order). Each time the transition to a new generation was marked by an increasing dispersal of forces on the battlefield. In a fourth-generation war, the battlefield is likely to include the entire society in whose name the enemy is fighting the war. Under these conditions, dispersal, as well as, in all likelihood, increasing the significance of the actions of very small groups of combatants, will require from combat units even the lowest level of flexible actions based on knowledge and understanding of the intentions of the higher command.
The second is a reduction in dependence on a centralized logistics system. Dispersion, coupled with the ever-increasing importance of speed, will require a high degree of readiness to maintain existence at the expense of the surrounding terrain and the enemy.
The third element that the fourth generation will probably inherit is a greater emphasis on maneuver. Massaging and firepower will no longer be the deciding factor. Moreover, mass character can be an unfavorable factor, since it makes it easier to find targets for destruction. There will be a tendency for small, highly mobile and mobile forces to prevail.
The fourth key idea will be the direction of actions to achieve internal collapse of enemy forces, and not to their physical destruction. The targets for defeat will include such “things” as support for war by the population and the culture of the enemy. Of great importance will be the accurate identification of the strategic foundations of the enemy’s combat potential.
On the whole, it appears that fourth-generation military actions are likely to be highly dispersed and for the most part undefined; the dividing line between peace and war will be blurred until it disappears completely. The war will be non-linear to such an extent that, quite possibly, it will lack identifiable battlefield and front lines. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” is likely to disappear. Actions will be simultaneously directed to the entire "depth" of the parties involved, including their entire society, understood not only in its physical, but also in its cultural aspect. Large military facilities such as airfields, fixed communications centers and large headquarters will become rare due to their vulnerability; the same is likely to affect their civilian equivalents, such as government residences, power plants and industrial sites (this applies not only to the manufacturing industry, but also to the "knowledge economy"). Success will depend heavily on the effectiveness of joint operations, since the dividing lines between tasks and the responsibilities of different participants will be blurred. Again, all these elements are present in the wars of the third generation; the fourth generation simply enhances them.
Potential transition to the fourth generation under the influence of technology.
If we combine the listed general characteristics of the fourth generation war with new technologies, we will see one of the possible contours of the new generation. For example, the 3 direct energy weapon will likely give small units the ability to destroy targets that they are not able to attack with weapons based on conventional methods of using energy. Such a weapon can make it possible to create the damaging effect of an electromagnetic pulse without producing a nuclear explosion. Studies in the field of superconductivity suggest the possibility of saving for the subsequent use of a very large amount of energy in very small containers. Technologically, it is quite possible that a very small group of soldiers will have a combat influence equal to a modern brigade.
The development of robotics, remotely controlled aircraft, communication devices with a low probability of interception, and artificial intelligence can entail the potential for a radical change of tactics. On the other hand, the growing dependence on such technologies may create new points of vulnerability, for example, vulnerability to computer viruses.
Small highly mobile units consisting of highly intelligent soldiers, armed with high-tech weapons, will move across large areas in search of critical targets. It may be that these goals will often be civilian than military. The terms “front - rear” will be replaced by the terms “is the goal - is not the goal”. This, in turn, can fundamentally change the way in which the types of armed forces are organized and structured.
Military units and subunits will combine intelligence and shock functions. Remote “smart” devices, programmed using artificial intelligence, will play a key role. At the same time, the ability to hide from these devices and deceive them will be a huge advantage in defense.
Since the political infrastructure and civil society of the enemy will become objects of combat action, the tactical and strategic levels will merge. The most important task will be to isolate your own country from the enemy, since a small number of people will be able to cause great damage in a very short time.
Commanders will need to own both the art of war and technology, which is a difficult task, because involves a combination of two different mindsets. Primary tasks facing commanders at all levels will include the choice of objectives (representing a decision not only of a military, but also of a political, and cultural nature), the ability to achieve rapid concentration at an initially high degree of dispersal, and the selection of subordinates who will be able to cope with the challenge of conducting operations in a rapidly changing environment with minimal or no control “from above”. A significant problem will be the processing of a potentially huge excess of information without losing sight of operational and strategic goals.
Psychological operations in the form of media information intervention can be the predominant operational and strategic weapon. 4 "logical bombs" and computer viruses can be used to disrupt both military and civilian operations. The warring parties in the fourth generation war will become so adept at manipulating the media in order to change public opinion in the country and in the world that the skillful use of psychological operations can sometimes make it unnecessary to put combat units into action. The most important target of impact will be the support of the population of the enemy of his government and the ongoing war. Television news can become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions.
This kind of high-tech fighting of the fourth generation can carry the seeds of a nuclear catastrophe. Their effectiveness can quickly nullify the ability of the nuclear possessor to wage war by conventional means. Destroying or disrupting the workings of key production facilities, political infrastructure, and social fabric, combined with unexpected shifts in the balance of power and with attendant emotions, can easily escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. This risk can serve as a deterrent against the conduct of fourth-generation wars between nuclear powers, just as today it serves as a deterrent against conventional wars between them.
However, it is necessary to make a substantial reservation regarding the possibility of a transition to the fourth generation under the influence of technology, at least in the American context. Even if the state of the art in technology allows a fourth-generation high-tech war - and whether this is still unclear - technology itself must be transformed into a weapon that is effective in real combat. The process of research, development and procurement in our country now faces serious difficulties with regard to this transformation. Very often, weapons are produced that include high technology, do not play a role in a real battle, or are too complex to work in the chaos of battle. A good example is the excessive abundance of so-called “smart” weapons; in combat, they are too easy to resist, they refuse because of their own complexity or impose impracticable requirements on the people who use them. The current research, development and procurement process in the United States may simply be unsuitable for making the transition to fourth-generation, military-efficient weapons.
Potential transition to the fourth generation under the influence of ideas.
The main determining factor of the second generation was technology, the third - ideas. You can imagine the fourth generation, based on ideas.
Over the past approximately 500 years, the West has set the tone in military affairs. In order for the armed forces to be effective, they had to generally follow Western models. Since the strength of the West was technology, its representatives may be inclined to think of the fourth generation in technological terms.
However, the West no longer dominates the world. The fourth generation may arise on the basis of non-Western cultural traditions, such as Islamic and East Asian. The fact that some regions, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in the technological sphere, may induce them to develop fourth-generation military affairs based on ideas, not technologies.
The origin of the fourth generation, based on ideas, can be seen in terrorism. This does not mean that terrorism is the fourth generation war, but some of its elements may serve as signs pointing in the direction of the fourth generation.
Some points in terrorism seem to reflect the aforementioned “legacy” of the third generation war. It seems that the most successful terrorist structures operate on the basis of orders oriented to the accomplishment of the task and formulated in general terms, which are brought to the level of an individual terrorist. The “battlefield” is characterized by a high degree of dispersal and includes the entire enemy society. The life support of a terrorist is almost entirely at the expense of the surrounding area and the enemy. The essence of terrorism is maneuver: the terrorist’s firepower is small and therefore where and when it applies is of critical importance.
Two more inherited features should be noted, since they can serve as “road signs” pointing in the direction of the fourth generation. The first feature is the emphasis on the collapse of the enemy [as opposed to destruction]. It means shifting the focus from front to rear of the enemy. Since terrorism has too little destructiveness and cannot cause large-scale damage, it has to strive to destroy the enemy from within. The military operations of the first generation were tactical and operational (in those cases where operational art was practiced) focused on the enemy front, on its armed forces directly involved in the battle. The second-generation military actions remained frontal tactically, although, at least in the Prussian version, they focused on the enemy’s rear in operational terms through an emphasis on the environment. The third generation shifted both tactical and operational focus on the enemy rear. Terrorism is taking the next big step in this direction. He is trying to completely bypass the armed forces and strike directly at the enemy country, at civilian targets in it. Ideally, for a terrorist, the enemy’s armed forces should generally become irrelevant.
The second “road sign” is the way in which terrorism seeks to use the power of the adversary against itself. This "judo" idea of war began to manifest itself in the second generation, in campaigns and battles for the environment. Enemy fortresses, such as the Metz and the Sedan, became deadly traps. This idea received a new development in the wars of the third generation, when the side on the defensive often tried to base its actions on allowing the other side to advance so that the attackers' own inertia would make them less able to maneuver and parry the counterblow.
Terrorists use against the free society the most important source of its strength - freedom and openness. They can move freely in our society, actively engaged in its undermining. They use our democratic rights not only for penetration, but also for self-defense. If we treat them within our laws, then they get many opportunities for protection; if we just shoot them, then television in its news can easily put them as victims. Terrorists can effectively wage their own kind of war, while simultaneously receiving protection from the society they are attacking. If we are forced to abandon our own system of legal guarantees in order to cope with terrorists, they will win a different kind of victory.
On top of that, terrorism seems to be a solution to the problem that was generated by previous generations of changes, but which they really did not try to solve. This is a contradiction between the nature of the modern battlefield and the traditional military culture. This culture, embodied in ranks, military greetings, military uniforms, drill, etc., is for the most part the product of the first generation of wars. This is a culture of order. At the time when it was created, it corresponded to the situation on the battlefield, on which order also prevailed. The ideal army was a well-oiled mechanism, and it was precisely this result that a military culture based on order sought to achieve.
However, each new generation has generated a significant shift towards an unordered battlefield. Military culture, which remained a culture of order, became increasingly contradictory to the combat situation. Even in the third generation war, the contradiction was not insoluble; it was successfully overpowered by the Wehrmacht, externally maintaining a traditional culture based on order, while simultaneously demonstrating, during hostilities, the adaptability and ability to maneuver, which the unorganized battlefield requires. At the same time, the armed forces of other countries, for example, the British, were less successful in overcoming this contradiction. They often tried to bring order-based culture to the battlefield, with disastrous results. For example, during the Anglo-Boer War at Biddulfsberg, a handful of Boers defeated two battalions of the British Guard, which went into battle as if on parade.
The contradiction between military culture and the nature of modern war confronts traditional armed forces with a dilemma. Terrorists, on the other hand, resolve this dilemma by ignoring a culture based on order. They do not wear uniforms, do not walk in order, do not give honor and, for the most part, do not have a system of titles. They can potentially create (or have already created) a military culture corresponding to the disordered nature of modern warfare. The fact that they often belong to a non-Western culture can contribute to this development of events.
It seems that even with regard to the weapons used, terrorism indicates signs of a change of generations. Usually the previous generation requires much more resources to achieve a given goal than the next. Today, the US spends on stealth bombers on 500 thousand dollars apiece. The Invisible Bomber used by terrorists is a car with a bomb in the trunk that looks exactly like any other car.
Terrorism, technology and something in addition.
Once again: we do not claim. That terrorism is the fourth generation. It is not a new phenomenon, and so far it has been largely ineffective. But what will happen if we mentally combine terrorism with some of the new technologies that were discussed? For example, what will be the effectiveness of a terrorist’s actions if a mine in his trunk is stuffed with some kind of genetic engineering product, and not explosives? Or, to imagine the further development of the potential fourth generation, mentally combine terrorism, high technology and the following additional elements.
• Basis not related to nation-states or of a transnational nature, like ideology or religion. Our national security capabilities are designed to operate within the framework of the nation-state system. Outside of this framework, our security system faces considerable difficulties. A good example is the war on drugs. Since drug trafficking lacks a base in the form of a national state, it is very difficult to attack. Such a state can cover drug barons, but cannot control them. We cannot attack them without violating the sovereignty of a friendly country. The attacker in the fourth-generation war may well act in the same way as some Middle Eastern terrorists already do.
• Direct attack on the enemy culture. Such an attack can be carried out both from within and from outside. It allows you to bypass not only the armed forces, but also the enemy state itself. The United States is already suffering enormous damage from such an attack on a culture that has taken the form of drug trafficking. Drugs deal a direct blow to our culture. They have the support of a powerful "fifth column" in the form of drug buyers. Despite all our efforts, they successfully circumvent the entire state apparatus. Some ideological groups in South America view drugs as weapons and are called "intercontinental ballistic missiles for the poor." They highly value drug trafficking, not only because it brings money, with which we ourselves finance the war against us, but also for the damage that it inflicts on the hated North Americans.
• Sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through media manipulation, in particular, television news. Some terrorists already know how to play this game. More generally speaking, the hostile side can easily take advantage of an important product of television news coverage, namely, the fact that thanks to television, the enemy’s losses can become as destructive in the fight on the domestic front as their own losses. If we bombed the enemy city, the pictures of dead civilians, brought to the evening in the evening news to every family in the country, can easily turn into a serious defeat what might seem like military success (assuming that we also hit a military object).
All these components already exist. They are not the product of “futurology” or peering into a magic crystal. We just ask ourselves: what will we have to face if all these phenomena unite? Would such a combination represent at least the initial stage of the fourth generation of wars? One of the arguments in favor of a positive answer is that, apparently, the armed forces of the third generation (not to mention the second) will not be able to counter this synthesis. And this is typical for a change of generations.
The purpose of this article was to pose a question, not to answer it. The partial answers offered in it may in fact prove to be a dead end. But considering the fact that the eighth decade has already gone to the third generation of wars, we ask ourselves: what will be the fourth generation?
Translation by Yu. Kuznetsov
1 Battle rush (Fr.). Hereinafter, all notes are made by the translator.
2 An order to a unit or unit that defines the final task, but does not detail the means to solve it.
3 A weapon that allows you to direct energy in a certain direction without using any projectile, for example, with the help of various kinds of radiation.
4 Programs that maliciously distort data.
Information