The G-20 summit in India turned out to be deep in content and will require a serious response from Beijing
On September 10, the G20 or G-XNUMX summit, which was held in the capital of India, New Delhi, ended. September and October have traditionally become the months when the results are summed up on various international platforms - a kind of finalization of the next political annual cycle.
The Indian summit was covered and analyzed in some detail by observers, since the absence of the Chinese leader at it made the GXNUMX format itself strange. However, the BRICS format is beginning to undergo changes relative to its original ideas and tasks (“On the results of the last BRICS summit").
If in the original conceptual design the G-7 (financial and technological cluster) balanced the BRICs + C (industry, raw materials, labor resources), and the G-20 represents a kind of connecting mechanism between the first and second platforms, then the current situation shows certain changes.
The G-7 can now potentially be balanced (in some future and under certain circumstances) by BRICS+, but the G-20 format is beginning to lose its role as a coupling. It is gradually being stitched together with the Big Seven.
This is only a trend for now, and the question is how sustainable it will become, but it cannot be ignored. But then a new question arises: what functionality was updated by the G-20 in New Delhi? The results and conclusions here can be quite interesting.
Many people drew attention to the use of the original name of the country in Hindi, “Bharat,” instead of the name “India.” Both names are used in official documents, but it is “India” that traditionally appears on international platforms. This time they decided to review the order, and Indian Prime Minister N. Modi spoke on behalf of Bharat.
Bharat, attributed to the early stage of the formation of the social system of India - to the time of the Aryan conquest (or modern and tolerant resettlement), of course, quite clearly emphasizes not just the pre-colonial, but the extremely original character of India as one of the centers of civilization.
In the West, observers focused on the opposition between Britain and India, but judging by the general agenda of the summit and its results, this should still be attributed to the line that separates India and China.
The Aryan migration goes back, according to a number of sources, much deeper than the described and codified Chinese story. In this particular case, in turn, it is hardly worth delving into the historical analysis of “who is older,” because we are talking primarily about ideologemes. The Chinese have their own civilizational ideologies that underlie their current policy, while India has its own.
In this case, New Delhi emphasizes that the basis of Indian policy is equivalent even at its “roots”. It should also be noted that a few days before the GXNUMX summit, the Pope brought a very peculiar message to China, which dealt with the material in detail (“Pope in Mongolia. Khan Guyuk's message for China").
Where does Tibet and part of the Indo-Pakistan region fall, based on the essence of this message?
To the imperial sphere of Pax Mongolica, which had its capital at that time in China and was governed from there. In Bharat-India, they do not agree at all with this idea of a continental design axis between Rome and China. And many other important details of this summit already speak about this. N. Modi’s sign with the not yet very familiar name “Bharat” is also a kind of response to the ideologies of Pax Mongolica “with Chinese characteristics.”
Initially, it seemed that the main part of the event would be devoted to topics related to Ukraine. Indeed, in this part we see a direct continuation of the so-called. “peace summit” in Jeddah, which previously caused a wide reaction and was examined in detail. As a result, the Arabian peace initiative began to be called a failure, but not only the occasion is important, but also the general context and how long this part of the event took.
At the summit in Jeddah, it was important for the United States to involve China in the discussion, but at the same time, methodically, like one persistent forest bird that hollows out food from under the bark, try to “glue” the Middle East and Israel together with India into one large political and economic structure (cm. "USA and the new concept of the “Third Pole for the Middle East”", and "About the strange peace talks in Saudi Arabia").
Actually, that's why the author emphasized At the beginning of August, attention was paid to a number of Bloomberg reports that a new stage of a peace summit based on the Arabian model could no longer take place in Saudi Arabia, but in neighboring India. The logic of the process here is connected not so much with Ukraine, but with the vision of regional development as a whole.
At the time this seemed like an outright stretch, but (as in Jeddah) what is important here is not the Ukrainian topic itself, but, again, the general context. The second big task was to synchronize the G-7 and G-20 formats, not only in terms of agenda and time, but also in final statements. The United States remained true to its line, it just must not lose sight of this line.
The problem for the United States is that they are frankly overdoing it with the Ukrainian agenda, as is customary when Kiev follows a policy of “aggressive conscious beggary,” but both Jeddah and New Delhi are already showing Washington itself that the Ukrainian agenda is not a universal cement with which to strengthen any international forums. If there is too much cement and too little sand, the effect may be the opposite.
China, after all, reduced its participation in the GXNUMX summit, not least because it had a prior understanding of the amount of time that would be devoted to agreeing on the final statement on Ukraine. After all, he voiced his position earlier and more than once.
In addition to the general context, the process of agreeing on general theses on Ukraine allows Washington, in turn, to sense the limits of what is possible in terms of its goals of actively or passively freezing the confrontation on the Dnieper.
It is not for nothing that the Western press is almost directly saying that it is necessary to freeze the active phase of the confrontation if the counter-offensive is unsuccessful (and so far it has been).
Different groups of American politics thus, through such summits, assess the situation, including in relation to Russia’s potential trade opportunities, because in the current “import substitution” model, foreign trade is a basic indicator of sustainability for Moscow.
The final theses of the summit on Ukraine are known in fragments, and they are once again too neutral for Washington (this is the general opinion from the summit). It was not for nothing that the summit of the GXNUMX parliamentary associations was convened at the same time. There were formulations that did not allow for neutrality at all.
Let us note once again a point that illustrates the position stated above: through the Ukrainian agenda, the United States is gradually bringing both the G-20 and G-7 summits onto the same wavelength.
It would be strange if China did not see this, and Beijing would respond on other scales - the SCO and BRICS+, since the GXNUMX is already ceasing to play the role of a balancer and that same docking mechanism.
By pulling the G-20, the United States automatically removes the balance function from it. The problem is that this vacuum will need to be filled. On what conditions to participate is something for Beijing to think about. After all, the current summit in New Delhi has shown that China’s political weight is also a changeable value.
This aspect of the summit matters strategically even more than the actual formulations on Ukraine. Two globalization projects continue to compete with each other (“Club of Rome” vs “Ultra-Liberals”), each of which has models where all these summits, forums, associations are endowed with certain functionality. Functions change (objectively or subjectively), one side or the other will have to adjust the original models, no matter how much one would like to. And this is already a change in institutions, this is not a wording to be agreed upon, even if it is important at a particular moment.
In the final theses on Ukraine, as far as we know, there is no mention of “Russian aggression” or “war against Ukraine”; moreover, most likely, they will not even be included in the main document, but it turned out to direct the vector of the two associations in the right direction. At the summit, much more time was devoted to the Ukrainian case than last year. This is not a low result for the United States, although it is not even close to the maximum.
On the second day of the summit, it was announced that a memorandum of understanding had been signed between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India, the US and the EU to form a common port, energy and railway network.
The interesting thing is that they immediately started talking about this as an alternative to the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” project. But, on the other hand, isn’t it strange that all these countries, excluding the United States, are already potential recipients of goods along the Chinese logistics corridor. Particularly interesting in this regard is the European Union, the main recipient of the One Belt, One Road project. Well, they will finally build a trans-Arabian railway network - a project that is already at least twenty years old, the Chinese will transport their containers to Europe, or maybe they will simply buy shares there.
We are not talking about logistics - an alternative to the Chinese one; this logistics does not contradict the Chinese project, and even in some ways simplifies it and makes it cheaper.
We are talking again about the US conceptual idea of creating a “Third Macroeconomic Pole”, which grew out of the ideas of the Abraham Accords and through several stages took shape in the I2U2+ concept. But these are no longer logistics projects, not trade and transport corridors, of which there are never many, but the transformation of the region into a separate industrial cluster. The idea is to create competition for China at its main production site.
J. Sullivan in early May, when this concept was finally formed and presented, said directly: “You will hear about it more and more often.” And we really see that Washington is persistently building it. The obstacle to this initially lay in the plane of relations between Saudi Arabia - Palestine - Israel. Without Saudi Arabia, the project will not work. But no matter how much over the past couple of years the States tried to persuade Riyadh to join this idea of an “Indo-Arabian bloc”, they ran into opposition from the crown prince.
The signing of this memorandum means that the ice has broken and Riyadh's position has softened. And this, in turn, means that somewhere certain agreements on Palestine are ripening, progress on this issue by B. Netanyahu’s cabinet, certain difficulties on Syria for Russia and Iran, and many more related combinations of problems and opportunities. This is not yet a breakthrough in terms of I2U2+ and the “third pole”, but it is already quite close to it. And this is also a good answer to the Trumpists and MAGA adherents in the domestic political field in the United States - you thought that only you could talk about “good deals”, here’s a “big deal”.
Combined GXNUMX PGII funding and Arabian funds could, in theory, fully cover the costs of such a project. Of course, China will have to counteract it, and this will not be an easy task. The peculiar irony of fate here is that this concept is a clear expression of the thesis about the need to create a “multipolar world” - well, such a model of multipolarity, it turns out, is possible. Opposing it with theses of “fighting American hegemony” will not be the most trivial task after a while.
Those who believe that the above is only a hypothetical construction should answer a simple question: under what concept will the billions of dollars of rupees floating in India work? S. Lavrov cheerfully reported that India will offer directions for investment. Great, but what (or rather, whose) strategy will they work for in the end? In this case, the GXNUMX can only express gratitude that the amount of its own funds allocated to the PGII integration strategy can be reduced, and this is precisely the alternative (one of) the Chinese initiatives.
Although we cannot exclude the possibility that this is just a veiled outflow of capital, it is unlikely that it will work outside the framework of the same PGII. In any case, when we are shown photographs of a smiling N. Modi, who very cordially shakes the hand of our Foreign Minister, we must understand that everyone would have such a face if your seller left you funds in your accounts in such a volume “for investment "
In general, the G-20 summit turned out to be not so much “Ukrainian” as conceptual, and it would be sad if in Russia everything in our analysis is focused only on the analysis of theses around Ukraine, although it is clear that this is the most painful point.
Rome came to Mongolia, but China and Russia were not the first persons to participate in the G-20 summit, nor, of course, Iran. That is, the “continental axis” was not fully involved in the summit one way or another. This is a serious challenge, and we will see what the answer to it will be by how another major international forum – the SCO – is held.
Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.