Build a fleet, not a surrogate
Where can get a separate "theory"
The reason for writing this material was an article by Andrei Samsonov, “Better a small missile ship in service than a destroyer in a project,” published in issue 48 of the Military-Industrial Courier weekly. Its subtitle has already shaken - “With all the wealth of choice, the alternative to“ mosquito the fleet" not yet".
Excuse me, why not? The alternative is to build a balanced Navy, and not to search for some “national ways”, invent a bicycle, or give what you wish for.
About old classes and new rockets
Let's start with some "technical excesses" that are present in the material. First, nobody created a “separate class of ships” under the appeared small rocket ships (MRCs) of the 1234 Ovod project. RTOs belonged to the class “rocket-artillery ships” adopted in the Navy of the USSR and to the subclass “small rocket ships”. At the same time at the very beginning stories "Gadfly" in the class of "rocket-artillery ships" were allocated subclasses of "small rocket ship" and "big rocket ship." The latter - the BRK - attributed the former destroyers of the 56М / ЭМ and 57-bis projects, which received anti-ship missile systems in the 60-ies of the 20th century. Then, however, in connection with the plans for the priority development of the class of anti-submarine ships of the BRK project 57-bis were converted into large anti-submarine ships (BOD).
The class “rocket-artillery ships” became our unique invention and owes its appearance to the creation by Soviet specialists of anti-ship guided missile systems. weapons ship-based. The Soviet fleet was the first in the world in this area, and therefore the indicated class and subclasses were born along with the “missile cruiser” and the “missile boat”. Later in the class of "rocket-artillery ships" appeared subclasses "heavy nuclear missile cruiser", "small missile hovercraft" and "squadron 1 rank-2", but the "big rocket ship" forever gone down in history.
Secondly, it is necessary to clarify the possibility of using the 1234 IRAs of the Malachite complex at full range. The radar complex (RLC) "Titanit" was included into the composition of the radio engineering armament of the IRAs for independent, without the aid of external sources of target designation (DC), detection of surface targets at a distance of 120 – 130 kilometers. The over-the-horizon detection range was provided in the passive mode of operation for the intercepted radiation of the electronic weapons of the surface target ship. In the mode of work with external sources of the control center - airplanes and helicopters located at an altitude up to 2000 meters, the detection range of surface targets reached 150 – 170 kilometers. You can recall this fact here. In 1973, with a full salvo on the Bure, the head MRK of the project, diesel generators failed to shake the hull, the ship was de-energized, but fulfilled its main purpose - hit three targets at a distance of about 100 kilometers.
Later, the RNC Monolith with improved characteristics was placed on the 1234.1 RTOs. The high efficiency of the latter was demonstrated during exercises held by the Kamchatka flotilla of heterogeneous forces in May 1993: the MRK was able to detect a surface target at night at a distance, as indicated, more than 100 kilometers, and deliver the target command to the missile complex. At the same time, the passive channel of the RLC is significantly less exposed to the enemy EW facilities than the active one.
Thirdly, pointing to “IRAs - a very unpretentious ship. A few floating piers, a fuel depot and an electrical network are sufficient for arranging a temporary base station. The modern strike aircraft needs a much more developed infrastructure, not to mention the fact that the airfield is the primary target for the attack, and therefore, when conducting combat operations, it is very likely that it will require frequent repairs, ”the author contradicts himself. The fact is that in the conduct of real hostilities, and not the raid of the “pirates of the 21st century,” the home base of the MRCs will also represent the primary target for the enemy.
Time gap
We also note a certain obsolescence of information on current performance characteristics discussed in the material. So, when comparing anti-ship missile systems (SCRC) of the 1234 project with foreign counterparts, the author noted the SCRK Exochet and Harpoon, but for some reason did not mention a word about the SCRK RBS 15 Mk3, which has, according to the manufacturer, firing range over 250 kilometers He is able to hit both surface and coastal targets. Versatile on the carrier - ships, aircraft and coastal missile systems. Over the past half decade, entered service with the Navy of Germany, Sweden, Poland, Finland and Croatia.
Another example is “Penguin” and “Sea Skye” as “helicopter” anti-ship missiles. In fact, in recent years, this “marte” anti-ship missile has been created and is actively being replaced by this and other old rockets, which surpasses its predecessors in a number of parameters and can also be placed on aircraft and surface ships. And the helicopter RCC’s flight range has already passed 30 kilometers and approached the 40, which allows ship-based helicopters to attack MRKs almost from its “radio horizon”.
The conclusion suggests itself - the author is either not up to date with the developments of the last five or seven years, or talked to an expert who retired around the turn of the year at 2004 – 2006. If the latter is true, then I would still like to see the words of a specialist behind his last name and with his personal assessment, and not a third person retelling.
The reader of an authoritative specialized publication, which undoubtedly is the weekly "MIC", has the right to get acquainted with the personal assessments and judgments of an experienced professional, who, of course, must be aware of the latest developments in the field of naval equipment and weapons abroad.
Their time has passed
Now - about the very class of small rocket ships and why Russia needs to stop caring about the ghosts of the past. It is necessary to engage in the systematic construction of a balanced fleet capable of solving all urgent problems. With the “mosquito fleet”, declared uncontested for Russia, this cannot be done.
Firstly, it was absolutely not necessary to compare the latest modifications of the Exocset and Harpoon missiles with the П-120 rocket since the time of the King of Peas to make the only correct one, even taking into account the possibility of equipping the “Malachite” with a special warhead, conclusion: 120 had to be decommissioned a few years ago, putting in return on the same "Gadfly" of the Onarix (Yakhont) or Uranus SCRC. This would allow and significantly increase the ammunition ready for the use of anti-ship missiles on these ships and, in the case of Onyx, expand the area of destruction of the RTOs. Why this has not been done so far is completely incomprehensible. Even the argument about the lack of funds does not go away - the re-equipment of all ISCs of the 1234 / 1234.1 project would cost the treasury cheaper than building one surface ship of the main class.
Why did we modernize the Libyan RTOs of the 1234E project, under the Uran-E SCRC, the 1234EM project, but didn’t reach our own ships?
Glorifying the excellent speed and mobility of ships of the 1234 project, somehow casually refers to mediocre seaworthiness. However, it was the latter that became one of the scourges of RTOs. The fact is that a ship of this type is actually an enlarged rocket boat and has gliding cutter hull contours that adversely affect the seaworthiness and stability of the Gadfly.
In particular, V.V. Kostrichenko and V.E. Kuzmichev in the book “The Pistol at the Temple of Imperialism. The history of the ships of the 1234 project ”with reference to the participants of the creation of the ISCs and the sailors serving on them noted:“ The ships of the “corvette” class are able to successfully cross the oceans in a brutal storm, but our ISCs cannot operate in the sea with waves over five points because overturning hazard. At medium and low passages, the interplanetary interconnected submersibles bury their noses in waves, cruel pitching on them ... At sea state, four or five points the ship became Valky, did not keep up to date with a wave from aft heading angles, which imposed a restriction on the use of the main missile complex, especially shooting volley. The departure interval of the cruise missiles reached one and a half minutes, since the ship could not lie on the combat course. A strong rolling motion limited the use of anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems. The antennas lay on the stopper, the target tracking lock was disrupted. The rolling motion caused a strong splashing of the superstructure, and at large strokes (more than 15 nodes) - strong shock waves on the body. When sailing in ice, the outboard kingstones were scored with ice chips, the cooling of the main and auxiliary engines refused, which did not allow to fully use the capabilities of the main power plant. ” These words can be trusted - Viktor Kuzmichev served on IRC for more than two decades.
A serious drawback of the Gadfly is a small supply of fuel (especially given the fact that the fuel attack mode was constantly required to maintain a rocket attack mode) and provisions. In the absence of a developed “overseas” basing system, Soviet RTOs in remote areas of the oceans had to be trivially towed by support vessels, or the crews of RTOs could use such a specific tactical technique as tracking enemy ship formations while drifting. The latter was caused not only by the fact that in this case the secrecy of ROC actions increased in some way, but also by the fact that it allowed saving the ship’s “blood” - fuel, without which it would not have been possible to solve its main purpose - to launch a rocket attack. Well, in order to eliminate interruptions in the supply of fresh provisions at the RTOs, even mini-bakeries had to be built later.
That is why the most successful way to use the “Gadflys” in the Soviet fleet was to operate in coastal zones from an ambush, when ROCs “on foot”, hiding from the enemy’s radar radar in bays, behind islands or capes, performed rocket firing at a conventional enemy according to the CC from external sources - airplanes of the MRST-1 system, helicopters or larger ships that solved the task of lighting the air, surface and underwater conditions. For example, such a tactical method fully justified itself during the actions of RTOs in a number of areas of the Mediterranean Sea, full of islands: the enemy often “lost” RTOs and was forced to allocate an additional order of forces and means to search for them. This method can be used today, although the rapid development of foreign reconnaissance has significantly reduced its effectiveness, if not devalued at all: it is possible to find the ship with a displacement of 1000 tons of technical means that are currently in service in the developed world to hide in the bay or behind the island .
The author, of course, rightly noticed and vital, so to speak, the lack of "Gadget" - a weak air defense / missile defense. You can parry this factor only when the IRA is operated in an “ambush” way or by including ships of this type in the shipboard strike group, which will have larger surface units having powerful means of lighting the air and surface situation and long-range air defense / missile defense systems. Moreover, such ships, having a powerful hydroacoustic station (GUS) and anti-submarine weapon systems, which are not at all on the ISCs (for some reason, this significant disadvantage of the ship, which is proposed to be built by dozens, even forward destroyers, is not mentioned) Gadfly "and from the underwater threat - the worst, perhaps, today for surface ships. After all, if the means of air attack IRAs can even detect with their radar and try to destroy them, then he will not only be unable to attack the submarine, but he will not even see it. From the torpedoes ISC can try to evade in the event that the sailors find it visually. Of course, the torpedo can be detected by dropping the HAS “on the foot,” but in this case the fate of the IRAs is not at all enviable.
The lack of means of detecting and defeating enemy submarines is, perhaps, for today's war at sea, when only a lazy and terribly poor ruler did not get "underwater hunters", the main drawback of the Ovod type MRK, surpassing even its relatively weak air defense capabilities. Missile defense
Fourthly, arguing the decision to proceed with the serial construction of the ISCs in conditions where “the 20380 corvettes, which are still a novelty - as the ship class itself, which did not exist in the Soviet naval doctrine, and in terms of installed weapons, not tested on the exercises, ”the author points out:“ The decisive factor is that today compared to new projects of corvettes and to a lesser extent, fighter-bomber small rocket ships have a fully developed weapon complex. ”
Let me talk about what kind of weapons complex? About rocket complex "Malachite"? No different - in fact, the SCRC "Onyx" and "Uran" only began to more or less actively enter the fleet, and the complex "Caliber" is to be in the near future. Or is it about the OSA family "Wasp"? And what, the author proposes to continue the release of both missile systems for the new IRAs? We will put new SCRC and SAM / SARK? So they are just undergoing testing on corvettes of the Stereguschy type and frigates of the Admiral Grigorovich type (Russian modification of the 11356 project for the Indian Navy). And it’s not at all clear where the author proposes to place a UAV for reconnaissance and target designation on the already not very spacious RTC. After all, if you give an over-the-horizon target designation, then the UAV should have a very decent flight range and time in the air, and, accordingly, not particularly small weight and size characteristics. It is possible to find a place on a corvette and a frigate for such a UAV, but on an IRA ...
Fifth, the following thesis is completely incomprehensible: “An airplane cannot, like a ship, conduct long-term passive tracking of a target during a period of heightened opposition or during the invasion of a potential enemy’s ship into territorial waters.
To begin with, the period of “acute confrontation”, of course, can arise, but, perhaps, only in a specific clinic. But when a potential enemy's ship invades the territorial waters, there can be two options: if the ship made a navigational error or lost controllability, it should be helped, and if it is an outright provocation or hostile action, stop it, including with the use of weapons. Especially since the same Americans do not stand on ceremony with such threats: it seemed to the commander of the URO “Vincennes” that an enemy combat aircraft was flying at him, he immediately ordered the use of air defense systems. As a result, a passenger airliner was shot down.
On the other hand, territorial waters are far from an 200-mile exclusive economic zone, they are fully capable of covering mobile or stationary coastal missile systems of the type “Ball” with anti-ship missiles “Uran”, “Bastion” with anti-ship missiles “Onyx” or “Club-M” ”And“ Club-K ”with PKR of the“ Caliber ”family. Mobile and stationary BRC should cover all important coastal areas of our country in general, and the fact that the ship violated a potential enemy of the state border in the “not too important” area can then be assessed with a diplomatic whip. However, “long-term passive surveillance” of warships of other countries located in close proximity to the territorial waters of Russia is necessary with the help of coastal radar stations and DRLO and U aircraft. Moreover, to cover all potential offenders to cover the entire maritime border of Russia a la Yorktown is not enough for a hundred or other RTOs.
Special mention should be made of the option of using the Gadfly as a “guard” for coastal defense. This role is completely unacceptable for the ISCs because, as correctly stated in the article, the ISCs with their missile weapons are “redundant” and also because they cannot independently pursue the enemy submarines. He can still detect them “on foot” - with the help of a lowered GUS (for example, “Anapa” or “Pallas”), but to pursue them - only according to external CC. And really attack except grenades. To chase the “fattened rocket boat” after the surface violators of the state border is absolutely absurd.
The statement that with the capacity of two shipyards it is possible to build four ROCs of the “Gadfly” type per year, that is, two ROCs per year at each shipyard, is quite debatable. Such a pace of construction seems overly optimistic. For example, the same JSC "SF" Almaz "one IAC project 21630" Buyan "built the fastest two and a half years. It took the Zelenodolsk CVD to take two years to launch the head XM of the 21631 project “Buyan-M”. In the current situation, the shortage of highly professional specialists in Russian shipyards and the non-rhythmic financing of shipbuilding programs on the part of the customer, the construction of the Ovod type MRK will become almost as long-term construction as the Stereguchy type corvettes. It is time to take off the rose-colored glasses and take a sober look at the situation.
For actions in the near zone, the mentioned RTOs of the 21631 project will be enough. Yes, and serious experience on the type of "Gadfly" at the Russian shipbuilders, not counting the modernization of the Algerian units, very old. The last IRC of the 1234.1 project was transferred to the Russian Navy at the beginning of 1992. It can be assumed that the resumption of mass production will take not so little time. It is also necessary to recall how much time it took for our shipbuilders to repair and modernize the Algerian ships of the 1234 project — at least about four years. The term of work on the last ship, defined in the contract of April 2012, is 32 of the month (almost three years). Building a ship from scratch is certainly easier, but not so much.
And finally, it is completely incomprehensible, what kind of “system of interaction of old specialized ships with new ones built according to the Western model of application” is called for in the article? If those are the so-called universal ships capable of solving the tasks of fighting air, surface and submarine targets, as well as providing support to their amphibious forces, then in the domestic fleet such ships appeared more than a dozen years ago. These are the time-tested and sea-controlled EM 956 and BOD 1155.1 projects, 1144 and 1164 missile cruisers (and the same last-generation 1135 patrols) equipped with both powerful air, surface and underwater lighting and anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft systems missiles, rocket-torpedo / torpedo and rocket bomb weapons, as well as artillery complexes. How is this - earlier “old specialized ships” (apparently, such as RCA / ROC or BOD / IPC) successfully interacted with them, and now suddenly you need to create a new system?
Poverty philosophy
By and large, the main purpose of the MRC, which in Soviet times from the very beginning was conceived, if one can say so, one-time (the enemy would not have given the PCR reloading to it), can be defined as weakening enemy ship groupings by launching a missile attack on surface ships and ships , within the framework of which the “Gadflies”, combined into small shipboard strike groups (as was done in Soviet times, say, in the Mediterranean or in the Far East), could have launched missile strikes against airborne troops against and to escort ships, to be limitedly used to disrupt enemy communications, destroying ships or warships with weak air defense / missile defense, and to take part in disrupting the enemy’s efforts to build shipboard groups in closed sea theaters - for this IRA could act “from ambush” in torrential zones.
But, firstly, these tasks can be accomplished only by an “umbrella” of zonal anti-aircraft defense, organized either by “large” ships with the corresponding anti-aircraft complexes, or coast-based anti-aircraft defense. This does not allow ships to act in isolation from points of stationing or “large” ships.
Secondly, in the presence of modern BRK, having a defeat zone up to 300 kilometers and most importantly, with unique basing capabilities (the “container” RK Club-K can now be “thrown” on any island), the combat value of the RTOs is fading away . After all, BRK is also easier to protect with air defense / missile defense, and easier to reload, isn't it?
In the end, paying tribute to the wit of the shipbuilding engineers who in the shortest time created the “gun at the temple of imperialism”, as well as the courage and high skill of the sailors who gave years of service to the “Gadfly”, it is necessary to recognize the time of the ships like the 1234 RMS / 1234.1, already gone.
We must not dwell on the past, but fearlessly and confidently go into the future. However, over the past two decades, we constantly only hear from various representatives of the military-political leadership and the military and not very experts: they say, there are not enough funds, but we urgently need to plug this or that hole in the defense, and therefore let's quickly “rivet” "Of certain" time-tested "and" not very expensive "samples of weapons and military equipment, and then - when the cash flow rushes and the industry learns to work more efficiently - we will replace them with new high-tech samples.
The path is a dead end for our country and especially for the Russian Navy. Russia needs a fleet capable of operating in all zones - from coastal to ocean. It should be equipped with modern models of naval equipment and weapons. Yes, the latter should be brought to mind, train seafarers in operation and combat use, shipbuilders raise the level of technical (technological) literacy and industrial culture, and shipyards be equipped with the latest equipment. But if we do not do this, constantly postponing for later, we will never get modern shipbuilding and ocean fleet.
In this case, the fleet must be balanced. According to S.Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, “the balance of the fleet lies in the fact that all the elements that make up its combat power and the means providing them are constantly in the most advantageous combination in which the fleet can fully realize this quality , as universality, that is, the ability to perform various tasks in the conditions of both nuclear and any possible war. ”
Funds allocated for the period up to 2020, at least to create the beginnings of such a balanced fleet. In the part concerning the ship composition, the country's military-political leadership only needs to firmly determine the required number of warships and auxiliary ships and the schedule for their construction, and then firmly stick to the latter and reasonably spend money, avoiding useless and destructive "bounces" to the side. And if the question of aircraft carriers can still be postponed (especially since there is no agreement on their need for the Russian Navy even among admirals), then corvettes, frigates and destroyers need to be built first and not to invent some temporary "ersatz-ways".
Sergei Gorshkov rightly pointed out: “History provides many instructive examples when underestimating the problem of balancing the fleet or neglecting it, especially in conditions of limited economic opportunities, due to erroneous military doctrine or short-sighted foreign policy of states led to either defeat of the fleets in the war, or excessive overstrain of the economy these countries, forced during the war to eliminate the mistakes made earlier. ” To add to this, perhaps, there is nothing.
The reason for writing this material was an article by Andrei Samsonov, “Better a small missile ship in service than a destroyer in a project,” published in issue 48 of the Military-Industrial Courier weekly. Its subtitle has already shaken - “With all the wealth of choice, the alternative to“ mosquito the fleet" not yet".
Excuse me, why not? The alternative is to build a balanced Navy, and not to search for some “national ways”, invent a bicycle, or give what you wish for.
About old classes and new rockets
Let's start with some "technical excesses" that are present in the material. First, nobody created a “separate class of ships” under the appeared small rocket ships (MRCs) of the 1234 Ovod project. RTOs belonged to the class “rocket-artillery ships” adopted in the Navy of the USSR and to the subclass “small rocket ships”. At the same time at the very beginning stories "Gadfly" in the class of "rocket-artillery ships" were allocated subclasses of "small rocket ship" and "big rocket ship." The latter - the BRK - attributed the former destroyers of the 56М / ЭМ and 57-bis projects, which received anti-ship missile systems in the 60-ies of the 20th century. Then, however, in connection with the plans for the priority development of the class of anti-submarine ships of the BRK project 57-bis were converted into large anti-submarine ships (BOD).
The class “rocket-artillery ships” became our unique invention and owes its appearance to the creation by Soviet specialists of anti-ship guided missile systems. weapons ship-based. The Soviet fleet was the first in the world in this area, and therefore the indicated class and subclasses were born along with the “missile cruiser” and the “missile boat”. Later in the class of "rocket-artillery ships" appeared subclasses "heavy nuclear missile cruiser", "small missile hovercraft" and "squadron 1 rank-2", but the "big rocket ship" forever gone down in history.
Secondly, it is necessary to clarify the possibility of using the 1234 IRAs of the Malachite complex at full range. The radar complex (RLC) "Titanit" was included into the composition of the radio engineering armament of the IRAs for independent, without the aid of external sources of target designation (DC), detection of surface targets at a distance of 120 – 130 kilometers. The over-the-horizon detection range was provided in the passive mode of operation for the intercepted radiation of the electronic weapons of the surface target ship. In the mode of work with external sources of the control center - airplanes and helicopters located at an altitude up to 2000 meters, the detection range of surface targets reached 150 – 170 kilometers. You can recall this fact here. In 1973, with a full salvo on the Bure, the head MRK of the project, diesel generators failed to shake the hull, the ship was de-energized, but fulfilled its main purpose - hit three targets at a distance of about 100 kilometers.
Later, the RNC Monolith with improved characteristics was placed on the 1234.1 RTOs. The high efficiency of the latter was demonstrated during exercises held by the Kamchatka flotilla of heterogeneous forces in May 1993: the MRK was able to detect a surface target at night at a distance, as indicated, more than 100 kilometers, and deliver the target command to the missile complex. At the same time, the passive channel of the RLC is significantly less exposed to the enemy EW facilities than the active one.
Thirdly, pointing to “IRAs - a very unpretentious ship. A few floating piers, a fuel depot and an electrical network are sufficient for arranging a temporary base station. The modern strike aircraft needs a much more developed infrastructure, not to mention the fact that the airfield is the primary target for the attack, and therefore, when conducting combat operations, it is very likely that it will require frequent repairs, ”the author contradicts himself. The fact is that in the conduct of real hostilities, and not the raid of the “pirates of the 21st century,” the home base of the MRCs will also represent the primary target for the enemy.
Time gap
We also note a certain obsolescence of information on current performance characteristics discussed in the material. So, when comparing anti-ship missile systems (SCRC) of the 1234 project with foreign counterparts, the author noted the SCRK Exochet and Harpoon, but for some reason did not mention a word about the SCRK RBS 15 Mk3, which has, according to the manufacturer, firing range over 250 kilometers He is able to hit both surface and coastal targets. Versatile on the carrier - ships, aircraft and coastal missile systems. Over the past half decade, entered service with the Navy of Germany, Sweden, Poland, Finland and Croatia.
Another example is “Penguin” and “Sea Skye” as “helicopter” anti-ship missiles. In fact, in recent years, this “marte” anti-ship missile has been created and is actively being replaced by this and other old rockets, which surpasses its predecessors in a number of parameters and can also be placed on aircraft and surface ships. And the helicopter RCC’s flight range has already passed 30 kilometers and approached the 40, which allows ship-based helicopters to attack MRKs almost from its “radio horizon”.
The conclusion suggests itself - the author is either not up to date with the developments of the last five or seven years, or talked to an expert who retired around the turn of the year at 2004 – 2006. If the latter is true, then I would still like to see the words of a specialist behind his last name and with his personal assessment, and not a third person retelling.
The reader of an authoritative specialized publication, which undoubtedly is the weekly "MIC", has the right to get acquainted with the personal assessments and judgments of an experienced professional, who, of course, must be aware of the latest developments in the field of naval equipment and weapons abroad.
Their time has passed
Now - about the very class of small rocket ships and why Russia needs to stop caring about the ghosts of the past. It is necessary to engage in the systematic construction of a balanced fleet capable of solving all urgent problems. With the “mosquito fleet”, declared uncontested for Russia, this cannot be done.
Firstly, it was absolutely not necessary to compare the latest modifications of the Exocset and Harpoon missiles with the П-120 rocket since the time of the King of Peas to make the only correct one, even taking into account the possibility of equipping the “Malachite” with a special warhead, conclusion: 120 had to be decommissioned a few years ago, putting in return on the same "Gadfly" of the Onarix (Yakhont) or Uranus SCRC. This would allow and significantly increase the ammunition ready for the use of anti-ship missiles on these ships and, in the case of Onyx, expand the area of destruction of the RTOs. Why this has not been done so far is completely incomprehensible. Even the argument about the lack of funds does not go away - the re-equipment of all ISCs of the 1234 / 1234.1 project would cost the treasury cheaper than building one surface ship of the main class.
Why did we modernize the Libyan RTOs of the 1234E project, under the Uran-E SCRC, the 1234EM project, but didn’t reach our own ships?
Glorifying the excellent speed and mobility of ships of the 1234 project, somehow casually refers to mediocre seaworthiness. However, it was the latter that became one of the scourges of RTOs. The fact is that a ship of this type is actually an enlarged rocket boat and has gliding cutter hull contours that adversely affect the seaworthiness and stability of the Gadfly.
In particular, V.V. Kostrichenko and V.E. Kuzmichev in the book “The Pistol at the Temple of Imperialism. The history of the ships of the 1234 project ”with reference to the participants of the creation of the ISCs and the sailors serving on them noted:“ The ships of the “corvette” class are able to successfully cross the oceans in a brutal storm, but our ISCs cannot operate in the sea with waves over five points because overturning hazard. At medium and low passages, the interplanetary interconnected submersibles bury their noses in waves, cruel pitching on them ... At sea state, four or five points the ship became Valky, did not keep up to date with a wave from aft heading angles, which imposed a restriction on the use of the main missile complex, especially shooting volley. The departure interval of the cruise missiles reached one and a half minutes, since the ship could not lie on the combat course. A strong rolling motion limited the use of anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems. The antennas lay on the stopper, the target tracking lock was disrupted. The rolling motion caused a strong splashing of the superstructure, and at large strokes (more than 15 nodes) - strong shock waves on the body. When sailing in ice, the outboard kingstones were scored with ice chips, the cooling of the main and auxiliary engines refused, which did not allow to fully use the capabilities of the main power plant. ” These words can be trusted - Viktor Kuzmichev served on IRC for more than two decades.
A serious drawback of the Gadfly is a small supply of fuel (especially given the fact that the fuel attack mode was constantly required to maintain a rocket attack mode) and provisions. In the absence of a developed “overseas” basing system, Soviet RTOs in remote areas of the oceans had to be trivially towed by support vessels, or the crews of RTOs could use such a specific tactical technique as tracking enemy ship formations while drifting. The latter was caused not only by the fact that in this case the secrecy of ROC actions increased in some way, but also by the fact that it allowed saving the ship’s “blood” - fuel, without which it would not have been possible to solve its main purpose - to launch a rocket attack. Well, in order to eliminate interruptions in the supply of fresh provisions at the RTOs, even mini-bakeries had to be built later.
That is why the most successful way to use the “Gadflys” in the Soviet fleet was to operate in coastal zones from an ambush, when ROCs “on foot”, hiding from the enemy’s radar radar in bays, behind islands or capes, performed rocket firing at a conventional enemy according to the CC from external sources - airplanes of the MRST-1 system, helicopters or larger ships that solved the task of lighting the air, surface and underwater conditions. For example, such a tactical method fully justified itself during the actions of RTOs in a number of areas of the Mediterranean Sea, full of islands: the enemy often “lost” RTOs and was forced to allocate an additional order of forces and means to search for them. This method can be used today, although the rapid development of foreign reconnaissance has significantly reduced its effectiveness, if not devalued at all: it is possible to find the ship with a displacement of 1000 tons of technical means that are currently in service in the developed world to hide in the bay or behind the island .
The author, of course, rightly noticed and vital, so to speak, the lack of "Gadget" - a weak air defense / missile defense. You can parry this factor only when the IRA is operated in an “ambush” way or by including ships of this type in the shipboard strike group, which will have larger surface units having powerful means of lighting the air and surface situation and long-range air defense / missile defense systems. Moreover, such ships, having a powerful hydroacoustic station (GUS) and anti-submarine weapon systems, which are not at all on the ISCs (for some reason, this significant disadvantage of the ship, which is proposed to be built by dozens, even forward destroyers, is not mentioned) Gadfly "and from the underwater threat - the worst, perhaps, today for surface ships. After all, if the means of air attack IRAs can even detect with their radar and try to destroy them, then he will not only be unable to attack the submarine, but he will not even see it. From the torpedoes ISC can try to evade in the event that the sailors find it visually. Of course, the torpedo can be detected by dropping the HAS “on the foot,” but in this case the fate of the IRAs is not at all enviable.
The lack of means of detecting and defeating enemy submarines is, perhaps, for today's war at sea, when only a lazy and terribly poor ruler did not get "underwater hunters", the main drawback of the Ovod type MRK, surpassing even its relatively weak air defense capabilities. Missile defense
Fourthly, arguing the decision to proceed with the serial construction of the ISCs in conditions where “the 20380 corvettes, which are still a novelty - as the ship class itself, which did not exist in the Soviet naval doctrine, and in terms of installed weapons, not tested on the exercises, ”the author points out:“ The decisive factor is that today compared to new projects of corvettes and to a lesser extent, fighter-bomber small rocket ships have a fully developed weapon complex. ”
Let me talk about what kind of weapons complex? About rocket complex "Malachite"? No different - in fact, the SCRC "Onyx" and "Uran" only began to more or less actively enter the fleet, and the complex "Caliber" is to be in the near future. Or is it about the OSA family "Wasp"? And what, the author proposes to continue the release of both missile systems for the new IRAs? We will put new SCRC and SAM / SARK? So they are just undergoing testing on corvettes of the Stereguschy type and frigates of the Admiral Grigorovich type (Russian modification of the 11356 project for the Indian Navy). And it’s not at all clear where the author proposes to place a UAV for reconnaissance and target designation on the already not very spacious RTC. After all, if you give an over-the-horizon target designation, then the UAV should have a very decent flight range and time in the air, and, accordingly, not particularly small weight and size characteristics. It is possible to find a place on a corvette and a frigate for such a UAV, but on an IRA ...
Fifth, the following thesis is completely incomprehensible: “An airplane cannot, like a ship, conduct long-term passive tracking of a target during a period of heightened opposition or during the invasion of a potential enemy’s ship into territorial waters.
To begin with, the period of “acute confrontation”, of course, can arise, but, perhaps, only in a specific clinic. But when a potential enemy's ship invades the territorial waters, there can be two options: if the ship made a navigational error or lost controllability, it should be helped, and if it is an outright provocation or hostile action, stop it, including with the use of weapons. Especially since the same Americans do not stand on ceremony with such threats: it seemed to the commander of the URO “Vincennes” that an enemy combat aircraft was flying at him, he immediately ordered the use of air defense systems. As a result, a passenger airliner was shot down.
On the other hand, territorial waters are far from an 200-mile exclusive economic zone, they are fully capable of covering mobile or stationary coastal missile systems of the type “Ball” with anti-ship missiles “Uran”, “Bastion” with anti-ship missiles “Onyx” or “Club-M” ”And“ Club-K ”with PKR of the“ Caliber ”family. Mobile and stationary BRC should cover all important coastal areas of our country in general, and the fact that the ship violated a potential enemy of the state border in the “not too important” area can then be assessed with a diplomatic whip. However, “long-term passive surveillance” of warships of other countries located in close proximity to the territorial waters of Russia is necessary with the help of coastal radar stations and DRLO and U aircraft. Moreover, to cover all potential offenders to cover the entire maritime border of Russia a la Yorktown is not enough for a hundred or other RTOs.
Special mention should be made of the option of using the Gadfly as a “guard” for coastal defense. This role is completely unacceptable for the ISCs because, as correctly stated in the article, the ISCs with their missile weapons are “redundant” and also because they cannot independently pursue the enemy submarines. He can still detect them “on foot” - with the help of a lowered GUS (for example, “Anapa” or “Pallas”), but to pursue them - only according to external CC. And really attack except grenades. To chase the “fattened rocket boat” after the surface violators of the state border is absolutely absurd.
The statement that with the capacity of two shipyards it is possible to build four ROCs of the “Gadfly” type per year, that is, two ROCs per year at each shipyard, is quite debatable. Such a pace of construction seems overly optimistic. For example, the same JSC "SF" Almaz "one IAC project 21630" Buyan "built the fastest two and a half years. It took the Zelenodolsk CVD to take two years to launch the head XM of the 21631 project “Buyan-M”. In the current situation, the shortage of highly professional specialists in Russian shipyards and the non-rhythmic financing of shipbuilding programs on the part of the customer, the construction of the Ovod type MRK will become almost as long-term construction as the Stereguchy type corvettes. It is time to take off the rose-colored glasses and take a sober look at the situation.
For actions in the near zone, the mentioned RTOs of the 21631 project will be enough. Yes, and serious experience on the type of "Gadfly" at the Russian shipbuilders, not counting the modernization of the Algerian units, very old. The last IRC of the 1234.1 project was transferred to the Russian Navy at the beginning of 1992. It can be assumed that the resumption of mass production will take not so little time. It is also necessary to recall how much time it took for our shipbuilders to repair and modernize the Algerian ships of the 1234 project — at least about four years. The term of work on the last ship, defined in the contract of April 2012, is 32 of the month (almost three years). Building a ship from scratch is certainly easier, but not so much.
And finally, it is completely incomprehensible, what kind of “system of interaction of old specialized ships with new ones built according to the Western model of application” is called for in the article? If those are the so-called universal ships capable of solving the tasks of fighting air, surface and submarine targets, as well as providing support to their amphibious forces, then in the domestic fleet such ships appeared more than a dozen years ago. These are the time-tested and sea-controlled EM 956 and BOD 1155.1 projects, 1144 and 1164 missile cruisers (and the same last-generation 1135 patrols) equipped with both powerful air, surface and underwater lighting and anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft systems missiles, rocket-torpedo / torpedo and rocket bomb weapons, as well as artillery complexes. How is this - earlier “old specialized ships” (apparently, such as RCA / ROC or BOD / IPC) successfully interacted with them, and now suddenly you need to create a new system?
Poverty philosophy
By and large, the main purpose of the MRC, which in Soviet times from the very beginning was conceived, if one can say so, one-time (the enemy would not have given the PCR reloading to it), can be defined as weakening enemy ship groupings by launching a missile attack on surface ships and ships , within the framework of which the “Gadflies”, combined into small shipboard strike groups (as was done in Soviet times, say, in the Mediterranean or in the Far East), could have launched missile strikes against airborne troops against and to escort ships, to be limitedly used to disrupt enemy communications, destroying ships or warships with weak air defense / missile defense, and to take part in disrupting the enemy’s efforts to build shipboard groups in closed sea theaters - for this IRA could act “from ambush” in torrential zones.
But, firstly, these tasks can be accomplished only by an “umbrella” of zonal anti-aircraft defense, organized either by “large” ships with the corresponding anti-aircraft complexes, or coast-based anti-aircraft defense. This does not allow ships to act in isolation from points of stationing or “large” ships.
Secondly, in the presence of modern BRK, having a defeat zone up to 300 kilometers and most importantly, with unique basing capabilities (the “container” RK Club-K can now be “thrown” on any island), the combat value of the RTOs is fading away . After all, BRK is also easier to protect with air defense / missile defense, and easier to reload, isn't it?
In the end, paying tribute to the wit of the shipbuilding engineers who in the shortest time created the “gun at the temple of imperialism”, as well as the courage and high skill of the sailors who gave years of service to the “Gadfly”, it is necessary to recognize the time of the ships like the 1234 RMS / 1234.1, already gone.
We must not dwell on the past, but fearlessly and confidently go into the future. However, over the past two decades, we constantly only hear from various representatives of the military-political leadership and the military and not very experts: they say, there are not enough funds, but we urgently need to plug this or that hole in the defense, and therefore let's quickly “rivet” "Of certain" time-tested "and" not very expensive "samples of weapons and military equipment, and then - when the cash flow rushes and the industry learns to work more efficiently - we will replace them with new high-tech samples.
The path is a dead end for our country and especially for the Russian Navy. Russia needs a fleet capable of operating in all zones - from coastal to ocean. It should be equipped with modern models of naval equipment and weapons. Yes, the latter should be brought to mind, train seafarers in operation and combat use, shipbuilders raise the level of technical (technological) literacy and industrial culture, and shipyards be equipped with the latest equipment. But if we do not do this, constantly postponing for later, we will never get modern shipbuilding and ocean fleet.
In this case, the fleet must be balanced. According to S.Gorshkov, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, “the balance of the fleet lies in the fact that all the elements that make up its combat power and the means providing them are constantly in the most advantageous combination in which the fleet can fully realize this quality , as universality, that is, the ability to perform various tasks in the conditions of both nuclear and any possible war. ”
Funds allocated for the period up to 2020, at least to create the beginnings of such a balanced fleet. In the part concerning the ship composition, the country's military-political leadership only needs to firmly determine the required number of warships and auxiliary ships and the schedule for their construction, and then firmly stick to the latter and reasonably spend money, avoiding useless and destructive "bounces" to the side. And if the question of aircraft carriers can still be postponed (especially since there is no agreement on their need for the Russian Navy even among admirals), then corvettes, frigates and destroyers need to be built first and not to invent some temporary "ersatz-ways".
Sergei Gorshkov rightly pointed out: “History provides many instructive examples when underestimating the problem of balancing the fleet or neglecting it, especially in conditions of limited economic opportunities, due to erroneous military doctrine or short-sighted foreign policy of states led to either defeat of the fleets in the war, or excessive overstrain of the economy these countries, forced during the war to eliminate the mistakes made earlier. ” To add to this, perhaps, there is nothing.
Information