Military Review

Arab revolt in the Syrian Trans-Euphrates

Arab revolt in the Syrian Trans-Euphrates

The summer of 2023 brought not only the intensification of hostilities in the Ukrainian direction - in the Middle East, forces also began to move at some key points. For us, of course, today it is quite difficult to switch our attention to seemingly third-party contradictions, but the problem is that we, one way or another, have already been involved in them before.

And if Sudan or Libya are secondary directions for us, Central Africa is rather an optional direction for the time being, then Syria is the node where we have taken and still take direct participation at the state level. Issues related to Syria are largely tied to Russian-Turkish relations, relations with Arab countries, and Iran.

In a recent article Syrian protests and US strategy in Lebanon the problems of Syrian protests were considered in the context of the US policy of establishing control over “grassroots” financial flows.

It is carried out within the framework of the strategy of separating the Syrian and Iranian financial system from the possibilities of dollar replenishment from Lebanon and Iraq. But, firstly, the general strategy of Washington is not limited to this, and secondly, other players in the region have their own vision of the future and their own projects.

It is now again necessary to consider the current problems in the Middle East “as a whole”, the confrontation, after a certain pause, has again reached the level of competition of projects and concepts. Again, throughout the region, problems like gears cling to each other with teeth. Those players who can use this mechanism properly will receive a strategic advantage.

The trend towards a general normalization of relations in the region only partly coincides with the new US strategy. For example, the synergy of the efforts of regional players in the Syrian direction is not included in this strategy at all.

Having taken an active position in Syria this summer, the United States decided in this way to stop the consequences of normalization along the Iran-Saudi Arabia line, where, partly in response to concessions on Yemen, Riyadh, albeit without much desire, was supposed to help withdraw the tribal confederations of the Syrian Trans-Euphrates region from under the direct control of pro-American formations, at the same time not preventing Damascus from conducting targeted operations in Idlib.

Thus, the ground was created for the subsequent integration of southeastern Syria with the rest of the country. There was no talk about the specifics of such integration, and so far there is no talk - a base must be created that can already be developed and built up within the same League of Arab States.

Trans-Euphrates is oil-bearing fields - the basis of the well-being of Syria. By world standards, black gold reserves there are less than one percent, but specifically for Syria, this is a real economic basis.

Today, these oil fields, as well as the infrastructure for production and processing, are controlled by a kind of conglomerate of the forces of the SDF (Kurdish, Assyrian and Arab formations of the so-called "Northern Syria Federation"), militias of local tribal unions, eight of which, like Baggara and Shammar , are large, and armed groups that are in many ways outright gangs under a common umbrella brand - "Kasad detachments".

If the SDF (the so-called "Syrian Democratic Forces") are formations officially recognized by the US and the EU, which are allocated equipment, weapons, special equipment. funds, training and informational support is provided, then Kasad is completely frank "Ushkuyniki of Trans-Euphrates". This is a hodgepodge of armed individuals of all kinds. If the SDF controls the north more, then the Kasadans control the territories from Rakka and south along the left bank of the river. The Euphrates, which includes oil fields and southern passages to Iraq.

Kasad is outright smuggling and just banditry, on the basis of which they have constant friction with the SDF and local tribal communities, and periodically clashes. This is being resolved through various councils and meetings, but the problem does not go away. Kidnappings for ransom, restrictions on the passage of caravans, price gouging are normal practices.

In Syria, they are simply considered a terrorist formation without any "equivocals" (although this is more a network of different cells), and this is not far from the truth, since some of these forces are often simply former members of local ISIS cells (banned in the Russian Federation), at one time they even controlled the infamous Al-Khol base, where the remnants of this former "black international" are still kept. Covering all this (and there is no other way to call it) the US military contingent, which is stationed at military bases and oil refineries, and the overall political leadership on the ground is based on the consensus of the military councils of the tribes and the SDF.

Traditionally, the Arabs blame the SDF for helping these formations, they nod in the direction of the local Arabs. For obvious reasons, there are no “saints” among the former or the latter; in the conditions of that “international oil trade” it cannot be any other way. The SDF constantly puts forward theses about the Arabs feeding local ISIS cells; the Arabs point to the chaos that is already happening among the armed groups that fly the official flags. The origins of the problem are ways of selling and making money from the sale of oil, petroleum products, tools and equipment, weapons, as well as substances that are not very beneficial to health.

At the end of August, periodic skirmishes common for this area led to an almost full-fledged uprising of part of the Arab tribal communities of Zaevfratya, which surpassed even the clashes in 2019 in strength. Moreover, in the same areas - settlements around Mayadin and Deir es-Zor. In 2019, the locals who came out to protest were partly dispersed, partly shot, the infrastructure was destroyed and burned. They looked for (and found) dissatisfied people in other provinces to the north. In general, not all local Arabs are ready to give recruits to these formations, which is another reason for dissatisfaction, in addition to infringement of financial interests.

However, now things have come to the point that the heavy artillery weapons that the SDF has at its disposal (up to the Grad MLRS) have already been used, since the uprising has not only swept the southern villages, but also led to the expulsion of these Kasad forces and officials from SDF from cities.

The list of settlements from which the SDF and Kasad detachments were squeezed out is already several dozen, including the town of Baguz, which at one time became famous, where at one time they surrounded, finished off and eventually captured the remnants of ISIS along with family members (then moving the survivors to Al -Hol). In the same part of geography is located. the village of Hisham, known for the unsuccessful campaign of Wagner PMC and Syrian formations across the Euphrates.

It all started with the dismissal and detention of the leader of the Military Council of Deir es-Zor, A. Abu Khawla (Ahmed Habil), by the SDF and Kasadovites. The military council is just for the most part a local tribal militia. Then there was a series of ultimatums from tribal elders, the ultimatums eventually escalated into hostilities, which today, in fact, take place around the main oil fields and oil production facilities, including the “Omar fields” known even in Russia. Almost all local communities in the south have announced a call for volunteers, the SDF, in turn, is blocking roads and bringing in reinforcements from Manbij and Raqqa.

The Americans increased the military contingent in the summer, but the problem is that the entire political structure that is built in this region, in fact, is based on the legitimacy of such military and civilian Councils. These are, in essence, conglomerates of self-governing communities. It is clear that there is also an analogue of the power vertical, and a very peculiar and ideological one at that (the so-called “TEV-DEM system, which is mistakenly called “Kurdish”), but formally the basis of territorial administration is local councils: city, town, district. And today it is the local councils that have rebelled.

If official Syrian troops or pro-Iranian formations were directly involved there, it would be easier for the United States to stop the problem by force, but the fact of the matter is that the uprising is taking place within the framework of a built-in system. But now, from the same system, there are calls for American forces to gradually gather "out."

Friction between the ideologized elite of the so-called. "Federations of Northern Syria" and Arab tribal confederations occurred constantly. The ideas of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, on the one hand, are completely free of any national Kurdish narratives; the current PKK and its civilian version PYD (PYD) is an international association where the Kurds are simply represented in greater numbers due to the territory in which this movement lives, as well as historical reasons related to traditional anti-Turkish policies.

But in reality, it is precisely the forces and politicians who previously defended the Kurdish national identity in front of official Damascus, over the years, squeezed out of the region, as they say, "to the ends" to Iraqi Kurdistan and the EU. Moreover, they were squeezed out very harshly, through political purges. Some features of this political model can be found in the April material on Military Review Last pillars of the Syrian war.

Why has the balance in the Trans-Euphrates region been maintained under the US umbrella for almost five years since the end of the “hot phase” of the Syrian campaign in terms of access to official Damascus on the Euphrates and the south-eastern border, but now it has been so sharply disrupted? After all, the activity of all players there has decreased.

Here it is appropriate to quote a paragraph from the author’s past work:

“Saudi Arabia may stop supporting the tribes that sit in the oil fields on the left bank of the Euphrates River. Saudi Arabia should change its position, taking into account the fact that today all former opponents are going towards normalization with Damascus, and the cards are being turned over. If the tribal sheikhs decide that they have enough guarantees and benefits, and the Arabians are the guarantor, then the Americans in Syria have no room for maneuver at all, and the Workers Party loses its sources of income. The reconfiguration in the south will inevitably cause a backlash in the Arab settlements.”

In Russia, assessments often overlook the fact that the Arab Middle East is a kind of intertwining cells of tribal confederations - they are often scattered across the region in “spots” that reflect very old migration processes. One community can live in Iraq, and in Saudi Arabia, in Syria, Jordan. In Yemen, each of them still has its own "historical base".

The factor of such interaction should not be overestimated and made decisive in everything, but in such threshold processes as those that are taking place today on the left bank of the river. Euphrates, they have a very significant weight. After all, it is necessary to conduct trade business in the conditions of the specifics of the local monetary system based on close partners in countries like Saudi Arabia. Approaches on the shores of the Persian Gulf have changed - it was reflected on the Euphrates.

On September 2, another tribal confederation, Jabbur, opposed the SDF, and its leader Nawaf al-Muslat stated:

“The Arabs in Al Jazeera are not ISIS or gangsters. They did not attract foreign fighters and did not carry out foreign programs.”

"This is not a war against our Kurdish brothers, and we have strong ties to Kurdish tribes through religion, neighborhood and blood."

He called the actions carried out by the SDF just an outright war, which

"is no longer waged against an individual or council, but rather against the entire Arab tribal component."

(source: Al Mayadeen)

Al-Jazeera is the common name for the territories of the northern province (governorate) of Syria, Al-Hasakah. The conflict is rapidly moving north from the southern towns of the deserted Deir es-Zor.

It is very characteristic that N. Al-Muslat clearly distances himself from the SDF, foreign influence programs (USA), emphasizes the pan-Arab narrative (and he is the leader of not only the local community, but the entire Jabbur confederation in the Middle East), emphasizes the difference between national Kurdish interests and political systems of Northern Syria.

He also mentions that the situation cannot be tolerated further, since the violations of the Self-Defense Forces in the eastern regions have gone beyond the personal dispute with Ahmed Al-Habil and the Military Council in Deir Ezzor, and also explicitly states that the SDF bases are in Sinjar and Qandil Mountains, that is, these are the bases of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and the SDF officially distances itself from the PKK.

This is the most acute crisis in the Trans-Euphrates region in recent times, and it is not surprising that Turkey immediately reacted and opened border crossings, supporting its proxy formations from the so-called. Syrian national (free) army, which immediately became more active in the Manbij area.

Russia has so far supported the operations of B. Assad’s forces in Idlib, and partially stopped the activity of pro-Turkish formations in the area of ​​the same Manbij, which, apparently, was connected with the second part of the program of H. Fidan’s visit to Russia, in addition to the grain initiative.

Intervene directly in the situation for the river. Neither official Damascus nor Moscow is in a hurry to reach the Euphrates yet, which is partly logical - direct intervention so far would only violate the Arab consensus, which is always very shaky. On the other hand, it would be very short-sighted not to take advantage of such a chance, and it would be nice to transfer the Arabs from the left bank of the river through certain channels. Euphrates additional funds, as well as intensify all diplomatic channels to work with these tribal confederations in the Middle East as a whole. This will help the Iranian efforts. This must be done, since interception of the initiative here is traditionally possible on the part of special forces. services of Qatar, which in such moments acts synergistically with Turkish interests. Directly addressing Riyadh here is also not possible, since the normalization trend is going directly between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The situation in the Trans-Euphrates shows, along with troubled nodes in Lebanon, financial problems and protests in central Syria, that the kaleidoscope has turned and the political pattern in the region has begun to change. That is, the players’ new strategies have started working.

For the United States, this is a serious stone in their idea of ​​dividing the region into two clusters: someone else's - "Iranian" and their own - "Indo-Arabian", but for other players, especially Syria, there are good chances to create a base for the return of much-needed raw materials territories . Having won one round in terms of financial restrictions on opponents in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, the United States runs the risk of greatly “sinking” already in terms of supporting the Arabs of the Trans-Euphrates region.
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  1. antivirus
    antivirus 5 September 2023 04: 21
    So the Afghan lived. For a long time. The 40th army, then, as now in Syria, is part of the layouts and stirrings under the carpet. Or bulldogs squabbling under the carpet? And who is the USA? - cats or cockroaches? Maybe the owners of the carpet?
    And how are rf numbers?
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      5 September 2023 11: 33
      Rather, here, as elsewhere, however, several participants play an analogue of "Reversi" - there was such a board game - the British analogue of the game Go. By the way, quite entertaining in terms of ideas.
  2. parusnik
    parusnik 5 September 2023 05: 39
    but for other players, especially Syria, there is a good chance of creating a base for the return of much-needed raw material territories.
    Will Assad be able to use this chance?
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      5 September 2023 11: 01
      As there was in the song "Chance - he is not a payday, not an advance." See how they use it. Remember the story of Wagner in Hisham? Then the Syrians agreed with one of the tribal confederations that they would be allowed into the oil fields. Wagner was brought in and moved quickly and in silence. These local negotiations were leaked to the Americans who led this operation, and at the time of deployment after the crossing, the detachments were covered. Here, everything is according to the classics - "More carefully, more carefully"
  3. kor1vet1974
    kor1vet1974 5 September 2023 08: 17
    The United States runs the risk of a strong “sink” already in terms of supporting the Arabs of the Trans-Euphrates.
    Yes, they take risks, but apparently this risk is somehow justified.
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      5 September 2023 10: 56
      Well, the States "felt" that such scenarios were possible, otherwise why multiply the military contingent in that area. Now they will organize negotiations, which they have already announced, well, McGurk is going to Saudi Arabia. Formally, he is going to discuss the Palestinian issue, but Syria is also on the agenda there. Which side will be able to use the window of opportunity will be seen soon.
      1. kor1vet1974
        kor1vet1974 5 September 2023 11: 54
        Which side will be able to use the window of opportunity will be seen soon.
        Those. how it will develop is not yet clear and can only be assumed.
        1. nikolaevskiy78
          5 September 2023 12: 16
          No, not clear.
          But something else is clear - this opportunity opens up along with a change in the general approaches of regional players. So, unlike the period when Wagner went to Hisham, this opportunity will not be one-time, but it will be possible to pump it systematically. It's not that small.
          1. Old Michael
            Old Michael 5 September 2023 12: 50
            Hello Michael!

            the opportunity will not be one-time, but it will be possible to pump it systemically. This is not so little.

            Yes, this is significant.
            Is the direction of “pumping” clear and obvious? Looks like no. That same “fragile Arab consensus” - where will it go from inaccurate pumping?
            And even if you try to draw perspectives with very rough strokes, it turns out something like this. One of the most acute destabilizing factors is the presence of US troops. But if they leave, like from Afghanistan, then problems will immediately begin for the Kurds, Erdogan will pinch them in every possible way, and Assad is unlikely to greatly interfere with this. And the Kurds, whatever one may say, have made their contribution to the fight against ISIS and have the right to have their interests not ignored. And vice versa, if Turkey begins to curtail its Syrian adventures, the pro-Turkish formations will become sad, which is fraught with banal banditry along the entire northern border of Syria. Well, etc.
            That is, in addition to the “Arab consensus,” it is necessary to form some kind of “Syrian consensus” that takes into account the interests of the Syrian state, tribal conglomerates, and Kurds. Of course, we cannot forget about the interests of Iran. Will Iraq like this trend? Israel definitely won't like it.

            PS Thank you for another interesting post: as always, good food for thought.
            1. nikolaevskiy78
              5 September 2023 13: 02
              Thank you for rating hi
              In general, in such things it is very important not to miss the conceptual thread. I understand that our people are already somewhat tired of such terms as "geopolitics", "project", "concept". However, it is precisely such things that are at the heart of major changes - the goal setting of the players, from which they move on. It is necessary to understand who has such a vision and who does not, who has come forward and who is going with the flow.

              Then, you need to feel the "context". Here, for example, everything related to Northern Syria is referred to on TV and talk shows as "Kurds", and this is a mistake - all Kurdish activists with theses about a national state and identity were squeezed out of there. From here it is concluded that "it is necessary to cooperate with the Kurds", only they are not Kurds, but the PKK and PYD under the US umbrella, therefore they do not have adequate political ties with Iraqi Kurdistan, although PKK cells operate everywhere, from Qandil to Sulaimaniyah. In general, a topic for one more material for an article at least smile
    2. alystan
      alystan 5 September 2023 12: 36
      Justified of course. They don't want to leave for obvious reasons.
      But there, in addition to the United States, the influence of neighbors from all sides is not weak.
      The Turks will not calm down in any way, they all want to snatch something somewhere - the western and northern provinces of Syria, as well as Iraqi Kirkuk - and all under the "plausible pretext of protecting themselves from the claims of the Kurdish separatists. He would not mind doing the same against the Iranian Kurds , but there the alignment is not entirely successful. Therefore, the Glavturok is inciting "fraternal" Azerbaijan to confront the evil Iran. Then Israel came to their aid in time for them, what you just can’t do when it comes to at least somehow annoying your main implacable enemy.
      Who knows how things will turn out in the future. Maybe after establishing relations with the Arabs, Iran will reconsider its views on Israel? Although this is from the realm of unrealizable fantasy. But you can’t say never, Israel, despite all its internal strife and problems, is slowly opening its embassies everywhere - a week ago they wrote about all the republics of Cf. Asia, and yesterday Minister Indel of Israel arrived at the opening of the embassy of the Jewish state in Bahrain. Well, who would have thought of this even relatively recently. Even the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Libya (its pro-Western part) fell into their trap, she was fired, serious passions raged in the country for several days, the Prime Minister temporarily undertook to play the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs (this is his third ministerial portfolio). And yesterday a serious thunder struck already in his regard - the fact of his personal meeting in Qatar with the head of the Mossad surfaced. The anti-Israeli Arabs will not forgive him for this. In Libya itself, for sure.
      1. nikolaevskiy78
        5 September 2023 12: 46
        Yes, the scandal in Libya is such that they have been talking and writing about it for a week in the region. Even the theme of the Palestinian speeches, Janina, etc. faded into the background in the media. The Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs is of course a beauty, there is nothing to say - in a region where all the players are involved, you can go on such a “tour” without telling anyone anything. And this is precisely at the moment when the United States, Israel and the Saudis are moving towards some kind of agreement, a teaspoon per hour. It is possible that this is just a diversion from opponents of such an agreement.
        1. alystan
          alystan 5 September 2023 13: 19
          The beauty hid the fact of the meeting with the Minister of Indel of Israel. It was he who "for joy or as a specialist" published information about this.
          This beauty, as it became known a year or two ago by her own admission, is married to a cousin of the current head of the Tripoli government, which for four years already has no legal basis to be one.
          This government was given a mandate (?) by the West for 2 or 3 years.
          Now the prime minister himself has got himself so involved ...
  4. runway-1
    runway-1 5 September 2023 20: 17
    If I correctly understood the article and other sources, the Syrian government still does not control the entire territory of the country and the events taking place in reality do not contribute to this.
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      5 September 2023 20: 29
      The Syrian war, which is essentially a massacre, ended in its active phase in 2019. Northern Syria remained partially outside the control of Damascus. In general, in detail, if you are interested, you can make a separate material, I worked with the region and many issues can be covered. If it’s not difficult, you can formulate what is interesting and not clear, I will compile the answers in the article.
      1. runway-1
        runway-1 6 September 2023 20: 53
        The question is who (and with whose support) controls the various territories of the country and in what direction the situation is developing...
        1. nikolaevskiy78
          6 September 2023 20: 56
          I have already started a dialogue with the reader below. I am already completely confident that it is necessary to make a large review material specifically on the Kurdish-Syrian issues. I will take my old articles and update many things. I think that I will give answers to the questions you specified.
  5. springrain
    springrain 6 September 2023 14: 54
    1. There is no group "Kasad" - this is the term used by propagandists in Damascus to refer to Kurdish groups in order to emphasize their alienation to the "indigenous population" of the country.
    Here, for example, is an infographic on the structure of SDF.
    2. Beyond the Euphrates is controlled by the Military Council of Deir ez-Zor, which is almost entirely composed of Arabs (including the leadership). So there is no "liberation struggle" of the Arabs there - there is a redistribution of spheres of influence with the active participation of Turkish and Iranian intelligence services.
    3. The transfer of weapons to the local Bedouins, the possibility of which the author points out, never stopped. And it often led to the fact that these weapons fired not only at the Kurds, but also at the SAA soldiers. The latest attacks in the desert are proof of this.
    4. It is naive to count on the loyalty of the local tribes, which changed sides several times. And their "loyalty" to Damascus will depend solely on the percentage received from smuggling.
    5. Saudi Arabia does not help reintegration because it expects Mr. Assad to fulfill his earlier commitments to political normalization in the country. The latter does not at all consider that he should keep his word.
    6. At this stage, participation in a new round of confrontation will not bring Russia any benefit, but a lot of resources may be required. Especially if the Turks decide to carry out a large-scale attack with the help of their proxies.
    1. nikolaevskiy78
      6 September 2023 19: 08
      I had a lot of dialogues with representatives and fans of the PKK. And also from the opposite side. In past years, PKK fans used to write to my materials that I was almost hired from Erbil. The materials were good and informative not only for the Russian, but also for the Kurdish reader, which you actually did not like. Therefore, I prefer not to expand the answer point by point, although I usually do this in detail, as readers know.

      Assad is doing the right thing. It is useless to conduct business and dialogues with supporters of this sect.
      1. springrain
        springrain 6 September 2023 19: 25
        This, in my opinion, is Kurdish national entertainment - to accuse opponents of working for the collapse of the national movement.
        PKK blame Erbil, Erbil blame Sulaymaniyah. It even spreads to the Internet.
        On the previously existing site of Riataz, Mr. Adzhoev was ready to erase from the face of the earth everyone who does not share the side of the Barzani clan. And which of them is considered a sect?

        What is Assad doing right? In that completely "scored" on economic recovery? That he agreed with the transformation of his country into the largest drug hub, comparable to Afghanistan? That it completely ignores the interests of the non-Arab population?
        A completely incapacitated ruler who only survives with foreign military support.
        1. nikolaevskiy78
          6 September 2023 19: 33
          What “national Kurdish interests” is the PKK promoting?
          M. Adzhoev, I agree, is quite emotional. What, are the other authors there “sectarians”? Aza Avdali for example. The PKK is distinguished by its peremptory nature and absolute inability to negotiate, which is naturally transmitted to the PDS and the entire TEV-DEM system. In this regard, it was always clear that it was only possible to negotiate and generally condemn anything with Erbil and its creatures in Syria while they were there. So what if they criticized Damascus in the harshest terms? This is politics. It’s just that for the domestic reader these nuances are somewhat distant.
          1. springrain
            springrain 6 September 2023 20: 13
            1. There are no questions at all for Aza Avdali. But moderate assessments like hers are rather rare.
            2. You are right that the PYD and TEV-DEM are not entirely about Kurdish interests. But the alternative now looks very pale. The KNU is a structure created with the support of Turkey precisely in order to seize the initiative from the PKK and PYD. Consists of a bunch of small parties that have no significant influence.
            3. KDP, of course, should not be written off right away. But first they need to restore order in Iraqi Kurdistan. And now the 5th year of military reform has begun, and there has been no unified armed forces in the region.
            As a result, Sulaymaniyah remains an alternative center.
            You can also remember the 2017 referendum, when, as Hashd al-Shaabi approached, only the PKK tried to fight back, and the units received by the KDP and PUK immediately fled. Was this really the defense of national interests?
            4. The PKK and their structures are not saints at all. However, they managed to do one very important thing - they began to teach in Kurdish. In the same Kobane, a university has opened that deals with this
            5. If Russia believes that the PKK and the PDS are non-negotiable structures and cannot be worked with, ok. This means we need to find those who are dissatisfied with the PKK and help them create an alternative. But this requires systematic work, which is not actually being done.
            6. The Trans-Euphrates region is strategically important. If you plan to stay in the Middle East for any length of time, you will also have to take care of the Kurdish issue.
            1. nikolaevskiy78
              6 September 2023 20: 35
              I was invited to be an observer at the referendum. I then wrote before the vote that any PKK cells at this time should either be limited or simply removed from the KRG. Their role in the confrontation around Kirkuk is so specific that it will require separate material. Actually, like the special operation of K. Soleimani itself in Sulaymaniyah, sorry for the forced tautology.

              I think it makes sense to release a separate large material on the topic of Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan, somewhere taking articles from past years from the archive, somewhere updating sources and coverage. That's where we can discuss it. Because it is possible to respond to your comments, at first I thought that you would write in the style of the RPK people, but you don’t do this, honor and praise, however, the answers all need to be supported and it will turn out that the comments in volume will almost become a separate article. I will try not to delay it, especially since in preparation an article about Iraq and the topic of the KRG + current Syria will be included as an organic addition.
              1. springrain
                springrain 6 September 2023 21: 07
                It would be very interesting to read materials on the topics you have outlined. Especially if there was an opportunity to look at the processes from the inside.
                The situation when comments develop into an article is, in principle, a normal phenomenon. On this site as well)
                It would be interesting to also try to analyze what opportunities and prospects the Russian Federation has in “Greater Kurdistan” as a whole, and how to work with it.
                1. nikolaevskiy78
                  6 September 2023 21: 13
                  Yes, I update materials from 17th-18th.
                  As for the prospects, well, what can I say - they don’t exist yet, because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not involved in this area “at all.” At all. There are no specialists, no theorists, no practitioners. In principle, I have always said that the Middle East should not be dealt with by orientalists in civilian clothes, but by traders and businessmen. What's the point of coming up with empty concepts if first you need to sell 5 liters of oil there and get money for it. A bag of flour, a bag of chickpeas, etc.
                  Russia could simply take the lead there in one move if it opened a large ophthalmology clinic somewhere in Yazidi Sinjar. Does anyone know about this, did someone hear from the Foreign Ministry? Come on. What if there are three clinics - in Hasakah, Damascus and Sinjar?

                  Our trade representatives there are useless. This is generally a nonsense topic. Of course, against this backdrop, the United States and France are outsmarting us there.
                  1. springrain
                    springrain 6 September 2023 21: 38
                    You just touched on another important topic. The situation with medical institutions on both sides of the Euphrates is “dire” (with the possible exception of Damascus). Problems with both medications and equipment.
                    I have observed Kurdish groups on social media from time to time.
                    So for local residents, both Kurds and Arabs, every restored hospital is a great event of which they are proud.
                    Whoever “organizes” medicine will have considerable influence.
                    So far the equipment is mainly European, partly Chinese. As I understand it, it is delivered through Iraqi Kurdistan.
                    1. nikolaevskiy78
                      6 September 2023 21: 47
                      Not only medicine, but also things like mobile distillation units. Almost the entire region runs on generators. I’ve suggested a hundred times, let’s give a program for mobile container installations. Silence. And what is the installation - two trailers. Novosibirsk residents do. Business is nothing. But we put these “special conditions”. But only with this can a lot of money and recognition be raised. The silence is like a death freezer. Well, let private owners do it. No, we won't give it wink
                      Ophthalmology in the desert is such a clear thing to anyone who is not from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there. After 60, under these conditions, all old people have problems with their eyes. Not only is the sand dust fine, but the deserts there are rocky, and in the south of Syria they are also volcanic (black lands). This dust is real.
                      All medicine, you correctly noted, is an event, but moreover, they treat you there at the expense of the tribal community, and then everyone will pay for the treatment of the elderly there for you. The entire confederation. Ours, in principle, do not understand this, since they themselves do not go further than the embassy, ​​and their wives do not go further than the bazaar (and many do not go there either, but go to Israel or Amman and Dubai)
                    2. nikolaevskiy78
                      6 September 2023 22: 00
                      Yes, here's another point.
                      It is possible to work directly with Syria, but these are the most complicated and complicated government contracts. Those. useless, although there were many proposals. In principle, it is possible with Iraqi Kurdistan, but it is easier to negotiate with the Turks so that they send the goods themselves through Zakho. There are 22 checkpoints there, not a single commercial vehicle can overcome them on its own. wink
                      Deliveries can be carried out through Iraq, through the port, but again it is better to work through the Jordanians, because in that “cash-non-cash” system you will break your head. And official payments through Iraq are a mess on an Iranian scale.
                      Accordingly, the second way is to work through Iran, since all trade with Sulaymaniyah goes through the IRGC. You can work, but you have to make sure that payments will come in three weeks and in installments. And no one will immediately tell you which operator it is from. As a result, there will be another Frankfurt. Although today it’s easier, of course. But even here you need to have your own agent in the ports of Iran.
                      There are also sites in the UAE where you can raise a lot of things through exhibitions, but you have to keep a separate office there