Bat or field mouse? Doubtful option of reforming special forces ('The Jamestown Foundation', USA)
The most characteristic features of the Russian military reform are its unpredictable nature and irregular implementation. Such an approach leaves officers with the opportunity to only guess about their fate and about what other surprises they may encounter in the future. The latest victim of this non-stop process was the GRU special forces (GRU — Main Intelligence Directorate, Special Forces — special forces), elite units under the command of the General Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. A special gift for the 60 anniversary was for the special forces statement of the Ministry of Defense on October 24 about the reassignment of special forces to operational-strategic commands, which actually means the transfer from submission to the General Staff to the command of the Ground Forces. A spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Vlasov, told Interfax: “In the process of reform of the Armed Forces, separate brigades of special forces are subordinated to the commanders of the joint strategic commands” (Interfax, October 25).
October 22 in the report of the TV channel Zvezda, which is controlled by the Ministry of Defense, showed special forces exercises in the Samara region, but no mention of the reform was made. Critical to the decision to transfer special forces to the subordination of the Ground Forces, the media noted that the Minister of Defense, Anatoly Serdyukov, did not issue the usual order congratulating the special forces on their professional holiday. Neither he nor other high-ranking military officers, for example, Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Nikolai Makarov, Commander of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Alexander Postnikov, attended the official events dedicated to the Special Forces Day. (For the holiday, a special congratulatory order was issued by the commander of the Land Forces - approx. Lane.). Only in ITAR-TASS, by passing, it was mentioned that the structural transformations were completed, thereby noting that the special forces were reassigned to the Ground Forces. The statement of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Colonel Vladimir Mardusin was quoted as quoting (in the text, in fact: the Chief of Intelligence - Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces Colonel Vladimir Marusin - approx. Lane), who confirmed that from now on the special forces are subordinate to the command of military districts or operational-strategic commands.
The correspondent of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta suggested that the special forces officers were extremely dissatisfied with such a spiral of military reform, believing that it would be impossible to train a special commando, a saboteur scout, for the year of military service. There are also many other concerns regarding structural reform of special forces. For example, should parachute training be excluded? How will the high level of training be maintained? Illustrating dissatisfaction with reform among veteran officers of special forces, Ptichkin ironically: “Until now, the bat was a symbol of military intelligence. However, soon we will have to replace the silhouette of a noiseless night hunter with the image of a gray vole mouse - a sweet and harmless rodent. ”
In the newspaper Izvestia in November 2009, Dmitry Litovkin suggested that special forces would be reassigned to the command of the Ground Forces. Noting the disbandment of the 3rd, 12th and 67th separate special forces brigades, and assuming that the 16th brigade could suffer the same fate, Litovkin and Igor Korotchenko linked the re-subordination of special forces to the command of military districts with the weak results shown by the GRU and special forces during the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. (Izvestia, November 6, 2009). The reform of the special forces was partly generated by the study of the results of this conflict, and partly by the logic of the military reform itself, according to which these forces should be at the disposal of the command of the Ground Forces. Emotionally defending the traditional special forces structure, Ptichkin mentions a successful operation to prevent the Georgian forces from capturing the Roki tunnel in August 2008, however, he ignores several glaring GRU errors during reconnaissance during the conflict, which, in particular, led to the Russian aviation bombed unused Georgian air forces airfields.
It has already become customary when action on military reform is undertaken unexpectedly and without explanation. No action was taken to explain the reform of the special forces, and even for those whom it directly concerns - for officers. Criticism of recent initiatives is particularly acute from retirees (officers on the military are forbidden to criticize reforms) who accuse Serdyukov of destroying the army. What can definitely be said is that the “new look” in itself is constantly changing and somehow evolving in the absence of any general plan, and problems that need to be addressed are identified along the way. Accordingly, the fears that the GRU bat will be replaced by a gray mouse are just as solid as the assumptions of retired colonel Anatoly Tsygank that the “new look” is basically a plastic operation (“Time News", December 3.12.2009, XNUMX). Many of the reform initiatives are incomprehensible not only to critics of the reform, but also to the authors themselves, who admit that they cannot always predict what their action will lead to.
Of course, this strange case of the late special forces reform not only underlines the mood of the reformers to act taking into account the lessons of the Georgian war, but also shows that the assessment of the “lessons” and the model of reform are carried out by several groups. This is also confirmed by a number of mistakes made during the reform. Heard at a closed meeting of the State Duma’s defense committee at the end of October, General Makarov seems to have abandoned his idea of conducting a large number of operational-strategic exercises. Since the beginning of the reform, the following exercises have already been carried out: "Caucasus", "Lagoda" (as in the test, in fact - "Ladoga-2009" - approx. Lane), "West-2009" and "East-2010". Moreover, it seems Makarov realized that professional standards and the level of training of officers are inadequate, and holding such exercises gives the opposite result, as commanders spend too much time preparing their units to solve the specific tasks of such large-scale exercises. In the 2011 year, it is planned to conduct only one operational-strategic exercises - “Center-2011”, in order to leave more time for methodological preparation of training for soldiers, individual and group training of military personnel in subunits. Moreover, more time will be devoted to training the teachers themselves, i.e. platoon, mouth, battalion and brigade commanders. Such an approach, which leaves behind traditional “shows for generals”, will probably lead to a real improvement in combat training, and, perhaps, help to resolve geopolitical differences generated by a number of countries misinterpreting the signals that Russia sent by conducting large-scale exercises (“Independent military Review ", October 29 2010 of the year).
Organizational changes do not mean deep systemic reforms, and changes in special forces may turn out to be less destructive than critics fear. However, such transformations are not implemented by simply shuffling the cards. This shows that the reformers themselves have a blank check to carry out any steps they deem necessary. In addition, in military circles, the following question is troubling: what structures will fall next under the reform: maybe the next goal is the GRU, or the General Staff?
October 22 in the report of the TV channel Zvezda, which is controlled by the Ministry of Defense, showed special forces exercises in the Samara region, but no mention of the reform was made. Critical to the decision to transfer special forces to the subordination of the Ground Forces, the media noted that the Minister of Defense, Anatoly Serdyukov, did not issue the usual order congratulating the special forces on their professional holiday. Neither he nor other high-ranking military officers, for example, Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Nikolai Makarov, Commander of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Alexander Postnikov, attended the official events dedicated to the Special Forces Day. (For the holiday, a special congratulatory order was issued by the commander of the Land Forces - approx. Lane.). Only in ITAR-TASS, by passing, it was mentioned that the structural transformations were completed, thereby noting that the special forces were reassigned to the Ground Forces. The statement of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Colonel Vladimir Mardusin was quoted as quoting (in the text, in fact: the Chief of Intelligence - Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces Colonel Vladimir Marusin - approx. Lane), who confirmed that from now on the special forces are subordinate to the command of military districts or operational-strategic commands.
The correspondent of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta suggested that the special forces officers were extremely dissatisfied with such a spiral of military reform, believing that it would be impossible to train a special commando, a saboteur scout, for the year of military service. There are also many other concerns regarding structural reform of special forces. For example, should parachute training be excluded? How will the high level of training be maintained? Illustrating dissatisfaction with reform among veteran officers of special forces, Ptichkin ironically: “Until now, the bat was a symbol of military intelligence. However, soon we will have to replace the silhouette of a noiseless night hunter with the image of a gray vole mouse - a sweet and harmless rodent. ”
In the newspaper Izvestia in November 2009, Dmitry Litovkin suggested that special forces would be reassigned to the command of the Ground Forces. Noting the disbandment of the 3rd, 12th and 67th separate special forces brigades, and assuming that the 16th brigade could suffer the same fate, Litovkin and Igor Korotchenko linked the re-subordination of special forces to the command of military districts with the weak results shown by the GRU and special forces during the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. (Izvestia, November 6, 2009). The reform of the special forces was partly generated by the study of the results of this conflict, and partly by the logic of the military reform itself, according to which these forces should be at the disposal of the command of the Ground Forces. Emotionally defending the traditional special forces structure, Ptichkin mentions a successful operation to prevent the Georgian forces from capturing the Roki tunnel in August 2008, however, he ignores several glaring GRU errors during reconnaissance during the conflict, which, in particular, led to the Russian aviation bombed unused Georgian air forces airfields.
It has already become customary when action on military reform is undertaken unexpectedly and without explanation. No action was taken to explain the reform of the special forces, and even for those whom it directly concerns - for officers. Criticism of recent initiatives is particularly acute from retirees (officers on the military are forbidden to criticize reforms) who accuse Serdyukov of destroying the army. What can definitely be said is that the “new look” in itself is constantly changing and somehow evolving in the absence of any general plan, and problems that need to be addressed are identified along the way. Accordingly, the fears that the GRU bat will be replaced by a gray mouse are just as solid as the assumptions of retired colonel Anatoly Tsygank that the “new look” is basically a plastic operation (“Time News", December 3.12.2009, XNUMX). Many of the reform initiatives are incomprehensible not only to critics of the reform, but also to the authors themselves, who admit that they cannot always predict what their action will lead to.
Of course, this strange case of the late special forces reform not only underlines the mood of the reformers to act taking into account the lessons of the Georgian war, but also shows that the assessment of the “lessons” and the model of reform are carried out by several groups. This is also confirmed by a number of mistakes made during the reform. Heard at a closed meeting of the State Duma’s defense committee at the end of October, General Makarov seems to have abandoned his idea of conducting a large number of operational-strategic exercises. Since the beginning of the reform, the following exercises have already been carried out: "Caucasus", "Lagoda" (as in the test, in fact - "Ladoga-2009" - approx. Lane), "West-2009" and "East-2010". Moreover, it seems Makarov realized that professional standards and the level of training of officers are inadequate, and holding such exercises gives the opposite result, as commanders spend too much time preparing their units to solve the specific tasks of such large-scale exercises. In the 2011 year, it is planned to conduct only one operational-strategic exercises - “Center-2011”, in order to leave more time for methodological preparation of training for soldiers, individual and group training of military personnel in subunits. Moreover, more time will be devoted to training the teachers themselves, i.e. platoon, mouth, battalion and brigade commanders. Such an approach, which leaves behind traditional “shows for generals”, will probably lead to a real improvement in combat training, and, perhaps, help to resolve geopolitical differences generated by a number of countries misinterpreting the signals that Russia sent by conducting large-scale exercises (“Independent military Review ", October 29 2010 of the year).
Organizational changes do not mean deep systemic reforms, and changes in special forces may turn out to be less destructive than critics fear. However, such transformations are not implemented by simply shuffling the cards. This shows that the reformers themselves have a blank check to carry out any steps they deem necessary. In addition, in military circles, the following question is troubling: what structures will fall next under the reform: maybe the next goal is the GRU, or the General Staff?
- Roger McDermot
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