“The scale of corruption and theft in the Ministry of Defense under the Minister of Anatolia Serdyukov is amazing,” said Anatoly Lokot, member of the State Duma commission on legal support for the development of organizations of the defense industry complex of the Russian Federation, on Friday 7 December According to him, “we have always criticized the team of the former Minister of Defense, but could not imagine the scope of corruption”. To defend Serdyukov with his “Marktan wagon train” after opening the facts of “squandering and selling off the assets of the defense ministry, there is no point,” the deputy said.
I think about the protection of the former Minister of Defense today and there can be no question. Although some high-ranking officials made statements like that, for example, “under Serdyukov” the social status of military personnel was raised, military pensions increased, “army transformations began” and, in general, “Serdyukov was an effective minister of defense”. Of course, “under Serdyukov” does not mean at all that positive transformations occurred as a result of his activity as Minister of Defense, but the question is different: why did he get fired if he was such an “effective reformer”?
According to the official version, Anatoly Serdyukov was dismissed, as noted by Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, “at least so that there is no doubt about the objectivity of the investigation being conducted.” The statement is clearly of a ritual nature, which is used in world practice precisely in the case when, for the time being, they want to hide the true reasons for the resignation of a high official. So let me assume that the motives for dismissing Serdyukov, to put it mildly, are somewhat different than they are voiced. It is to such a conclusion that the materials of the round table meeting on the topic “Reforms of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Where to Go Next?”, Held on November 14 in the Committee on Defense of the State Duma, sum up. Take, say, such an excerpt from a speech by Lt. Gen. Viktor Sobolev, the former commander of the 58 Army (2004 – 2006):
"NATO military analysts point out that as a result of the reforms carried out, the Russian Armed Forces are not able to more successfully solve problems even in local conflicts."
And further: “The Russian army does not have enough vehicles to transport troops over long distances, does not have enough aircraft and pilots who can fly in any weather, there is no single information system. The army lacks soldiers ... "
By and large, this quotation alone sounds like a verdict on the entire “tumultuous” activity of the Ministry of Defense headed by Anatoly Serdyukov. And at the meeting of the "round table" none of those present gave a positive assessment to the military department. So, Valentin Selivanov, the Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1992 – 1996), the admiral, said: “... when the first steps of the military reform began, we then said that it was not a reform, but“ a defeat operation Soviet Armed Forces ". I believe that the main task now is to prevent the development of the success of the “operation” that was carried out ... For 21, not a single ship, not a single submarine was built a year. This I declare to you as a sailor. Over 315 years stories Naval fleet it wasn’t like that. ”
“Stop copying the construction of the Armed Forces on the model of the United States. Our army solves completely different tasks. Our Armed Forces are the protection of the state on its territory. They have a tool to ensure aggression and world domination. One cannot even approach this, ”said Colonel-General Boris Cheltsov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Air Force in 2000 – 2007.
“The failure of the tasks of military reform is largely due to the fact that their implementation is entrusted to completely unprepared“ professionals ”who do not understand the essence of the reforms, completely alien objects and goals of reform and are not responsible for the failures in the state of the Armed Forces and the defense of the state”, the general said - Colonel Alexander Rukshin, Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff - Deputy Chief of the General Staff (2001-2008).
And there are a lot of similar statements. Meanwhile, the results of the survey, reflecting the attitude of citizens of the country to the change of leadership in the Ministry of Defense, published VTsIOM.
55% of Russians believe that the decision on the resignation of Anatoly Serdyukov should have been taken much earlier, as with him the situation in the army deteriorated markedly.
At the same time, citizens believe that it is necessary to continue some of the reforms initiated by the former leadership in the Armed Forces and substantially correct the reforms in those areas where success has not been achieved. 74% of Russians support the continuation of the rearmament program of the army and navy. But undertakings that it is better to give up, recognized the transfer to civilians non-core for military functions (48%) and the reform of the military education system (48%). 66% of respondents want to stop reducing the size of the Armed Forces.
As we see, the opinion of the people and military leaders coincides. And - thank God that there are no indifferent ones. This is especially important in the condition of the Armed Forces, in which they were thrown back due to the “Serdyukov reforms”. General Viktor Sobolev, in particular, believes: “In fact, the army was destroyed in a way similar to how it was destroyed in 1917 after two revolutions. Requires a plan to build an army. We actually have none today. ” He, unfortunately, is right.
The disbanding of divisions and the creation of permanent readiness brigades on their basis was justified by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense with the need to increase the mobility of troops, the level of their operational and combat training. The goals are certainly good and it makes no sense to challenge them, but there are no scientifically based judgments about the unconditional benefits of the introduced brigade principle of recruitment.
In total, there are ten armies in the Ground Forces, and in each of them there should be 3-4 brigades of 5-6,5 with thousands of people. But in our "millionth" army there is currently a huge shortage - more than 20%, which is about 200 thousand people. So, at best, brigades are limited to combat readiness already by their manning. And considering that on each theater of operations (theater of operations) the enemy will be different, it must be opposed by troops (forces) with an appropriate organizational and staff structure. In the opinion of many military experts, for example, in the Eastern theater of war, not mobile brigades are needed, but strong divisions with high strike power and high firing capabilities. The statement of General of the Army Nikolai Makarov that the brigade is not inferior to the divisions in fire capabilities is far from the truth. In addition, a qualitative analysis shows that the share of modern weapons and military equipment is 20 - 30%, while in the armies of other countries this figure is more than 70%.
In the air force, the number of fighters of all types is approximately 650 units, the age of 55% of them exceeds 15 years, and the age of 40% ranges from 5 to 10 years. In the air defense forces, the arrival of new technology ceased in the 1994 year and was not resumed until the 2007 year.
There are huge “holes” in the air defense of the country, the largest of which is between Khabarovsk and Irkutsk - 3400 km. Not covered the most important economic centers of the country: Perm, Izhevsk, Vladimir, Nizhny Novgorod, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Tula, Ulyanovsk.
Even some divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces are not protected from air strikes. The Russian Navy is also in an extremely deplorable state. By 2015, approximately 60 submarines and ships of the first and second rank will remain in its structure. All these models are outdated samples.
Similar figures and facts can be listed further, but it is almost impossible to do it here and now. Therefore, it is quite enough to mark only some tendencies, to name individual results with which the Defense Ministry in its, I hope, already “irrevocable” composition came up to the sad - for the country! - final-2012. Although, according to the former Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, the main large-scale measures to form the perspective image of the new Russian army were held in 2009-2010. As a result, allegedly, the Armed Forces of the new look were created with the share of junior officers in the total number of officer personnel 68 percent. The number of officers was reduced from 350 000 to 220 000 people. And the ensigns and midshipmen were worn out altogether.
Yesterday’s statement by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu about the return of "those officers who were the color of science, the color of military education" is also understandable. This decision sees the desire to at least to some extent correct those blunders that were made by the previous leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
But although it will be necessary to carefully calculate how many such mistakes were made in the recent past, it is already extremely clear that, in conducting military reform, the leadership of the Defense Ministry largely copied the American experience (forms and methods of military operations, regulations and manuals, the percentage of officers in numbers Armed forces, etc.). The experience of military campaigns of multinational forces led by the United States in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and finally in Libya is often cited. It is argued that the Russian Armed Forces should fight in the same way, conduct maneuvering actions in broad bands, avoid direct clashes with the enemy, bypass and block his pockets of resistance. But is it possible to compare the military potentials of the United States, the coalitions of NATO countries and countries that have undergone their aggression in the late 20th and early 21st century?
Russian military science, analyzing the experience of these wars, considered such methods of action promising and made conclusions and suggestions on the direction in which the means of warfare and troop control systems should be developed in the Russian Armed Forces. The only question is how much it costs for the state and whether our military-industrial complex will provide for the development and creation of modern and advanced weapons. It should be noted that the tasks of the US armed forces and our army do not radically coincide. For decades, the United States and its NATO allies have led offensive military operations outside their territory, always have the initiative to start a war, and are at war with a weak adversary. Therefore, their experience is atypical for us. First of all, we need to ensure the protection of our territory and therefore at the beginning of the war we will have to conduct defensive actions against a stronger, fundamentally different enemy in each theater of military operations.
If you carefully analyze the military threats to Russia, it is clear that the most difficult situation is in the West and the Far East.
In the West, for example, innovative armies with non-contact forms and methods of using the latest forces and means. Due to the pacifism that struck Europe, the likelihood of a collision with NATO is small. But the threat is not the statements of politicians, but the power of the groups deployed in Europe, which, if necessary, can be strengthened. So, in the CFE zone (on the European continent), the North Atlantic Alliance has 24 divisions and 254 brigades. As of January 1, 2011, there were 22 troops in the forces of 11 NATO states in Europe tank, 22 armored fighting vehicles, 788 artillery systems, 13 aircraft and 264 helicopters. This group can be strengthened by US forces. In the means of ensuring combat operations (control, communications, reconnaissance, navigation, electronic warfare), the advantage of the NATO armed forces over the Russian armed forces is much higher than in people and equipment. Their overall superiority is such that we should not even talk about times, but about orders of magnitude.
Russia on 1 January 2011 had 3660 tanks, 7690 BBM, 4634 artillery systems, 1542 aircraft and 365 helicopters here. Given this, there is no need for special evidence that the Western Military District in its current composition is not able to repel the blow of the opposing grouping. But in the West, greater danger than groupings of troops and forces, are constantly growing opportunities to conduct information war. Developing high-speed information technologies already allow the US armed forces to master the techniques and methods of such a war.
Let's add the following detail: in the United States, a special unit has been created for force neutralization around the world news The media by disrupting their technical infrastructure.
However, “Conceptual views on the activities of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in the information space” published on the website of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation do not give an answer to the question of how to counteract the information war, what means and methods to use to conduct information confrontation. Unfortunately, today there are no tasks or corresponding scientific structures for the study of this important area.
In the East, two military districts (Shenyansky and Beijing) of the seven existing in the PRC are stronger than all the Land Forces of the Russian Federation combined. And considering that there are no more than one-third of the combined-arms units in the Eastern Military District, this superiority is even higher. China over the past 20 of years has bought fighter jets Su-27, Su-30, ZRKT Thor, ZRS-300 and other types of weapons and equipment in Russia, copied everything without a license and produced in large batches without selling anything abroad. And, apparently, it is far from coincidental that in Soviet times the largest grouping of troops (Far Eastern Military District, Pacific Fleet, ZabVO, etc.) was located in this theater with many parts of constant readiness in it, and it was supervised by the Headquarters of the Far East. It is surprising that even this historical example is clearly ignored by modern reformers.
“In the 29 Army, which now occupies the building of the former headquarters of the Siberian Military District in Chita, there is only one brigade in the territory from Ulan-Ude to Belogorsk - which is about three thousand kilometers of the state border,” says Lieutenant-General V. Sobolev. “In the event of an armed conflict with China, the Chinese will find it very difficult to find it in order to capture or destroy ... It’s not funny.”
By the way, given today's realities with military transport aviation and the presence of rolling stock (railway platforms) at Russian Railways, regrouping of troops is a very big problem. According to the experience of the exercises "West-2009", the redeployment of one team to the territory of Belarus at a distance of up to 1000 kilometers took five days. Calculations show that in the Far East (from Moscow to Vladivostok 9228 km) the transportation of one brigade along the Trans-Siberian Railway can take up to 2,5 months, and taking into account possible sabotage actions of a likely enemy, the normal functioning of this railway will be disrupted even before the outbreak of hostilities. What kind of troop mobility can we talk about today?
Vladimir Putin’s concern was quite understandable when, in an article published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta at the end of February, he noted that the main task of military reform, which has been carried out in Russia since the middle of 2000, is to create a “modern type army - mobile in a state of constant combat readiness. ”However, speaking about the specific goals and objectives of the reform, as well as discussing the priorities in creating weapons and military equipment, Putin stressed that until the main guidelines are developed, the only weapon, the development of which will be more or less calculated, will remain nuclear. “Our specialists will have to define a promising ideology for the development of types and types of troops, clearly identify their goals and objectives in the relevant conceptual documents. But it is already clear that the role and significance of the nuclear deterrent forces will remain in the structure of the Armed Forces. ”
It is the nuclear deterrence forces that are currently our main “answer to Chamberlain”.
So, in the current state, the share of strategic nuclear forces in government defense orders is 25%. On the basis of the 2009 year, Russia had 3909 warheads on 814 strategic carriers, and the US had 5576 warheads on 1198 carriers. And how many they need to have to maintain parity? Who counted?
Or here's another question: Does Russia need atomic aircraft carriers, Mistral helicopter carriers, and for what tasks? If for conducting military operations in areas remote from Russia, to combat piracy, then this is understandable. And what should these means do when defending their territory? Yes, and they can not be used independently, but only as a part of the shock group. They need an escort, security ships and support vessels.
The creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces was in fact the arithmetical composition of the Space Forces and the USC ESC (the former Moscow Military District Air Defense) and the prospects for their further construction and development are unclear. There is no clear decision on the forces of the fleets, the preparation of the infrastructure for their deployment. The question is: does the Ministry of Defense have at least one scientifically based decision, a scientifically based figure?
Judge for yourself whether or not this: speaking at the Academy of Military Sciences, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said bluntly that “we got involved in military reform without having any scientific justification. Everything was done hastily, often - by people who do not really understand the problem, with an eye on momentary problem solving. ” This is how a former member of the Russian Defense Ministry board and head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov (the Free Press publication), later commented on the situation with the Armed Forces:
“Today there is no atlas of threats, and the troops are supposedly ready to repel them. Threats are not indicated in military doctrine or in other documents. But if so, then the question arises: “What are the forces and forces of the fleet ready for?”
... if you look at the composition of the Armed Forces, then our current brigade-type troops are not able to withstand the likely adversary neither in the West, nor in the South, nor in the East. And they are absolutely not ready to defend our interests in the Arctic, where today a new theater of military operations is being formed in the struggle for resources.
... when the military prosecutor says that as a result of these reforms, every fifth budget ruble entering the defense ministry is being stolen, it becomes scary.
... the concept of a rapid global strike (a promising development of the US armed forces, which should allow them to strike with non-nuclear weapons on any part of the planet within an hour - approx. "SP"), which fit on us? Is it not a threat? It was introduced by Bush Jr. in 2003 year.
In addition, we have no serious military allies today. From a military-strategic point of view, we do not know who is closer to us: China, India or the NATO bloc?
Therefore, there is a constant flirting with the West, absurd statements and decisions. As a result, we have no serious allies left. That is, we did not build the necessary balance of power. Because of all this, I definitely assess the results of the reform negatively. ”
From myself I will add: as regards military science, at the present time it actually does not exist. Military reform was carried out contrary to the recommendations of military scientists, these recommendations were simply discarded as useless.
Not so long ago, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Slipchenko, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, full member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation, said: “One can only say that the Armed Forces for each state will cost as much as this state evaluates its sovereignty.”
It seems to me that it is from these positions that, first of all, it is necessary to approach the assessment of everything that is connected today with the activities of the Ministry of Defense and its former leader. Yes, of course, it is important and even more interesting to what extent the result is assessed by the damage that was inflicted on the state by some officials of the Ministry of Defense. And more importantly, will the funds obtained by dishonest means be returned to the state budget? But, I am sure, the disclosure of possible crimes in the military sphere is not a matter of the first degree of importance. The main thing is to bring the combat capability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces as quickly as possible to the desired level.
Many probably saw in the old films, as on the eve of the Great Patriotic War in the USSR, the song “If tomorrow is war, if tomorrow is a campaign ...” sounded. Most of the Soviet people were sure then that they could throw a hat on any enemy, and then finish it off. territory. And in 1941, a tragedy happened to our country. Now the situation with the state of national defense is very similar. And what will we do if war really happens tomorrow? Who will we blame? "Marrying traffic"?