During the very first armed clashes on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the winter of 1994-1995. revealed almost complete lack of preparation of the Russian troops for the sniper war. During the fighting in Chechnya in 1995-1996, more than 26 percent of the wounds of federal troops were bullet wounds. According to some eyewitnesses, in the battles for Grozny in the 8 Army Corps at the beginning of January 1995, almost all the officers in the platoon-company link were knocked out by sniper fire. For example, in the 81 motorized rifle regiment at the beginning of January, ten soldiers and one officer remained in the ranks.
For the defense of the city in general and for the sniper war, in particular, Chechen militants prepared in advance: positions were equipped and prepared, communications were established, actions were coordinated, and tactics worked out. There was enough time for the militants to train Dzhokhar Dudayev, weapons Also enough: when leaving Chechnya, the army left 533 sniper rifles of the SVD among other weapons. Chechen snipers worked very competently, efficiently and brutally. Most often, sniper pairs served as the basis of mobile fire groups, which in addition to snipers included two submachine gunners, a machine gunner and a grenade launcher.
Chechnya Fight in city blocks
Our infantry was absolutely not ready for a sniper war in the city. There is a case in which an infantry colonel sent an entire motorized rifle company to "catch" a highly annoying sniper: "He’s sitting somewhere over there."
However, not all have forgotten the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War. During the preparation for the mission to Chechnya, several sniper groups were created in the regiment of the Airborne Forces Special Forces. During the fighting in the center of Grozny, the Volgograd Corps of General Rokhlin lost from sniper fire to 30 people a day, and after snipers of special forces of the airborne troops worked there, losses were reduced to two people a day. By the beginning of February, the majority of Dudayev professional snipers had been destroyed - this was evidenced, first of all, by the changed nature of the wounds of federal troops.
Nevertheless, the withdrawal of the first month of fighting showed that the Russian soldiers were forced to start again from scratch and at the cost of their blood to learn what they should have been taught long before the fighting.
At the end of the "first Chechen", our military leadership made a logical conclusion that the sniper war was lost. For about half a century, the Russian Armed Forces did not have special training units for snipers, as a result of which the experience of their tactical use was lost. The troops have no weapons that meet modern requirements, nor equipment for a military sniper.
The 12,7-mm self-loading rifle OSV-96 is a good weapon for long-distance operation. Its fighting qualities in the mountains are especially pronounced.
A vivid confirmation of how highly efficient the professional sniper cadres are, can be the combat practice of the personnel of the Russian sniper training center in Solnechnogorsk (in the troops it is usually called just "K-43" - by the number of its creation order). This training unit was created in September 1999 by the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. To recruit a sniper school at its disposal from the districts officers were sent, the most trained in the field of sniping. Selected cadres received 6-month training and received the title of sniper-instructor. The main task of the Solnogorsk training company is to train instructors for sniper schools in military districts, to develop curricula and to deepen the development of tactical actions of single snipers and sniper groups in various types of combat operations.
In the training company, soldiers of fixed-term service who have undergone rigorous qualification selection also study. "K-43" regularly sends its students for combat training in the Chechen Republic. According to media reports, under Bamut during the counter-terrorism campaign in the Chechen Republic, snipers destroyed 44 militants, including 16 junior commanders, 3 leading field commanders and 12 instructors, including foreign mercenaries 7; disabled 8 units of equipment. During the storming of Grozny in the spring of 2000, this unit destroyed the 51 fighter, including 30 middle field commanders, 8 leading field commanders, 6 instructors, mercenaries; disabled 20 units of equipment. Over the entire period of hostilities in the spring and summer of 2000, the Russian shooters eliminated the Chechen snipers 28, thus preserving the lives of dozens of soldiers.
Today, the Solnogorsk training company is engaged in the compilation of experience, the improvement of tactics of application and other issues of the development of sniping. In addition to training instructors for other schools in Solnechnogorsk, they make up combat training programs for snipers for various military units, develop tactics for using snipers and sniper groups in various types of combat and in various terrain, determine the needs for sniper weapons and equipment.
Chechnya Sniper of the internal troops. April 1995 g
In terms of tactics development, this war has given a lot, now it is important not to lose the combat experience paid with blood. One of the specific features of the fighting in the North Caucasus region is the massive use of snipers in the guerrilla war. During the hostilities in Dagestan and Chechnya (1999-2000), the scale and their effectiveness were such that the Russian military rightly talked about the "sniper war." The Chechen shooters used not only regular Russian-made weapons (SVD and VSS), but also machine guns equipped with optics, as well as sports rifles adapted for sniping.
The typical weapons of the militant unit, consisting of 9-10 man, are 6 Kalashnikov assault rifles of various modifications (7,62-mm AKM or AKMS), 1 manual or single machine gun (7,62-mm RPK, 5,45-mm RPK-74 or 7,62-mm PKM) The 1 RPG-7 grenade launcher, 4-5 single-use grenade launchers (RPG-18, RPG-22 or RPG-26) and one sniper rifle SVD.
The main methods of combat operations of illegal armed formations are the shelling of garrisons, guard posts, checkpoints and escorts; conducting attacks (raids); device ambushes; committing sabotage and terrorist acts; seizure of important objects and hostages.
When conducting shelling, groups of numbers from 10 to 50 people are singled out. Most often shelling is carried out at night, using all types of weapons that are available, including sniper.
Ambushes are most often carried out on the roads or probable paths of movement of the federal troops with the aim of destroying personnel, capturing prisoners, weapons and materiel; sniper groups are usually part of the fire group, ensuring the defeat of manpower and the destruction of equipment, and the group that impedes enemy maneuver.
In the mountains, a sniper special tactics
During the fighting on the territory of Dagestan (August-September 1999), Chechen rebel fighters actively used the characteristic tactical methods of using snipers. In particular, they practiced the seizure of dominant heights, the most profitable routes, passes and the location of long-range fire weapons there, including snipers. Often used small fire groups, consisting of a mortar, a grenade launcher and a sniper pair. At the same time, snipers fired under the cover of sounds from mortar and grenade launchers from caves and other shelters. In the implementation of the withdrawal, the militants used consolidated firing cover groups - 1-2 mortar calculations, 2 calculation of large-caliber machine guns, 2 sniper, 2 rocket launcher, 1-2 calculation AGS-17.
A little later, in the conduct of hostilities in the territory of the Chechen Republic (November 1999 of the year), illegal armed groups used the methods of partisan warfare. Just as during the first Chechen conflict of 1994-1996, without entering into direct contact with federal forces, the illegal armed groups preferred to operate in small groups of 3-5 people, including a grenade launcher, sniper, machine gunner and 1-2 machine gunners. This group in many cases included sappers who mined the position after the group left. The principle of their actions is very simple: the main group opens fire (sometimes even not aimed) at an object of federal forces, and the sniper chooses targets and destroys them under the cover of battle noise.
Militants did not count on great results, being content with short but frequent and successful shelling without loss on their part. Snipers often occupied positions in the trees. Not far from the shooters (in a circle or square of the forest), there were observers who opened targets and directed snipers at them.
Particular attention is paid to the tactics of the actions of the so-called "combat triples", consisting of a sniper, a grenade thrower and a machine gunner. This method of fighting was worked out by Chechen militants even during the first assault on Grozny in the winter of the 1995 of the year. On the ground, such a troika is dispersed. The submachine gunner starts the battle, shelling the enemy and thereby causing fire on himself; the sniper identifies the firing points that have identified themselves with fire, and destroys them; The grenade launcher, using battle noise as a cover, hits armored vehicles and vehicles.
When conducting defense of the site, immediately before the start of artillery preparation by federal forces or during strikes aviation groups of militants made a quick dash towards Russian troops in a safe zone and hid on the ground. After the beginning of the attack of the federal troops, the militants shot the soldiers almost point blank - from a distance of 100-150 meters. At the same time, snipers sought in the first minutes of the battle to destroy the command staff and active soldiers and sergeants in order to sow panic.
Sniper first Chechen ...
Most effectively sniper groups are used by militants in combat in a locality. First of all, they incapacitate officers, drivers and radio operators. Each sniper operates under the guise of five or six militants, one of whom is at least a grenade launcher. Shooting positions are usually chosen according to the classical principle - on the middle floors of buildings, in the back of rooms. Breaks in the walls of houses are widely used. Machine gunners occupy the lower floors, and the grenade throwers are located on the upper level.
It is very common among Chechen snipers to receive when, in order to destroy as many people as possible, he first “shoots” one soldier (usually a wound to a limb), then immobilizes his comrades who help him in the same way and eventually finishes everyone.
Used and lone snipers. These people, as a rule, are professionals, planned in advance their actions in detail, choosing the most advantageous low-profile positions in attics and upper floors of houses (more often in corner apartments — it is convenient to fire from there in several directions). The prepared positions were equipped with caches of weapons and ammunition.
Sniper of the Russian special forces with a rifle CB-98
As another characteristic feature of the war in Chechnya, it is necessary to note the use of special Russian-made sniper weapons by the militants — OSV-96 large-caliber rifle and BCC and VSK-94 silent rifles.
Sniper war in Chechnya through the eyes of a modern journalist: “Night. Pleasant time to work. Night sight,“ fifty-first, ”is a great thing, you can see everything in it. Last time, at a great distance, shot Niva with militants, drove a clip there. Who I got, who I don’t have, is unknown, but the raspberries spoiled them. According to the information, in this house, where the car arrived, there was a gangster burial ... But this night is not at all. It is divided by seconds. , but it is impossible to break away. Oleg every second waits for a shot. Below, under the mound, on which oh they sat down with a radio operator, with a radio station "Crossbow", a small factory sprawled. There was a sniper wound up, who managed to spoil enough of ours. The task was to calculate it, nothing more. At your own risk, the Pipe decided to work in its own way. Tick off that bastard what's the point if he immediately changes his position. We must try to hit the flash. This is the most difficult option, but if you are lucky, you can’t think better. There is no order to shoot, but he has been waiting an hour and a half for an hour, not looking up from the sight ... Radioman is silent nearby, insuring him with a gun.
Finally, he still waited. A flash of a shot flickered in a ribbed opening, such as a duralumin hangar. He immediately took aim and sent a bullet there. Distance order 350 meters. At that instant, he managed to take into account the fact that it is not necessary to beat the flash itself, because it is the trunk, but a little to the side, where the creature’s head should be. Or, at worst, the body. It is clearly audible as the bullet passes through a thin wall. He hits the target point. Unable to verify defeat. They with the radio operator immediately reeled up so as not to fall under the very possible retaliatory strike. Sniper could easily work with a cover. The deed was done. Nobody shat from the little factory anymore ... "(O. Kolomiets." Everything was not in vain, sniper ... "- Soldier of Fortune, 2001, No. 6).
And yet, despite all the difficulties, Russian snipers many times proved their skills in this war. In particular, sniper Alexander Chernyshov for courage and heroism shown during the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic, was awarded the title Hero of the Russian Federation.
Sniper war in Chechnya