The destruction of the Patriot air defense system in Kyiv and the strikes of the S-200 air defense system on the Belgorod region: optimism and pessimism regarding the capabilities of Russian intelligence
Image of NPO Lavochkin
At the beginning of the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine, the author had the opinion that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) had certain problems in terms of effective detection of objects for delivering effective strikes with high-precision weapons (WTO) long-range, as well as the correct assessment of the results of these strikes.
Apparently, long-range ATO strikes were not as effective as it was presented, although, of course, this raises the question of responsibility, what was required - to better identify targets and destroy them better, or talk less about "suppressed air defense systems (Defense) of Ukraine" and "the disabled military infrastructure: military airfields, aviation, air defense facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (APU)...". In the information field then there was an impression that aviation, air defense and fleet the enemy no longer has any left, you just need to break the slight resistance and enter Kyiv in full parade.
However, it is simply impossible to deny that Russian intelligence has certain problems.
Air Defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
I would like to start with it. On the one hand, in the matter of destroying Ukrainian anti-aircraftmissile complexes (SAM) there are definitely successes - the confirmation by the Americans that the Patriot SAM was "minorly damaged" clearly indicates that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) seriously rolled it. If it really was slightly damaged, no one would have said anything about a hit at all.
It is clear that hunting for air defense systems is a rather difficult task, especially for mobile systems operating in ambush mode and receiving external primary target designation from intelligence assets of NATO countries.
Only the recent S-200 air defense missile attack on Belgorod is surprising. By itself, the S-200 air defense system is an outdated and low-mobility complex. By the way, it was with his help that the Armed Forces of Ukraine shot down a civilian plane over the Black Sea - the world community did not attach much importance to this event, but you can imagine what a howl would rise if it were Russia, it is enough to recall the “democratic hysteria” about the downed South Korean Boeing "- over our territory (!), and not over neutral waters.
The S-200 air defense system is not highly mobile
It could be assumed that by the current stage of the conflict, Ukraine should no longer have these air defense systems, however, the blow to Belgorod was allegedly delivered by a missile of the S-200 complex. How did our intelligence manage to figure out the Patriot, but "missed" the ancient S-200?
It can be assumed that the elements of the complex that allow it to be used precisely as an air defense system - radar stations (radar) for detection, as well as tracking and guidance radars, were destroyed, and since without them it will not be possible to use the S-200 air defense system against aircraft, then the remaining launchers (PU) and warehouses of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) of the S-200 complex simply "scored". And the Armed Forces of Ukraine took and used the SAM from the S-200 air defense system as operational-tactical missiles - fortunately, the warhead there is quite powerful, most likely, even the control system was not particularly finalized - for firing at such large targets as peaceful cities, its accuracy is quite enough.
In principle, after the Armed Forces of Ukraine turned the obsolete Strizh and Reis UAVs into cruise missiles, something like this could be assumed, the question is also why don’t we do something like that, we don’t have old missiles left in the warehouses?
Air Force (Air Force)
Enemy aviation still exists and functions, periodically there are reports of the downing of enemy aircraft and helicopters. It is about shooting down in the air, and not about destruction on the ground. Moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine strike with stealthy Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which are launched from Su-24 front-line bombers. Most likely, these aircraft do not come close to the front line, where Russian aviation and air defense systems operate, but strike from the depths of the territory of Ukraine, which means that they can only be destroyed on the ground, at base airfields.
Photo of a Ukrainian Air Force Su-24M with suspended Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Telegram channel image bmpd
Why can't we destroy the Ukrainian Air Force on the ground? We don't have the resources to detect enemy aircraft? APU skillfully disguise aviation equipment?
It is clear that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have information about all the overflights of Russian reconnaissance satellites, that the United States warns the Armed Forces of Ukraine about the start of strikes against the Russian Armed Forces, and they urgently relocate planes and helicopters while the Geranium or Caliber is flying - it’s not difficult to catch it, they are slow, subsonic , but what about the "Dagger"? After all, it should be very difficult to “escape” from a hypersonic missile - the flight time of the Kinzhal missile for 500 kilometers will be less than five minutes, or even less than three.
Ukrainian Su-24 front-line bombers with Storm Shadow cruise missiles are a worthy target for Kinzhal
There is another option - Ukrainian aviation, at least part of it, is based abroad, in Poland, and makes flights from there. If so, then Poland is actually an aggressor, a direct participant in the conflict, which strikes at Russian territory, which means that Poland is a legitimate target for a massive strike on its airfields - Article 5 of the NATO Charter is no longer applicable here. If someone decides to use it, then NATO forces in Eastern Europe should be dealt a massive strike with tactical nuclear weapons.
And do not be afraid that Russia will become a "rogue state", that the whole world will turn its back on us, and so on and so forth. This will only happen if one or two nuclear strikes are launched, which our opponents will regard as another sign of weakness. And if there are two or three hundred strikes, then the world will change, as if by magic, and the conversation will quickly turn into a constructive direction - no one, neither in the United States nor in Western Europe, wants to die in radioactive ashes, but if someone has illusions about their ability to sit out in "quiet places", then they are easy to dispel.
Naval Forces (Navy) APU
On May 29, 2023, the Russian Armed Forces, with a strike of high-precision weapons at the parking lot of warships in the port of Odessa, destroyed the last warship of the Ukrainian Navy - the landing ship "Yury Olefirenko" of Polish construction. The question is that, in fact, the NWO has been going on for almost a year now, what were you expecting before?
Landing ship "Yuri Olefirenko"
Well, let's say that the destruction of this pelvis is not so bad, it is possible that it simply did not make it into the list of priority targets. Although, on the other hand, given the creative approach of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to outdated weapons, it was definitely not worth leaving such toys in their hands for a long time.
But here's another question - quite recently, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny, who at the time of writing this article is in a state of "Schrödinger's cat", that is, it is not known for certain whether he is alive or dead, was apparently present at the commissioning of a small armored artillery the Bucha boat of Project 58155 Gyurza-M, launched in September 2021. The boat was developed by the Experimental Design Center for Shipbuilding in the Ukrainian city of Nikolaev and built at the Kuznya na Rybalskom enterprise in Kyiv.
Artillery boat "Bucha"
Of course, all these artillery boats are the Navy "for the poor", but still, why do this boat and the Forge on Rybalsky still exist? The reasons why artillery boats are not destroyed on the move are clear to everyone., but they periodically moor to the shore, is it really impossible to catch them at this moment? Well, the “Forge on Rybalsky” will definitely not run away anywhere. What matters here is not the boat itself, but rather the ability of Ukraine to still produce them, as well as our ability or inability to prevent this.
In addition, if the leadership of our country decides, and Russian Armed Forces will be able to ensure the destruction of bridges across the Dnieper, then there will be a need for the complete destruction of all watercraft on the Dnieper in order to completely deprive the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the possibility of supporting their forces on the left-bank Ukraine.
The destruction of bridges across the Dnieper is one of the cornerstones on which victory in Ukraine can be forged in the shortest possible time.
Ground Forces (SV) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
For ground forces, the situation is more complicated.
On the one hand, it is much easier to disperse and shelter ground combat vehicles than aircraft at airfields, but on the other hand, photographs periodically get into the network when the Armed Forces of Ukraine deliberately demonstrated large concentrations of armored vehicles and manpower, as if preparing for a counteroffensive.
APU quite often demonstrate large clusters of armored vehicles in the open air
The question is where these photos were taken. Most likely, most of the staged photos are taken somewhere in Western Ukraine, away from the front line. In this situation, even if the intelligence of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation detects accumulations of armored vehicles, then most likely it will not work to strike. However, options are possible in this case, we will talk about them in the future.
Again, it is possible that a photo session with clusters of armored vehicles with Ukrainian flags is arranged somewhere in Poland.
If the Armed Forces of Ukraine collect armored vehicles in large clusters somewhere not far from the front line, then it would be very sad - how much our Armed Forces lack strategic high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft such as the American RQ-4 Global Hawk, capable of viewing the terrain 20-200 kilometers or more deep into enemy territory from a height of 300 kilometers. But on the approach of the enemy stratospheric scouts capable of patrolling for weeks or even months at an altitude of several tens of kilometers.
Boeing's SolarEagle (Vulture II) UAV must provide the ability to relay communications and reconnaissance while continuously in the air for five years (!), At an altitude of about twenty kilometers
Conclusions
The RF Armed Forces need a qualitative and quantitative strengthening of reconnaissance capabilities.
First of all, these are reconnaissance satellites in the optical and radar wavelength ranges. It is necessary to optimize designs and production lines, conveyor manufacturing of reconnaissance, control and communications satellites and their batch launch into orbit, as SpaceX does with its Starlink Internet communications satellites.
It is important to understand that the enemy has already mastered these technologies, and that the number of reconnaissance satellites of the United States and NATO countries will exceed any optimistic expectations, that China is breathing down their necks, which is quickly learning and well able to use other people's developments - we cannot lag behind in this matter.
The air base of the Russian strategic aviation in the city of "Engels" ("Engels-2") on satellite images of a private American company Capella space, it is possible that strike by Ukrainian UAVs on this air base planned based on satellite imagery provided by Capella Space
It is necessary to create high-altitude reconnaissance UAVs, as well as stratospheric UAVs capable of quasi-continuously monitoring the enemy, both in peacetime and in wartime, keeping him in relentless tension.
The high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft M-55 "Geophysics" was built in five copies - neither the USSR nor Russia had their own serial high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft comparable in performance to the American Lockheed U-2
It is necessary to create centers for processing large data arrays based on supercomputers and neural networks capable of almost instantly find threats, classify them and automatically prepare information for striking them with high-precision long-range weapons, where only the final decision-making remains for a person.
And finally, it is necessary to deeply study the possible actions of the enemy, including his non-standard moves, for example, such as turning obsolete UAVs into cruise missiles, but seemingly useless without radar for detecting and guiding missiles into operational-tactical missiles, which will ensure the elimination of these threats in the bud.
Information