41 Games of the Year

The most important element of the combat training of commanders and staffs of the Red Army were operational games and field trips. The recently declassified documents of the “games” provide a wealth of information for reflection on how the top military leaders of the USSR saw the future war with Germany, which they expected from their troops and enemy troops.

Even the most cursory review of the currently available archival funds shows that the work in the headquarters of the Red Army was in full swing, there were not many military and front-line military games, but very many. Thus, only in the last six months before the actual start of the war took place (the names of the events are indicated in accordance with the relevant documents):

operational game on the cards in the Baltic PSB (February);

bilateral district operational game in Odessa IN (February);

field trip of the headquarters of the Leningrad, Ural and Oryol districts (March);

field trip in the Arkhangelsk IN (March);

operational war game in Moscow IN (March);

operational two-way game in Kharkov VO (May);

front-line operational game in the Western PSB (March);

Front-line field trip in the Baltic OBO (April);

headquarters operational and strategic game in the Arkhangelsk IN (April);

team operational game in Moscow IN (May);

front-line operational game in the Kiev OBO (May);

joint exercises of the headquarters of the Transcaucasian HE and the Caspian military flotilla (May);

Front-line field trip in the Baltic OBO (June).


And this list is far from complete; this is only what was discovered during a quick scan of the documents, and the Far East theater theater was completely excluded from attention; army games and so-called army battles are not mentioned at all. Of course, the level of military districts of the “game” was not limited to, regular strategic games were also conducted with the participation of the highest command of the Red Army, during which the general plans for the use of the Armed Forces of the USSR were worked out and refined. With regard to 1941, two strategic games held in January are known (described in detail by P. Bobylev in the article “Rehearsal of the Catastrophe”, “VISH”, No. 7, 8 for 1993 a year) and the mysterious May game (see M. Solonin, “ Unknown game May 41-th ").

"Orange" is not considered neutral ... "

If paleobiologists reconstruct the appearance of a dinosaur on several fragments of bones, then for a military historian, the reconstruction of the Great Plan does not pose an insurmountable problem on the basis of documents from the district (front-line) operational plans and staff games. For example, it does not take long to guess why 12 – 20 in March 1941 was a joint field trip of the headquarters of the Leningrad, Ural and Orel districts. Yes, on a geographical map these districts are separated by hundreds of kilometers, but as part of the plan of war with Finland * they had to work together “to invade central Finland, defeat the main forces of the Finnish army and capture the central part of Finland”. For the defeat and mastering, it was planned to deploy four armies: the 7 and 23 of the troops of the Leningrad region, the 20 on the base of the Orlovsky and 22 troops on the basis of the Ural district troops.

These tasks — hardly compatible with the spirit and letter of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty of 12 in March of 1940 — were worked out during a field trip, which was directly stated in the Directive of NPO No. OP / 503596 of 28 in March of 1941 of the year: “During a field trip the FRONT STAFFING OPERATION was worked out (in capital letters, in the original document. - M.S.) under difficult winter conditions ... The main purpose of the field trip was to check the preparedness of the front and army departments in organizing and conducting the modern operation in the winter in condition s Karelian-Finnish theater. " The level of secrecy with which the field trip was conducted is noteworthy - even a sealed safe in the headquarters of the Leningrad District seemed to be not a reliable place for the subsequent storage of such documents; On April 3, the Chief of the General Staff (i.e. Comrade Zhukov) orders the Chief of Staff of the LenVO "to submit to the Operational Directorate of the GSH by April 10 an act on the destruction of tasks and maps on a field trip to the LenVO [held] in March 1941. cards to them return to the OU GSH. "

Of particular interest are the operational games conducted by the command of the Kiev OVO (the future Southwestern Front). It was this front that was to deliver the main blow in the direction Lvov - Krakow, it was there that the most powerful grouping of the Red Army troops (in particular, exceeding in number tank divisions and tanks of "new types" three other districts / fronts combined). Alas, this particular interest was foreseen by someone, and among the archival funds that have been declassified at this time, there are neither tasks for operational games in KOVO, nor descriptions of the course of such games. All the currently available "body of information" comes down to a few fragmentary references to the game held in May 1941.

So, on April 26 of 1941, the head of the operational department of KOVO headquarters, Colonel (future marshal) Bagramyan reports to the head of the General Staff Directorate: “I present the tasks for command-and-staff exercises with the 5 and 6 Armies and front-line operational game. Applications: tasks on 115 sheets ... plan for conducting front-line operational games on 7 sheets ... situation map for 18.00 12 in May ... general situation map for 12.00 in May 6 ... "30 in April 1941, deputy head of General Staff Major Anisov sends the following telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Red Army Air Force: “During the period 12 – 18 in May 1941, command and staff exercises of the headquarters 5 and 6 Army KOVO are held. For these exercises, it is advisable to attract the headquarters of the 2 th air corps as part of 7 people. I ask you to give instructions ... ”4 May 1941, the deputy head of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Vatutin, sends a response telegram No. OP / 1409 to the headquarters of the Kiev district:

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“To amend the task and plan of the front-line operational game. 1) “Orange” should not be considered neutral, but should be counted from the first stage of the game on the side of “Western” ones. 2) The organization and forces of the "Orange" take real and strengthen one army corps and a tank division "Western". 3) At the last stage, the southern front should not be created, leaving the 16 Army under the control of the South-West Front. I remind you to take all measures to preserve the secrecy of the game. ”

That's all that is known. We can only assume that taking into account the chronology of events (the game in KOVO was held from 12 to 18 in May, and the strategic “May game” took place in 20's numbers in May 1941) and special attention paid to the actions of the right-flank 5 and 6 th Army - during the operational game in Kiev, a “fragment” of that big strategic operation that was played out during the May game was worked out. On the map, it looked like this (1 map).

Having forewarned the "eastern" in deployment, the "western" began the war ...

Within the framework of the overall strategic plan of the war, the troops of the Baltic ObVO (North-Western Front) were to solve defensive tasks (in some variants of the Big Plan, supplemented by a private offensive operation to “cut off” the Suwalki bulge). And somehow it turned out that it was precisely for command and staff exercises in the Baltic PSB that there was a significant body of documents available to historians.

In February, a district operational game was held in PribOVO on the theme “A defensive operation of the front with a subsequent offensive to destroy the enemy”. The assignment approved by 1941 in February prescribed the following situation to be played:

The "Western", warning the "Eastern" in the deployment, 5.6.41 began the war. The “western” strike the main blow in the south, against the Ukrainian (as in the text. - MS) front, while simultaneously concentrating large forces in East Prussia, where it develops a strike in the Šiauliai and Kaunas directions. Against the North-Western Front, at least 30 infantry divisions with tanks and a large aviation... To the south, the troops of the Western front of the “eastern” continue to concentrate for a strike in the western direction, successfully repulsing parts of the cover of the “western” attempt to cross the state border. Border with the Western Front: Polotsk, Oshmyany, Druskeninkai, Suwalki, Letzen ... "

So, according to the terms of the “game,” it happened just what happened in June of 41 in real stories. At least that is how 10 June described the situation in the 22 in the morning as an operational summary of the Red Army General Staff number one: “The enemy, having preempted our troops in deployment, forced the Red Army to accept the battle in the process of occupying a starting position under the cover plan ...” More One feature of the similarity of the game assignment and the real events of June 41 is manifested in the fact that the troops of the North-Western Front "Eastern" are scattered at a great distance from each other; The two first-tier armies comprise no more than half of the total number of front-line units (15 from 33 rifle divisions, 4 from 7 tank brigades, 6 from 11 individual artillery regiments).

This, in fact, the features of the similarity of the game and no one at that time of a known future end. Further serious differences begin. First of all, the compilers of the game task made a radical mistake in determining the direction of the main attack of the enemy: there (in the Belarusian direction), where in reality the Germans concentrated their main forces, according to the conditions of the game, the “western” are marking time, unsuccessfully trying to cross the border. At the same time, the troops of the Western Front of the "Eastern" slowly "finish concentration and prepare for the transition to the offensive at the end of June." It is noteworthy that this mistake clearly coincides with the misinformation that the German intelligence services used to throw Soviet intelligence in all available ways: allegedly the German command plans a grand coverage of the Red Army with the main attack on the northern and southern flanks, through the Baltic States and Bessarabia.

Unlike what will happen in reality, the troops of the “Western” are also deeply echeloned, while in the second echelon almost half of all forces are concentrated (18 from 39 infantry divisions, 4 from 5 tank divisions, 2 from 2 light divisions, 9 from 22 artillery regiments). Mobile units (tank and light divisions) are almost completely withdrawn to the second echelon and patiently wait for the infantry and artillery of the first echelon to penetrate a rather wide “breach” in the defense of the “eastern”.

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And yet the most incredible from the point of view of our current knowledge about the events of the initial period of the war is the chronology of the events of the operational game. The conditional “war” begins on June 5, after which the “western” spend 12 days (!!!) to reach the main defensive zone of the “east”, which lies 30 – 40 kilometers from the border (2 map). Moreover, this stage of “combat operations” during the game was not worked out at all, it is only briefly mentioned in the assignment.

The combat actions played during the exercise begin with the conditional 17 of June. The "Western", concentrating on the 60-kilometer section of the breakthrough (from Kvedarna to Tauragen) 12 infantry divisions against the 3 rifle divisions of the "Eastern", by the end of June 18 break through the front. A tank avalanche of unimaginable numbers rushes into the resulting gap - more than 4 thousand tanks ** (in real history, the 4-I Wehrmacht tank group operating on Šiauliai was armed with 650 tanks and self-propelled guns). From 18 to 25 June, the “eastern” with stubborn battles depart to Siauliai. To the south, on the Kaunas direction, where the enemy has “only” 10 infantry divisions and 725 tanks, the “eastern” depart and are fixed on the left (western) bank of the Neman.

At the second stage of the game (from the conditional 25 of June to 3 of July), the offensive of the “Western” was stopped everywhere, the front stretching for 420 kilometers stabilized. Receiving significant reinforcements (5 rifle divisions), the conditional 1 Army of the "Eastern" (for which the headquarters of the real 8 Army of PribOVO played) put a counter-attack on the enemy and threw it away from Šiauliai. Meanwhile, in the operational rear of the "eastern", in the Panevezys-Jelgava line, fresh concentrations of the Red Army, redeployed from the depths of the country, are concentrated. At the same time, the command of the "eastern", showing iron restraint, does not throw suitable parts directly from the echelon to the front for the feverish "plugging of holes" (this is what the Soviet command has been doing all summer 1941 of the year in real history). The only thing that was done: anti-tank artillery divisions (18 PTO guns in each) were withdrawn from the six rifle divisions of the second echelon of the front, of which a mobile combat group was formed, which halts the advance of German tanks to Šiauliai.

By the morning of July conditional 3, the concentration of the "eastern" strike group was completed. The overall balance of forces at this point is as follows: the "Eastern" 43 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions, 11 tank and 5 motorized brigades; the "Western" 39 infantry, 5 tank and 2 light divisions. On military equipment: the "Eastern" 6614 tanks and 4358 guns, the "Western" 6525 tanks (incomprehensible to the mind - where could they come from in such numbers?) And 3624 guns. As we can see, the forces are almost equal, although half of the “eastern” formations are fresh troops that did not suffer losses in previous battles.

The crushing blow of the "eastern" forces the "western" to a hasty retreat. For three days (3, 4, 5 of July), the "eastern" are moving 100 kilometers, from Šiauliai to the border. The Kaunas group of “Westerners”, which turned out to be in a semi-circle in the bend of the Neman, throws heavy equipment and breaks into East Prussia with battles. A curtain.

On not knowing the airfields

Deserves attention and description of the actions of the Air Force of the parties. In the task for the game we read:

“Western“ air forces ”with 5.6 raids on 20 – 30 airplanes operate on“ eastern ”airfields, located south-west of the Jelgava, Panevezhes, Shvenchenis line, railway nodes, unloading stations and railway bridges, and“ eastern ”troops in the region of Jelgava, Panevezys, Šiauliai, preventing their concentration. The operation involves 1100 – 1200 airplanes, of which 50% are fighters.

Air forces of the “eastern” with 5.6, covering the concentration of their troops, are fighting the enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground, especially stubborn battles take place on the Siauliai direction, where there is simultaneous participation in air battles of 150 – 200 aircraft; fighting the enemy’s operational shipments, acting on railway junctions, unloading stations and freeways, operating along enemy troop concentrations in Tilsit, Insterburg, Gölärd, Gumbinen and at the ports of Memel, Karkeln, Labiou and Pillau ”.

In order to have time to solve such a wide range of tasks at the same time, combat aircraft of the "eastern" works with an incredible (if compared with the reality of the 1941 – 1945 air war) intensity, So, during the conditional 14 – 18 of June, the Eastern air forces carry out six (!) fighter flight regiments, from 2 to 4 flight regiments of bomber and attack aircraft per day.

However, the most surprising thing is the losses that the "Eastern" air force suffered at such intensive combat use (and after repeated 20 – 30 air strikes of the enemy aircraft on the airfield, moreover). By 18 June, the 6-I mixed aviation division has a shortage (which, strictly speaking, is not equivalent to the word “loss” - the division could have some shortage of aircraft before the outbreak of “hostilities”) 68 aircraft, 254 aircraft are in combat readiness; 2-I GARDEN - incomplete 65 aircraft, in the 254 aircraft also in the ranks; 1-I GARDEN - incomplete 51, in the 268 order. And this is the hardest loss. Other aircraft divisions lost from 17 to 45 aircraft. In general, the shortage (loss) of the Air Force "eastern" to the conditional 18 of June is 322 of the aircraft or 17 percent of the number remaining in the ranks.

From 22 to 27 June, three more air divisions (a total of 420 fighters and a 473 bomber) are included in the Air Force "Eastern", which, as we see, is more than covering losses; by the beginning of the July offensive at the "eastern" already 2833 aircraft in service. Aviation "Western" by the time somewhat weakened, they have "only" 2393 aircraft. It only remains to recall that in reality, the Luftwaffe air fleet as of 1 June 22 was included in the 1941 air fleet, including the defective, 434 combat aircraft.

Second attempt

Compared to what happened in real June 41, the events of the “game June” seem like a sweet fairy tale today. The high command of the Red Army did not look at them that way at all - the documents contain a long list of identified shortcomings, shortcomings and mistakes in the actions of the headquarters and conditional "troops". For this or for any other reason, but a front-line field trip conducted in PribOVO from 15 to 21 on April 1941 was devoted to working out the same task: “The defensive operation of the front and armies under the conditions of the onset of large enemy forces with incomplete concentration of their troops; conducting a counterstrike with forcing a river obstacle. " The geography of conventional "combat operations", the direction of strikes and the lines of defense of the parties almost completely coincided with the February game on the maps.

Some differences — moreover, to the useful side of giving the teachings greater realism — are observed only in quantitative terms. First, the “Western” offensive is developing this time noticeably faster: having started the operation on the morning of April 17 (the game and the real time of the field trip were the same), by the end of the day April 22 crossed the Dubis River and occupied the city of Prienai on the left (western) bank of the Neman ; the rate of onset was about 15 – 20 kilometers per day. Secondly, the number of rifle divisions (11 units) in the two armies of the first echelon of the "Eastern" exactly coincided with the composition of the real 8 and 11 Army PribOVO; just like in the real June of the 41, the entire 8 rifle divisions were directly in the border strip. Closer to the real (although still overstated) was the composition of the "Western" grouping - 30 infantry divisions, 6 tank and 2 motorized (22 June 1941, the German Army Group "North" included 20 infantry divisions, 3 tank and XNNXXNNXXNNXXNNXXNNXX and NNXX infantry divisions, 3 and XNUMX XNUMX tank divisions motorized).

It is noteworthy that this time Oriental aircraft performs conditional “combat” 5 fighters and 12 bomber departures for 8 days, and even this voltage level is estimated by inspectors from the General Staff as “somewhat overstated departures”. In general, everything was completed successfully, the enemy received a counterblow from Kelme, Betagola to the south, to the Neman (though crossing the river, originally envisaged by the task, was not worked out during the field trip). The inspectors noted the increased - as compared with the February game - coherence of the work of the headquarters and wrote another long list of comments.

Not standing aside and 3-e NPO (military counterintelligence). 16 in May 1941, Assistant Chief of 3-th Department of State Security Captain Moskalenko sent a report to Vatutin on the “Shortcomings in the operational field trip of the Baltic PSB”. Noting a number of mistakes in ensuring secrecy, covert control of troops and protection of headquarters, the “special person” drew attention to the most important thing: “The operational task was drawn up following a template. The same theme carried out on army trips (a defensive operation with limited forces and means, followed by a counteroffensive), and each time gave the enemy the opportunity to break through our defenses with large forces, and then these large forces stopped and waited for our counterattack ... "

The next front-line field trip took place in PribOVO from 3 to 8 June. The report on her "senior group of commanders of the General Staff of the SC" Colonel Enyukov signed on Monday, June 16; before the beginning of the present war there was less than a week. The theme of the exercise is the same: “Organization and conduct of a counterblow in a front-line defensive operation with forcing a river obstacle.” The idea of ​​the operation and the direction of blows of the parties have changed somewhat:

“The Northeastern Front of the“ Western ”as part of the 4, 13 and 7 Army (ten army corps and two mechanized corps) at the end of May crossed the state border and is developing an offensive in the Kaunas direction on both banks of the r. Neman. The North-Eastern Front "Eastern" (9-I and 5-I Army, thirteen rifle divisions) under the onslaught of superior forces of the enemy departs, at the same time creating a strike force (16-I Army consisting of six rifle divisions and two mechanized corps) in the Siauliai region for striking the flank and rear of the “Westerners” operating in the direction of Kaunas ”.

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In the early days of the conventional war, the affairs of the “Oriental” are very bad. 14.00 3 June “Westerners” advanced 150 kilometers east of the border, forced the Dubis river, forced the Neman on a wide front from Sredniki to Druskininkai, reached the western suburbs of Vilnius and strive to build on their success by attacking tank formations through Kedainiai to Panevezys (NN map) (NN map) .

However, this time the hostilities of the most difficult first days of the “war” are not played out, they are only mentioned in the field trip assignment. The game begins with 3 June. The "Eastern", in the grouping of which anti-tank artillery brigades appear for the first time, push them into the Kedainiai, Jonava area and in the fierce battles 4 and 5 of June stop the advancement of the "Western" towards Panevezys. At the same time, in the area of ​​Kryazhay, Tytuvenai (that is, on both sides of the Dubis River), the "eastern" are concentrating the shock grouping of two mechanized corps (in reality, they could be the 12 and 3 of the PribOVO mechanized corps) and deliver a crushing blow to the flank the adversary.

By the end of the day 5 June tanks "Eastern" go to the Nemunas in the Jurbarkas band, Sredniki (now Syaryadzius). Two days later, infantry approaches (six rifle divisions) approach the Neman and successfully force it, leaving the Western grouping that had broken through to Vilnius. At this "game" was completed. The report states cheerfully: “On this field trip, one of the PribOVO troop actions by the“ western ”main attack in the Kaunas direction was worked out with a double ratio of forces (for example, the document refers to the double numerical superiority of the“ western. ”- M. WITH.). The issue of using the PTARB has been worked through. ”

Concluding the brief review of the field trip for the command of the Baltic OVO, it is worth noting that the operation played out in it almost exactly coincides with the situation on the North-Western Front that took shape during the strategic “May game”. The only difference is that in May the “Western” who broke through the Neman to Vilnius received three hits from three directions: the 12 Mechanic Corps advanced from Šiauliai to the south, the Western Front 11 Mechanical Corps struck from the city of Lida to the north-west , to the right flank of the enemy, and the 3 th mechanized corps of the North-Western Front, prudently relegated earlier to Shvenchenis, delivered a “head-on” blow to Vilnius. It can be assumed that such a dispersal of forces was recognized as erroneous and in the operation played during the June field trip, two mechanized corps of PribOVO were combined into one strike fist.


* Considerations for deploying the Armed Forces of the Red Army in case of war with Finland from 18 September 1940, Directive of the USSR and General Staffs of the Red Army to the Commander of the Leningrad VO to develop an operational deployment plan for the North-Western Front from November 25 of November 1940, Directive of the NPO of the USSR and General Staff of the Red Army commander of the Arkhangelsk VO troops to develop a plan for the operational deployment of troops of the Northern Front, b / d

** At first glance, a huge number of tanks strongly does not coincide with a very modest number of "Western" tank divisions. Here, however, we must bear in mind that Soviet intelligence doubled the standard number of tanks in the Wehrmacht’s tank division, estimating it in 450 units. Secondly, the compilers of the game assignment included in the composition of each army (infantry) corps of the Wehrmacht a certain “separate tank regiment” with 275 tanks.


Farsightedly traced in September 1939 of the year (at the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and the Border), the Belostok salient to the depth of 120 kilometers crashed into the territory of the German-occupied Poland. Such an outline of the border opened up a wide range of opportunities for the Red Army.

Without making a single shot, the Soviet troops were deep in the rear of the Suvalk and / or Lublin enemy grouping. At first glance, especially if you look at an extremely simplified map, the bright prospects were promised by a blow in the north-west direction, from the “tip” of the Belostok junction to Allenstein (now Olsztyn): there are no large rivers on the way. the edges of the Baltic coast are less than 200 kilometers, with one blow it was possible to cut off from Germany and surround the entire East Prussian grouping of the Wehrmacht.

Burden of choice

Everything changes if you look at the military topographic map: in the eyes of you there are countless blue spots ... Suvalkiya and Mazovshe is the land of dense coniferous forests and countless large and small lakes. An ideal place for hiking and boating, but fighting there is incredibly difficult. In such a place, the Red Army inevitably lost its main "trump card" - huge herds of high-speed light tanks, stuck in narrow inter-aisle passages, on the marshy banks of forest streams, Soviet tanks would have become a fixed target for guns of German VET.

A serious problem for the attackers is created not only by geography, but also by the history of this region, which for many centuries was the scene of the military rivalry between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the German knightly orders. Hundreds of years they built, built and built all sorts of fortifications there (by the way, the largest medieval fortress in Europe is located there, in Malbork, German Marienburg). After the division of Poland into these places, the border line between the Russian and German empires was crossed, and there, with new force and new technical capabilities, they began to build fortresses and pillboxes. In the end, the southern strip of East Prussia turned into a huge, almost insuperable fortified area.

Nevertheless, the temptation of a simple solution (to encircle East Prussia with one blow) was so great that the option of an attack on Allenstein and further to the sea was repeatedly considered: in the August and September (1940) versions of the strategic plan of the Red Army, during the operational game in the Western PSB (September 1940) and in the first of two January (1941) strategy games. But ultimately, the Soviet military-political leadership came to a firm decision to abandon the "northern option", since "the struggle on this front can lead to protracted battles, will tie our main forces, will not give the desired and quick effect."

The direction to the south of the Bialystok salient also created serious problems for the advancing army — three rivers (the Narew, the Bug, the Vepsh) stood in its way, and in their lower, that is, the most affluent course. The very topography of the future theater of military operations led to the only rational decision - to go to the Vistula approximately at a hundred-kilometer stretch between Warsaw and Demblin (that is, between the mouths of the Bug and Wepsch rivers). It was this course of action with different variations that was worked out in 1941 during the command and staff exercises of the Western PSB.

Warsaw direction

The first of the now famous front-line operational game of the Western OBO was held from 15 to 21 in March. Subject: "The offensive operation of the front and the army." The calendar and conditional time in this game is the same (in the task for the game we read: “Longitude of the day, weather conditions and road conditions are real in the days of the game”). Conditional "fighting" began in the morning of March 16. The Directive of the Western Front Command No. 027 set the following tasks for the "Eastern" troops:

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“The troops of the Western Front to carry out a private operation to capture the Suwalki bulge, securely covering the 1 Army from the north, complete (I emphasize. - MS) the rout of the opposing enemy and go to X. NUMX on r. Wisla is in readiness for a subsequent strike in the direction of Lodz (23.3 kilometers south-west of Warsaw. - M.S.) for the defeat together with the South-Western Front of the main forces of the Warsaw-Sandomierz "Western" group (130 map).

The words about the "completion of the defeat" are not an accidental reservation. The preceding events were described in the introduction to the game as follows: “As a result of the oncoming battles, the Western Front’s“ Eastern ”troops repulsed the“ Western ”offensive and, launching a concentrated counter-offensive, defeated the opposing enemy grouping by the end of 15.3. Pissa, p. Narew, p. Bug The position of the troops according to the Western Front Operations Command No. 017 from 15.3.1941. ”

At the same time, the “counter battles” and the “offensive of the“ Western ”were not described in any way, and certainly not worked out during the game. Everything happened easily and simply, as can be judged by the losses of the "Eastern" tank formations indicated in the introduction to the game. Before the start of the “combat operations” of the game (by the end of March 15), 8 tank divisions and 20 tank brigades of the “Eastern” - and according to the staffing schedule this is about 7,5 thousands of tanks - irrevocably lost all 73 (!!!) tanks. One percent of the original strength. In eight tank formations there are no irretrievable losses at all. Even taking into account 396 tanks sent for medium and major repairs, the specific losses of the "eastern" are negligible.

But this is not limited to the extraordinary success of the “oncoming battle”. The boundary of the rivers Pissa, Narew, Bug - this is the border line agreed with Hitler in September 1939 (more precisely, the “line of delimitation of state interests of the USSR and Germany on the territory of the former Polish state” - this is exactly what was called in the documents). However, if we take the Operational Summary No. 017 mentioned above and find Ksebka, Kadzidlo, Krushevo, Brok, Sarnaki and Ossuvka townships mentioned in it, it will be seen that the “eastern” not only dropped the “western” to the border, but also crossed to the opposite bank of the border rivers. Moreover, they did it on two sectors that were critical for the upcoming offensive: north-west of Ostroleka (at the tip of Belostok projection) and north-west of Brest, where the “east” were located behind the Bug, 10 kilometers from the Polish city of Biala-Podlaska.

Such an amazing coincidence of the results of the short (from 12 to 15 of March) "counter battle" with the optimal for the "eastern" line of the initial position of the troops to advance from the border to the west makes, in my opinion, a reasonable assumption that no one will repel the invasion of "western" and was not going to. Mention of him is a ritual phrase, a fig leaf, which was supposed to hide the real plans of the high command from the persons allowed to play (it is worth noting that the circle of informed persons was very wide and even the task for the game was made typographically in the form of a brochure on 99 sheets). For the commanders of the middle level, the conditional “war” was supposed to begin strictly according to the Charter: “If the enemy imposes war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking army that has ever attacked. We will conduct the war offensively, with the most decisive goal of completely destroying the enemy on his own territory ... "(Field Regulations, PU-39, chapter of 1, paragraph 2).

A giveaway game?

In order to realize the decisive goal of complete defeat, an unrealistically large number of formations were included in the “Eastern” Western Front: 67 (sixty-seven) rifle divisions and 3 cavalry divisions, 4 mechanized corps and 20 tank brigades. So it still seemed a little, and during the "game" the front received reinforcements as part of the 21 rifle division and 8 tank brigades. Never, according to any of the known plans of the strategic deployment of the Red Army, nor according to one of the statements of the distribution of forces of such a number of infantry for the Western Front, the real figures are in the range from 41 to 24 rifle divisions. Yes, 198 rifle divisions were part of the Red Army, and abstractly arguing, 88 divisions could be found for the Western Front, but this is a completely different alignment of forces, suggesting a completely different plan of war.

According to the scenario of the March "game", the enemy in the Western Front had only 33 infantry and 2 tank divisions in the first echelon and 6 infantry divisions in reserve in the Warsaw and Neidenburg area (now Nidzits - 80 kilometers north-west of Ostrolenka). Continuing to "play in the giveaway," the compilers of the assignment write: "In the direction of Augustów, the Sedlec enemy uses only medium and light tanks of old models." In other words, there is simply nothing to counterattack the advancing armada of the “eastern” Germans.

With such an introductory result of the game turned out to be quite expected. Within six days, the "Eastern" in tatters crushed the "Western". The main striking force of the Western Front, 2-Army (24 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 2 Mechanized Corps - not every front during World War II had the number) has made in-depth coverage of the Warsaw grouping enemy through Przasnysz, Ciechanow got to the Vistula and crossed it. Slightly less numerous 15-I Army (20 rifle divisions and 2 mechanized corps) advanced 130 kilometers from Brest to Demblin and is preparing to force the Vistula to join the 2-th Army troops with a ring of environment around the defeated enemy. To complete the picture, the "eastern" landed large airborne assault forces, which quickly captured the Vistula crossing.

The war in the air was described in an uncommon way in the game assignment. The “Western” air forces in the period of 12 – 15 of March were actively operating on troops, railway nodes and airfields. During the 13 – 15 March period, the Eastern air forces continued (emphasized by me. -M.S.) to fight for air superiority, covered the 2 Army’s strike force, interacted with ground forces to destroy the enemy’s retreating forces, stopped railway transportation , destroyed aircraft [of the enemy] at the airfields and did not allow the enemy’s reserves to approach the front along dirt roads. ” It is not clear what the aircraft of the “eastern” 12 of March did and when it began what “continued” 13 – 15 of March. In any case, having 5657 airplanes (four times more than it was in real June 41) against 2611 airplanes of "western" (twice as many as it was in reality) and, of course, did not disappear without a trace after the first strike on their own airfields, the Eastern air forces successfully solved all the tasks assigned to them: they won the air superiority, interacted, stopped, destroyed and prevented ...

April "fly"

For the sake of truth, it must be admitted that the General Staff of the Red Army very quickly realized that there was little practical use in the command-staff game with an outrageously overpriced own troops. The last "volleys" of the March "game" did not have time to fall asleep, as 20 March 1941, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Vatutin, approved the "Task for the decision of the army patrol". This interesting document was sent to 1 – 3 in April to the headquarters of nine (!) Military districts. The commanders had to analyze the situation as a result of conditional "combat actions", decide on the commander of the conditional 3 Army of the Western Front and prepare the corresponding combat order. Deadline (for different districts) - from 13 to 20 April.

And the “war” this time was this: “Westerners”, having suffered a defeat on the front of Grajewo, Brest (that is, from the northern to the southern bases of the Bialystok salient), departed in the Warsaw direction, covering the approach and concentration of reserves. 15 May 1941. The "Western" launched an offensive:

a) from the area of ​​Wyszków, Ostrow Mazowiecki by forces of 15 – 20 infantry and 2 tank divisions in the general direction of Bialystok;

b) from the area of ​​Lublin, Kock, Demblin by 25 – 30 infantry and 2 – 3 tank divisions in the direction of Brest.

2 card

In the direction of Przasnysz, Modlin and Siedlce, Warsaw, the “Western”, under pressure from the “Eastern”, continue to withdraw, putting up stubborn resistance on the previously prepared lines.

The Western Eastern Front (1, 10, 3, 5 of the Army) in a battle at the turn of the Narev and Bug rivers defeated the Western and develops an operation with a target of 1 and 3 with a concentric strike Armies in the direction of Warsaw defeat the Warsaw group of "Western" and go to the river. Vistula by the end of 20 May ... "(2 map).

As you can see, the overall plan of the operation and the direction of the main strikes of the "eastern" fully coincide with the March "game" in the Western PSB. As before, defeating the “Western” Warsaw grouping is planned by a concentric blow of two armies, one of which (1 on the game) leads the offensive north-west of the Narew River and goes to the Vistula west of Warsaw, and the other (3 on the game) breaks through Vistula from the southern contour of the Bialystok ledge, through Siedlce, Lukow. The other two, much smaller in composition army (10 and 5-I for the game) are connected by enemy forces at the junction between the two shock armies of the Western Front and the neighboring South-Western Front.

At the same time, the task for the April "fly" has two significant differences from the March "game". One of them is clearly visible on the map: the enemy this time is not limited to passive defense, but resolutely counterattacks with large forces, striking at the two weakest armies of the Western front and achieving significant success (in the Ostrolenka, Ostrow-Mazovia actions "transferred to the Soviet territory).

Secondly, the correlation of forces is completely different: in the 10 Army Band, the “Western” had almost double the numerical superiority (15 – 20 infantry and 2 tank divisions against the 9 rifle divisions and one “Eastern” mechanized corps), in the south, in the 5 band Army's superiority "Western" is simply overwhelming (25 – 30 infantry and 2 – 3 tank divisions against 6 rifle divisions “Eastern”). As a result, “on the morning of May 15, the troops of the 5 Army, met with a counterattack on the River Vepsh, began to withdraw to the r. Tysmenitsa; the left flank is broken in the area of ​​Stokek, Lublin, in the gap between the 5 Army and the 9 Army of the South-Western Front are attacking enemy tank and motorized formations ”.

As already mentioned, the mission was sent to nine military districts. In this list, and close neighbors Zapovo (Baltic and Kiev districts), and the most distant, including the Siberian and Central Asian (although it would seem - where is Vistula and where is Amu-Darya?). There is only one district in the list whose troops conduct conventional “military operations”. In my opinion, the only explanation for such an incident can only be that the command of the Western PSB worked out the above-described scenario of the war in more detail, most likely during a district operational game or field trip. But documents on these events have not yet been found.

On the eve of the disaster

About the command and staff exercises of the Western PSB in May of the 41, virtually nothing is known. Little more is known about the big strategic “game” of May 1941, but there is a map and even it alone allows us to draw some important conclusions. At the junction of the Western and Southwestern Fronts, the events of the May “game” developed as follows (3 map).

3 card

As we see, the plans of the high command of the Red Army have become more modest, and the mood and expectation are very alarming. The red arrows no longer reach for Warsaw and beyond the Vistula (and even more so there are no fights on the map for Budapest and Timisoara, which were played cheerfully on the strategic “game” in January). Worse, the enemy manages to invade Soviet territory, and on the northern flank of the Southwestern Front, the line of maximum advancement of the “western” reaches Kovel, Lutsk and Berestechko (70 – 80 kilometers east of the border).

The actions of the main grouping of the Western Front boil down to delivering two blows strictly to the south, through Siedlce, вuków and Biala Podlaska, Parchev in the general direction of Lublin. There, they meet with the shock grouping of the South-Western Front and close the ring around the "Western" ones surrounded in the Chelm, Krasnystav area. The composition of the Western Front was taken quite realistic (realistic for the completed or close to that strategic deployment of the mobilized Red Army, and not for the “surprise attack” situation).

We still do not know - what conclusions were drawn from the results of the strategic May "game", what decisions were made (more precisely, communicated to the performers) during the meeting of the senior commanders in Stalin's office 24 May 1941. The last pre-war weeks are still one of the most mysterious periods of Soviet history. Especially noteworthy are the six documents that were found in the archives of TsAMO, f. 28, op. 11627, d. 27, ll. 160 – 165. These documents are three huge maps and three small sheets of paper attached to each of the maps (4, 5, 6 maps).

The maps contain the “situation on the operational field trip” of the headquarters of the 3, 10 and 4 armies of the Western PSB, respectively (on the instructions of the field trip, they have the numbers 19, 21 and 22). The General Staff of the KA card with a short “escort” received, respectively, 4, 5 and 12 of June. The game time was set as follows: from the conditional 13 to 18 of June - for the 3 Army, from 16 to the 23 of June - for the 10-th Army, from 26 to the 29 of June - for the 4-th Army. Whether practically all or at least some of these trips have been carried out is unknown *.

4, 5.6 Cards

An extremely interesting phrase is found in the cover letter to the map of the field trip of the 3 Army headquarters. Major-General Semenov, deputy chief of staff of ZAPOV, reports: “In connection with the call of the commander of the troops to the People’s Commissar of Defense on 11.6, the field trip was postponed and will be conducted from 5 to June 9”. This phrase is interesting because it allows you to remove one of the riddles of June 41. Judging by the journal of Stalin’s office visits, in the evening of June 11 he met with the commander and the Emergency Situations Council of the Baltic PSB. And this is quite strange, since no other district commanders in Stalin’s office after the 24 meeting in May and up until the start of the war did not appear. Why would such special attention to the district, which, as can be seen from the currently known plans, was far from the direction of the main attack? Now it becomes clear that Kuznetsov and Dibrova did not appear alone in Moscow on June 11; in the same place and at the same time was the commander of the Western PSB Pavlov. It may well be that declassifying the documents of the Kiev OBO will expand this list ...

As for the scenario of army field trips planned for June of 41 in Western PSB, in all three cases the option of counterstrike is played, and this blow is dealt after the enemy is unusually deep, 70 – 100 kilometers advanced to the east - nothing there was no such thing in the previous "games". Three cards are not “pieces of the same mosaic”, the lines of defense and the direction of strikes of neighboring armies do not coincide according to the scenarios of field trips. On the other hand, comparing the maps with the text of Section VI of the Western OVO cover plan (“Possible actions to ensure the main operational directions in case of a breakthrough through the army’s defense areas of the enemy’s mechanics”), we find almost complete similarity of the tasks and operational solutions. Most likely, during the field trips it was planned to work out the actions of the command and army headquarters according to the cover plan, which was drawn up and approved just in June.

One answer and one question

Let's sum up. Despite the fact that the available information is rather chaotically scattered around the time of the first half of 41 and the space of the western regions of the USSR, despite the fact that the information on the operational “games” of the most powerful Kiev OVO remains inaccessible, the documents discussed above allow us to make several important conclusions.

The first. Operational preparation of the command and staffs of the Red Army for the war against Germany was carried out, and it was conducted constantly and persistently. It is sad that such an ordinary conclusion has to be specially emphasized, but the “historians” have not yet translated here, which tell us how Stalin replaced preparation for war with love looking at Ribbentrop's signature under the Non-Aggression Pact.

The second. From January to June 1941, the scenario of operational "games" undergoes quite distinct changes: the number of "eastern" troops is becoming less and less, the tasks and successes are becoming less and less ambitious. From the attack on Budapest to the counterattacks near Vilnius and Bialystok.

Third. Evaluation of combat effectiveness of its own troops remains consistently high. You can even describe some kind of conditional "pyramid of opportunities." With the numerical equality of forces with the enemy, the Red Army successfully comes - yes, slowly, passing “only” 10 kilometers per day, but it comes. With a twofold numerical superiority, the "eastern" carry the "western" to feathers. With a double numerical superiority of the enemy, the "eastern" stubbornly defend themselves, moving from time to time to a mobile defense. It is possible to break through the “eastern” front only when the “western” have 3 – 4 – 5 -fold numerical superiority in infantry and the overwhelming one in tanks; however, in these cases, a breakthrough means not “the beginning of a catastrophe understandable to you” **, but the crushing counter-strike of the Red Army in the next few days in the next, inevitably weakened section of the enemy front.

All this allows us to give a reasoned answer to the unfortunate question that was raised a thousand times on the pages of books and articles titled "The Secret of 22 June", "The Mystery of 22 June", "At Midnight 22 of June ..." As well as I could Stalin calmly go to sleep after intelligence reported on ...

And what is "wrong", dear comrades? Intelligence reported that in the frontier zone of East Prussia is concentrated to 500 German tanks? So they were expected to see 4000 there. Eight times more. On the Suwalki ledge airfields discovered before 300 German aircraft? But there, according to the scenario of the March "game", there should have been more than a thousand. Because of what Comrade. Stalin had to lose sleep and appetite? Stalin was proud of his logic and reasoned perfectly logical: all available intelligence information indicated that the concentration of the grouping of German troops near the borders of the USSR — the group that they expected to see at the border — was not only not completed, but had not yet begun. And if the troops of the indestructible Red Army are able to shake the enemy in a border battle for two weeks, then is it worth worrying - an hour earlier or an hour later, Directive No. 1 will go to the troops?

The question to which I have no intelligible answer lies in the other. From Kaunas, the command of the 11 Army, the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, the KGB and other superiors fled the afternoon of June 22. Wait until the evening did not. Bialystok will be far away from the border, and on the way to it two rivers - all military, party, KGB and other authorities escaped from Bialystok on the evening of June 22. Judging about the people on business - and it has always been considered the only true, it turns out that the comrade generals did not even have a shadow of doubt about the Red Army and its ability to resist the Wehrmacht. So for what and for whom did they write the “game assignment on 117 sheets”? Why did day after day, month after month draw arrows on maps? Who did they want to fool? Yourself? Stalin? Each other?

* In the book of Sandalov (on the eve of the war — Chief of Staff of the 4 Army) we read: “At the end of May, an army field trip was carried out, ending with a game on the cards. An offensive operation from the Pruzhany region, Antopol, Bereza-Kartuzskaya was played in the direction of Brest, Biala Podlaska ... For the last week of June, the district headquarters was preparing the game with the 4 Army headquarters also for an offensive operation. ”
** The sadly famous phrase from the report sent to Moscow by the Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front 14 September 1941 of the year after the breakthrough of the 2 and 1 units of the Wehrmacht tank groups to the deep rear of the Kiev Red Army troops.

Comments

[Kostya pedestrian]

instructive. thanks to the author.

[VadimSt]

1) “Orange” should not be considered neutral, but should be counted from the first stage of the game on the side of “Western” ones.
Do not go to Vanga - orange is already in Ukraine.

[uizik]

No Panic VadsmSt! There are still reds in Ukraine. We will play them to the full!

[valokordin]

The article is clearly anti-Soviet and every democrat is trying to kick the ancestors who have left for another world. The author spat in his grandfathers. Glory to the winners of the Soviet hydra.

[bart74]

Normal Soviet article. We were preparing for war. In his own way. in Russian. But they were getting ready. Article plus. Very greasy. And to you as a pessimist and provocateur MINUS!

[dmb]

Dear Kostya, what exactly did you learn from Solonin? Ability to customize the answers to the problem. Solonin's task is utterly primitive, to give "evidence of the impudent aggressiveness of the USSR" and his guilt in unleashing World War II. In this, he is no different from Novodvorskaya, Sakharov or Svanidze. I will not particularly paint that Solonin owes the very fact of his existence to the system that he criticizes, but even this he does with the expectation of the layman, who, apart from his articles, does not read anything, but believes him due to the large number of figures and schemes. (Well, about the same they were drawn by the cadet Bigler at Hasek). Here are some gems of modern Moltke. A headquarters game with an offensive operation in Finland. Aha-a-a-, the aggressors were preparing to attack, they wanted to break the peace treaty again. The author apparently forgot what the Finns were doing from 2 to 1941, and why we still had to carry out offensive operations in this area. The author's thoughts are no less deep in the "Burden of Choice" section. Foolish Soviet generals did not look at the map, they planned to attack with light tanks along the Mazovian swamps, where they could get to Solonin. He would have done it apparently in Ukraine. The Germans thought about the same in the summer of 1944. Is it okay that Operation Bagration, which the "idiots" who have not read Solonin, consider it successful for some reason, was carried out in no less swampy Belarus, and there were also a lot of tanks there?

[AK-74-1]

I absolutely agree with your position Dmitry-dmb. Moreover, the work of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense is a statics of compromises. That is, it is not possible to plan actions in isolation from the opinion of the political leadership, intelligence information about the plans of "neighbors" and "potential partners." Also, taking into account the territory of the USSR, it was simply impossible to cover the border to the operational depth equally tightly, which sets the task of countermeasures, including with the withdrawal of troops beyond the existing state border, both not on the territory of the enemy and on the territory of neighboring neutral states (a vivid example of Iran). The presence of plans to enter adjacent territories does not at all mean the implementation of such plans. In the same way, the presence of strategic nuclear forces does not at all mean the need for their use in any conflict. The factor of the threat of the use of any troops is important here. The example of the actions of Commander Apanasenko is very accurate, when the presence of 2 armies in the Far East actually led to the neutrality of Japan.

[Uncle]

Solonin betrayed himself by signing up, it would be more interesting incognito, read Malekh, looked at the author and threw it reading ...

[bart74]

The Finns provoked the Soviets by "collecting Finnish lands." That's why we got the winter war. We started by the way! I agree with you. To hell with these provocateurs who do not know the history of the Fatherland.

[Beck]

Stalin foresaw the attack. The General Staff foresaw. Intensive reflection exercises were conducted. Why did you get such a rout in 41? In my mind. One of the main reasons was the repression of the late thirties of the officer corps of the Red Army. 40 thousand officers, regular Russian officers of the tsarist army. With knowledge of the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Empire and the experience of the First World and Civil Wars.

After their repression, the green and young platoon commanders became battalion commanders. Commanders of battalions commanders of regiments, Commanders of regiments commanders of divisions and armies. After all, it was necessary to replace the experienced and knowledgeable, and that was replaced by inexperienced and unprepared. And the army was led not by commanders, but by the Bolshevik apparatchiks Voroshilov, Budyonny, Kuliki, and Mehlis (Mehlis attended courses of the Communist Academy and the Red Professors). This is one of the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 .. It is later that commanders Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Vatutin and other trainees in schools and academies where the tsar’s officers taught, that is, the color of the Russian officer corps destroyed Stalin.

And as communist propaganda buzzed in our ears, that the USSR simply wanted to push the border away from Leningrad. Finland, like half of Poland and the Baltic states, under the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, was included in the sphere of influence of the USSR. Therefore, Stalin wanted to capture Finland, as he captured half of Poland and the Baltic states.

Here are the plans, from the article - "Directive of NGOs No. OP / 503596 of March 28, 1941:" On a field trip, a FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION was practiced (so, in large letters, in the original document. - MS) in difficult winter conditions ... The main purpose of the field trip was to check the preparedness of the front-line and army directorates in organizing and conducting a modern operation in winter in the conditions of the Karelian-Finnish theater. "

"As part of the plan for the war with Finland * they had to jointly “Invade central Finland, defeat the main forces of the Finnish army here and take control of the central part of Finland”. To defeat and take possession, it was planned to deploy four armies: the 7th and 23rd of the troops of the Leningrad District, the 20th on the basis of the Oryol forces and the 22nd on the basis of the troops of the Ural districts.

[aleks]

some beck you trash dinosaur

[Beck]

Quote: aleks

some beck you trash dinosaur

Why are you saying that? You have not seen me? I have not grown up to a dinosaur. Well, not mature enough.

Quote: tomket

Regarding the tsarist army. What did the tsarist army achieve against Germany in 14-17?

They have achieved the main thing. They fought at the borders. And they did not let either the German or the Austro-Hungarian army deep into the territory of Russia.

Rokossovsky, like some others, is an exception. I can’t imagine how many Rokossovskys out of those 40 thousand would be.

The personal bravery and talent of the military commander are completely different things. Flapping a saber and moving armies in battle is quite, well, not at all one and the same.

The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland gained independence under the Brest-Litovsk treaty, initiated by the Bolsheviks as a subject of international law. The Bolsheviks would give even more if only to build their communism on some part of the earth. Or do you have a desire to return everything to the Russian Federation - try it, we will see how you violate all rights and obligations undertaken by the Kremlin.

During the defense of Crimea, the arrived Mehlis accused the commanders of regiments and divisions of cowardice. And he ordered to place the headquarters no further than three kilometers from the front line. After an hour of battle, all regiments and divisions were beheaded, since the headquarters were destroyed by artillery and aircraft. The front was broken through and German troops entered the strategic-operational space.

[nightingale]

Rokossovsky was also repressed in the 40th, it seems they released him, and before that he went to the beetles subordinate to him.

[tomket]

And Guderian, for example, in his car drove so far from his troops that he collided with a truck of our soldiers, and only because they were confused did not shoot him, and no one screams at the fact that Hitler drove Guderian ahead of his troops. for me it is so logical, since the divisions don't want to use radio communications, but they can't make phone calls, so how else can they lead the troops? Of course, when you wave the saber and they can kill you, but sitting at the card you’ll get a lope the mechanized corps will pass, and what will remain of it after such a march.

[bart74]

Put a minus. On the emotions. These are the generals who leaked the Baltic states of Poland and Suomi to the wall and put. Is not it so? Write the facts.

[tomket]

On the question of the tsarist army. What did the tsarist army achieve in Germany against 14-17? Nothing. So I wouldn’t have relied on the knowledge of the military who had acted on themselves in 17, and I wouldn’t keep those who had violated the oath in the army it would be, out of sin, so to speak. By the way, Rokossovsky also entered the 40 thousand officers and ordered nothing at the parade. And I think Rokossovsky was not the only one returned. Further, you know that Budyonny-ONLY man in the Russian army had five George Crosses? Budyonny in 31 year made a parachute jump, and ru led the reorganization and rearmament of the army, and in fact he gave life to t-34. No, he’s an apprentice and a grunt for you! Do you know that Voroshilov was the first to encircle the troops and kick Manstein? Not too, after all, a politician of pure water! and the Baltic States are parts of Tsarist Russia ???? Do not know? So why should we blame Stalin for collecting the confused royal lands? Regarding the Mehlis, it seems to me if it weren’t for the Mehlis, then the 41 drape would have stopped not near Moscow but somewhere in the Urals, what is so terrible that the Mehlis demanded that the military fight and PROTECT THE COUNTRY ???? Ah poor Popel, his voice was raised because he didn’t learn how to lead the troops, but here the war. Evil Vashugin is demanding to launch an offensive, oh ooh, things are bad, how is that ????

[Uncle]

And you do not remember in what year Ukraine was given to the Germans?

[nightingale]

By the way, Rokossovsky was also a member of 40 thousand officers and commanded nothing at the parade. And I think Rokossovsky was not the only one returned.

only a few hundred were returned and many were shot in October 41

[bart74]

FRAMES DECIDE EVERYTHING - THIS IS AN EXPRESSION OF STALIN!

[bart74]

Here! otherwise Hitler wouldn’t be jealous of Stalin. Not only this bastard still fired. Grandfather was sitting around sitting over a disassembled machine gun without cartridges, and the officer was sunbathing on vacation. It was so? IT WAS! All these Moss Vissarionitch is to blame

[Uncle]

Quote: Beck

One of the main reasons was the repression of the late thirties of the officer corps of the Red Army

Why were there repressions? Why were intellectuals from science, art, military affairs forced into camps or shot? That is the main question. And I do not know the answer to it ... Perhaps the repression was not an end in itself, but a consequence of the revolution, if you like, a payment for its blood.

[tomket]

Intellectuals who, for example, wanted to nationalize women in the USSR, I would have driven them to the camp. Who do you think is a specialist in military affairs who was killed? For example, Brusilov died of his own death, Tukhachevsky, you read what he offered as a military thought? Yakir or Uborevich? about the repression, because Stalin didn’t make peasants in the villages knock on each other.

[nightingale]

about the repressions, so after all, it was not Stalin who peasants in the villages forced to knock on each other

it was his henchmen and their henchmen and henchmen henchmen did

[tomket]

Yeah, and the Rothschilds are soldering Russia.

[Beck]

Quote: Uncle

Why were there repressions?

My answer. From the theory of communism. From the provisions of class antagonism. And in addition to this theory of Stalin's calculations, that the class struggle after the victory of the revolution can even escalate.

And not only the bourgeoisie and the landlords, kulaks were assigned to the hostile classes, but also the intelligentsia as the offspring and collaborator of capitalism.

It was this theory that substantiated all the eliminations of objectionable, any.

[Uncle]

Quote: Beck

My answer. From the theory of communism. From the provisions of class antagonism.

We begin to approach the essence of communism. To his original source. To the roots of satanic teachings.

[nightingale]

To the roots of satanic teachings.

and who wrote it

[Evreget]

Beck, it seems, is stupid, and Uncle is even more ...

[Evreget]

(To Beck) You, my friend ...

[nightingale]

Why were there repressions? Why were intellectuals from science, art, military affairs forced into camps or shot? That is the main question. And I do not know the answer to it ... Perhaps the repression was not an end in itself, but a consequence of the revolution, if you like, a payment for its blood.

initially destroyed the political opponents of Stalin. then those who somehow came into contact with them. the conveyor does not tolerate stops and as a result we got to initiative and honest people.

[bart74]

Back it up with facts. Who are your honest and proactive people? Among today's homosexuals, there are also many initiative ones. Therefore, we now have the "most comfortable and best" form. DATA! STAFF IS DECIDING EVERYTHING - THIS IS STALIN'S EXPRESSION!

[nightingale]

And as communist propaganda buzzed in our ears, that the USSR simply wanted to push the border away from Leningrad. Finland, like half of Poland and the Baltic states, under the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, was included in the sphere of influence of the USSR. Therefore, Stalin wanted to capture Finland, as he captured half of Poland and the Baltic states.

if Stalin had not captured half of Poland and the Baltic states, then Moscow simply would not have time to defend

[tomket]

It would have been possible if the number of troops had not decreased, the concentration would have increased, well, maybe the encirclement would have been more catastrophic in scale of the troops destroyed in the boiler. Yes, and the light in Moscow did not converge, after 1812 of the year nothing has changed in the country, why would it have changed in 41 ? Well, there would be stalingrad only near Moscow.

[Thunderbolt]

I think that Stalin really did not consider the reconnoitered number of German troops critical for the start of the war. In addition, information about the concentration came from scattered agents, sometimes contradictory. And given the disinformation actions of the Germans (for example, tankers were wearing field uniforms, and many second echelons and the rear remained in the operational depth and began to pull up on June 22 according to the clearly developed plan of the General Staff) all this allowed them to achieve operational surprise and hide the direction of the main attack. Of course, the Red Army units were pulled closer to the border (which in itself created " local "confusion and disorganization), but the pace, the pace ... Mobilized, with the experience of fighting in Europe, well-oiled management and supply, using effective methods of waging a short-lived war, the German army rushed deep into the Soviet Land. This is my opinion

[tomket]

Let me tell you a secret, Stalin thought, as it is not strange, dvizii on the border and not tanks and planes individually at the airfields in Prussia. Besides, they didn’t exactly tell him anything, otherwise the military leadership would at least know the direction of the main attack.

[Black]

Why from day to day, from month to month did arrows draw on maps? Who did they want to trick? Yourself? Stalin? Each other?
The fear of the events of the 30s deprived the leadership of the Red Army of the opportunity to speak and think, soberly assess the capabilities of the enemy. Fear is not to please, fear is not to think as the Party commands, they drew up their own abilities and belittled the capabilities of the enemy.
Well, the "general genius of the Leader of all times and peoples" shone brightly here.

[Uncle]

Quote: Chen

Fear of the events of the 30s deprived the leadership of the Red Army of the opportunity to speak and think,

Precisely, fear was in all the institutions of the state, from ordinary citizens to the government. My grandmother briefly described those pre-war years, "We were afraid."

[tomket]

And my friend’s grandmother, a Chechen, says that such a person is spread rot now, under the tsar they didn’t consider people like cattle, and prices only fell under Stalin.

[bart74]

Here! My grandmother speaks Russian too. Bread prices only under Stalin declined. All for Victory. All for the People!

[tomket]

They probably didn’t put their hands to their heads, but they wrote in unison when Stalin came into the office, such an atmosphere of fear was at that time, by the way, you didn’t think that the same Zhukov was part of the Party, apparently stood and was afraid to think differently from that of his party .

[nightingale]

Yes, they were not written, but rejoiced how they could put it right on Stalin.
fear experienced those who did not write danos

[bart74]

Black one. Do not get fooled by provocations. Before that, the Japs were beaten on Hassan? BEAT. Belofinnov beat? BEAT? But the Tukhachevsky Poles could not split, and Stalin returned to Poland without firing a shot. Do you feel? Here is the difference. Do not Cry. Under Stalin, they didn’t put anyone to the wall. My family of workers and peasants has no losses! And if pittarmoses of hintelligents were placed against the wall - these are your difficulties. As one friend of mine in the 5th generation says, I’ll shoot everyone! who from syphilis is not dead!

[8 company]

Read the memoirs of V. Novobrantz "I warned about Stalin's war." Before the war, the author held a "firing squad" position as chief of the information department of the RU RKKA. Before him, several people were shot in this position. He describes well the "kitchen" of the pre-war plans, when Stalin did not believe in the data of the Intelligence Agency, which revealed the German troops on the Soviet border quite accurately. The scouts who provided accurate information were shot as disinformers and spies. Golikov, the new chief of the Intelligence Agency, was forced to give Stalin deliberately low data on concentrated German troops in order to survive himself. 39 senior officers with extensive experience and knowledge of intelligence work, with many years of service in the Intelligence Agency, were killed. Only the chiefs of the RU were shot Berzin, Nikonov, Gendin, Orlov, Proskurov. Only Golikov managed to survive, and only because he put on Stalin's table only the information that the leader wanted to see, and not the real one.

[bart74]

It was all in the Khrushchev era. Bring me memoirs before 1953.

[tomket]

He didn’t accidentally report to Stalin that the main direction of the attack would be Novaya Zemlya? It’s very convenient for Stalin to dream while Got stomping on the shores of the White and Barents Sea we will hit Berlin! A furious blow to Germany !!! Well, we’ll put Zhukov on the Novaya Zemlya as a commandant, so that he could restrain the onslaught of the scoundrel-Guderian! One can only sympathize with Stalin that after the shooting of Proskurov he remained to rest on his laurels and did not take on Golikov, who pushed to the direction of the main attack.

[Black]

Maybe not quite "on topic" ....
Often on the forum one can hear "that would be Stalin!", "And at that time ,,." etc.
The totalitarian Soviet system has undoubted advantages. Somehow ..
- clear plans and development prospects, submission of the will of the people to this goal,
- the ability to mobilize funds and forces,
- ......... well, and much more .....
But
- the lack of initiative of everyone, from a general to a sergeant in the army, from a locksmith to a chief designer in industry - as a dogma, manual control of everything - from cinema and theatrical performances to T-34 (there is someone in the country to think, and you do it!) "Initiative - punishable! "
- promotion to leadership positions is sometimes not based on knowledge and skills, but according to the principles of reliability
- gaps in knowledge and shortcomings in the total genius of the leader (where he is strong, everything works out, and where he turned out to be a "Generalissimo", they got there in 41, and what is very indicative of this plan, in 42; "bourgeois" of genetics, cybernetics threw the country to frontiers that we will never cover now, at least for the foreseeable future)
- the low price of a person’s life (and according to the laws of social justice, life, of an ordinary and a marshal, was not much for the system).

I think when we "call" ourselves back to the past of the country, and we need to think about that.

[tomket]

Apparently Stalin invented the T-34, and he personally led each platoon, since the sergeants were initiativeless, and he also sorted out the potatoes on collective farms, since they were all initiative-free, don’t carry any rubbish, many had such an initiative that only by shooting them managed to stop their initiative.

[bart74]

Think first before carrying any Vava on the air. Think! Put you such a first to the wall to not provoke and did not bark. Mongrel.

[tomket]

And what am I provoking? Read Tukhachevsky’s thoughts on dynamo-reactive weapons, for example, or the number of tanks needed in the Red Army, or a biography of Yakir and Dybenko, then make sure of Stalin’s humanism, let's insult Mr. Tuzik or pug like you there. You probably read about Dybenko for the first time ... ..

[bart74]

And what do you think sergeants are initiative now? And where is the sergeant and where is the ensign who are no longer there? You do not need to flog nonsense. In a crisis situation, the volitional qualities of a person manifest spontaneously. And about the asshole of Russian sergeants, I think you simply were not in combat units.

[tomket]

And where in Russia can a normal sergeant come from? The same conscript is no more no less.

[washi]

In my opinion, and not only, there were conspiracies of the Trotskyists, and not only. And not all supporters of the "world revolution" were able to neutralize them. (Khrushchev alone is worth something (he officially belonged to the Trotskyist bloc, then repented)). Otherwise, it is not possible to explain why the Navy was able to move to BG, and the land districts slowed down. Pavlov's actions are generally not clear. Either he was in a vacuum at all, or there were not official orders that he followed and the entire western direction flew

there was no need to engage in window dressing, it was necessary to train troops. By the way, it was Zhukov who was the main show-off and the most stupid military commander. And he was an NGS, which did not set up intelligence and communications. As a result, at the beginning of the war there was neither one nor the other - as a result of the loss

[Selevc]

At present, fashionable theories are walking among the people - for example, Tukhachevsky and others would have been alive - there would have been 41 years, a conspiracy theory in the Red Army, a theory of Stalin’s insane acts ...

But this is all nonsense - it does not essentially answer the question - Why did the Germans so quickly defeated parts of the Red Army and so quickly found themselves near Moscow?

In my opinion, it is absolutely not a matter of repression - if in the place of the same Pavlov there would have been one of the executed marshals, the situation would have been the same, if not worse ... The main reason is that no one knew how to counter Blitzkrieg tactics... The tactics of a deep breakthrough of the front was but there was nothing to oppose it ... Moreover, with the enormous length of the western border of the USSR, weak spots for breaking the front would only be a matter of a matter of days ... And so far, Blitzkrieg has not run out of steam (front line and communications Wehrmacht greatly increased) until that time, our army retreated and could not turn the tide ...

Suvorov and Solonin are constantly repeating to us in their books - here Germany had much fewer tanks, planes, divisions, etc. Tanks were worse than they were less, etc. etc. All the writings of these authors can be answered with one phrase - SO WHAT ?
After all, the availability of a multitude of modern equipment is by no means a guarantee of victory ... It is also necessary that the troops competently and harmoniously fight, that the communications between the units are established, that the fighters are fired, that the orders of the high command are carried out quickly and as needed ... Next - you need that the rear services, the fuel and lubricants support service and the repairmen work effectively, that there is mutual understanding between the different branches of the army ... None of this was in our army in the 41st ... RKKA - it was an army of PEACE TIME - that is, a huge clumsy mechanism in which some gears were clearly not fitted to others ...

[Selevc]

But for the Germans, this very mechanism was established and worked perfectly - this is the main reason for the defeats of the 41st and 42nd years ...

And even any of the most talented marshals could not, like a wizard, set up this huge and complex mechanism that the Red Army was ...

And how many do not carry out staff exercises (as well as field exercises) - all the same, war is not otherwise ...
And of course, you must pay tribute to the German generals at the beginning of the war, their tactics were unsurpassed ...

I also forgot to note - the situation on the fronts changed within a matter of hours - and it was necessary to quickly respond to all events, despite the fact that the initiative was clearly in the hands of the enemy ... Put yourself in the place of Pavlov - I think you would be shot too !!!

And in 1944, the Soviet army already showed your blitzkrieg - the same deep breakthrough of the front ... And the Germans were never able to turn the tide in their favor, although they competently defended themselves - they dragged on until the end of the war ...

[nightingale]

And how many do not carry out staff exercises (as well as field exercises) - all the same, war is not otherwise ...

the article shows how the situation is being rethought towards realism according to Stalin we were not a year old 0 the war was planned for 42 years

I forgot to note that the situation at the fronts changed within a matter of hours - and it was necessary to quickly respond to all events, despite the fact that the initiative was clearly in the hands of the enemy ... Put yourself in the place of Pavlov - I think you would be shot too !!!

I don’t know about the execution, but probably it would be better for Pavlov to manage the front from the rate as far as I know than to drive to the bayonets under the bialystok

maybe there wouldn’t be such a rout

[Selevc]

Many field exercises and staff games were held in the Red Army before the war - there are interesting photos and info on this topic even in Zhukov's book "Memories and Reflections" ...

But in any exercises there is a considerable proportion of window dressing and war usually shows the real state of affairs in the army ...
On the other hand, confusion + sabotage work of the enemy + categorical and often belated orders of his command usually reigns in a dying army ... I think the situation was similar in the 41st year in the Soviet army ...

[8 company]

Quote: Selevc

The main reason is that no one knew how to withstand Blitzkrieg tactics ..

You are deeply mistaken. Firstly, blitzkrieg has been used in Europe for 2 years. Secondly, read on the Internet how Mogilev defended 172 sd Romanova against several divisions of Guderian for 22 days, how Katukov acted in 1941, how the 1st Moskovskaya mssd Kreizer fought on Moskovsky Highway. These formations not only fought worse than the Germans, but better.

The Red Army - it was an army of PEACE TIME - that is, a huge clumsy mechanism in which some gears were clearly not fitted to others ...

Yes, this is true, but it is in the competence of the top leadership of the army and the country. Everything is organized from top to bottom and nothing else.

[Selevc]

The fact that some of our troops defended themselves heroically is an indisputable fact ...

So what if Blitzkrieg has been used in Europe for two years? And tell me please - has at least one European country found an effective way to defend against Blitzkrieg tactics? Blitzkrieg has been very successfully applied and NO ONE I didn’t know how to counter this tactic - neither France nor England nor Poland ... The Germans had very good intelligence - they found weak links in the enemy’s defense and quickly concentrated troops and broke through the front ... When breaking through the front, you can defend in two ways - either retreat with battle to the entire defending group, or keep to separate units to the end and get surrounded ...

Maybe you understand military tactics better than me - then explain what to do, for example, the Red Army divisions if the enemy broke through the front in a neighboring sector? How to defend reasonably so as not to get into the environment?

For example, already in the first weeks of the war, a huge group of Soviet troops was surrounded in the Białystok region - since this area with very poor roads prevented the rapid withdrawal of troops and the geography itself was against ours (Bialystok ledge) ... And by the way, I think that it was because of of bad roads, none of the neighboring formations came to the aid of these troops ...

In addition, the Germans used the tactics of the offensive "ticks" - covering our separate formations from the north and south ... How can you reasonably resist such tactics?

To the interlocutors who are simply minus - special thanks - I think they just have nothing to argue !!!

[8 company]

Quote: Selevc

In addition, the Germans used the tactics of the offensive "ticks" - covering our separate formations from the north and south ... How can you reasonably resist such tactics?

There is such a popular saying: the cunning ... there is ... with a screw. Read the history of the war, ours gradually learned to resist this tactic and used it successfully themselves. And what they could not at the beginning of the war is, I repeat, entirely the fault of the country's leadership and the army. Who commanded the army at the beginning of the war? Budyonny, Voroshilov, Tymoshenko. Read about their military "achievements".

[tomket]

The Germans had the same intelligence as we could where they could, otherwise they would have known the number of tanks before the war and the second echelon, etc. You can resist the blitzkrieg, you don’t even need to invent anything, you just need to fight on the flanks in an organized manner to go into captivity. as soon as resistance appeared in the surrounded or surrounded parts, the blitzkrieg mechanism malfunctioned instantly, for example the Mogilevsky Kotel. well, in addition, the Germans sometimes simply choked on the number of troops that surrounded them, but it was also necessary to liquidate them, and this already was usual second military operation, and to blitz Krieg had nothing to do.

[nightingale]

then explain what to do, for example, the Red Army divisions if in the neighboring area there was a breakthrough of the front by the enemy? How to defend reasonably so as not to get into the environment?

you don’t even have to invent anything; everything is written in the charter. another question why not? probably they were afraid because there was an order contrary to all charters, and failure to comply with the order was punishable by death. many commanders had their own lives more expensive than the lives of fighters. Yes and relatives had to think after the punishment, they became relatives of the enemy of the people

[Selevc]

Quote: nightingale

you don’t even have to invent anything; everything is written in the charter. another question why not? probably they were afraid because there was an order contrary to all charters, and failure to comply with the order was punishable by death.

I think this is the ossified and idle army mechanism of the Red Army ... Too many formalities, too little initiative, too much needed to be coordinated with the authorities and the charter + fear for the possibility of a tribunal in case of failure ... And the enemy at that time I didn’t sit ...

Then all this tinsel somehow crumbled by the year 1943 - the Red Army began to operate more reasonably under the circumstances and all kinds of formalities became less ..

[nightingale]

For example, already in the first weeks of the war, a huge group of Soviet troops was surrounded in the Białystok region - since this area with very poor roads prevented the rapid withdrawal of troops and the geography itself was against ours (Bialystok ledge) ... And by the way, I think that it was because of of bad roads, none of the neighboring formations came to the aid of these troops ..

the roads there were excellent - after all, Poland. they came there along good roads, and retreated along bad roads - the German took good ones. none of the neighboring formations came to the aid of these troops, and there were practically none.
it was necessary to manage to drive all the troops into this ledge without leaving reserves.

[Selevc]

Which are great? - you look at the map - from the side of the former USSR only one railway and two or three more or less large highway roads lead to Bialystok ... And around the famous Masurian swamps ...
Excellent roads are closer to Warsaw - and in eastern Poland, roads at that time were significantly worse than in other regions of the country ...

[Selevc]

Quote: Company 8

Yes, this is true, but it is in the competence of the top leadership of the army and the country. Everything is organized from top to bottom and nothing else.

One fact that after five months of the war the Germans found themselves near Moscow suggests exactly that something was clearly not working in the control structure of the Red Army ...

[bart74]

Not all commanders were put up against the wall. They didn't put the squeeze on. The komvzod made excellent regimental commanders. As for the hysteria of the lack of personnel, I can say that the top and the General Staff remained in full completeness. Plus, the red-faced khomandirs turned around from the bunks. It is not only necessary to fill the price of these "reprised" commanders. The price of these commanders is 1 kopeck per market day! Remember Tukhachevsky's legendary campaign against Warsaw! Until now, Russia cannot get rid of this. Where is Russia and where is the Kingdom of Poland? So it was reasonable to put the snickering polkans against the wall. It would not be superfluous even now. Who served and saw these half-kanoderasts will agree with me. Comrade was right. Stalin. Right in everything!

[Beck]

Quote: bart74

From the commander’s excellent regiment commanders were obtained.

Therefore, they rolled back to Moscow with the loss of millions of soldiers.

It is good that even before the repressions, Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Chernyakhovsky and others would graduate from the academy in which former tsarist officers taught.

[nightingale]

Who served and saw these polkoderoderastov Rights was comrade. Stalin. Right in everything

Polkoderoderasty are all the stalnices of the stalinists of Stalin or their spiritual heirs

[nightingale]

the fact that in the governance structure of the Red Army clearly something was not working ...

It seems that this continues and now does not work so

[tomket]

How was the dumbest warlord able to take Berlin? I now think that Montgomery was the dumbest. Patton was not very smart either, and different SS generals didn’t know much about military science. At the expense of ostentatiousness, did you hear about the three greatest commanders on earth according to the Amers? MACEDON, CAESAR AND PATTON. No more, by the way about ostentatiousness.

[homosum20]

Played out, damn it, naf. And our lovers of squares and arrows play out.

[nightingale]

there is a pearl - Zhukov at one of the exercises playing for the blue surrounded and defeated Pavlov who played for the Reds. the article doesn’t say about this, is this just another fiction?
the article shows how the military leadership descended from heaven to earth with each game more and more realistic assessed the situation

[rainer]

Well, it’s not so true ... On the site rkka.ru there are REAL materials of that game ...

[bart74]

Comrade I want to put a solid plus to Mark Solonin. Now it’s clear why Vissarionych was calm before the war. It's like that. Summed up the efficiency of management and the moral and combat qualities of commanders.
Not everyone, unfortunately, was put to the wall by this moment. Even Hitler admitted it. But he didn’t have enough power to clean it.

[tomket]

Solonin is a pseudo-historian and that says it all. By the way, who let Roosevelt down at 41 ???? Nimitz or Fletcher? or MacArthur? But the disaster in the Pacific Ocean is one-on-one according to the "Barbarossa" scheme, and by the way, the Americans had more battleships, and the surrender of the Philippines is quite comparable to the Kiev cauldron in terms of the scale and unexpectedness of the finale, the reason is the same - the ENEMY.

[Selevc]

Pearl Harbor really looks like June 41st - in that it was a sudden and powerful blow ... But of course the scale is incommensurable ...

Pearl Harbor it was a great idea in terms of tactics but a defeat in terms of strategy ... Given the power of US industry - time worked against Japan immediately after the outbreak of war ...

[nightingale]

By the way, who let Roosevelt down at 41 ???? Nimitz or Fletcher? or MacArthur? But the disaster in the Pacific Ocean is one-to-one according to the "Barbarossa" scheme

it is assumed that a telegram about the Japanese attack on Hawaii specially slowed down the ball Roosevelt needed a war to pull the economy out of depression. The American people did not want to get involved in the war. but the aircraft carriers were taken away from Pearl Harbor

[Igarr]

You guys are arguing about nothing.
It’s immediately obvious that you do not work much with papers.
Game conditions on 117 pages - can you imagine? One U S L O V AND I ..
report to 10..something there .. about the destruction of stuffed cards and materials ...
...
And ..bart74 .. writes about his grandfather, who was sitting with a disassembled machine gun.
..
One to one, as now. Nastrochim..Projects, .. Plans, ... Presentations ...
We will call from three boxes ... how we will build the most powerful bridge ... the longest road .... the most intelligent and technologically advanced Skolkovo ....
And - to implement ?? A - what for?
The funds have been spent, the bosses have approved everything, the materials have been written off.
All - the process is complete.
...
All these games of 1941 - they are the games. A circle of ... lovers of war games .. fought ... on the maps. And nobody - was involved in the field - it’s difficult there.
The authorities reported. The authorities made a decision - Normal.
And ... EVERYTHING.
...
Got 1941.
But by 1945 they learned to fight in the field!
That’s the glory ... of our Army.

[mamba]

Quote: Igarr

Got 1941.
But by 1945 they learned to fight in the field!

The main thing is that the combat experience gained with a lot of blood does not go to waste. So that we do not step on the same rake every time of disorganization, lack of initiative, incompetence, slovenliness and bungling. And recently there has also been total theft! In order not to have to study again, as it was in Afghanistan, Chechnya, South Ossetia. The payment for such a "study" is too high.

[8 company]

Quote: Igarr

All these games of 1941 - they are the games. A circle of ... lovers of war games .. fought ... on the maps. And nobody was involved in the field - it’s difficult there. They reported to the authorities. The authorities made a decision - Normal.

These games are a normal attribute of staff work and are used in all armies of the world to train commanders and staffs. In the strategic war game of 1935 - the last game in which Tukhachevsky participated (he commanded the 'blues' advancing on Moscow), the task was developed by General Lukirsky and he also conducted the rallies. Subsequently, when at the end of 1941 the Germans reached Moscow, all the officers who participated in that game recalled Lukirsky and argued that the front in 1941 self-stabilized exactly at the line at which Lukirsky stabilized it in the game. By the way, he was also shot for this game. He was accused of 'letting the enemy near Moscow itself'.
Little did you do the field? As much as they planned "upstairs", they did so much: the pilots had 10-20 hours of flight, the tankers did not more. Planning is carried out from top to bottom, all questions are to the people's commissars Voroshilov and Tymoshenko. The issue of allocating fuel and lubricants for training troops was discussed at the very top, Rychagov was shot for him when he flared up at a meeting in the Kremlin:
- 30 hours is enough to ensure that the pilot crashed. And he still needs to be able to fight. 120 hours is required at least!
Stalin did not like this; he knew better how much the pilots needed.
And the Germans had at least 200 flying hours.

[tomket]

under Nicholas II the projects of automatic and self-loading were cut off because of the fear that the soldiers would start to spend a lot of cartridge, as another example, you can remember the veteran’s words that you’ve mastered everything you need by the fifth flight, but you can also fly for 500 hours but don’t learn anything. In England, for example, memories of Douglas Bader, before the war was prepared in the year already A whole squadron, well, there was a raid on hoo and all is necessary, even the Germans were jealous but the quantity for World War is clearly worthless.

[Selevc]

I think that after the Soviet-Finnish war, the Soviet leadership made the right conclusions and during the first half of the 1940s, enough field exercises were held ...

But still, modernizing the management of such a huge army as the Red Army, improving the supply, building fortified defensive positions, increasing the experience of the junior from the middle command link - it simply did not have enough time ...

And you do not forget that all over the world at that time, tank building and aircraft building were developing with giant steps ... The equipment released just yesterday very quickly became obsolete ... Yes, and there was no need to spray tanks and planes in parts, and to form shock groups of them - as the same Fritz did ...

[tomket]

They learned to fight by the 42 year, in fact a radical turning point was in the battle of Moscow, further on the Wehrmacht’s agony stretched out over the 4 year.

[Igarr]

We were able to fight in 1939. In 1929, 1940. 1941 ..
The regiment is fighting - against the division. A "platoon near the village of Kryukovo" is fighting. 28 Panfilov's men are fighting against a tank company (or maybe a battalion, I was not looking for it).
They are at war near Moscow in 1941, when they razdanilil smaller number and drove off a larger group.
And 1942 .. again - Kharkov, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Crimea. As long as we are not bullied, we won’t sway.
Is this PLANNING? Get in the face? And then, washing your blood - to smash the enemy?
The plan .. we get in the face, three times ... as the third molar is knocked out - we begin the attack.
For some reason, I, planning, especially military, had a different idea.

[tomket]

The main thing that is constantly being missed during 41goda disasters is the path that tank armies traveled on the path from the incapable mechanized corps to the tank armies, and our tank armies corresponded in composition and quality to approximately the German tank division. As a reverse example of learning from experience, we can recall the borrowing of tank brigades by the Wehrmacht in the 44 year from us. Just because our brigades were not very viable and the Wehrmacht quickly abandoned them, we also note that neither the Americans nor the British really learned how to use tanks before end of the war. The correctness of certain pre-war decisions could only be verified by the war, we have corrected the mistakes, the Wehrmacht is not.

[nightingale]

Which are great? - you look at the map - from the side of the former USSR only one railway and two or three more or less large highway roads lead to Bialystok ... And around the famous Masurian swamps ...
Excellent roads are closer to Warsaw - and in eastern Poland, roads at that time were significantly worse than in other regions of the country ...

in western Belarus even dirt roads were covered with gravel and they did not become wet after rain, the network of roads is denser than in other regions of our country. famous Masurian swamps ... in the northwest of Bialystok in the territory of Prussia. surrounded ours in the area of ​​Novogrudok, where the good roads ended practically they were gone two Germans occupied the shoseyki if not the swamps at all, no one would have escaped.

[Mikhail Zubkov]

“The command of the 11th Army, the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, the Chekist and other authorities fled from Kaunas in the afternoon of June 22. They did not wait until evening. Bialystok will be far from the border and there are two rivers along the way to it - all military, party, from Bialystok KGB and other authorities escaped on the evening of June 22. " - for this alone, the 100% FALSE statement of the author Mark (!) Solonin should be brought to justice. Firstly, for the vile slander against the headquarters of the 11th Army of the NWF. Secondly, for the perversion of facts on the 10th army of the ZF and its 6th mk, whose headquarters were in Bialystok. As for the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party and parts of the NKVD (and not only), located on 22.06.41. in Kaunas, in which already from night from 21.06.41. a sabotage and terrorist attack by ARMED and ORGANIZED pro-fascist formations, shooting from around the corner and reprisals against individual Soviet military personnel and members of their families, with killings in the back of Soviet officers in the Lithuanian "territorial" division, I can’t cite the facts right now, although I’ve published the facts right now I remember the documents in general terms - EVERYTHING ACCEPTED THE PLANS FOR THE CASE OF WAR AND THE REALITIES OF ATTACKS AS AN EXTERNAL AND AN INTERNAL ENEMY. The Lithuanian communists defended themselves, formed labor squads, the NKVD troops defended around the military depots of the NWF and the transportation hubs of Kaunas, primarily the military airfield and railway station (where there were fights involving even our tank and anti-aircraft units, rear units and units, evacuation was ongoing family members and parts of military property, sending to already active troops at the border of a part of ammunition and fuel and lubricants), etc.
ALL NWF compound headquarters had EQUIPPED FIELD DEPARTMENTS in case of war, located CLOSER to the border, where they were redeployed according to the plans and directives of the General Staff and PribOVO headquarters. And this sofa author calls the term "escaped"? My father, an officer-captain of the headquarters of the 11th Army, was already under 4.00 am under shelling in Alytus, where he delivered an order at 3.30 on the callsign and communication plan from 22.06.41. to headquarters 5 etc., whose regiments by this time had already been withdrawn from this town to the forest surroundings. In Alytus, in the unfinished URs, the battalions of 8 divisions of the 11th army and the detachments of military builders were already taking positions, the rifle regiments were already behind the bridges, they were already at the positions of the VET battery - and for a full day from 4.00 to 23.00 they these positions were held ON THE BASIC DIRECTION OF THE MAJOR IMPACT of the German army group "North". It was precisely the 11th NWF army that was held under the command of Lieutenant General Morozov and gave it 5 TD, which suffered heavy losses during the day under continuous bombing and shelling, as well as multiple TANK attacks, on the night of 23.06. BY ORDER, she retreated to Kaunas (again in the main strike zone of the Germans), where she took part in the battles for him with the remainder of her forces and withdrew completely on the 24.06. to Vilnius, and then forced to retreat in the ZF strip. Rifle divisions of the 11th army, border guards, builders of the UR, leaving cover, ORGANIZED retreated to Šiauliai, where by order they took up defenses, but were soon knocked down and partially surrounded, and began the ORGANIZED exit from the encirclement from 24.06.41., Without any help and relations with the headquarters of the NWF, where, on the initiative of a bastard, also political writers, meanwhile, were declared "surrounded or captured and not representing an organized force, and unable to carry out tasks" - in the encryption of the headquarters of the NWF in the General Staff from 26.06.41. But the 11th army fought at the exit from the encirclement on 28.06.41/26.06.41/11., Trying to break through Dvinsk (Daugavpils), but NOBODY helped it from the front at the already occupied SS Panzer Division "Dead Head" 11/1942/10. Dvinsk. But the headquarters of the XNUMXth army eventually got out of the encirclement in the region of Polotsk-Demyansk, withdrawing several thousand people, hundreds of wagons with wounded and property, carrying out the banners of the army, corps and divisions, and was put on the defensive at the same Demyansk, where the Germans were stopped! Lieutenant General Morozov remained the commander of the same XNUMXth Army until November XNUMX! Continuously! I'm afraid to say what I want to say to the author !!! The headquarters of the XNUMXth Army of the ZF in similar circumstances was removed from the encirclement from Białystok by the chief of staff of the army, Major General Pyotr Lyapin, who was appointed the NS of the Reserve Front near Moscow and soon became lieutenant general. He also led thousands of people WITH THE BANNERS of the army, corps and divisions. Why should the political author slander these HEROIC armies and HEROIC military leaders?
As for the "offensive" ambitions in the headquarters games of the Red Army, there is nothing unusual here at all. In any military game on the maps, one side advances, and the other defends, but thinks about the offensive. What the Germans thought about - I bring documentary evidence of the JUDICIAL investigation and the case:

“In February 1941, Kleist was officially informed by Field Marshal Rundstedt about the time of Nazi Germany’s military attack on the USSR and received under his command three tank corps, which were part of the Rundstedt army group called“ South ”.

------

* Handwritten text in the upper right corner in blue ink.

[264]

In April 1941, Kleist, at the direction of the same Rundstedt, began to develop specific plans for a German military attack on the Soviet Union, and for this purpose from the tank corps, led by generals Mackensen *, Kempf and Wittersheim **, formed a tank group and located these troops are on Polish territory in the region of the cities of Tomaszew-Zamosc, 15-30 km from the Soviet border.

On the question of participation in the preparation of the military attack on the Soviet Union, Kleist during interrogation on April 9, 1949 testified: “For the first time I became aware of the impending German attack on the Soviet Union in February 1941, when I was in Bulgaria. I stayed in Yugoslavia until "On April 18, 1941, and then with his headquarters he went to Germany, where on April 25, 1941, while in Breslau, he began preparations for an armed attack on the Soviet Union."

“Having received from Rundstedt a list of units that will be part of my subordination and task, I took up the development of issues related to the offensive. I completed preparations for the invasion of Soviet territory by mid-June 1941, and then I went to my district with my headquarters the city of Tomashev-Zamosc on the Soviet-Polish border in the location of my buildings "(vol. 1, ld 18-26, 37)."

On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany, in violation of the treaty with the Soviet Union, committed a treacherous military attack on the USSR, and on June 23 Kleist, carrying out Hitlerite aggression plans, crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with his troops and invaded Soviet territory.

Kleist testified about his participation in the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on the USSR: ““ On June 22, 1941, the army of the Reichenau army crossed the Western Bug and went on the offensive, and on June 23 or 24, 1941 my tank group followed them ” . "In mid-August 1941, my corps approached the Dnieper and entered the battle for the cities of Kherson, Nikopol, Zaporozhye" (vol. 1, ld 26-27, t. 2, ld 9-11). "

From June 1941 to April 1944, Kleist, commanding successively the 1st Panzer Group, the 1st Panzer Army and Army Group A, participated in the capture and occupation of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Krasnodar Territory, the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Soviet Moldova and Crimea (vol. 1, ld 26-36, vol. 2, ld 9-17). "So the Germans have been drawing offensive arrows on maps since 1940 - and what are the rezunist authors trying to impute to the Red Army ? There are no words, except for very common ones, I have AGAINST SUCH POLITIC AUTHORS.

[jhltyjyjctw]

Is it that Solonin who cannot distinguish a topographic map from a geographical one and on a piece of paper dated May 15, in which Vatutin wanted to wrap pies, accuses my country of cannibalism? Turn on the brain, dear, this person is incompetently incompetent in the question he is talking about ...