Vyazminsky boiler
However, with the preparation of the new operation, the number of forces for its implementation increased. Ten days after Directive No. 35, 16 of September, the command of Army Group “Center”, from the general plan of the operation against “Tymoshenko’s troops,” proceeded to a more detailed plan. Successful development of the events near Kiev for the Wehrmacht allowed the commander of the Army Group Center to Fyodor von Bock to plan the deployment not only of the 3 and 4 of the tank groups, but also of the 2 of the tank group. 19 September 1941 g. Operation received the code name "Typhoon" (Taifun).
The German command has already received a certain experience of fighting with the Red Army. Therefore, the actions of the Soviet command were predicted quite accurately: “the enemy, just as before, will most heavily cover and defend the road to Moscow with large forces, that is, the Smolensk-Moscow highway, as well as the Leningrad-Moscow road. Therefore, the German offensive on these main roads will meet the strongest opposition from the Russians. ” Accordingly, it was decided to advance in poor areas of the road to the north and south of the Smolensk-Moscow highway.
The topic of lively discussions was the scale of the planned environment. Von Bock insisted on the closure of the ring of encirclement of Soviet troops on the distant approaches to Moscow in the Gzhatsk region. However, in the end, in the OKH it was decided to close the ring of the environment in the Vyazma area, and not Gzhatsk. That is, the scale of the "boiler" has been reduced.
"Typhoon" was the most ambitious operation of the German armed forces, carried out in one direction. Neither before, nor after this did three groups of a tank group class (tank army) concentrate in one army group. Typhoon included three armies and three tank groups totaling 78 divisions, including 46 infantry, 14 tank, 8 motorized, 1 cavalry, 6 cavalry brigade and 1 cavalry CC. Only in the composition of the armies and the three tank groups in the subordination of von Bock were 1 183 719 people. The total number of personnel in the combat and auxiliary units of the Army Group Center in early October was 1 929 406 people.Aviation The 2nd Air Force provided support for the Typhoon. fleet under the command of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. It included the II and VIII air corps and the anti-aircraft corps. By transferring air units from Army Groups North and South, the German command brought the number of aircraft in the 2nd Air Fleet to 1320 machines (720 bombers, 420 fighters, 40 attack aircraft and 140 reconnaissance aircraft) by the start of Operation Typhoon.
While the Germans planned to crack down on the “group of armies of Tymoshenko”, this name has ceased to correspond to reality. September 11 S.K.Timoshenko headed the South-West direction, and on September 16 the Western direction itself was disbanded. Instead, the Soviet troops on the outskirts of the capital united in three fronts, directly subordinate to the supreme command. Directly Moscow direction defended the Western Front under the command of Colonel-General I. S. Konev. It occupied a lane width of about 300 km along the Andreapol line, Yartsevo, west of Yelnya.
In total, the Western Front had 30 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade, 3 cavalry divisions, 28 artillery regiments, 2 motorized rifle divisions, 4 tank brigades. The front tank forces consisted of 475 tanks (19 KV, 51 T-34, 101 BT, 298 T-26, 6 T-37). The total strength of the Western Front was 545 935 people.
For the most part, in the rear of the Western Front, and partially adjacent to its left flank, the forces of the Reserve Front were built. Four armies (31, 32, 33 and 49-i) of the Reserve Front occupied the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line behind the Western Front. With the forces of the 24 Army, Major General K. I. Rakutin, the front covered the Yelnovo army, and the 43 Army, Major General P. P. Sobennikov, covered the Yukhnovo direction. The total defense front of these two armies was about 100 km. The average staffing of a division in the 24 army was 7,7 thousand people, and in the 43 army - 9 thousand people [2]. In total, the Reserve Front numbered 28 infantry, 2 cavalry divisions, 27 artillery regiments, 5 tank brigades. In the first echelon of the Reserve Front there were 6 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades in the 24 Army, 4 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades in the 43 Army. The total number of troops of the Reserve Front was 478 508 people.
The troops of the Bryansk Front under the command of Colonel-General A.I. Yeremenko occupied the 330 km front in the Bryansk-Kaluga and Orel-Tula areas. The front tank forces counted 245 tanks (22 KV, 83 T-34, 23 BT, 57 T-26, 52 T-40, 8 T-50). The total number of troops of the Bryansk Front was 225 567 people.
Thus, more than 800 1 thousand people were concentrated on the front in 250 km as part of the Western, Bryansk and Reserve fronts. It should be noted that the Moscow area shortly before the start of the battle was significantly strengthened. During September, the fronts of the Western strategic direction to compensate for the losses incurred over 193 received thousands of marching personnel (up to 40% of the total number of people sent to the army).
The air forces of the three fronts numbered 568 aircraft (210 bombers, 265 fighters, 36 attack aircraft, 37 reconnaissance aircraft). In addition to these aircraft, 368 long-range bombers and 423 fighters and 9 reconnaissance aircraft of fighter aviation were introduced into the battle in the first days of the battle. Defense Moscow. Thus, the Red Army Air Forces in the Moscow direction were generally almost equal to the enemy and numbered 1 aircraft against 368 in the 1nd Air Fleet. However, the Luftwaffe certainly had a numerical advantage at the initial stage of the battle. The German Air Force also intensively used its units, performing up to six sorties per day per aircraft and ultimately achieving a large number of sorties.
The operational plans of the troops in the western direction provided for the conduct of defense on almost the entire front. Defense orders in one form or another were received at least three weeks before the onset of the Germans. Already on September 10, the General Headquarters demanded that the Western Front “firmly dig in the ground and, through secondary directions and solid defense, bring six to seven divisions into reserve in order to create a powerful maneuvering group for an offensive in the future.” Fulfilling this order, ISKonev singled out four rifle, two motorized rifle and one cavalry division, four tank brigades and five artillery regiments to the reserve. In front of the main line of defense in most armies, a support zone (predpole) with depths from 4 to 20 km and more was created. I.Konev himself writes in his memoirs: “After the offensive battles, the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts, as instructed by Bid, in the period from 10 - 16 of September, went over to defense”. Finally, the front's measures to strengthen the defense were secured by the Supreme Command Rate Directive No. 002373 of 27 in September of 1941.
However, as in most defensive operations of 1941, the main problem was the uncertainty of the enemy's plans. It was assumed that the Germans would strike along the highway running along the Smolensk-Yartsevo-Vyazma line. A defense system with good densities was created in this direction. For example, the 112th Rifle Division of K.K. Rokossovsky's 16th Army, which straddled the highway, occupied a front of 8 km with a strength of 10 men with 091 machine guns and 226 guns and mortars. The neighboring 38th Rifle Division of the same 38th Army occupied an unprecedentedly narrow front by the standards of the initial period of the war - 16 km with a strength of 4 men with 10 machine guns and 095 guns and mortars. The average manning level of the 202th Army divisions was the highest on the Western Front — 68 thousand people. On a 16 km front, the 10,7th Army had 35 guns of 16 mm caliber and higher, and 266 76 mm anti-aircraft guns for direct fire. The 32th Army was even more densely built on a 85 km front with three divisions in the first echelon and two in the second. The army had 25 guns of 19 mm caliber and higher, 338 76 mm guns and 90 (!) 45 mm anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank guns. The 56th and 85th Armies were the most numerous on the Western Front — 16 and 19 people, respectively.
Behind the line of defense of the 16 and 19 armies, there was a reserve line of defense on the highway. MF Lukin later recalled: “The frontier had a developed defense system prepared by the units of the 32 Army of the Reserve Front. At the bridge, on the highway and the railway line stood naval guns on concreted sites. They were protected by a crew of sailors (up to 800 people). ” It was the OAG Navy's 200 Division of four 130-mm B-13 guns and three 100-mm B-24 batteries at Izdeshkovo station on the Yartsevo-Vyazma highway. There is no doubt that an attempt to break through along the highway would have cost dear to German motorized corps. It is impossible not to recall the German opinion quoted above that the offensive along the highway "will meet the strongest opposition from the Russians."
However, for a dense, layered barrier on the highway had to pay low densities of troops in other directions. In the 30 Army, which took the brunt of the 3 tank group, the 50-guns were caliber 157-mm and higher, 76 (!) 4-mm anti-tank guns and 45 24-mm anti-aircraft guns as PTO . There were no tanks in the 85 Army at all. Approximately the same was the situation in the first line of the Reserve Front. Here on the front in 30 – 16 km divisions of 24-9 thousand defended themselves. The statutory standard for the defense of the rifle division was 12 - 8 km.
According to a similar scheme with a dense barrier, the defense of the Bryansk Front was built by A.I. Yeremenko on a large highway. He, synchronously with Konev, received a similar content directive to the Supreme Command Rate No. 002375 on the transition to tough defense. But, as under Vyazma, the direction of the German strike was incorrectly determined. AI Yeremenko expected a strike on Bryansk and held its main reserves near Bryansk. However, the Germans attacked 120 - 150 km south. The Germans planned an operation against the Bryansk front in the form of “asymmetrical cannes”, when a deep breakthrough of the left wing of the 2 tank group from the Glukhov region was carried out on one flank, and the LIII army corps attacked it to the south of Bryansk.
It should also be said that in September 1941 there were no independent mechanized units of the tank division class in the Red Army. The mechanized corps burned down in the flames of the July and August battles of 1941. Separate tank divisions were lost in July and August. From August, tank brigades began to form. Until the spring 1942, they will become the largest tank compound of the Red Army. Those. the command of the fronts was deprived of one of the most effective tools to counter the deep breakthroughs of the enemy.
The commander of the 2 tank group, G. Guderian, decided to attack two days earlier than the 3 and 4 tank groups in order to take advantage of massive aviation support from aviation that was not yet involved in the operations of other units of the Army Group Center. Another argument was the maximum use of the period of good weather, in the offensive zone of the 2 tank group there were few hard-surface roads. Guderian's offensive began on September 30. Typhoon has started! Already on October 6, the German 17-I tank division was howling to Bryansk from the rear and captured it, and Karachev was captured by the 18-tank division this morning. A.I. Eremenko was forced to give the order to the armies of the front about the fight "with an inverted front", that is, to break through to the east.
2 October 1941 was the turn to get a crushing blow to the Western Front. The effect of surprise was aggravated by the fact that the transfer of mobile units from the Army Group North was made at the last moment. She simply did not have time to track the Soviet intelligence. Near Leningrad, even the radio operator of the group was left with the characteristic handwriting of the key. This was misleading Soviet radio intelligence. In fact, the headquarters of the 4-th tank group was transferred to the area south of the Smolensk-Moscow highway. On the 60-kilometer front, at the junction of the 43 and 50 armies, the attack force was concentrated from the 10 infantry, 5 tank and 2 motorized divisions of the subordinate 4-th field army of the 4 tank group. In the first echelon there were three tank and five infantry divisions. For the Soviet divisions occupying the defense on the broad front, the blow of such large forces was fatal.
At 6 a.m. on October 2, after a relatively short 40-minute artillery preparation, the strike group of the 4th tank group went on the offensive against the 53rd and 217th rifle divisions. The large air forces assembled for the offensive allowed the Germans to prevent the approach of the 43rd Army reserves. The defensive front was broken, the rifle division and tank brigade held in reserve found themselves in a local encirclement. This became the harbinger of a large "cauldron". The tank group's offensive developed along the Warsaw Highway, and then the tank divisions turned toward Vyazma, delaying for some time in the impassable wooded area near Spas-Demensk.
The offensive of the 3-th tank group at the 45-kilometer sector at the junction of the 30-th and 19-th armies of the Western Front developed in a similar pattern. Here, the Germans put in the first echelon all three tank divisions intended for striking in this direction. Since the strike fell on a plot where no offensive was expected, its effect was deafening. In the report on the hostilities of the 3 Tank Group from 2.10 to 20.10 1941, it was written: “the 2.10 offensive that was launched turned out to be a complete surprise to the enemy. [...] Resistance ... turned out to be much weaker than expected. Particularly weak was the opposition of artillery. ”
For the flank counterattack on the advancing group of German troops, a so-called “Boldin group” was created. It included one rifle (152-I), one motorized rifle (101-I) divisions, 128-I and 126-I tank brigades. On 1 of October 1941, the tank regiment of the 101 th motorized rifle division included the 3 of the KV tank, the 9 T-34, the 5 BT and the 52 T-26, the 126-I tank tank numbered the 1 19 41-26 Tank Brigade numbered 128 7 1 I tank tank squadron 34 39, 14 T-26 tank squadron regiment XNUMX, XNUMX-I tank brigade - XNUMX KV, XNUMX T-XNUMX, XNUMX BT and XNUMX T-XNUMX. The forces, as we see, are few, with a large share of light tanks.
Having advanced to Holm-Zhirkovsky, the Boldin group formations entered into a tank battle with the XXXXI and LVI German motorized corps. In one day on October 5, the 101 Division and the 128 Panzer Brigade announced the destruction of German tanks 38. In the report on the 3 Tank Group's hostilities in October 1941, these battles are described as follows: “To the south of the Hill [-Zhirkovsky] a tank battle broke out with Russian tank divisions coming from the south and north, which suffered significant losses under the blows of 6 units- th Panzer and 129 Infantry Divisions, as well as from air raids of VIII air corps formations. The enemy was defeated here during multiple battles. ”
When the directions of the main strikes of the German troops were determined, the front commander, I. Konev, decided to advance a strong group of troops under the command of an energetic commander to the point of convergence of tank wedges. In the evening of October 5, Konev removes control of the 16 Army from the highway and directs it to Vyazma. Thus, one wing of the German troops entering Vyazmu, I. S. Konev, planned to hold back the counter-attack of the group of I. V. Boldin, and the second - to defend the reserves of the front controlled by K. K. Rokossovsky.
However, by October 6, the German infantry entered Holm-Zhirkovsky, pushing the Boldin group from the flank of the German tank wedge. The 7 Panzer Division quickly broke through, first through the Dnieper defensive positions of the Rzhev-Vyazma border, and then to the highway west of Vyazma. This maneuver 7-I tank division for the third time in the campaign 1941, became the "trailer" of a large environment (before that were Minsk and Smolensk). One of the darkest days of Russian stories, 7 October 1941 g., 7-I tank division of the 3-th tank group and 10-I tank division of the 4-th tank group joined and closed the encirclement of the Western and Reserve fronts in the area of Vyazma.
Signs of the approaching catastrophe became apparent already on the third day of the German offensive in the Vyazma sector. In the evening of October 4, the commander of the western front, I.S.Konev, reported to Joseph Stalin "about the threat of a large enemy grouping going to the rear of the troops." The next day, a similar message was received from the commander of the Reserve Front, SM Budenny. Semyon Mikhailovich reported that "there was nothing to cover the resulting breakthrough along the Moscow highway."
On October 8, the commander of the Western Front ordered the encircled troops to break through to the Gzhatsk area. But it was too late. Under Vyazma 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades, 31 artillery regiment of the RGK and control of the 19, 20, 24 and 32 armies of the Western and Reserve fronts got into the environment. Organizationally, these troops submitted to 22, 30, 19, 19, 20, 24, 43, 31, 32, and 49 armies and the Boldin operational group. The management of the 16 Army already in the first days of the battle was evacuated to unite the troops in the northern sector of the Mozhaisk line of defense. 27 divisions, 2 tank brigades, 19 artillery regiments of the RGK and 50 control, 3 and 13 armies of the Bryansk front turned out to be surrounded by Bryansk. Altogether, seven army directorates (from 15 in total on the western direction), 64 divisions (from 95), 11 tank brigades (from 13) and 50 artillery regiments of the RGK (from 64) were surrounded. These formations and units were part of the 13 armies and one task force. Attempts to release the encircled ones, although they were initially planned, were not actually made due to the lack of forces. A more important task was the restoration of the front on the Mozhaisk line of defense. Therefore, all the breakthroughs were undertaken only from within the “boiler”. Before October 11, the surrounded armies tried several times to break through, but were unsuccessful. Only October 12 managed to briefly breach, which was soon sealed again. Anyway, the remnants of 16 divisions made their way from the Vyazma “boiler”.
Despite the absence of visible air supplies, the surrounded troops resisted for a week after the “boiler” was closed. Only on October 14, the Germans managed to regroup the main forces of the 4 and 9 armies operating under Vyazma for pursuit, which began on October 15. In the Vyazma “cauldron”, the commander of the 19 Army, Lieutenant General MF Lukin, the Commander of the 20 Army, Lieutenant General F. A. Ershakov, and the Commander of the 32 Army S. V. Vishnevsky were captured. Killed by the Vyazma commander of the 24 Army, Major General K. I. Rakutin.
October 19 1941, commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, in his day order to his troops, wrote:
“The battle for Vyazma and Bryansk led to the collapse of the Russian front echeloned. Eight Russian armies as part of the 73 rifle and cavalry divisions, 13 tank divisions and brigades and strong army artillery were destroyed in a tough battle against a far outnumbered enemy.
The total trophies were: 673 098 prisoners, 1 277 tanks, 4 378 artillery shells, 1 009 anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, 87 aircraft and huge quantities of military stocks.
The first thing that catches the eye is the discrepancy between the number of three fronts of tanks (1 044 units) and the number stated in the order of von Boc - 1 277 tanks. Theoretically, the number of 1 277 could get tanks on the repair bases of the fronts. However, such a discrepancy, of course, undermines the credibility of the figures declared by the enemy.
What were the real losses? According to official data, the loss of Soviet troops in the Moscow Strategic Defense Operations from September 30 to 5 1941 658 279 people, including 514 338 people were lost forever. Let's try to isolate the Vyazemsky and Bryansk “boilers” from these figures. You can immediately deduct the losses created after the formation of the "boiler" Kalininsky front. 608 will remain 916 people. According to Krivosheev, the Western Front lost 30 to 5 people from September 310 to September 240. For obvious reasons, it was impossible to obtain accurate information about the losses from the surrounded armies. However, we have data on the losses of those troops who defended Moscow after the collapse of the front near Vyazma. According to reports from the department of accounting and staffing of the Western Front from October 11 to November 30, the front forces lost 165 207 people killed, missing, wounded and diseased. Losses from 1 to December 10 amounted to 52 703 people [3]. This figure includes losses incurred in the first days of the counteroffensive. In this regard, we have to state that the number of losses claimed by the Krivosheev team in 310 240 seems underestimated for the entire defensive period. 310 240 - 165 207 = 145 033. Suppose that of losses from 1 to 10 in December, half falls on defense, that is, for the period from 1 to 5 in December. Total for the Vyazma "boiler" remains the total 120-130 thousand people. Such low losses in a large environment seem extremely unlikely.
On the other hand, estimates of Soviet losses of a million or more people seem equally far-fetched. This figure was obtained by simply subtracting from the total number of troops two (or even three) fronts of the number of occupants of fortifications on the Mozhaisk line (90-95 thousand people). It should be remembered that from the 16 unions of the three 4 army fronts (22-I and 29-I of the Western Front, 31-I and 33-I Reserve) and the operations team of the Bryansk Front were able to avoid encirclement and complete defeat. They simply ended up outside the German "ticks". Their number was about 265 thousand people. Part of the rear units also had the opportunity to go to the east and avoid destruction. A number of 30, 43 and 50 armies were also cut off from the "boilers" by the German tank groups. A number of units from the 3 and 13 armies of the Bryansk Front retreated to the zone of the neighboring South-Western Front (these armies were eventually transferred to him). Breakthrough was not such a rare occurrence. Thousands of people left 13 Army in an organized manner. Thousands of people from 10’s entourage, 20 Thousands of people from 5, according to 17 1941 of October XNUMX
Nor should the small groups of Soviet servicemen breaking through to theirs from the “boilers” be disregarded. Through the woods, roundabout ways, they could make their way to their weeks. Accounting for this component is the most difficult. Record keeping in 1941 left much to be desired and accurate screening of troop replenishment at the expense of soldiers and commanders who left the encirclement is almost impossible. Moreover, part of the encirclement turned to guerrilla actions and remained in the forests under Vyazma until the winter of 1941 – 42. Of these surroundings, in February-March 1942 were replenished, isolated under the Vyazma part of the Belov Corps. In short, even the calculated 800 thousand people the difference between the initial number of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts and the number of troops left outside the “boilers” does not give us a single-digit number of losses.
Big losses make Vyazemsky and Bryansk “boilers” the worst tragedies of 1941. Was it possible to avoid it? Unfortunately, you have to say no. There were no objective prerequisites for timely deciphering the enemy’s plan in the front headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army. This was generally a typical mistake of the party that lost its strategic initiative. Similarly, in the summer of 1944 in Belorussia, the plans of the Red Army were incorrectly assessed by the German command (the main attack was expected for Army Group Northern Ukraine) and Army Group Center received the largest defeat in the history of the German Army.
In any case, the death of three fronts surrounded by troops on the distant approaches to Moscow in October 1941 was not in vain. For a long time they chained large forces of German infantry and even tank units of Army Group Center. The attack on Moscow could be continued only by mobile units of tank groups and then not at full strength. This made it possible to restore the collapsed front with the support of the Mozhaisk line of defense. When the German infantry reached this line, the Soviet defense was already significantly enhanced by the reserves. The rapid capture of Moscow on the move did not take place.
[1] S. K. Timoshenko was at that time really the commander of the Western direction.
[2] With a regular number of 10-14 thousand people
[3] Reports of casualties in both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army presented in increments of 10 days
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