On the question of the level of artillery preparation of the English and Japanese fleets of the early twentieth century

The battleship King Edward VII firing in 1907

"Practically useless
open fire
at distances over 4 yards,
and 8 yards is ridiculous
and impossible
distance for battle.
Rear Admiral R. Kastens,
(board of the battleship Venerable,
Mediterranean, 1903).

In domestic sources dedicated to stories of the Russo-Japanese war at sea, the narrative has long become a commonplace, according to which the Japanese fleet, following the example of the British, allegedly mastered the art of firing at long distances for that time, thereby providing itself with an advantage in battles with the Russian fleet. The Russian fleet, not catching the spirit of the times, continued firing practice at close range, which predetermined its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. In our time, thanks to Internet archives, as well as naval literature and periodicals from the beginning of the XNUMXth century from electronic libraries, lovers of the history of the fleet have the opportunity to verify the truth of the above postulates.

The immediate impetus for writing the proposed article was the post “The Shelling of a Target by the English Fleet in October 1905”, posted in LiveJournal by a longtime opponent of the author of the article. The essence of this post boils down to the conclusion that since the battleship King Edward VII in 1905 accurately fired at practical shooting, it means that the Japanese fleet at Tsushima also fired just as accurately - “there is only one school”. And the results of the battle are proof of this. Without blindly accepting this conclusion on faith, by comparing the results of several firings of the English and Japanese fleets, we will try to find out how true this conclusion is.

Shooting of the English fleet

Let's start with the firing of the English fleet, with the level of artillery training of which, according to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. H. Arnold-Forster, no other fleet could then compare.

In 1901, 127 ships of the Royal Navy took part, according to the order of the Admiralty, in the annual prize firing, which was a test of the combat capability of the ships. Another 47 ships, having failed to comply with the order, refrained from participating in the firing.

According to data published at the time, only one ship - the cruiser Terrible - managed to achieve a shooting accuracy that exceeded 70 percent. Two more ships had over 65 percent accuracy. Seventy-five ships achieved an accuracy of 15 percent, and five ships, including the flagship of the Pacific Station, the armored cruiser Warspite, never hit the target. The firing conditions depended on the caliber of the guns. Heavy guns fired at 15-foot-tall (525 square feet) trapezoidal targets from 1 to 400 yards at 2 knots.

Rapid fire from 1 to 400 yards and at 1 knots was fired at rectangular targets, the same 600 feet high, but reduced to 12 square feet. A total of 15 guns of all calibers fired 300 shells, 1 percent of which hit the target.

In addition to prize shooting, in the same year the Mediterranean Fleet also conducted practical shooting from a distance of 6 yards, this time initiated by the Admiralty, with disappointing results. As you know, in the period from 000 to 1899, the Mediterranean Fleet, which was headed by Admiral Fisher from July 1900, 1, at the initiative of the latter, conducted a series of practical firing at distances from 1899 to 5 yards.

The goal pursued by Fisher at the same time was prosaic - to demonstrate to the Admiralty that effective long-range shooting is impossible without the necessary tools, and thus encourage the Admiralty to fork out and finally begin their massive deliveries to the fleet. Summarized, the results of these experiments, included in a series of articles by Captain E. Harding, are as follows: 10 percent hits at 5 yards and 000 percent at 5 yards.

For reference, the Royal Navy's overall marksmanship at prize shooting in 1901 was 36,3 percent.

Gradually, the Admiralty began to realize that without more thorough training and without appropriate stimulation of gunners, as well as without providing them with the necessary tools of proper quality, long-range shooting could not be successfully carried out. Playing for the public, the Admiralty then demanded that the sailors shoot farther and more accurately, while avoiding the inevitable costs necessary to comply with these instructions.

The facts testify in favor of Fisher's rightness: the capabilities of the gunners of His Majesty's fleet did not correspond to the tasks assigned to them, which is well illustrated by the results of firing a pair of Mediterranean battleships at normal and long distances.

In 1902, the Mediterranean Fleet conducted three prize shootings, during one of which the battleship Formidable fired 22 main battery shells, 14 of which hit the target. The battleship Vengeance fired 19 main battery shells, 8 of which hit the target. Thus, the accuracy of firing of the main caliber guns of the two battleships was 63,63 and 42,1 percent, respectively. Firing conditions were standard for the English fleet of the time: a shield area of ​​525 square feet at a height of 15 feet, a range of 1-400 yards, a speed of eight knots.

The following year, 1903, during long-range practical shooting (6 yards), these same ships showed different results. The shooting of Formidable made such a depressing impression that the battleship received the nickname “Hand Mouse”, which is insulting for a warship, and Vengeance, which fired two hundred and two shells at the target, achieved only four hits.

Battleship Vengeance

In the following year, 1904, these same two ironclads fired at prize shooting from a distance of 2 yards, and the results of the shooting are again pleasing to the eyes of Their Lordships. Formidable fired 500 rounds, 195 of which hit the target. Vengeance fired 134 rounds, 178 of which hit the target. Thus, the overall accuracy of the two battleships was 98% and 68,2%, respectively.

The year 1905 was a turning point for the firing of the English fleet. Rear Admiral Percy Scott, upon his appointment as an ex officio gunnery inspector in 1905, was present at all firings of the Channel Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, and the Mediterranean Fleet. What he saw shocked him, and he called the results "deplorable." The 68 ships he was present at firing used twenty different methods of firing.

In an attempt to eradicate the established practice, Scott drew up a standard set of rules for conducting competitive firing of ships of the fleet, which for the first time made it possible to evaluate in points and compare both the results of firing and the level of combat training of crews. Checking the level of artillery preparation in the entire fleet was organized and carried out according to a single scheme for each squadron and for each ship.

Since the results of the previous, 1904, prize firing, due to a sharp change in firing conditions, turned out to be worse than the firing of 1903 (the total accuracy of firing of all participating ships in 1903 and 1904 was 46,04 and 42,86 percent, respectively), to training firing in 1905 thoroughly prepared. Apparently, after the triumph of the Japanese fleet in the Russo-Japanese War in "foggy Albion", there was an urgent need to show the whole world that the English fleet was not a fool.

Artillery fire control devices for each individual caliber began to appear on the ships, points were equipped on the masts to monitor the fall of shells. Since, according to the new rules, the firing range increased to 6 yards (000 cables), to facilitate the work of gunners, a rectangular shield of cyclopean, by old standards, dimensions (30 square feet) was adopted as a target. They decided to increase the speed from eight - twelve to fifteen knots.

One hundred ships of six squadrons took part in the shooting, including twenty-seven battleships of seven types with 12 "main caliber guns. Of all the participating ships, through the efforts of the press, the battleship King Edward VII (261,4 points), which took third place in the overall standings of the Royal fleet with the following results:

– 12" guns: 11 shots / 10 hits;
- 9,2 "guns: 31 shots / 15 hits;
– 6" guns: 71 shots / 26 hits.

We do not have similar information for other battleships of the King Edward VII type, however, we have the opportunity to compare the number of points received for the accuracy of shooting by all battleships of this type.

– King Edward VII: 261,4 points;
– Hindustan: 153,7 points;
– Dominion: 148,7 points;
– Commonwealth: 87,2 points;
– New Zealand: 25,7 points.

The variegation of the results obtained by the latest ships of the same type in the same conditions and with exactly the same training of commanders is striking. As you can see, the best result (King Edward VII) differs from the worst one (New Zealand) by more than fourteen times, which does not characterize the new system of training commandors of the English fleet in the best way. In addition to the battleships of the three fleets stationed in European waters, two battleships of the Chinese Station took part in the firing of 1905. As you know, in the early summer of 1905, all of her battleships (Albion, Vengeance, Centurion, Ocean and Glory) received orders to return to home waters.

Battleship Centurion

Three of them, upon arrival in the metropolis, were sent to the armed reserve, while the rest took part in the shooting of 1905, where Albion "knocked out" 46,7, and Glory, which showed the worst result among all battleships, only 11,7 points.

We remind the reader that at the prize shooting in 1903, these two battleships showed the following results:

Albion
– 12" guns: 11 shots / 4 hits;
– 6" guns: 117 shots / 57 hits.

Glory
- 12 "guns: 21 shots / 7 hits;
– 6" guns: 115 shots / 80 hits.

In 1904, at the prize shooting, Albion improved on the previous year's result. There were 174 hits for 105 projectiles fired. Thus, the overall accuracy of shooting was 60,34 percent against last year's 47,65 percent. However, it was enough to increase the distance from 2 to 500 yards, as the accuracy of shooting fell sharply, and both battleships were at the very bottom of the standings. We do not know how many and what kind of shells Albion fired in 6, but we know that the overall accuracy of her shooting in 000 was 1905 percent (1904 hits per 60,34 shots), while the overall accuracy of the battleship King Edward VII in 174 was 105 percent (for 1905 shots 45,13 hits).

Thus, a paradoxical situation has developed: the battleship, which was in service for less than a year, demonstrated miracles of accuracy at long distances, and the Far Eastern veteran, who had several years of hard training behind him and over a dozen prize shooting with decent results, turned out to be the worst among all battleships.

Many well-deserved shooters like the same battleship Majestic (general accuracy of shooting 58,63 percent in 1903 and 41 points in 1905), who shone in previous years, showed pitiful or insignificant results in the shooting of 1905, which cannot be compared with the successes several armadillos that topped the standings.

In addition to the above, we give one more, very significant example.

The battleship Bulwark fired thirty 1902" shells at prize shooting in 12, fifteen of which hit the target. In 1904, at prize shooting, he fired 190 shells of all calibers, of which 113 (59,47 percent) hit the target.

As you can see, the quality of artillery preparation there was at the proper level. It is understandable: Bulwark is the flagship of the Mediterranean squadron, whose permanent first commander was Captain F. Hamilton, who in the winter of 1905 replaced Captain P. Scott as captain of the largest artillery training school in Portsmouth, and two years later - as a shooting inspector. However, despite all the successes of previous years, in 1905 the main battery guns of the battleship Bulwark at a distance of 6 yards could not achieve a single hit.

All these cases of a sharp decrease in shooting accuracy due to a significant increase in the firing distance perfectly illustrate the correctness of Admiral Fisher, who never tired of repeating that effective long-range shooting is impossible without proper technical equipment. Gradually, this began to be understood in the Admiralty. As you know, in the process of preparing for the firing of 1905, which looks a lot like a large-scale propaganda PR campaign, the fleet received a batch of Lieutenant Mostin's optical sights with a threefold increase, intended for installation on turret guns.

Obviously, the batch of sights was limited, and the presence or absence of such sights when firing at a distance of 6 yards is mainly explained by both the success of the battleship King Edward VII (000 points), which had just entered service, and the failure of the former naval champion battleship Albion ( 374,8 points).

Shooting of the Japanese fleet

And now let's turn our attention to the firing of the Japanese imperial fleet: how similar were the conditions for their conduct and the results obtained to those in England?

The information contained in open sources allows us to conclude that some important conditions for the firing of Japanese and English battleships differed. Judging by the available data, the British fleet, unlike the Japanese, used a wide range of shields of various shapes for caliber shooting, the area of ​​\u640b\u100bwhich ranged from XNUMX to XNUMX square feet. In the Japanese Navy, as far as we know, there were two types of shields at that time.

Shield measuring 48 by 18 yards

Shield measuring 24 by 18 yards

The consumption of 12 "shells at the firing of the two fleets also differed: the British surpassed the Japanese in this indicator, depending on the circumstances, by seven to eighteen times. At the same time, the distance at which the Japanese fired at the shields ranged from 2 to 000 yards, the British - from 1 to 900 yards.

In parentheses, we note that the consumption of 12 "shells by the Japanese was less than not only by the British, but also by the Russians. In our time, it turned out that it was completely in vain, respected R. M. Melnikov, for decades, indignantly reproached the Russian Imperial Navy for "obscenely economical »expenditure of shells in exemplary firing - Japanese battleships in firing spent them noticeably less.

So, during approximately live firing in Port Arthur, held on October 19, 1903, four Russian battleships fired forty-eight 12 "shells, and during the shooting of the Japanese fleet, conducted in April of the same year, six Japanese battleships fired nineteen 12" shells .

A comparison of the shooting accuracy of English and Japanese battleships in 1903 is also not in favor of the Japanese. During one prize shooting, four battleships of the Chinese station (Ocean, Glory, Albion and Goliath), firing seventy-six 12 "shells, achieved thirty-six hits (47,4%). During another prize shooting, three battleships (Ocean, Albion and Goliath ), firing seventy-eight 12 "shells, achieved 51 hits (65,4%).

Battleship Ocean in "Victorian livery" is a multiple Royal Navy prize shooting champion

The Japanese six battleships, which fired, as mentioned above, nineteen 12 "shells, achieved only five hits (26,3%).

The results of firing 12 "guns, as well as firing distances, are tabulated by the author.

In fairness, we note that the distance of the Japanese was noticeably greater than that of the British, but at the same time, the targets of the two fleets were strikingly different from each other. The British probably had a trapezoidal shield measuring 50 feet long and 15 feet high, while the Japanese fired at a well-known island measuring from 24 to 30 meters in length and 10,5-12 meters in width.

In one of the Japanese Internet archives there is a sloppy image of the battleship Peresvet, against which this island is depicted, which was regularly used as a target by the Japanese fleet. The proportions are distorted there, so we improved this picture by replacing the armadillo's sketch with the latter's factory drawing. To the right of the island, for clarity, an English shield is placed - as we can see, it was several times smaller in size than the island.

Hack and predictor Aviator

Thus, based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the gunners of the main caliber guns of Japanese battleships on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War were seriously inferior to their English counterparts in terms of the level of combat training. However, judging by the results of the firing of the Togo battleships in the naval battle on February 9, 1904 near Port Arthur, the Japanese subsequently implemented certain measures aimed at correcting the situation for the better.

We remind the reader that the Japanese squadron, which was moving at a 16-knot course, firing at a distance of 46 to 26 cables, fired seventy-nine 12 "shells at Russian ships. Statistics show that the accuracy of fire of six Togo battleships was 7,59 percent (battleship Petropavlovsk "- two 12" shells, the Poltava battleship - two 12" shells, the Pobeda battleship - one 12" shell, the Bayan cruiser - one 12" shell).

In parentheses, we note that the return firing of five Russian battleships, which fired sixty-five 10 "and 12" shells at the ships of three combat detachments, was more accurate and amounted to 9,23 percent (battleship Mikasa - one 10 "shell and one 10" -12 " shell, battleship Fuji - one 12" shell, cruiser Iwate - one 10"-12" shell, cruiser Kasagi - two 12" shells).

Thus, the facts allow us to conclude that at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the gunners of the main caliber guns of Japanese battleships were inferior in terms of combat training, both to their English partners and their Russian counterparts.

Comments

[Kote Pan Kokhanka]

.Thus, the facts allow us to conclude that at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the gunners of the main caliber guns of Japanese battleships were inferior in terms of combat training, both to their English partners and their Russian counterparts.

The main thing is different. Japanese gunners on the day of "Tsushima" had behind them the practical experience of real naval battles with the XNUMXst Pacific Squadron. Alas, we were essentially only "theorists"!
Good morning comrades, thanks to the author - they haven’t touched this topic for a long time !!!

[Rurikovich]

Finally, something normal appeared on VO
, dear Comrade
Considering range shooting under ideal conditions is, of course, an interesting exercise, but in a real battle, a lot of other factors that directly affect shooting are included - visibility, excitement, the impact of enemy fire, maneuvering, and one of the main, in my opinion, time factor. Often the banal amount goes over in quality, because even the most crooked-armed and cross-eyed gunners with long shooting can still hit the enemy and cause purely hypothetical acceptable damage
Purely for me, range shooting is a subjective thing, but useful, allowing you to draw conclusions in the field of methodology. What Fischer proved. Therefore, it is the combat fate and experience that are fundamental in improving the quality of shooting. Therefore, under Tsushima, having such experience after skirmishes with 1 TOE, the Japanese visually fired better than the Russians, who had only shield firing behind them.

[Comrade]

Quote: Rurikovich

Considering range shooting under ideal conditions is, of course, an interesting task, but in a real battle, a lot of other factors that directly affect shooting are included - visibility, excitement, the impact of enemy fire, maneuvering

Of course you are right, dear colleague. However, many people - from historians to amateurs - ignore all these factors. Extremely simplifying, they reduce everything to the topic “the gray-bearded admirals spared the shells and did not learn how to shoot far, therefore they were not ready.”
This article is something like a rebuttal to these theses, invented by journalists even before the revolution.

[sevtrash]

In the testimony of the officers of the 2TOE, this is exactly what they write - there are few shells, they did not train enough, they did not know how to shoot. From artillery officers to admirals. And this is not a journalistic article at all.

[Comrade]

Quote: sevtrash

In the testimony of the 2TOE officers, this is exactly what they write - few shells

They complained because they did not know that the Japanese fired even fewer shells during firing. They, unlike us, did not have the opportunity to read Japanese service documents.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Comrade

However, many people - from historians to amateurs - ignore all these factors. Extremely simplifying, they reduce everything to the topic “the gray-bearded admirals spared the shells and did not learn how to shoot far, therefore they were not ready.”

It's just more convenient ... Why break your brains, analyze, dig, compare something, if you can, as it is fashionable now, fit the facts to the conclusions, if something does not fit, then ignore, etc.
Personally, I always try to look at the problem not one-sidedly, more critically. It's more interesting - as one comrade says - facts are much more interesting than fiction
The topic of the REV has recently died out altogether against the backdrop of well-known events ... Chelyabinsk is even inaudible ...
So your material, colleague, is like a breath of fresh air.

[Comrade]

Quote: Rurikovich

The topic of the REV has recently died out altogether against the backdrop of well-known events ..

And she wasn't the only one who stumbled.
Previously, articles about ships and the struggle at sea in the two world wars were often posted, now this is a rarity.
I myself was chained to the well-known news, and then I realized that it was already unhealthy, almost some kind of dependence began to develop.
Come on, I think, I'll try to digress a little from the information shaft. And then it happened so that the nerves would strain, that the dream was off.

Quote: Rurikovich

Chelyabinsk even can not be heard ...

But maybe he will read our conversation with you, and decide to please the members of the forum with material.
I remember with such nostalgia the times when his articles were coming from a cornucopia. Article after article, cycle after cycle.

[volodimer]

Yes, it’s boring without Andrey .. Thank you for the article.
The only comment on this paragraph "The British probably had a trapezoidal shield measuring 50 feet in length and 15 feet in height, while the Japanese fired on a well-known island measuring from 24 to 30 meters in length and 10,5-12 meters in width." I had to reduce the feet with meters myself, so that an understanding of the sizes would come.

[Oleg Zorin]

Finally, something normal appeared on VO

[Illanatol]

Quote: Rurikovich

Therefore, under Tsushima, having such experience after skirmishes with 1 TOE, the Japanese visually fired better than the Russians, who had only shield firing behind them.

Commanders need constant practice. How many practical firing did the Russians do while they were going to the Far East during the campaign?
The question of the condition of the sights and rangefinders of the Russians - we will not touch.
It is no coincidence that the Japanese admiral preferred to fight at fairly long distances, so that the Russians had little chance of even accidentally covering the Japanese ships (as Pereslegin, in particular, rightly noted).

[mmaxx]

Tsushima walked at short distances. Up to torpedo shots. The Japanese tried to fire torpedoes.
Togo fought precisely a decisive battle for destruction.

[Frettaskyrandi]

I found a curious document on the topic of the article - the minutes of the debate in the British Parliament of June 9, 1903.
Among other issues, it also considered the issue of practical firing of the Mediterranean squadron, which was carried out on April 29, 1903.
Parliamentarian Gibson Bowles asks Secretary of the Admiralty Arnold-Forster whether he received a report on these firings, in which, according to his information, 7000 shells were used up, who was the initiator and whether the necessary conditions were met.
The secretary replies that the report has been received. Shooting was carried out at a distance of 600 to 1800 yards. The battleships of the squadron fired. Expended 720 76mm rounds, 178 47mm rounds and 9615 aiming rifles rounds worth £875.
At that time, the 1890s 1-inch Nordenfelt gun - the Nordefeld gun - was used in the British Navy as an aiming rifle (plug-in barrel) for the main caliber.

That is, the British commandors serving the main caliber did not always shoot with a regular projectile during practical firing.

[Comrade]

Quote from Frettaskyrandi

the British commandors serving the main caliber did not always shoot with a regular projectile during practical firing.

You mean barrel shooting. The article deals only with caliber firing.

[PPD]

And the ability to maneuver a squadron?
Does it affect the outcome of the battle?
And all these mechanistic, bureaucratic calculations .....
Here Rozhdestvensky also thought that everything was fine with him. With superiority in guns.

the gunners of the main caliber guns of the Japanese battleships were inferior in terms of combat training, both to their English partners and their Russian counterparts.

The joke was appreciated - and now calculate these notorious percentages during the Gulsky incident and during firing during the campaign ...
175% of 100

[geniy]

and now calculate these notorious percentages during the Gulsky incident and during firing on a campaign ... 175% out of 100

Please answer: from what source did you take the initial figures for the calculation and what are these initial figures?

[27091965]

Good afternoon.
Dear Valentin, thank you for the interesting material. It is clear that the training of ship crews will be different, this is not very noticeable at prize shooting, but with an increase in the distance, the level of training will immediately show the shortcomings of the gunners of different ships. In this case, it is worth considering the technical equipment of the guns and the quality of the rangefinders.
Regarding the training of Japanese artillerymen, it is difficult to write whether it was better than ours or worse, although we know the result of the battles. I am inclined to think that the main "trump card" of the Japanese was the concentration of fire on individual ships and the passivity of Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky.

[mmaxx]

The Japanese fired less frequently and had fewer ships. In any case, they shot better.

[mmaxx]

The most interesting thing is that the concentration of fire on one ship implies a rare firing of each ship. For control, it is also necessary to observe the order.

[Comrade]

My respect, dear Igor!

Quote: 27091965i

Thanks for the interesting stuff.

Thank you for your kind words. Alas, no matter how hard I tried, it was not without punctures.

Quote: 27091965i

In this case, it is worth considering the technical equipment of the guns and the quality of the rangefinders.

It is yes, of course. I have a book on rangefinders Barr and Strood. I read it and was amazed at how bad the British were with this case. We fared much better with rangefinders, contrary to the widespread (thanks to R. M. Melnikov) opinion. And he complained about GUKiS, complained, complained.
There is nothing to compare with Royal Navy.

Quote: 27091965i

I am inclined to think that the main "trump card" of the Japanese was the concentration of fire on individual ships and the passivity of Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky.

This is true, but there were many other important factors as well.

[mmaxx]

When Melnikov's books first appeared, it was a revelation. It's impossible to read now. One whine. And then he completely went crazy from his whining. So it is not clear what to believe in those books now. After the third tower on the "Tsesarevich" I can't read this book to the end. It's always good to know the whole picture. And there's a lot of information here.

[PPD]

Melnikov is a very respected naval historian.
Unlike you fools.

[27091965]

Quote: Comrade

This is true, but there were many other important factors as well.

I agree with you, but if we consider the possible number of hits, with the average training of artillerymen, given the rate of fire of medium-caliber artillery, let's say 3 rounds per minute, then we can notice that the concentration of fire from several ships on one enemy ship for a certain period of time will cause serious damage adversary. Admiral Togo created such shooting conditions for his fleet, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, without changing the course of the squadron, improved these conditions for the Japanese. I understand that this is just a theoretical calculation, but in its own way it is of some interest.

[Sergey Zhikharev]

Admiral Togo created such firing conditions for

The battle in the Yellow Sea - 80 percent (if not 90) hits on the battleship Mikasa.
Battle of Tsushima - and again most of the hits in Mikasa.

[PPD]

But in real life, things are a little different.
In our country, for example, after several volleys, they were very different from each other.
And the Japanese strongly suspected that, because the shooting system ....

[Frettaskyrandi]

Yes, he crushed the people on the site. Three years ago, an article on this topic would have caused an epic holivar. And then it almost went unnoticed.
Question to the author - it would be nice to announce the list of sources.

[Comrade]

Quote from Frettaskyrandi

Question to the author - it would be nice to announce the list of sources.

Data on the Japanese - one or sections of the JACAR website.
Data for the British - Brassey reference books and Marine Collection magazines for the corresponding years.
General information - Proceedings magazine of the beginning of the last century, books by R. M. Melnikov, debates in the House of Commons, “History of the Russo-Japanese War. Documents”, “Description of military operations at sea in 37-38. Meiji". Well and on trifles - newspapers of that time.

[PPD]

Like, we got to the sources ..
Nude Nude.
Let's look further...

[Silhouette]

The article was written for the English. The author did not bother to convert yards to cables or even kilometers. Hack. Disrespect for your readers.

[Comrade]

Quote: Silhouette

Article written for English

The article is written for people in the subject.

[Eule]

Those who are accustomed to documents in miles and cables, and kilometers will require a reverse conversion.
The author has a question - where can I find the trajectory profile of these same 12d? I have a suspicion that closer than a mile there is almost flat shooting at the sight, and at 45 cables and further it is already mounted, according to the rangefinder and setting the pointing angle. And the officer needs to quickly use the tables, commanding the angles of guidance and the installation of tubes.
And these are completely different types of shooting - like a sniper and a mortar, to be completely exaggerated.

[rytik32]

These are not original shooting tables, but a modern calculation on a ballistic calculator. But close to reality.
https://disk.yandex.ru/i/yxZA2jQEiF2fNw

[PPD]

Written by a teapot, for teapots.
That's why I couldn't translate.
Ponty is our everything.
Because stupidly mmmm- creatively transferred from where they count in yards.
And to compare in single values ​​is to count, to work, uh, well, you understand for specializations

[mmaxx]

You don't need to translate anything. We are not small. We can use the calculator. Some even know how to write on paper.

[Luminman]

Quote: Silhouette

convert yards to cables or at least kilometers. hack-work

It seems that your main organ of thought is the belly. And it's always been toxic waste...

[sevtrash]

Unstoppable - an endless theme. Or is it like this question - who is to blame? Also infinite, no matter what.
You can speak and even give convincing (or not very) arguments for your point of view. But, as always, theory is one thing, reality is another. If the Japanese won, and with a devastating score, and the main weapon was artillery, then they shot better. Strategy, tactics, management, logistics set the stage for the use of artillery. You can write - in the first seconds of the battle, such and such a fleet outplayed the enemy, he fired more shells and there were 3 percent more hits in these seconds. Or, as they once wrote, like - in the first phase of the 2nd stage of the battle, the fleet outplayed the enemy tactically. But the main thing is the result.
The British saw the problem and solved / solved it. Like the Japanese, it seems, too. Everything is as always - the results / effectiveness must be constantly monitored, analyzed / compared (with the best samples), measures to eliminate / improve, put them into action, and monitor again. The process is endless, who was late / missed, he lost

[mmaxx]

Nevertheless, it seems that prize shooting, despite the importance, still has the character of a custom-made one. Anyone who has served in the military knows this. Everything, one way or another, is known and predictable. And the Japanese had combat experience and understood how to fire live shots at moving targets.
In WWI, the British, in the presence of Percy Scotts, Dreyers, etc., did not always shoot well. And sometimes disgusting.
In Tsushima, Togo also put the weather to his advantage. Thanks to the gift of superiority in speed, the Japanese have always been out of the wind. The wind did not blow on them, there was no spray and smoke.

[Fangaro]

Valentin, Thank you!
Not naval and not military, but it was interesting to read.
There was so much information (for me) that I was going to write about inaccuracies. Well double-checked... Some targets are in feet and others are in yards. When the information is interesting, you don’t notice it, and since the British had feet, then the Japanese also had feet. You see the numbers, but the brain thinks up the units of measurement)
Thank you!

[Comrade]

Quote from Fangaro

Some targets are in feet and others are in yards. When the information is interesting, you don’t notice it, and since the British had feet, then the Japanese also had feet.

Thank you, dear colleague, for drawing attention to the units of measurement for Japanese targets.
On the original documents, from which the target diagrams were cut out, the units of measurement were not indicated. Only their number. I assumed that there are feet by default - because in yards too large targets are obtained - but out of absent-mindedness I signed that there are yards.
Alas, I can’t fix the signatures under the targets.

[rytik32]

Valentine, good afternoon!
Everything is shown on the diagrams. The top diagram is signed 大標的 - big target, the bottom one 小標的 - small target. All dimensions are in feet (呎). For example, 六呎 is six feet from the top of the shield to the tip of the pole. Need to fix it. Large target 48 x 18 feet, small target 24 x 18 feet. I'll write a more detailed comment a bit later.

[Comrade]

Hello, Alexey!

Quote: rytik32

Everything is shown on the diagrams. For example, 六呎 is six feet from the top of the shield to the tip of the pole.

It turns out that in the Meiji era, the word foot write differently?

Quote: rytik32

I do not dispute the fact that optical sights significantly increased the accuracy of shooting at long distances, but there is such a fact. During the battle in the Yellow Sea, in no more than 9 minutes, our ships inflicted 3 hits on Mikasa with 12-inch shells from a distance 8,5-9 km. And without optical sights!

In addition to the above facts, there are the following.
1) In the battle on April 27, 1915, the senior gunner of the battleship "Panteleimon" A. Zhukov from the second salvo hit the battlecruiser Goeben from the second salvo. Distance - one hundred and four cables (19,26 km).
2) The cruiser Terrible, with its accuracy of fire, which thundered throughout the Royal Navy, was mainly due to Petty Officer Grounds. He died, and the accuracy of the main caliber guns fell from 63,63 % in 1901 to 38,88 % in 1902
Obviously, those three hits of 12" shells on Mikasa, which you write about, were achieved by the same experienced and talented old-time gunners.

Quote: rytik32

Not true. The islet was 310 feet wide and 45 feet high.

Wouldn't it be difficult for you to provide evidence like a text recognized and translated into Word?
By the way, here is the "Peresvet" scheme mentioned in the article.

Japanese armadillos spent much less on firing

Quote: rytik32

To say so, it is necessary to have information about all the shootings.

Here you imagine them: Dates, battleships participating, the number of shells fired. To make it clear - yes, Mikasa really fired more 12 '' shells than, for example, Majestic in 1903 with his thirty seven shells of the main caliber.

Quote: rytik32

at Kasagi, only one of the close gaps was rated as 12-dm

Thank you for pointing out my misunderstanding. You are the second one to do this.

[rytik32]

It turns out that in the Meiji era, the word foot was written differently?

It's handwritten!

Obviously, those three hits of 12 '' shells in Mikasa, which you write about, were achieved by the same experienced and talented old-time gunners

I am of the same opinion.
But at the 2TOE there were many yesterday's students from the artillery training detachment ...

Wouldn't it be difficult for you to provide evidence like a text recognized and translated into Word?

Can you explain to me why??

By the way, here is the "Peresvet" scheme mentioned in the article.

Islet dimensions: height 49 feet (2nd line from bottom), length 100 feet (bottom line). Can you send a link to the jakar where is it from?
I took the picture from https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=eng&REFCODE=C10127913300&BID=F2011011210440435367&ID=&NO=119&TYPE=PDF&DL_TYPE=pdf
there is another island. There were at least two shootings?

Here you imagine them: Dates, battleships participating, the number of shells fired.

This is very labor intensive. I dug through pre-Tsushima combat magazines. And then I found the expense for the Kamimura detachment, but for the Togo detachment - only fragmentarily. For example, "Kasuga" consumption of 10-dm, 8-dm, and 6-dm is not divided. Full data on both caliber firing only on "Mikasa" and "Fuji" https://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?pid=1571618#p1571618

[Comrade]

Quote: rytik32

It's handwritten!

And that's true!

Quote: rytik32

I am of the same opinion.

Fischer too. One or two snipers who do not need optical sights per ship are, of course, good, but optical sights, telescopes and rangefinders are better for everyone.

Quote: rytik32

But at the 2TOE there were many yesterday's students from the artillery training detachment.

In the "Sea Collection" published lists of those awarded for excellent shooting. I don’t have much time, so I didn’t check all the ships of the Rozhdestvensky squadron, but I didn’t find any of them on the Suvorov.

Quote: rytik32

Islet dimensions: height 49 feet (2nd line from bottom), length 100 feet (bottom line).

Thanks for the clarification.

Quote: rytik32

Can you send a link to the jakar where is it from?

I don’t store codes, I downloaded the document of interest - and into a folder.

Quote: rytik32

And then I found an expense for the Kamimura detachment,

That's interesting.
And how is it compared to the 9.2 '' and 6 '' shells fired by the Mediterranean Fleet?
Here is the data for 1903. On average, one 6'' gun fires 10 shells, plus or minus a few pieces, of course.

[rytik32]

Quote: Comrade

I don’t store codes, I downloaded the document of interest - and into a folder.

Can you tell me the code of this file: are these the first letters/numbers of its name, for example C05110119100? Or upload the file itself?

And how is it compared to the 9.2 '' and 6 '' shells fired by the Mediterranean Fleet?

In April 1905, Kamimura's armored cruisers had two caliber fires. The total consumption of 6 shots per 8-inch gun, 8 - for a 6-inch gun. Not much.
Results https://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?pid=1571459#p1571459

[rytik32]

without proper technical equipment, effective long-range shooting is impossible

I do not dispute the fact that optical sights significantly increased the accuracy of shooting at long distances, but there is such a fact. During the battle in the Yellow Sea, in no more than 9 minutes, our ships inflicted 3 hits on Mikasa with 12-inch shells from a distance of 8,5-9 km. And without optical sights!
There is also an opposite example, when the equipment was available, but ...
In the campaign of 1905, the artillery training detachment of the Baltic Fleet tried to carry out firing at long distances. Preparations began in early spring. We decided to fire from the 6-inch Kane guns from the Minin cruiser at a distance of 30, 40, 50 and 60 cab. These were the "great distances". There were Perepelkin optical sights and BiS rangefinders. We argued for a long time which island or line to shoot on. In the program, they wrote a distance adjustment according to the rangefinder, but the MTK corrected it: according to sighting. They argued how to observe the results of the shooting, they wanted to place observers on the island with a wire or wireless telegraph. The best gunners were selected, but at the first distance of 30 cabs a fiasco happened: it turned out that the gunner could not simultaneously:
point horizontally,
point vertically,
set horizontal adjustment
set vertical adjustment
watch the shells fall
fire shots.
This ended the attempt to conduct shooting in 1905.

Japanese armadillos spent much less on firing

To say so, it is necessary to have information about all firing

the Japanese, on the other hand, fired at the well-known island measuring from 24 to 30 meters in length and 10,5–12 meters in width.

Not true. The islet was 310 feet wide and 45 feet high.

And in 1905 they shot at to another islet

battleship Mikasa - one 10" shell and one 10"-12" shell, battleship Fuji - one 12" shell, cruiser Iwate - one 10"-12" shell, cruiser Kasagi - two 12" shells

"Iwate" and "Kasagi" received damage from close gaps, with "Kasagi" only one of the close gaps was rated as 12-in
See Naval War 2010-01 (available online)

[geniy]

it turned out that the commando could not simultaneously:
point horizontally,
point vertically,
set horizontal adjustment
set vertical adjustment
watch the shells fall
fire shots.

Could you explain: why do you need to introduce vertical and horizontal corrections at all, if there is a full vertical and full horizontal aiming angles?
And also, would you explain why the gunner would want to watch the fall of the shells if this is done for him by the artillery fire control group under the control of the senior artillery officer, and they calculate all the corrections and transmit the angles of full vertical guidance for each gun using the Geisler system?
And also, can you explain why the reverse return occurred when, in 1941, on the ZIS-3 gun, they returned to one gunner who simultaneously pointed both vertically and horizontally?
And also, can you explain even the difficulty of simultaneously aiming and firing a shot?

[rytik32]

Quote: geniy

if there is a full vertical and full horizontal aiming angles?

You confused the time and are trying to project the method of firing from the future onto the REV.

[Andrey Tameev]

Thank you for the article! Very interesting comparison!

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey Tameev

Thank you for the article! Very interesting comparison.

Thank you for your kind words.
Maybe you, dear colleague, will try to write something? It's a pity that the theme of the era of armor and the couple fell into decay on the site.
If you are interested in this period, there are certainly aspects where you have discovered more than others. So, there will be something to share, and there will be something to talk about.

[Andrey Tameev]

I continue the book on projectiles and pipes. Alas, not quickly. And if I also get distracted by small articles, I will never finish at all.

[geniy]

I continue the book on projectiles and pipes.

please tell us: which of the Russian artillery officers came up with the idea to supply the entire Russian fleet shells with wet pyroxylin with a moisture content of 30%?
How many experiments were carried out on penetrating armor with such shells and in what years did this happen?
and how exactly were experiments carried out on penetrating armor in the Russian and foreign fleets: that is, with fully prepared shells with explosives and fuses, or, on the contrary, shells without explosives but inert ones with sand or salt poured into them?
And what was the force of the explosion of Russian wet shells: how many fragments did they give and how far did the fragments of Russian and Japanese shells fly?

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

Tsushima walked at short distances. Up to torpedo shots. The Japanese tried to fire torpedoes.

No, most of the time - at a fairly large distance. 26 cables (about 4.8 km) - this is not a small distance at that time ("Let us remind the reader that the Japanese squadron, which was moving at a 16-knot course, firing at a distance of 46 to 26 cables, fired at Russian ships ...")

Torpedoes are not fired, they are launched. Specifically, destroyers, which, due to their high speed and modest dimensions, are able to get close enough to the enemy. I suspect that the Japanese used the destroyers in the final part of the battle to finish off the damaged ships.

[mmaxx]

It is rather big by pre-war standards. And according to the experience of the war, it is already small. The battles with the Port Arthur squadron went on at greater distances. And torpedoes were launched and fired by Japanese battleships. There was such a moment. Ours didn't notice.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

It is rather big by pre-war standards. And according to the experience of the war, it is already small. The battles with the Port Arthur squadron went on at greater distances. And torpedoes were launched and fired by Japanese battleships. There was such a moment. Ours didn't notice.

It is rather big for gunners, whose sights were knocked down from continuous rolling in a long sea passage and needed to be recalibrated. And the Russian sailors themselves were not in the best physical shape, after such a long trip.

Small - from the experience of the war? And who dictated the conditions of the battle, who set the distance of fire? Perhaps the Japanese? Is it because they understood that at long distances they have an advantage?

Like, the Japanese didn't have destroyers? Or were they out of business?
Here are the hoses...
Actually, finishing off the ships with destroyers is quite a suitable tactical technique.

Well, if ours did not notice the Japanese torpedoes, then they were not very effective? It’s hard not to notice a torpedo hit, though ... maybe the distance for launching torpedoes was too great?

[mmaxx]

I don't understand what we're arguing about. The Japanese effectively controlled the Russian squadron by maneuver and fire. As they saw fit, they controlled it. Moreover, the weather was bad. When necessary, they approached almost point-blank. And the battleships launched a torpedo attack. Didn't hit. Why? Yes, who knows. Maybe the waves got in the way. And I didn’t write anything about destroyers at all. There was a rapprochement. The Japanese jumped out of the fog. The distance was 10 or 15 cables. I don't remember from memory. They weren't afraid of anything. They hit "Alexander III". Managed to organize and carry out a torpedo attack. Basically something unprecedented. That is, the degree of maritime training and self-control of the Japanese simply rolls over. T. e
their initiative was overwhelming. Simply put, what he wanted, he did. It was then, and we see it now.
And the then torpedoes were not very effective. Yes. Besides, the weather was bad. And we didn't see anything at all.
In general, the claims against the Japanese are incomprehensible. Rozhdestvensky gave the initiative completely. And if they fired at 26 cab. (5 km), this does not mean at all that they were afraid to approach. Maybe then someone had illusions about the Japanese. But now we know that the Japanese warriors are brave and desperate, and even skillful. And the fear of something there is not about the Japanese at all. So.....

[geniy]

It is rather big for gunners, whose sights were knocked down from continuous rolling in a long sea passage and needed to be recalibrated.

Please explain - why do we need sights for a ship's gun if the full angles of vertical and horizontal guidance are developed by a group of a senior artillery officer and transferred to each gunner using the Geisler system? And by the way - half of the guns on the ships of the first TOE did not have optical sights at all! How did they get on then? Yes, according to the Geisler system!

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

In general, the claims against the Japanese are incomprehensible. Rozhdestvensky gave the initiative completely. And if they fired at 26 cab. (5 km), this does not mean at all that they were afraid to approach.

What are you talking about, what claims? Personally, I didn't have any. On the contrary, firing from such a distance I consider very reasonable on their part. The Japanese admiral was clearly aware of the unimportant state of the materiel of the Russians and tried to use it. Short-range rapprochement, 10 cables, for example, gave the Russians an extra chance.
As for Christmas, I'm not sure. The speed of the squadron, as you know, is equal to the speed of the slowest ship, and the Russians simply lost in this indicator. The initiative is in the hands of those who have the advantage in speed. And the division of the squadron into two columns by Rozhdestvensky - was that maneuver so bad?
What could the Russian admiral do in that situation? What algorithm of actions would be more optimal?
Can you offer an afterthought? Perhaps not only I read with interest.

I, even an amateur, am firmly convinced that our squadron was doomed immediately after leaving the port. To join the battle after such a long sea voyage, being exhausted, you have no chance of winning initially. I suppose Rozhdestvensky understood this too, but he was forced to follow the order of his emperor, albeit not very smart.

[mmaxx]

They tried to play for the Russians here once. The fact that Rozhdestvensky underestimated the speed of the squadron is a fact. It was a complete revelation for the Russians that it was possible to fight in separate detachments, and with one goal at that. If the Arthur squadron did not need such an opportunity, then the 2TOE, on the contrary, is needed. But there were no attempts and there was nothing to talk about.
Under Jutland, the difference in speed between the Germans and the British was greater than under Tsushima. The Germans dragged armadillos with them. But they got out! The only advantage for the Germans was the relative proximity of the bases. And this suggests that if Rozhdestvensky tried to lead a squadron of at least 11 knots, maneuver more actively, then maybe something happened. I will not stutter about the battle with the detachments. For our then admirals, this is fantastic. But the desire to preserve the mechanisms of battleships led to the defeat. They say that at such a speed it was possible to maneuver without reducing it. Because during maneuvers in the ranks, the speed is necessarily reduced. But the same can be said about the Japanese. It was impossible to fly 16 knots throughout the battle. This is the full speed of some ships and cannot be kept constant. And with any rudder shift, it falls. It's just that Togo adhered to the tactics of greater speed, and the Russians - less. Which in general speaks strongly about the much greater proficiency of the Japanese. What prevented Rozhdestvensky, having passed half the world, to give something close is incomprehensible. Although it is also clear that it is simply impossible to achieve coordinated maneuvering in such a huge herd. You have to split into teams.
All together allowed the Japanese to realize their skills in artillery shooting.

[27091965]

Quote: mmaxx

It was a complete revelation for the Russians that it was possible to fight in separate detachments, and with one goal at that.

I think you are mistaken, the theory of using detachments in a squadron battle was developed long before Tsushima, but working it out in exercises required a large consumption of coal, and our admirals could not afford this.

[mmaxx]

Wow how! This is a must work! And how does the consumption of coal when sailing a large squadron and small detachments differ in coal consumption? On the contrary, driving out the squadron is a whole thing. And 4-5 ships, as it were, and not very much? All the same, maneuvers are two sides. You can imitate by any means. At least destroyers. The main thing is to understand your speed and your maneuverability and the enemy. Our goal is not to win. The question is very much. And most likely, just blindness and conceit.

[27091965]

Quote: mmaxx

And how does the consumption of coal when sailing a large squadron and small detachments differ in coal consumption?

The movement of a squadron in one formation is a single speed and maneuver. The movement of a squadron consisting of detachments, these are various maneuvers and a change in the speed of detachments, depending on the tasks assigned. The ability of individual detachments to move forward or on the flanks of the enemy, which requires an increase in speed, coal consumption, and high-quality maintenance of vehicles and boilers. In addition, such exercises were required to be carried out often in order to be able to obtain complete mutual understanding and coordination of actions, both between detachments and between individual ships included in the detachment. This is only maneuvering, but there is also shooting.

[geniy]

The ability of individual detachments to move forward or on the flanks of the enemy, which requires an increase in speed, coal consumption, and high-quality maintenance of vehicles and boilers. In addition, such exercises were required to be carried out often in order to be able to obtain complete mutual understanding and coordination of actions, both between detachments and between individual ships included in the detachment.

All this is an opinion about an increase in coal consumption, because for about half a year of navigation (lasting about 4000 hours), an increase in speed for maneuvers would require only about 40 hours - that is, a negligible amount of about 1%.
and in fact, the third Russian squadron did not maneuver well due to the fact that it was used to the two-flag system of orders, and Rozhdestvensky made everyone maneuver according to the four-flag system.

[geniy]

But the desire to preserve the mechanisms of battleships led to the defeat.

saving mechanisms is the stupidest thing. In fact, all ships reduce their maximum speed during operation. but the reason for this is not at all that the mechanisms wear out, but from the fouling of the watery part of the skin with shells and algae. and moreover, fouling occurs to a greater extent in the parking lot and to a lesser extent on the move. and since the Japanese squadron stood longer all winter, and the squadron of the Christmas pain moved, it was smaller and overgrown, and a month before the battle they cleaned the sides of algae.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

They tried to play for the Russians here once. The fact that Rozhdestvensky underestimated the speed of the squadron is a fact. It was a complete revelation for the Russians that it was possible to fight in separate detachments, and with one goal at that. If the Arthur squadron did not need such an opportunity, then the 2TOE, on the contrary, is needed. But there were no attempts and there was nothing to talk about.
Under Jutland, the difference in speed between the Germans and the British was greater than under Tsushima. The Germans dragged armadillos with them. But they got out! The only advantage for the Germans was the relative proximity of the bases. And this suggests that if Rozhdestvensky tried to lead a squadron of at least 11 knots, maneuver more actively, then maybe something happened. I will not stutter about the battle with the detachments. For our then admirals, this is fantastic. But the desire to preserve the mechanisms of battleships led to the defeat. They say that at such a speed it was possible to maneuver without reducing it. Because during maneuvers in the ranks, the speed is necessarily reduced. But the same can be said about the Japanese. It was impossible to fly 16 knots throughout the battle. This is the full speed of some ships and cannot be kept constant. And with any rudder shift, it falls. It's just that Togo adhered to the tactics of greater speed, and the Russians - less. Which in general speaks strongly about the much greater proficiency of the Japanese. What prevented Rozhdestvensky, having passed half the world, to give something close is incomprehensible. Although it is also clear that it is simply impossible to achieve coordinated maneuvering in such a huge herd. You have to split into teams.
All together allowed the Japanese to realize their skills in artillery shooting.

Well, how are the results of the local exercises? Who is the local "Ushakov" here, what did the Japanese dupu kick?

Excuse me, but when evaluating speed characteristics, do you rely on "paper" data? How do you know what real speed Russian ships could develop by that time? What if the steam boilers were worn out on old ships, of which there were many in the Russian squadron? But what if there was a shortage of coal on some ships by that time? When and where was the last time the Russians replenished their fuel supplies? And were the gunners more likely to hit the enemy at higher speed, given the lack of proper practice? How many firing exercises did the Russians conduct during the campaign?

If the enemy is faster than you, splitting into squads may not be the best idea. The enemy can break them one by one. The one who is superior in speed will also have the initiative, forcing the fight on his own terms.

By the way, did the Russians have transports? It seems they were carrying supplies to the theater. Should they have been abandoned so that the Japanese could sink them calmly? After all, they, presumably, tied the actions of the squadron?

That's it. Under Jutland, the Germans, like the enemy, were "fresh", the materiel, presumably, in very good condition. The Germans carried out more practical shooting than the enemy, excellent sights and everything in the same spirit. The analogy doesn't work.
On the good side, after such a transition (taking into account the quality of ship life), the crews needed a week's rest, and the materiel (power plants, weapons) - preventive repairs would not hurt.

The Japanese withstood the speed that they considered optimal in terms of defeating the enemy and avoiding return fire.

[rytik32]

Quote: Illanatol

How do you know what real speed Russian ships could develop by that time?

There are records of who could develop what speed.
"Emerald" 22 knots during the breakthrough, Nebogatov on the night of May 14 - 14 knots. "Aurora" in the daytime battle also ran well.
A noticeable decrease in speed was only for those who had large flooding in the nose: "Ushakov" and "Svetlana".

[mmaxx]

And after the battle, the "Eagle" was dispersed so that the Japanese could not catch up ((((. Our stories about the deplorable state of the mechanisms, with clarification, are becoming more and more like an excuse for wrong decisions.

[mmaxx]

I don't really understand the claims. I did not record myself in the Ushakovs. But ANY headquarters or commander must know how fast the ship is moving, how it gains it, how it turns, how many knots it loses on this. How much coal does it take. Etc. After that, it is possible to work out - on paper - methods of maneuvering, etc. Check on the water. And you might as well not use it. If the mathematics is tested and errors are revealed, then it can be done by eye. The Ushakovs went by eye. Here, excuse me, there are zero sails and instruments. But now there are instruments and even under sail everything is considered only on the way. As a yachtsman I say. Moreover, normal riders constantly update their data. Because there are a lot of incoming.
What was done by Rozhdestvensky's headquarters is unclear. Installed 9 nodes and that's enough. So we will not get lost and can turn in formation, and not in a herd. And if you need more, how much? And you won't need everything. Go. Let's go with God. Somehow.
After all, even with the slightest maneuvering, even at our speed, ours broke away. What if they started right away? And not when there is practically no Suvorov, there is no Oslyabi at all, Alexander 3 barely rides behind the squadron.

[mmaxx]

All this writing about the fact that artillery art cannot be separated from naval training. Fire is always provided by maneuver. And without it, you can only fight a coastal battery.
During the exercises, all this is reset to zero. And numbers appear in 50-75% of hits. In WWI, the British, with rare exceptions, did not outnumber the Germans and did not reach the Japanese. The Japanese and the Americans then showed a lot of things.

[Illanatol]

Quote: rytik32

"Emerald" 22 knots during the breakthrough, Nebogatov on the night of May 14 - 14 knots. "Aurora" in the daytime battle also ran well.

14 knots, by the way, is not so much.
Those who "ran well" and managed to break into Vladik. "Aurora" - the latest cruiser then, cruisers, as it were, should be faster than battleships (of which there were enough in the squadron).
So others are less fortunate, alas. Well, catching up and finishing off is a common thing.

[mmaxx]

The question is that our Japanese speeds are taken from reference books, and ours are real. And sprinkle ashes on their heads.

[mmaxx]

That's only if our squadron went at least 13 knots, then Togo, before reaching the head, would have to be raked from the entire formation of Russian battleships. And it would have turned out first to cover the head in reverse. And with a one and a half times superiority in speed, the exit to the head occurred very quickly. Because the Japanese so effectively controlled our head.

[Oleg812spb]

"Aurora" - then the newest cruiser

Only "Oleg" could be called the newest there.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Illanatol

14 knots, by the way, is not so much.
Those who "ran well" and managed to

Especially when they are not.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

The question is that our Japanese speeds are taken from reference books, and ours are real. And sprinkle ashes on their heads.

And where and when could the Japanese steal their ships, their power plants? Did they also make transoceanic crossings?
I am an amateur, but still I know that battleships were originally designed for operations in the coastal zone. They had good armor protection, good weapons, but walking and fighting thousands of miles from their native shores was not their forte.

The Japanese operated close to their shores, so their battleships operated normally. Unlike the Russians. Still, cruisers are more suitable for long trips.

I believe that even Tsar Nicholas II did not really believe in the success of this enterprise, and therefore he took the news of the defeat of our squadron quite calmly.

- So what happened to your squadron, Your Majesty?
She drowned...

[mmaxx]

The Japanese hung out on the Elliot Islands for half the war. Ready to go. So it's not worth talking about the wear of the mechanisms. Our squadron was then idle in Arthur. Unless, they just had English armadillo mechanisms. Those. obviously the best quality.
Although the mechanisms of our new armadillos did not disappoint.
The question is that the Japanese Fought. And according to the samurai tradition, they did not look for excuses for themselves.
For example, the British in the 41st year in the Mediterranean had technically almost ruined ships. They didn't even have time to repair them. But you can't tell from the results.

[Rurikovich]

Quote: mmaxx

For example, the British in the 41st year in the Mediterranean had technically almost ruined ships. They didn't even have time to repair them. But you can't tell from the results.

It's just that they had Italians in their enemy. And how they fought - we know

[mmaxx]

The steam engine doesn't care what ship it's on. If it is well made, well maintained and it is not structurally forced / lightened (as on a destroyer), then it serves the same. Armadillos have many advantages: they have large vehicles, many mechanics, and service there is more prestigious. So people there, most likely, are more prepared.

[mmaxx]

The battleships of the Japanese were standard English. They differed only in slightly smaller coal reserves. For this they were given an extra pair of six-inchers. 1 PC. on Board. Not all God. But 15000 tons is an argument in their favor from all sides.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

That's only if our squadron went at least 13 knots, then Togo, before reaching the head, would have to be raked from the entire formation of Russian battleships.

If only... if I could walk like that.
How much the Japanese would have raked from our guns, which didn’t hit too well even at a lower speed, is also a question.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

But ANY headquarters or commander must know how fast the ship is moving, how it gains it, how it turns, how many knots it loses on this.

And Rozhdestvensky - didn’t know the type? Sure?
But what to do if the squadron is so diverse, such a spread in speeds? Stupidly throw the most slow-moving at the mercy of? Like, let them drown, but they won't interfere. And yet there were transports there? Or were the warships loaded? The squadron, it seems, was supposed to deliver supplies to ours in the Far East or not?

Quote: mmaxx

After all, even with the slightest maneuvering, even at our speed, ours broke away.

This became relevant after the defeat, as it were. During the battle, you still need to shoot, at least sometimes. And at the speed at which you could really hit. Alas, even 9 knots turned out to be too much for ours, so that the percentage of hits was high enough. I don’t know if our gunners really aimed guns, as in the 18th century, through the barrel (or Novikov-Priboy invented it, exaggerating), but that not everything was in order with the materiel is a clinical fact.

The Varyag gunners fired noticeably more accurately, probably because the condition of the crew and equipment was excellent, the Varyag did not make a long voyage before the battle.

[mmaxx]

Well, if the Varyag gunners fired better, then oh.

[mmaxx]

War is a cruel thing. Rozhdestvensky did not give the slow-moving creatures to be "torn to pieces". And just ditched the entire squadron. The Japanese throughout the battle showed a complete unwillingness to fight with the slug. To suggest that the Japanese may not fight in a duel mode in a parallel course, this is such a development of our then tactics.

[mmaxx]

Well, it is clear that if ours were standing at all, then the percentage of hits from our side would be greater.
Although personally it seems to me that the percentage should be the highest at the same speeds.

[Vagabung]

The Varyag gunners fired noticeably more accurately, probably because the condition of the crew and equipment was excellent, the Varyag did not make a long voyage before the battle.

Much more accurate, in the white light as a penny. After all, they never hit)))
You mentioned above that the Aurora was the newest cruiser. How to put it mildly...
A very controversial statement. The same Varyag, Askold, Oleg, Bogatyr were both newer and stronger.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

Well, if the Varyag gunners fired better, then oh.

What, no? Well, prove the opposite with exact statistics. How many shots, what percentage of hits.

[mmaxx]

Hit percentage -0. Nothing more is confirmed.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

War is a cruel thing. Rozhdestvensky did not give the slow-moving creatures to be "torn to pieces". And just ditched the entire squadron. The Japanese throughout the battle showed a complete unwillingness to fight with the slug.

"Die yourself, but save a comrade."
Would you leave the sluggards to certain death? From a pragmatic point of view - perhaps and correctly, but purely humanly and from the position of an officer's honor?
The Japanese acted quite logically. It is necessary to knock out, first of all, the most modern and high-speed ships, as the most dangerous. And leave the sluggards for last, where will they go? They can't get away because of insufficient speed.

By the way, how were things with communications in the Russian squadron? Was there a radio/telegraph on every ship? Or in the old fashioned way - they gave signals with flags? This is important for efficiency and tactical flexibility, as it were.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

Well, it is clear that if ours were standing at all, then the percentage of hits from our side would be greater.

Ours, the most reasonable, should have avoided the battle. But wishful thinking is one thing, reality is another.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

Hit percentage -0. Nothing more is confirmed.

And what confirms the absence of hits and losses among the Japanese? The statement of the Japanese themselves?

They write differently:

"There is no reliable information about the effectiveness of the firing of Russian gunners. The results of the battle at Chemulpo are still the subject of discussion between historians. The Japanese themselves insist that their ships did not receive a single hit. According to foreign missions and military attachés in Japan, a detachment of counter "Admiral Uriu nevertheless suffered losses in this battle. Three damaged cruisers and dozens of sailors were reported killed."

https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/[email protected]

"At 12.05, the steering gears were damaged on the Varyag. It was decided to give full back, continuing to fire on Japanese ships. The Varyag managed to disable the aft tower and the bridge of the Asama cruiser, which was forced to stop and start repair work The guns on two other cruisers were also damaged, and one destroyer was sunk. In total, the Japanese lost 30 people killed, the Russians 31 people killed, 188 wounded. "

https://histrf.ru/read/articles/podvigh-krieisiera-variagh-event

Kind of a lie? But why should I trust you more than these sources? Justify.

[mmaxx]

Good faith delusion. And essentially a lie.
Many times here I try to say that no commander in the report can hide damage and losses. It makes no sense. Damage must be repaired. And this is money. Accuracy is brought up in any fleet. What happened we write, what did not happen we do not write. You can embellish something, but hide a hole in the side or a padded gun? In battle? How? Then go around with a hole and without a gun? This is ridiculous. L / s losses cannot be hidden either. Otherwise, where have people gone? The Japanese have a rigid system. There can be no nameless heroes. Each deceased must be recorded in their yasukuni shrine.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

Many times here I try to say that no commander in the report can hide damage and losses. It makes no sense. Damage must be repaired. And this is money. Accuracy is brought up in any fleet. What happened we write, what did not happen we do not write. You can embellish something, but hide a hole in the side or a padded gun? In battle? How? Then go around with a hole and without a gun? This is ridiculous. L / s losses cannot be hidden either. Otherwise, where have people gone? The Japanese have a rigid system. There can be no nameless heroes. Each deceased must be recorded in their yasukuni shrine.

What if resources, financial and otherwise, could be allocated in advance? And reporting on repairs and other things could not be made public, or even be destroyed over time? For what? And so that the brilliance of victory does not fade slightly. Do you think the Japanese don't know how to put dust in their eyes?
From whom to hide? From the authorities? So they didn’t hide it from him ... then the high authorities hid it from the mikado (possibly) and from the so-called. "international community".
Even if you had access to the Japanese archives and their documentation, is it possible to guarantee that they were not "amended" retroactively for a very specific purpose? What guarantees?

Did you hold the temple lists of these dead in your hands? Have you checked everything, every last name?
And what prevents you from indicating a different cause of death? Unless even in peacetime there are no losses of l / s? Well, there, from diseases, accidents, etc.
There would be a desire (of the highest authorities), you can always correct the reporting. With the best of intentions, of course (spiritual maintenance, etc.)

And here's what you should pay attention to. Let's say the Japanese had no losses, neither human nor materiel.
Then how did it happen that an entire squadron was never able to sink a light cruiser with relatively weak weapons and armor? The "Varangian" was damaged during the battle ... which prevented him from finishing off and sinking in order to win a clear victory. Send destroyers and finish off the cruiser with torpedoes. There is no risk, the Russians do not know how to shoot, since they never hit.
But the "Varyag" was flooded by the crew itself on Rudnev's command, and the Russians even had a discussion, and the Japanese, like, were just waiting for the Russians to make a decision?
Simple Japanese gentlemen, yeah...

But if we accept the version that the damage was done to the Japanese, then everything falls into place. It is better to do repairs, help the wounded and so on (so that after the battle the foreigners do not see the consequences of the battle), and the Russian cruiser can wait.
So I remain of my opinion, this version seems to me more logical.

[rytik32]

Quote: Illanatol

Then how did it happen that an entire squadron was never able to sink a light cruiser with relatively weak weapons and armor? The "Varangian" was damaged during the battle ... which prevented him from finishing off and sinking in order to win a clear victory. Send destroyers and finish off the cruiser with torpedoes. There is no risk, the Russians do not know how to shoot, since they never hit.

Are you kidding me?
"Varyag" gave full speed and back to the port. And there are neutrals and you can’t fight.

[Illanatol]

Quote: rytik32

"Varyag" gave full speed and back to the port. And there are neutrals and you can’t fight.

Even at full speed (taking into account damage) would not have allowed to escape from the attack of destroyers, of which the Japanese had as many as 8 pieces.

“When the Varyag left the battle, a signal was raised on its yardarm to the “Korean”: “Follow me at full speed.” The Japanese fired at the Russian ships after them. fire on the Russian cruiser only when it stood on the Chemulpo roadstead in close proximity to the ships of neutral countries. The legendary battle of Russian ships with superior enemy forces ended at 12:45.

Link is above. That is, the Japanese pursued the Russians to the last, but failed to sink the already badly damaged ship, which received two holes and had a strong lateral trim.
The fact remains that, having a colossal superiority in firepower, the Japanese could not sink the light cruiser, they only damaged it. "Korean" was not injured at all.

[mmaxx]

Are you kidding me? There, the fairway for one ship is cramped. The destroyers dangled behind the Japanese cruisers. Far. Some cruisers were placed in advance astern of the Varyag in order to pursue if it breaks through.
And there was no need to attack. The main thing was not to let go. And "Varyag" was gone.

[mmaxx]

A good thought comes later. The Japanese were not going to drown in the fairway. This meant that later there would be problems with entering the port.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: mmaxx

The Japanese were not going to drown in the fairway. This meant that later there would be problems with entering the port.

Nothing like it. The width of the Incheon fairway at its narrowest point is at least one kilometer. The problem is different. A lot of shoals, and the echo sounder had not yet been invented in those days.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

There, the fairway for one ship is cramped. The destroyers dangled behind the Japanese cruisers. Far. Some cruisers were placed in advance astern of the Varyag in order to pursue if it breaks through.
And there was no need to attack. The main thing was not to let go. And "Varyag" was gone.

Taki pursued and fired, but could not sink.
The destroyers could still catch up with the damaged cruiser to launch torpedoes.
By the way, didn't the Varyag have to make a maneuver, turn 180 degrees in order to return to the raid? Or was he walking forward? In any case, the Japanese had the opportunity to sink the cruiser, but they could not use it.

They could not release without a fight at all (just a blockade). But there was still a fight. And the sinking of an enemy ship is still desirable. Well, there is a reward, gratitude from the command, other goodies.

[rytik32]

Quote: Illanatol

In any case, the Japanese had the opportunity to sink the cruiser, but they could not use it.

Why was it necessary to destroy the Varyag? The Japanese then raised it and put it into operation.

[mmaxx]

Look at the battle plan. Read the latest materials. Look on youtube. There, normal people have repeatedly performed. There you will find out where and how the "Varyag" turned around. And there will be no need to mess around here. The people here are mostly knowledgeable. This battle is dismantled every minute from all sides.

[Illanatol]

Quote: mmaxx

A good thought comes later. The Japanese were not going to drown in the fairway. This meant that later there would be problems with entering the port.

To whom, the Japanese?
And what if the damaged cruiser would have taken and sank in the fairway while trying to return to the port?
Were they inflicting damage on him with homeopathic doses, adjusting the trajectory of each projectile?
And what if the Russians had deliberately sunk their cruiser in the fairway, blocking it?

If the Japanese really took this into account, then the most reasonable thing in their situation would be to allow the Varyag to finally leave the waters of Chemulpo, catch up already in the open sea at a sufficient distance and there give it a fight, while dividing forces: part of the Japanese ships should have been between port and "Varyag", excluding the possibility of the latter returning.

[Mekey Iptyshev]

I am not an expert on the Russo-Japanese War. I know about Tsushima only from the famous book of the same name by Novikov-Priboy.
I think the main reason for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was well described by the author, a participant in those events, in his book. He also described his communication with Japanese sailors. And the picture came out as follows. In Rozhdestvensky's squadron there were "mobilized", in modern terms, who served in the army, navy, where there are a lot of parades and window dressing. They were opposed by Japanese "specialists-contractors", who served for a long time and many still participated in battles with the Chinese, then fought with the Pacific squadron. And experience - you will not spend on drink.