All the XVII-XIX centuries, the British attacked us on the Turks. As a result, Russia fought with Turkey in the Russian-Turkish war 1676-81, in the Russian-Turkish war 1686-1700, in the Russian-Turkish war 1710-13, in the Russian-Turkish war 1735-39, in the Russian-Turkish war 1768-74 , in the Russian-Turkish war 1787-91, in the Russian-Turkish war 1806-12, and in the Russian-Turkish war 1877-78. In addition, Turkey fought against Russia in the Crimean and in the First World War. Thus, a total of 10 times.
At the beginning of the XIX century, they incited Napoleon against us, with whom, like with Germany in 1939, we had the Treaty of Tilsit, concluded in the year 1807. In 1805, he almost invaded England, but then the British were able to draw Austria and Russia into the war against Napoleon. The Russian-Austrian attack forced Napoleon to move to Bavaria, and then to Bohemia, in order to defeat the allies 20 November (2 December) 1805 of the year at Austerlitz. But in 1812, through the efforts of agents of British influence, Napoleon decided to invade Russia.
Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov
We were forced by the British to perform on the 1813-14 Foreign Campaign. What have we gained from this campaign? Everlasting rebellious Poland? Strengthening Austria and Prussia, who have become our enemies in a century? Moreover, all this was paid for by several tens of thousands of Russian lives. After 1812, Napoleon would hardly go to Russia again. But he would have to concentrate all his efforts on England. Many laugh at Admiral Chichagov, who missed Napoleon on the Berezina (details on this here). In fact, Pavel Chichagov acted on the secret instructions of Kutuzov, whose plans did not include the capture of Napoleon. If Kutuzov needed this, he would have captured Napoleon in Smolensk at the beginning of November, where, after leaving Moscow, he would leave through Borovsk, Vereya, Mozhaisk and Vyazma after the defeat at Maloyaroslavets. Kutuzov was a supporter of Russia's withdrawal from the war immediately after the restoration of Russian borders. Anglophobe Kutuzov believed that the elimination of Napoleon as a political figure pours water primarily on the British mill.
In 1807, Mikhail Illarionovich was a supporter of the Peace of Tilsit and joining the Continental Blockade. In December, 1812 he opposed the foreign campaign, and when he was forced to obey the orders of the emperor, he was upset, ill and died.
Napoleon’s successful flight put an end to Chichagov’s reputation. Offended by public opinion, but shackled by an oath not to disclose Kutuzov’s plan even after his death, Chichagov was forced to go abroad on 1814. He died in Paris 1 September 1849 of the year.
Vasily Stepanovich Zavoyko
And in the 1853-56 years, the British themselves, in alliance with France and Sardinia, landed in the Crimea, blocked Kronstadt, 6-7 in July, 1854, subjected Solovetsky Monastery to nine-hour shelling by ship artillery. And 18-24 August 1854 squadron of Admiral Price (3 frigate, 1 corvette, 1 brig, 1 steamer, all - 218 guns) tried to seize Petropavlovsk. The city was defended by a Russian garrison under the command of Major General Zavoyko, numbering several hundred people with 67 guns.
On August 20, after suppressing the fire of two batteries, the British landed an assault force of 600 people south of the city, but a Russian detachment in 230 soldier counterattack threw him into the sea. On August 24, an allied squadron crushed 2 batteries on the peninsula and landed a large landing force (970 people) to the west and north-west of the city. The defenders of Petropavlovsk (360 people) detained the enemy, and then a counter-attack threw him away. The British and their allies lost about 450 people, the Russians - about a hundred. After being defeated, 27 August Allied squadron left the area of Petropavlovsk. Failure ended and the landing of the British in the Gulf of De-Kastri.
British Guards Grenadiers
Only in the Crimea, the English managed to succeed: 27 August 1855, the Russian troops, who had not yet exhausted all the possibilities of defense, left the heavily destroyed southern part of the city of Sevastopol, the defense of which lasted almost a year - 349 days. It should be noted that the siege of Sevastopol was led by Anglo-French-Turkish-Sardinian troops totaling 62,5 thousands of people. The number of defenders of Sevastopol was 18 thousands of soldiers and sailors. So it’s not the rottenness of the tsarist regime and not the technical lag that caused the defeat of Russia near Sevastopol, but the numerical superiority of the enemy three and a half times. The enemy’s numerical superiority explains the defeat of the Russian troops in the battle on the Alma River - 55 thousands of Allied soldiers against 34 thousands of Russians, that is, less in 1,6 times. This, taking into account the fact that the Russian troops were advancing. In a similar situation, when the Russian troops attacked, having a numerical superiority, they won victories. So it was in the Balaklava battle, which the Russians won, having suffered less losses than the enemy.
Balaklava battle won by Russian troops.
The Russian command is being scolded for not quickly introducing technical innovations - at a time when our opponents were armed with rifles, our troops continued to use smooth-bore guns. However, few people know that the rifled guns of our army were then not needed - Nicholas I himself invented a bullet, the rotation of which gave the oncoming air flow. Such a bullet in range was one and a half times as large as the range of a flight of the Minier bullet fired from rifles. And if not the premature death of the emperor, then the development weapons could go a completely different way.
British Enfield rifle model 1853 of the year
But, despite the fall of Sevastopol, the British did not succeed in repelling the Crimean Peninsula from Russia.
Attempts to overcome Russia, the British continued in the twentieth century. At the very beginning of the century, they supported Japan, which without this support could not have defeated Russia. Shortly after the revolution, 23 December 1917, an Anglo-French agreement was concluded on the division of future military operations and, therefore, spheres of influence in Russia: the Caucasus and Cossack regions entered the UK zone, Bessarabia, Ukraine and the Crimea entered the zone of France. In an environment where the old army, by the efforts of the Bolsheviks, had already collapsed, and the Red Army had not yet been created, the British tried to seize important key points from Russia in order to use them as initial positions for further expansion. For example, on March 6, English troops landed in Murmansk, on August 2 of the same year, British troops landed in Arkhangelsk, and on August 4 Baku was occupied by British troops.
But the Englishmen were closest to the war with the Russians in the first months of World War II - between Hitler’s attack on Poland and the defeat of France. After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the British began to consider the Soviet Union an accomplice of Hitler and, therefore, their enemy.
Almost immediately after the start of the war between Germany and Poland, in which the USSR took part from 17 in September of 1939, the Anglo-French allies paid attention to the Baku oil fields and searched for possible ways to disable them.
By the beginning of World War II, the Baku oil industry produced 80% high-grade aviation gasoline, 90% naphtha and kerosene, 96% autotractor oils from their total production in the USSR. The theoretical possibility of an air attack on Soviet oil fields was first considered in September by an 1939 liaison officer between the General Staff and the French Foreign Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Paul de Willelume. And on October 10, French Finance Minister Paul Reynaud asked him a specific question: Can the French Air Force "bombard oil development and oil refineries in the Caucasus from Syria?" In Paris, it was meant that these plans should be carried out in close cooperation with the British. The US Ambassador to Paris, William C. Bullitt, who was, incidentally, the first time the first US ambassador to the USSR, was also notified of these plans by the head of the French government Edouard Daladier and other French politicians in connection with the signing of the mutual assistance agreement on October 19 between England, France and Turkey. He telegraphed to Washington about a discussion in Paris of the possibility of "bombing and destroying Baku." Although the French agreed on their plans with the British, the latter were not far behind them in developing their similar projects.
11 January 1940, the British embassy in Moscow reported that the action in the Caucasus could “bring Russia to its knees as soon as possible,” and the bombing of the Caucasian oil fields can inflict a knockout blow on the USSR.
Edwin Ironside
On January 24, the chief of the imperial general staff of England, General Edwin Ironside, the same one who led the British mission in Arkhangelsk during the years of military intervention, presented to the military cabinet a memorandum on "The main strategy of the war", which indicated the following: "in determining our strategy in the current situation, there will be only the right decision to consider Russia and Germany partners. " Ironside emphasized: "In my opinion, we can provide effective assistance to Finland only if we attack Russia from as many directions as possible and, most importantly, strike in Baku, the region of oil production, to cause a serious state crisis in Russia " Ironside was aware that such actions would inevitably lead the Western Allies to war with the USSR, but in the current situation considered this to be completely justified. The document emphasized the role of English aviation for the implementation of these plans, and in particular it was indicated that "economically Russia is heavily dependent on the supply of oil from Baku in the war. This area is within the reach of long-range bombers, but provided that they have the ability to fly over the territory of Turkey or Iran" . The question of the war with the USSR moved to the highest military-political level in the leadership of the Anglo-French bloc. On March 8, a very important event took place in the context of the preparation of the war with the Soviet Union of Great Britain and France. On this day, an English committee of chiefs of staff presented to the government a report entitled "The military consequences of hostilities against Russia in 1940."
Halifax bomber was originally created specifically for the bombing of our oil fields, but their entry into the troops began only in November 1940 year.
By the beginning of World War II, the Baku oil industry produced 80% high-grade aviation gasoline, 90% naphtha and kerosene, 96% autotractor oils from their total production in the USSR.
British generals are discussing a plan for an air attack on the USSR.
30 March and 5 April 1940, the British carried out reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR.
20 March 1940 was held in Aleppo (Syria) a meeting of representatives of the French and English commands in the Levant, which noted that by June 1940 the construction of the first category 20 airfields would be completed. 17 April 1940 Mr. Weygan informed Gamelin that the preparation of the air strike would be completed by the end of June - the beginning of July.
30 March and 5 April 1940, the British carried out reconnaissance flights over the territory of the USSR. Shortly before sunrise 30 March 1940, the "Lockheed 12" rose from the Habbania base in southern Iraq and headed for the northeast. At the helm sat the best Royal Air Force scout pilot Australian Sydney Cotton. The task assigned to a crew of four, commanded by Hugh McFail - Cotton's personal assistant - was to air reconnaissance of the Soviet oil fields in Baku. At an altitude of 7000 meters, Lockheed did circles above the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan. The shutters of automatic cameras clicked, and two crew members - photographers from the Royal Air Force - took additional pictures with hand-held cameras. Towards noon - after 10 hours - the spy plane landed in Habbania. Four days later, he again took to the air. This time he made a reconnaissance of oil refineries in Batumi.
However, the plans of the Anglo-French command were destroyed by the German offensive against France.
10 May, on the day of the outbreak of hostilities in France, Churchill became the prime minister. The British consider him the savior of the Kingdom, who at a difficult moment decided to resist Hitler. But the facts show the opposite: Churchill did not sign the surrender only because Hitler did not offer it. Churchill was going to capitulate before leaving not only France, but also Belgium. So also 18 in May, when the Anglo-French forces in Belgium were not yet cut off and pressed to the sea, Churchill put to the Parliament’s discussion the question of where to evacuate the royal family: to Canada, India or Australia (House of Commons, Debates, 5th Series , Vol. 360, Col. 1502). He himself insisted on the last two options, since he believed that Hitler would capture the French fleet and, in a short time, would reach Canada (Gilbert M.Winston S. Churchill. Vol. VI. Lnd. 1983, p. 358). And on May 26 in a conversation with the head of the Foreign Office, Lord Edward Frederick Lindley Wood Halifax, Churchill said: "If we could get out of this conversion, giving Malta, Gibraltar and several African colonies, I would have seized the opportunity" (Chamberlain Papers NC 2 / 24A). But besides Churchill, there were more active defeatists in the government. On the same day, May 26 Halifax suggested contacting Mussolini for mediation in signing a truce (Hickleton Papers, A 7.8.4, Halifax Diary, 27.V.1940).
The press of neutral countries added fuel to the fire of defeatism. So 21 in May, the Swedish press wrote that Germany does not have a 31 torpedo boat, as it was in reality, but more than a hundred, each of which will allow her to land on the British coast along 100 people. The next day, the same newspaper, referring to a source in the German generals, wrote that the Germans were installing long-range guns on the banks of the English Channel, under the cover of which they intend to disembark from day to day. The source of this, most likely, threw the Swedes dezu, fabricated in the office of Walter Schellenberg. But the psychological effect was huge. The Canadian Prime Minister even suggested that England should evacuate all English children from 5 to 16 to this dominion. The offer was only partially accepted, since all English transport was already busy evacuating from Dunkirk. In Canada, they decided to send only 20 thousands of children from the most noble families.
The position of the British was more than unstable. There were only 217 in England tanks, and aviation had 464 fighters and 491 bombers. In addition, only 376 aircraft were manned (Liddell Hart B. History of the Second World War. New York, 1971, p. 311). If the Germans had not even landed, but simply offered England unconditional surrender, then at the end of May 1940 it would have been accepted by the majority of the British Parliament. But the Germans missed a moment.
It is no secret to everyone that the respected Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill inherited from his father Randolph Henry Spencer Churchill (1849-1895), among other things, a manic-depressive psychosis. This disease manifests itself in occasionally advancing mood disorders. In typical cases, it takes the form of alternating phases - manic, expressed unmotivated, cheerful mood, and depressive. Usually the attacks of the disease are replaced by intervals of complete health. So, over the period of full health in early June, Churchill had a depressive phase. 4 June he wrote to former premier Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947): “We are unlikely to live to better days” (Cambridge University Library, Stanley Baldwin Papers, Vol. 174, p. 264). And the 12 numbers, departing from Paris after another meeting with Raynaud and Weygun, he told Hastings already mentioned here Lionel Ismeyu (1887-1965), the future general (with 1944), the baron (with 1947), and the NATO Secretary General (in 1952) 57: "We'll die in three months" (Harvard University, Houghton Library, Sherwood Papers, fol. 1891).
It was Churchill’s depressive mood that was the last blow to Weigan’s hopes to organize resistance to the Germans on a narrow strip of the coast of the Bay of Biscay with the support of naval artillery of a strong French fleet. It was guided by this plan that Weygan recommended transferring the government not to somewhere else, namely to Bordeaux - just on the coast of the Bay of Biscay.
Soon, the depressive phase in Churchill was over by the twentieth of June. Began manic. And so, Churchill, speaking in the Parliament of June 23, declared to the stunned deputies that England would fight the war to the bitter end. What was Churchill's confidence in winning based on?
The fact is that these days a brilliant idea has come to his head: once again try to make Stalin think that Hitler, having dealt with France, will attack Russia. Even 20 May 1940, the Soviet side was informed of the intention to send to Moscow with the "research" mission "Special Commissioner" Sir Stafford Cripps. Soon Cripps becomes the ambassador instead of the previous Sir who left for 2 January, the previous Sir, Sir William Seeds. And already 25 of June, Stalin, through Cripps, receives Churchill's letter, in which the Prime Minister of a defeated country, possessing an unarmed, demoralized army, offers not to anyone, but to Stalin, a hand of friendship.
Stalin did not accept it, but Churchill did not calm down on this. He decided to provide Hitler with information that Stalin was preparing to stab him in the back. Such information is the British. Mainly through the French and neutral press, they unobtrusively tried to throw Hitler from the very moment of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. So also 15 of October 1939, in an editorial of the French newspaper "Temps", stated that "the positions won by Russia pose a constant threat to Germany" ("Temps", 15 octobre, 1939). A little later, in December 1939, "Epoque" literally wrote the following: "The plan of Russians is grandiose and dangerous. Their ultimate goal is the Mediterranean Sea" ("Epoque", 4 decembre, 1939). One of the episodes of this propaganda campaign was the aforementioned distribution by the Havas agency of the false protocol of the Politburo meeting.
The overseas press did not lag behind their French colleagues. The following lines appeared in the January issue of the State Department’s official journal: “Turning troops from east to west, Hitler must be constantly on guard” (“Foreign Affairs”, January, 1940. P. 210). But a truly wide scale such statements in the neutral press reached between the end of hostilities in France and the German attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler tried with all his might to convince Stalin that he wanted to attack him. And Hitler believed it. Already 8 January 1941, Hitler told Ribbentrop: “England is holding on only with the hope of America’s help and Russia. The British diplomatic training in Moscow is clear: England’s goal is to throw the USSR at us. Simultaneous intervention by Russia and America would be too heavy for us. Therefore destroy the threat back in the bud. " Therefore, the main reason for Hitler’s violation of the nonaggression pact is precisely the efforts of the British. It was England, saving itself from inevitable defeat, that was able to redirect Hitler’s aggression to the east.