Better a small rocket ship in the ranks than a destroyer in the project
From birth in 1967, the 1234 project turned out to be extremely controversial and elevated to the absolute the Soviet desire for specialized ships - it was not for nothing that a separate class was created specifically for it. Unprecedented "ship hunters" immediately attracted the attention of military experts from around the world, who vigorously discussed the question: what is the Soviet "toothy kid" really - a "gun at the temple of capitalism" or an easy target?
These disputes do not subside even today, when the domestic fleet is at a crossroads: whether to continue the Soviet tradition or go to the Western paradigm of multifunctional ships?
Our fleet inherited 15 small missile ships (RTOs) from the Soviet Union: 13 Project 12341 RTGs and two Project 1239 air cushion RTOs. The distribution of hulls by fleet looks like this: three for the Northern Fleet, four for the Pacific Fleet, four for the BF and four on the Black Sea Fleet (two ships of project 12341 and two ships of project 1239). As a result, today this class of ships is one of the most numerous in the fleet. It is noteworthy that all to one are in service. Nevertheless, the need for these ships is the subject of much controversy and controversy. Many people believe that in the modern concept of the fleet such highly specialized ships should be replaced by multi-purpose corvettes. The combat effectiveness of RTOs under conditions of powerful electronic warfare and the enemy’s assault aviation. In addition, today the tasks of RTOs can be performed in the same way by fighter-bomber aircraft and coastal missile systems. How justified are these doubts and has the RTO century really come to an end?
Advantages and disadvantages
First you need to understand the advantages and disadvantages of small rocket ships, applying them to modern realities.
The first and most basic advantage is powerful rocket armament. The main caliber of the 1234 project - six P-120 “Malachite” missiles reach speeds of M = 1 and have the maximum range to 150 kilometers, the active radar guidance system with an “insure” IR sensor. Having a powerful warhead (warhead) and impressive speed, these missiles are able to destroy rather large ships, such as a destroyer (EM) and, with several hits, even a missile cruiser (RKR). For example, in the course of the Crimea-76 exercises, two missiles were enough to sink the decommissioned destroyer of the 30 project bis with a displacement of 2300 tons, thereby demonstrating the excellent pointing accuracy. An important advantage is the relatively large ammunition, allowing to produce massive volleys.
However, the P-120 has significant shortcomings. First of all, it can be noted that the launch range is insufficient compared to some classmates, for example, with its closest competitors, Exocet and Harpoon, it is 180 and 315 kilometers, respectively. In addition, a considerable size of the rocket itself imposes considerable restrictions: on the experimental Nakat MRC of the 1234.7 project armed with relatively small P-800 Onyx missiles, it was possible to place twice as many launchers. Further, the ability to use weapons at the maximum range depends on reliable target designation (CC). The capabilities of the on-board radar do not allow to give a clear target control at extreme ranges, therefore it was initially assumed that the MRK would receive more accurate information from reconnaissance aircraft Tu-95РЦ and other ships.
The next undeniable advantage of the 1234 project is its excellent speed and mobility. The relatively small displacement and powerful engine allows it to reach maximum speed in 35 knots along with good agility. In combination with relatively large autonomy of navigation (10 days), this gives IRC advantages both at the operational level - you can quickly transfer combat units to the right directions, and in battle, where good maneuverability allows, for example, to dodge a torpedo or first to take a position for missile launch. However, these qualities inherited from the boat turn into a very mediocre seaworthiness. Nevertheless, for actions in the coastal and near-ocean zone, it is quite sufficient.
And one more important factor is the production one. The 1234 project ships are relatively inexpensive, can be built at almost any military shipyard capable of producing a ship with a displacement of up to one thousand tons, and the construction period under extraordinary circumstances and the strain of all capabilities will be within three to four months. This combination favorably distinguishes RTOs from all other classes, excluding only boats.
But along with these advantages, RTOs are not without very significant drawbacks.
The first and most important is the almost complete defenselessness of such a ship from air attacks. Of the anti-aircraft artillery armament, there is only one six-barreled 30-mm AK-630 unit and one 76-mm AK-176 (highly conventional as an air defense system), and from the missile system Osa-M, having a range of no more 10 kilometers. As experience shows, including real combat, the likelihood of interception of an enemy anti-ship missile (PKR) by these means is small, not to mention the possibility of directly dealing with strike aircraft.
The second drawback is the low survivability of the IRAs: as the tragic experience of the “Monsoon” that died in the training exercises when the P-15 rocket hit an inert warhead showed, the ship is very fire-hazardous due to the hull material - an aluminum-magnesium alloy. Small sizes cause insufficient buoyancy and margin of safety. As a result, many people consider RTOs to be “one-time” ships - by one salvo.
Application possibilities
Paradoxically, for all its narrow specialization, the small rocket ship of the 1234 project is relatively universal.
In the context of a large-scale conflict in the ocean theater, several options for the use of RTOs are possible. By virtue of their powerful weapons, these ships are able to support the overcoming of the air defense of a large enemy naval compound, making a significant contribution by launching six P-120 missiles. Using their speed and mobility, IRAs can act within the framework of the tactic "hit and run away", making sudden attacks on transport convoys, landing craft and destroyers of the PLO and ABM. And yet - maybe escort and protection of their own convoys.
All these three options rest against the already indicated shortcoming: the firing range. It is difficult to assume that the MRK will be able to approach, for example, the carrier-based strike group a distance of 120 kilometers and survive: even on the approaches it will be guaranteed to be detected and destroyed by deck aircraft, unlike carriers of large PKRs of the P-500 and P-700 type capable of firing over 500 kilometers. The second tactic also has vulnerabilities. The first of these could be the return fire of more long-range anti-ship missiles (for example, widely used on NATO ships “Harpoon”). The presence of a helicopter armed with short-range anti-ship missiles (Penguin and Sea Skua missiles can be launched at 28 and 25 kilometers, respectively) is possible on board destroyers and escort frigates. As noted above, the anti-aircraft capabilities of a small rocket ship are not enough to ensure that such an attack is repelled. A similar situation develops with the use of short-distance radio communications in defense: in modern conditions, an attack on a convoy will be made with high probability with the help of attack aircraft. Effectively deal with this threat can only their own fighter-interceptors.
But the main factor limiting the use of a small rocket ship under the conditions described is the need for accurate target designation and, therefore, active interaction with other parts of the fleet, including under conditions of powerful radio-electronic suppression. For full-fledged work, it is necessary to provide early warning or support of a larger surface ship, which is armed with a target designator helicopter.
Coastal defense can become another logical role for ISCs. In many ways, ships of this type fit well with the requirements for a patrolman: good artillery weapons, decent speed, autonomy. However, as the sailors say, for such tasks, the ISCs with their missile weapons are “redundant” - there are enough missile boats and small artillery ships to protect the sea border.
All of these concepts originate in the 70s of the last century, when small rocket ships were created. Today, all of the above tasks can be performed by the Air Force. For attack missions, light cruise missiles X-31 and X-35 have been created, which are suspended even on light fighters. Moreover, the X-31 product exceeds the P-120 both in speed (M = 2) and in range (160 kilometers). The X-35 “Uranus” missile is capable of reaching the target along a combined trajectory, has a smaller size, which makes it possible to increase the ammunition and produce more massive salvos, and also provides a smaller effective dispersion surface (ESR). Coastal defense against a serious enemy, which will be too hard for a missile boat (RCA) and a small artillery ship (MAC), can be produced by coastal missile systems and the same aircraft. There are several factors on the side of the air force: less vulnerability to the enemy’s oncoming fire (let us recall that the range of aviation anti-ship missiles does not allow the enemy to enter the enemy’s air defense zone), greater speed and mobility, no need to spend a long time in the threatened zone, and flexibility multifunctionality.
Many believe that the shortcomings of the RTOs are devoid of modern projects of multifunctional corvettes, combining the strike power of the 1234 project with a developed air defense system, capabilities for maintaining air defense, the presence of a helicopter, better survivability and navigability. In this way, almost all countries that had armament analogues of IRCs went: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany withdrew 90, 25, 20 and 15 units of missile boats from the Navy for 20 for the years. Instead, they put into operation exactly the corvettes of increased displacement. Moreover, a corvette with antisubmarine bias is also preferable for domestic realities, since in our vast territorial waters it is the enemy’s submarines that pose the greatest potential threat. Acting together with aviation, such corvettes (being built in sufficient quantities, of course) will be able to significantly reduce the danger.
As a result, it turns out that small rocket ships are indeed out of work: today more sophisticated means of destruction of enemy ships, capable of attacking faster and more efficiently, have been created. However, everything is not as clear as it seems at first glance.
To begin with, the MRC is a very unpretentious ship. A few floating piers, a fuel depot and an electrical network are sufficient for arranging a temporary base station. The modern strike aircraft, however, needs a much more developed infrastructure, not to mention the fact that the airfield is the primary target for the attack, and therefore, when conducting combat operations, it is likely to require frequent repairs. Further, the aircraft cannot, like a ship, conduct long-term passive tracking of a target during a period of heightened opposition or a potential enemy ship’s invasion of territorial waters (recall the incident with the American cruiser Yorktown in 1988). The main thing is the possibility of immediately striking the target when such an order is received, and in advance, the IRC will have an advantage over the aircraft that has just taken off from the base.
But the decisive factor is that today, compared to new projects of corvettes and, to a lesser extent, fighter-bombers, small missile ships have been fully developed weapons the complex, well-developed tactical techniques, there are trained staffs that provide structures and full-fledged ship formations.
In other words, the 1234 project is a very reliable and proven ship, guaranteed to be able to perform its tasks with maximum efficiency. Quite another thing - the corvettes of the project 20380, which are still a novelty - as the ship class itself, which did not exist in the Soviet naval doctrine, and from the point of view of the established weapons, not yet run-in exercises.
Without in any way denying the need to move ahead and build ships of a new generation, it must be admitted that now Russia needs a combat ready and equipped with all necessary MRCs than a completely new, but undeveloped, corvette. Of course, it is senseless to continue building old Soviet projects, but it is also impossible to simply leave the accumulated experience gained overboard. The best way out seems to be a significant increase in the potential of already existing buildings through upgrading with the installation of, for example, Onyx missiles in the 2x9 variant, the Kashtan TYPE and new electronic equipment. Sailors would not refuse from an unmanned aerial vehicle for reconnaissance and target designation. The preferred measure would be to build up a group of RTOs by producing a modernized version. For example, the capacities of the Eastern Shipyard and the shipbuilding firm Almaz can produce up to four MRK per year. This measure will help plug significant gaps in the maritime defense, including in the middle sea zone, which is not covered by lighter ships. In the future, with proper modernization of shipyards and the development of the production of ISCs at the end of their service life, they should be replaced with corvettes, provided that the number of new ships will at least not yield to sludge.
Of course, one cannot keep silent about the relatively new IRC of the 21631 “Buyan-M” project, which represents the development of the river IAC of the 21630 “Buyan” project. Armed with UVP for eight Caliber or Onyx missiles, as well as 100-mm AU A-190M and 30-mm AK-630М1-2, it is nevertheless not an alternative to the heavier 1234 project, since it can operate exclusively in the near marine zone. But precisely in cooperation, these two types of RTOs can ensure an acceptable level of security for our borders and economic zones.
Summing up, let's say that today our fleet needs, first of all, a completely clear and well-thought-out concept of combat operations, which ensures the formulation of tasks and requirements for each class of ships. And although the interaction systems of old specialized ships with new ones built according to the Western model have not been worked out, it is at least unwise to ignore the remaining IRAs from the USSR. Do not forget that the combat effectiveness of these ships was confirmed during the "five-day war" in South Ossetia. Under current conditions, when the fate of the fleet is still unclear, it is better to rely only on proven and reliable solutions and, as a result, several old IRAs may be preferable to the mythical prospective destroyer.
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