Strategic Stability in the 21st Century
DISCUSSION ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
For example, Steve Peifer and Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution consider it possible to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1000 units, and the total number of deployed and non-deployed nuclear warheads to 2000 – 2500 units. Derek Kimball, president of the Arms Control Association, proposed an even more radical reduction (up to 500 deployed nuclear warheads).
Special mention should be made of the report “Modernization of the nuclear strategy”, prepared by a group of eminent experts headed by the former Commander of STRATKO and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee of the General Assembly under the auspices of the Global Zero movement. Recently, the authors of the report came to Moscow, where they presented their proposals at an international conference. The report outlines a plan for unilateral reduction of US nuclear forces by a factor of five - to the level of 900 warheads (instead of 5 ths at present). Of these, half will be in a reduced state of readiness (use is possible in a few days, not hours), and the second half is in reserve. Deployed nuclear charges can be used in 24 – 72 hours, and reserve charges in 6 months. All US ICBMs, as well as tactical nuclear weapons, must be eliminated. Thus, the United States will have no more than 270 nuclear warheads on an SLBM for a pre-emptive strike, which is clearly not enough to defeat all strategic targets in Russia. In the event of the mobilization of all US nuclear potential, the following forces can be used to strike Russian targets: 325 warheads to destroy ICBM mines, 110 warheads to destroy command and control points, 136 warheads to destroy military-industrial facilities, and 80 warheads will be used to strike Moscow
The report of the Global Zero movement states that the radical reduction and reduction in the level of combat readiness of nuclear forces of the United States eliminates the technical threat of a sudden American first nuclear strike, the United States can no longer theoretically destroy the main strategic forces of Russia, therefore the prospect of clearing a small number of surviving Russian missiles using American missile defense. Thus, the approach proposed in the report to a certain extent recognizes the validity of the Russian concern over the threats to the Russian strategic nuclear forces by the US missile defense system. Thus, influential experts proceed from the possibility of concluding a new bilateral Russian-American treaty on the further reduction of nuclear arsenals. In our opinion, this requires taking into account Russia's concerns regarding the non-nuclear components of the military-strategic balance, where the US has significant advantages. This requires agreements between the two countries, which can be both legal and political in nature and be accompanied by confidence-building measures ensuring the necessary transparency.
Consider possible solutions.
MISSILE DEFENSE
In our opinion, the deployment of strategic missile defense should be frozen at about the current level (36 deployed GBI interceptors plus a small number of non-deployed interceptors in reserve) in Alaska and in California. The United States should not deploy the Third Strategic Missile Defense Position Area, either in Europe or on the east coast of the United States. In the event of increasing nuclear missile threat from other countries (North Korea, Iran), the United States may deploy an additional number of strategic interceptors, but their total number should be no more than 50 – 100 units, that is, the level established by the Protocol 1974 of the year to the ABM Treaty . Naturally, this implies a rejection of attempts to deploy a space echelon of missile defense.
The American side should regularly (at least twice a year) inform Russia about the ABM cash and plans for possible additional deployment of ABM assets. In addition, the American proposal to invite Russian experts to test SM-3 interceptor missiles and other advanced missile defense systems should be implemented.
As for the European missile defense, the fourth phase of the EPAA with the deployment of SM-3 Block 2B interceptor missiles should be frozen, since the deployment of the third phase of the EPAA 48 of the SM-3 Block 2A interceptor in Romania and Poland is more than enough to protect against existing and prospective Iranian medium-range missiles.
The number of permanently based in Europe, American ships equipped with SM-3 interceptors of various modifications, it is advisable to limit the current level (four units). At the same time, American ships are not based in the Black, Baltic and Barents Seas. It appears that in the event of a crisis, the grouping of American ships with SM-3 interceptors in the Mediterranean and North Sea could be increased to eight units, about which the Russian Federation should be informed in advance.
At the same time, we are convinced that Russia and the US / NATO should agree on the operational interaction and compatibility of their missile defense systems designed to protect against short-range and medium-range missiles. For this purpose, two centers can be created, as was suggested earlier, for the exchange and integration of data on rocket attacks and the distribution of tasks for intercepting third-party missiles. This may require an appropriate Executive Agreement between the United States or Russia, as well as an agreement between Russia and NATO. The problem of missile defense is analyzed in detail in a report devoted to the issue of missile defense in relations between Russia and the United States, excerpts from which were published in the Independent Military Review. At the same time, the United States and Russia strictly comply with their obligations under the INF Treaty, that is, they do not have ballistic missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 km.
In the future, if reliable information appears on the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles by Iran, the parties should agree on the adoption of additional measures to ensure missile defense.
Non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons
In the case of the creation by the American side of the Global Fast Strike means using ballistic and nonballistic trajectories of their flight, the number of such means should not exceed 12 – 20 units, as suggested by the authors of the Global Zero report. In our opinion, these funds should be taken into account in the total number of deployed carriers and nuclear warheads when determining the parameters of new legal agreements between the US and Russia to reduce strategic offensive arms. This also applies to inspections of appropriate launchers.
The idea of implementing the Global Rapid Strike using medium-range ballistic missiles on Virginia-class submarines (SSN-744), considered by the Pentagon, seems unacceptable. This proposal is clearly destabilizing.
First, the presence of medium-range ballistic missiles on Virginia-class submarines will drastically change the military-strategic balance in favor of the United States, allowing them to strike 10 – 15 minutes of missile flight times against strategic targets in the Russian Federation. The inclusion of these funds in the parameters of the agreements on strategic offensive arms is hardly feasible.
Secondly, the creation of a new class of medium-range ballistic missiles could lead to the undermining of the INF Treaty. After all, Russia may also have an incentive to deploy its own medium-range ballistic missiles, given that North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and a number of Middle Eastern states have such missiles, which have rejected Moscow’s proposal to accede to the obligations of the INF Treaty.
Third, the presence of thousands of high-precision cruise missiles capable of hitting certain strategic targets with the US Navy on surface ships and submarines plays a significant destabilizing role. In the case of implementation of the radical cuts in strategic nuclear weapons proposed in the Global Zero report, it can be assumed that the number of strategic targets for a hypothetical preemptive strike will also decrease by one and a half to two times. As a result, the United States will have the opportunity to hit 4 – 30% with a high-precision conventional means, but 50 – 70% of the reduced number of targets in Russia.
Strategic bomber B-1B ready for takeoff.
This may hinder Russia's agreement to reduce the strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, the placement of both high-precision cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles on Virginia-class submarines will have a very negative impact on the situation in the naval sphere, where the United States already has absolute superiority.
New confidence building measures in the naval sphere
Solving the problem of sea-based strategic non-nuclear armaments seems to be possible by concluding a new Russian-American agreement on confidence-building measures and ensuring transparency at sea. It must complement the proven agreement on the prevention of incidents in the open sea and the airspace above it from 25 in May 1972. In addition, in 2003, the Document on confidence- and security-building measures in the naval area on the Black Sea came into effect. The measures are politically binding. This is the first precedent of the spread of confidence-building measures on the activities of the naval forces: the exchange of information, annual plans of naval activities and prior notification of them. The document contains a wide range of voluntary forms of cooperation: joint exercises, ship calls, exchanges of delegations, reciprocal visits based on the annual rotation of naval bases, “annual exercises of trust” (invitation to the ships or observers). This is a good precedent for possible new Russia-US agreements on additional confidence-building measures.
Considering the notorious episode with the launch of the American cruiser Monterey into the Black Sea in August 2008, one cannot fail to recognize the validity of the Russian side’s concerns about the possible deployment of the US Navy group equipped with both SM-3 interceptor missiles in the waters Baltic and Barents Seas. It is necessary to prevent such situations.
With respect to the principle of freedom of navigation, the parties could agree to notify each other in advance about the location of their surface ships and submarines in certain areas of the world’s ocean, which are approximately xNUMX miles from the other side. This may include the coasts of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, as well as the Gulf of Mexico for the United States and the waters of the Black, Baltic, Barents, Okhotsk and Japan seas for the Russian Federation. It must be emphasized that although the entry of surface ships and submarines into these geographic areas will not be prohibited, fears of a possible sudden disarming and decapitating strike as a result of the covert deployment of naval forces will decrease.
At the same time, such confidence-building measures in many ways will reduce the threat of interception of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs by American ships equipped with the Aegis system with SM-3 interceptor missiles of various modifications at the initial and secondary segments of their flight.
In our opinion, the proposed new agreements on confidence-building measures and transparency could include:
- limiting the number of SM-3 interceptors on ships at sea (for example, no more than 30% of ammunition). Inviting Russian observers to ships or entering the Russian port to confirm such loading;
- providing annual information on the number of such ships and their loading, as well as preliminary plans for their naval activities;
- inviting Russian observers to the exercises with the actual use of shipboard missile defense systems (at least once a year);
- preliminary notification of the conduct of the missile defense system exercises;
- conducting various kinds of joint exercises with the participation of Russian ships in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean and North Sea.
NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS
If nuclear weapons of intercontinental, medium and shorter range are regulated by legal obligations under the START and INF Treaty, then tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) with a range of up to 500 km have never been limited to any agreements. True, in the 1991, the United States and the USSR, and later the Russian Federation, made parallel unilateral political declarations on reducing tactical nuclear weapons arsenals. However, no verification and verification measures were envisaged. Nevertheless, it is believed that both parties basically fulfilled their promises.
In recent years, the United States has abandoned most types of nuclear weapons, including SLCMs with nuclear warheads. The total number of US tactical warheads is estimated to be around 760 units. In the future, the Pentagon will have only one type of nuclear weapons - the B61 free-fall bombs, designed to equip the front-line aviation (500 units). Some of them (approximately 150–250 units) are stored at six US air bases in Europe and Turkey. The rest are in the United States. However, the B-52 strategic bombers are also equipped with the same bombs, which are included in the parameters of the new START Treaty. But according to the rules of offsetting this Agreement, for each bomber only one nuclear warhead is counted. The remaining aviation nuclear weapons are considered non-deployed and are not included in the limit of 1550 deployed nuclear warheads.
As for Russia, unfortunately, official data on non-strategic nuclear weapons have never been published here. According to the most realistic western expert estimates, Russia has approximately 2 thousand tactical nuclear warheads. Of these, about one third (about 700 units) refers to weapons of the air defense and missile defense systems. About 400 - to marine systems (mines, torpedoes, tactical missiles). Thus, the number of nuclear bombs and missile warheads (with a range of up to 500 km) does not exceed 900 units.
Many experts believe that Russian tactical nuclear weapons to a certain extent compensate for the asymmetric situation in conventional armaments in Europe, as already mentioned above. Recall that at the height of the Cold War, the United States launched 7 thousand units of TNW in Western Europe to compensate for Soviet superiority in conventional weapons.
Upon ratification of the New START Treaty, the US Senate recorded a requirement to include TNW in any new legal agreements on nuclear arms reduction. Relevant official and unofficial proposals have recently been put forward by the American side at various levels. NATO calls for reducing Russian tactical nuclear weapons or for withdrawing them from Europe to Asia. However, Moscow refuses to negotiate on this issue until American TNW is withdrawn from Europe to the United States. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the CFE Treaty was frozen, which provided for quantitative restrictions and verification of front-line aviation, including fighter-bombers, which are carriers of nuclear weapons. In addition, there are two more nuclear powers in Europe - members of NATO. Armed with France and the UK is about 500 nuclear warheads. However, these countries, like China, refuse to accept international legal obligations to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. But Russia can not ignore the British and French systems in assessing the nuclear balance in Europe.
In total, at the European theater of operations, the NATO countries have about 650 – 750 nuclear bombs and missile warheads, excluding American strategic nuclear weapons falling under the limitations of the new START Treaty. This is about the same as Russia has, if you do not take into account the nuclear weapons of the Navy, air defense and missile defense. But some of the 900 tactical warheads are in the Asian part of the Russian Federation. Therefore, to achieve a legally binding agreement on tactical nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States is unlikely to succeed.
The way out, apparently, is to include TNW in new Russian-American agreements on nuclear arms reduction, abandoning the artificial separation of nuclear weapons into strategic and non-strategic ones achieved in 1972. At the same time, all non-strategic nuclear weapons will meet the definition of non-deployed warheads adopted in the new START Treaty. But this will require the parties ’consent to concentrate all tactical nuclear warheads at the central storage bases.
Thus, it seems appropriate to establish a total quantitative ceiling for all classes of nuclear weapons. As a result, Russia’s preoccupation with US superiority in the so-called return potential of strategic nuclear weapons, where the American side has a significant quantitative superiority, and the US preoccupation with Russia's quantitative superiority in tactical nuclear warheads will be taken into account to some extent.
This "scalpel" especially irritated our overseas partners.
WEAPONS OF THIRD COUNTRIES
The fact that all other nuclear states have no division into strategic and tactical nuclear weapons also speaks in favor of this approach. Connecting these countries to the process of nuclear disarmament, which could have happened years through 5 – 10, will make it necessary to take into account all classes of nuclear weapons, regardless of the range of their delivery vehicles. This allows Russia and the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenals to about 1000 deployed nuclear warheads (that is, the total number of nuclear weapons of third countries), although deeper reductions cannot be ruled out, as suggested by the authors of the Global Zero report. But this seems to be possible only if other nuclear powers make a political commitment not to build up their nuclear arsenals. An important role could be played by such declarative steps as providing information on the number of available nuclear weapons, as well as plans to modernize nuclear arsenals, if such intentions are available.
In addition, it is advisable to seek the consent of third nuclear states to selective confidence and transparency. In the 21st century, a comprehensive negotiating process involving all nuclear states is required. Some nuclear states should not be allowed to disarm, while others at that time were building up their nuclear arsenals. Such an exchange of views, apparently, should begin in the framework of the officially recognized “nuclear five” (USA, Russia, China, Great Britain and France). The first step is to reach agreements on non-development, transparency and verification of nuclear arsenals, which will form the basis for formal negotiations on nuclear arms control.
In general, the problem of universalizing the process of nuclear disarmament deserves a comprehensive study with the obligatory participation of representatives of both officially recognized (China, France, Great Britain) and de jure unrecognized nuclear states (India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea). Otherwise, the “nuclear club” can replenish Iran and a number of other countries, and the non-proliferation regime will finally collapse.
OPERATIONAL STATUS OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE XXI CENTURY
The nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States exceed what is needed to meet the needs of deterrence between the two countries, as well as with respect to third countries. According to official data, according to the rules for offsetting the New START Treaty, on 1 September 2012, the US had 808 deployed launchers (launchers) of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as heavy bombers (TB) and 1737 nuclear warheads, from Russia - 491 PUs and TB, respectively and 1499 warheads. In addition, the US had 228 non-deployed PU, and Russia had 393.
If Washington and Moscow agree on a mutually acceptable solution of the missile defense problem and start discussing other problems related to the modern understanding of the military-strategic balance, the proposals for further reductions of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, as outlined in the Global Zero report, are possible.
Based on the real needs of nuclear deterrence, it seems possible and achievable during 10 years (by 2022) of Russia and the United States to reduce their nuclear potential more significantly than stipulated by the agreements (700 deployed PU and TB and 1550 deployed warheads on them) . It is advisable to consider three options for the possible composition of the Russian nuclear forces by 2022 year.
Option 1. Nuclear forces - 2500 warheads: 1800 strategic nuclear weapons in modified operational readiness and 700 units of non-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. For nuclear deterrence, the 900 strategic warheads are deployed, and the rest are in active reserve.
Option 2. Nuclear forces - 2000 warheads: 1400 strategic nuclear weapons in modified operational readiness and 600 units of non-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. Contained in the expanded state of 700 units of strategic weapons, and the rest - in reserve.
Option 3. Nuclear forces - 1500 warheads: 1000 strategic nuclear weapons in modified operational readiness and 500 units of non-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. At the same time for the implementation of nuclear deterrence contained in the expanded state of 500 warheads, and the rest is in active reserve.
Moscow and Washington could have implemented the first and second abbreviations without directly connecting other nuclear states to the disarmament process. The third option seems to be the most preferable if we proceed from the seriousness of the intentions of the political leadership of Russia and the United States to move towards a nuclear-free world. However, it can hardly be implemented without the participation of other nuclear-weapon States, primarily China.
The third embodiment structurally SNF Russia may consist of 270 IDB equipped 540 warheads (270 deployed, 270 in reserve), 8 NPBMS with 128 SLBMs and 280 tipped on them (140 deployed, 140 in reserve) and 15 heavy bomber with intended for them 180 ALCM.
A nuclear weapon contained in an active reserve can be taken from storage and loaded onto carriers for a period of several weeks to several months (which cannot be done imperceptibly). Most of the (up to 80 – 85%) deployed strategic nuclear weapons can be kept in low alert (with its recovery in 24 – 72 hours).
In everyday activities, it is sufficient to have two SSBNs on combat patrols at sea in the hourly ready to launch SLBMs equipped with a total of 70 warheads. In an emergency, two more SSBNs deployed in bases and armed with 70 additional warheads can be launched into the sea within a few hours. In 24 – 72 hours, the 135 MBR with 270 warheads can be restored, and 15 ALCMs are loaded on all 180 heavy bombers. Thus, after 72 hours, the number of deployed and ready for immediate use of strategic nuclear weapons in Russia will reach 590 units. This is quite enough for an adequate emergency response.
In the event of a protracted crisis or a sharp deterioration in geostrategic relations between Russia and the United States or China, a lasting period of several weeks or months would provide an opportunity to alert all 1000 weapons.
The ability of the Russian strategic nuclear forces to deliver strategic nuclear warheads to 1000 targets creates the risk of causing unacceptable damage to any potential aggressor. Thus, the task of nuclear deterrence is guaranteed to be solved if the considerations expressed above with respect to non-nuclear strategic weapons are taken into account.
Based on realities, Russia can limit its nuclear arsenal to the ceiling in 1500 of nuclear warheads in active reserves - strategic and non-strategic (tactical), deployed and non-deployed (stored and intended to be issued to the troops). These steps could be taken in unison with the United States, subject to resolving the problems associated with the deployment of strategic missile defense systems, high-precision conventional long-range weapons and the rejection of the deployment of any attack systems in space.
The existing high operational readiness for the launch of strategic nuclear missiles of Russia and the United States creates an unjustified risk and creates distrust between these countries. It is impossible today to imagine a situation in which Russia or the United States would suddenly decide to launch a preemptive nuclear missile strike against the other side. There is simply no motivation for this. Therefore, readiness for launching nuclear missiles can and should be reduced and brought in line with new military and political realities. If you even take such a step as transferring all nuclear missiles of Russia and the United States to lowered readiness, then Moscow and Washington’s ability to carry out nuclear deterrence will not suffer, because other nuclear states in the future have no motivation for a sudden nuclear attack on Russia or the United States.
Russia's possession of non-strategic nuclear weapons is considered by its military-political leadership as the most important factor in ensuring deterrence at the regional level of other states (coalition of states) from attempts to resolve the contradictions with the Russian Federation by military means, and in the case of unleashing aggression - to repel (stop) those catastrophic consequences that are inherent in the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Such an approach to the role and significance of non-strategic nuclear weapons is due to the changes in the ratio of military potentials that are not in favor of Russia in all strategic areas, aggravated by the weakening of the general-purpose forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Therefore, unlike the United States, which does not feel the need to contain its neighbors, Russia cannot abandon non-strategic nuclear weapons.
At the same time, in today's realities, the arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons that Russia possesses is surplus (according to estimates, the active stock of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons is about 2000 units). It can be reduced to about 500 units, completely eliminating the types of nuclear weapons that have lost their military significance (anti-aircraft missile warheads, depth charges, mines), and reducing the number of tactical aviation nuclear missiles and bombs. This amount of non-strategic nuclear weapons is enough for regional nuclear deterrence. In a large-scale armed conflict, which is unlikely, but still possible, Russia, in any case, will have to rely in ensuring its military security on its entire nuclear arsenal.
Russian-US agreements to reduce nuclear weapons cannot be sufficient to maintain military-strategic balance if we accept the “broad” definition of strategic stability, which, on the one hand, must take into account non-nuclear strategic systems, and on the other, the multipolar nature of the modern world. Restraining the militarization of space and the development of cybernetic weapons will help to maintain balance in the world. Maintaining strategic stability in a multipolar world in the 21st century will require new efforts to eliminate the threats arising in these areas of military rivalry.
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