Military Review

Ataman Kaledin and the Volunteer Army

18
As noted in the article Creation of the Volunteer Army and its first battle, the creation of the army was associated with the name of General Mikhail Alekseev. The general and his supporters were unhappy with the liberal regime of the Provisional Government and began preparatory work to create a militant organization even during the reign of Kerensky. Alekseev believed that it was necessary to restore order in the country and the army, and for this, tough power was needed.

The coming to power of the Bolsheviks forced Alekseev to transfer the center of the formation of the backbone of the new army from Petrograd to Don. This was due to the destructive processes that took place on the body of Russia. There was a process of destruction of the building of the empire, from which they took out the cornerstones - the regime of autocracy and the imperial army. Independence was declared by Finland, Ukraine, they considered themselves autonomous - Estonia, Bessarabia, Crimea and Transcaucasia. The Cossack regions went along this path: the Don region, headed by ataman Kaledin, Kuban - Filimonov, Terskaya - Karaulov, Orenburg - Dutov.

The strength of the Cossack positions was determined by their military organization and the strength of the largest army, the Don. Therefore, the main figure among the Cossacks in this period was Alexey Kaledin. He was born 12 (24) in October 1861, in the Cossack family, on the farm Kaledin, the village of Ust-Khopyorskaya Region of the Don Cossacks. He studied at the Ust-Medveditsk classical gymnasium, from there he transferred to the Voronezh Military Gymnasium, and also graduated from the 2-e Military Konstantinovsky and Mikhailovsky Artillery Schools. He completed his education at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff and was counted among the General Staff. He served in the Russian army from 1 in September 1879 to 25 in October 1917: he began serving as a platoon commander of a Cossack Battery artillery battery of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army, started World War I as a commander of the 12 Cavalry Division, then commanded 12 -GH. army. 8-th cavalry division attacked in the vanguard of the 12-th army and won a number of victories. In 8, the year was noted during the offensive operation of the South-Western Front of the Russian Army under the command of General A. A. Brusilov. Kaledin was distinguished by scrupulousness, perseverance and personal courage, he led the regiments to battle. He was called “the second piece of Russia” (“the first” was Fedor Keller - commander of the 1916 cavalry division, and then the 10 of the cavalry corps). Kaledin reacted negatively to the February Revolution. He refused to comply with the instructions of the Provisional Government on the "democratization" of the army, so he transferred the command of the army and moved to the reserve of the Supreme Commander. In the spring, 3 left for Don, and at the end of May began to participate in the work of the Don Military Circle in Novocherkassk.

Ataman Kaledin and the Volunteer Army

Commander of the 12 Army Corps, cavalry general A. Kaledin. November 1915.

At this time, the separatist Cossack movement provoked by the revolution began. The Cossacks were afraid of a general equalizing redistribution of Cossack lands (in the Russian Empire, they had significant privileges, including in the area of ​​land acquisition). The Minister of Agriculture in the Provisional Government of Kerensky, Social Revolutionary Party Viktor Chernov at the Peasant Congress declared that the Cossacks had too large land plots and now they would have to share part of the land. Naturally, the Cossacks were not going to share, they earned this land with faithful service and blood. 8 June 1917 of the year gathered on the Don Military Circle - 700 delegates from the villages and regiments. The candidacy of Kaledin unanimously nominated a military ataman for the post. The general did not want to take on this burden, saying that there would be no benefit from it. But, under the pressure of the Cossacks, Kaledin agreed to the election of a military ataman. Thus, Kaledin became the first elected ataman of the Don Cossacks after the election of the ataman was eliminated by Tsar Peter I. Position Kaledin accepted reluctantly: "... I came to Don with a pure warrior name, and leave, perhaps with curses."

Kaledin was right when he did not want to become the head of the Army. Tumor destruction struck the whole of Russia, there were no exceptions. Unity among the Cossacks was not. On the Don, most of the Circle attributed itself to constitutional democrats (Cadets), some supported socialist revolutionaries (Social Revolutionaries). In the Kuban, the majority of the Rada consisted of Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats, and Ukrainian nationalists. In fact, the power of the ataman was in many ways nominal, curtailed by “democratic” norms. The government’s meetings turned into empty disputes, with upholding party principles, struggling for wording, and so on. Kaledin could only punch decisions thanks to the enormous personal authority and respect he enjoyed among the Cossacks. As a result, he expressed the will not only of the Don Cossacks, but of the entire Russian Cossacks.

14 August 1917, he delivered a declaration at the Moscow State Conference, where he demanded to put the armed forces out of politics, ban political actions and meetings in military units, eliminate all Soviets and committees above the regimental ones, and restrict the competence of the remaining ones with economic issues. And also to supplement the declaration of the rights of a soldier with a declaration of his duties, decisive measures to restore discipline at the front and in the rear, in order to bring the war to a victorious end.

Ataman Kaledin sympathetically reacted to the speech of General Kornilov, although he did not support him openly. Therefore, on September 9, 1, Minister of War Alexander Verkhovsky, at the direction of Kerensky, declared him a traitor, and ordered him to be removed from his post and arrested. However, the Army Government refused to execute the order of the Provisional Government: “We will not issue the chieftain!” Don’s decision was supported by other Cossack troops, threatening to withdraw the regiments from the front. 1917 September Alexander Kerensky backed down and canceled the order, subject to the "warranties" of the Military Government for Ataman Kaledin.

This situation very well describes the general situation in Russia after the February Revolution. In fact, the country was already falling apart, and the central government lost most of its authority. Not the Bolsheviks ruined and destroyed historical Russia, and the “Februaryists” - politicians (from the Octobrists and Cadets to the Socialist Revolutionaries), a large part of the aristocracy and senior officials, a significant part of the generals and senior officers, bankers and industrialists. It was they who “leaked” Russian statehood, opening the gates to inferno wide.

Cossacks more and more left the control center. By the fall, they began to show themselves more and more opposition to Petrograd, seeing the weakness and incapacity of the central government. Already on October 5, the Kuban Rada adopted a resolution declaring its republic and its entry into Russia as autonomy. Negotiations with the Don Army ended with the creation of the South-Eastern Union from the Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan Cossacks, Kalmyks and the Highlanders of the North Caucasus. It was also proposed to attract the Ural army and the Caucasus. The Cossacks began to talk to the Provisional Government in the language of ultimatums.

Kaledin’s tragedy was that, being a stateman by nature, he was forced to consecrate the process of separating the Cossack regions from Russia with his name. He himself was well aware that all actions aimed at separating were meaningless and cost nothing without preserving Russian statehood. The mistrust between the Provisional Government and the Cossacks led to the fact that Kerensky lost one of the main forces that could really resist the new coup.

After the October Revolution, the ataman Kaledin issued a statement in which he stated that he considered the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks criminal, and until the restoration of the power of the Provisional Government, the Don Government assumed full authority in the Don Region. Kaledin, believing that the Provisional Government could still be restored, wanted to establish contact with its members and begin a struggle against the Bolsheviks. For a long time he did not want to use the money reserves of the regional treasury for the needs of the Don. On October 27, Kaledin declared martial law in the Don Oblast and invited members of the Provisional Government and the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic (“Pre-Parliament”) to Novocherkassk to organize a struggle against the Bolsheviks. On November 2, the ataman received on Don the former Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, General M. V. Alekseev. Leaders of the Provisional Government and commanders — Rodzianko, Milyukov, Savinkov, Kornilov, Denikin, and others — began to arrive at the Don. At the end of November Kerensky arrived, but Kaledin did not even want to meet with him.

At this time, the situation around the Don was complicated, the Bolshevik government, unlike the Provisional Government, was not going to sit idly and developed a vigorous activity to regain control over the regions. Nearby formed the "Donetsk Socialist Republic". The Black Sea Fleet sent ultimatums, began to prepare ships and landing forces. There was a process of formation of punitive expeditions. Initially, the Don government and local Democrats treated this without much fear, especially considering the former toothlessness of the Provisional Government. In addition, in the Don army under the gun was a 62 regiment, 72 individual hundreds, dozens of artillery batteries. Given the traditionally high combat training of the Cossacks, it was a significant force (especially given the fact that the army had already collapsed).

The problem was that the Don Cossacks themselves were no longer united. The Don region was doing the same things as all over Russia, which in February 1917, collapsed in the arms of chaos. The bloc of socialist revolutionaries and Mensheviks in the press, in workers' organizations and at peasant congresses subjected the Don government to sharp criticism, passed one after another resolution of no confidence in the authorities. The democratic public protested against the martial law on the Don, against disarmament and the expulsion of decomposed army reserve regiments from the region, against the arrest of Bolshevik activists. Democrats of various stripes suggested adopting a strategy of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. The government, in turn, spent time and energy on reaching an agreement between various parties, groups, organizations. Established a simultaneous congress of the Cossacks and peasants. They created a "parity" cabinet from 7 representatives of the Cossacks and 7 "non-resident". This only further intensified the controversy in the field. The peasantry was not enough already received - participation in the village administration, wide admission to the Cossacks, receiving 3 million tithes of landed estates. Representatives of the peasantry demanded the redistribution of the entire land fund of the Don region. In addition, the nonresident congress decided to disband Alekseev's "army".

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Cossack regiments began to return from the front. The Cossacks-front-line soldiers, in contrast to ordinary soldiers, returned in an organized manner, with whole military units, with their horses and weapons. This was helped by the fact that many units consisted of residents of the same village. In addition, it was easier to get to the Don, the military unit was easier to capture the train, to break through the chaos that was happening on the railways. Sometimes they even had to force their way through detachments of the Bolshevik orientation or Ukrainian nationalists. Therefore, the Dontians arrived in the Region in an organized, well-armed manner, often even with artillery. But as soon as they arrived in their small homeland, the order ended. Front-line soldiers yearned for a peaceful life, and most of all they feared the war on their lips. For the most part, they were hostile to any force that called them to war, including their government. The traditional order of life, all the foundations collapsed. The time began when the power was in the number of rifles that were in the head.

Some of the front-line Cossacks were sympathetic to the ideas of the Bolsheviks, others liked the anarchy, they became opponents of any government. As a result, there was a split along the line of “old” Cossacks and front-line soldiers. They rejected the traditional way of the village, the unshakable until this time the authority of the elderly. During the internal conflict in the majority of the villages the front-line soldiers won, there were more of them, they were more energetic and better armed. As a result, Don was defenseless in the face of an external threat.

Kaledin understood that he had no power capable of opposing the Bolsheviks, therefore he did not openly support Alekseev. Only after 26 in November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power in Rostov and Taganrog and almost all the Cossack units took the position of "neutrality", the ataman had to call for help from Alekseevs. Soon the Alekseev Organization was legalized, and Kaledin became one of the members of the triumvirate (along with Alekseev and Kornilov).

Volunteer Army

November 19 (December 2) Bykhov prisoners - Kornilov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky, Denikin and Markov left the prison and moved to the Don. Kornilov decided to go to the Don region marching order with his Tekinsky cavalry regiment. The fighters for the week made the 400-kilometer march, snow-covered roads and forests. In the 26-27 battles of November, the regiment was crushed. Turkmen ran into an ambush in the woods, retreated under fire. Then Tekin fired at an armored train. The regiment was dispersed, the 3 officer and the 264 rider were taken prisoner and were taken to the Bryansk prison. The general decided that without him the soldiers would not be in danger, and further decided to move only with an escort of 44 people. However, he was ambushed again, forced to break out of encirclement. Kornilov dressed as a peasant, and with a false passport, he went alone by rail. 6 (19) December 1917, the peasant Ivanov (Kornilov) arrived in Novocherkassk. Later, several officers and a platoon of horsemen from the Tekinsky regiment made their way to the Don and made up the personal convoy of Kornilov.

Soon the Kornilov shock regiment arrived. He began to be formed from 19 volunteers in May 1917 of the year at the suggestion of the captain, 8 th intelligence chief of the army, Mitrofan Nezhentsev, to counter the collapse of the front, the decomposition of the army and fraternization. 10 June 1917 year the regiment received the patronage of General Kornilov and the banner. The Kornilov shock regiment under the command of Nezhentsev successfully participated in the hostilities on the South-Western Front. From August 1917, he was in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander Laurus Kornilov. However, the commander himself during his speech at the end of August 1917, decided to abandon the involvement of this unit in the conflict. As a result, the regiment after the failure of the insurgency, was not disbanded. Initially, the regiment was planned to be transported to the Western Front, under the command of the French, but then included in the 1 th Czechoslovak Rifle Division. As a result, the regiment remained on the South-Western Front. After receiving news of the coup in Petrograd, the Czechoslovak Command concluded an agreement with the command of the Kiev Military District and the South-Western Front on the possibility of using Czechoslovakians in armed struggle on the side of the Provisional Government. Already 28 in October 1917, the 1 th Russian Shock Regiment (renamed it), together with the junkers of the Kiev military schools, took part in street fights with the Red Guards who supported the Bolshevik government and Sovietized parts of the Kiev garrison. However, the 31 of October was a truce, the power in Kiev was divided by the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks.

Petliura offered the Kornilov people to stay in the city to protect the order, but his command diverted the soldiers to the place of deployment. On November 12, the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters, which at that moment was headed to Dukhonin, ordered the transfer of the regiment to the Caucasian front. In reality, the Stavka was aware of Alekseev’s plans and tried to support him with troops and weaponsby transferring them to the Don area. However, this plan could not be implemented. After the defeat of Stakes, it became difficult to leave. Ukrainian nationalists only allowed trains with Cossacks. The Cossacks refused to take the Kornilovites. I had to leave for Don alone and in groups. Echelon with weapons and property managed to smuggle on false documents. The Bolshevik authorities reported that the regiment had fled, it was an ordinary thing at that time of troubles. During December, Don arrived before 50 officers and 500 soldiers. Nezhentsev restored the Kornilov regiment as part of the Volunteer Army.

Before the White Guards there was a question about future plans. Initially, Kornilov, along with Denikin, Lukomski was going to go further, to the East, to raise the Volga region and Siberia against the Bolsheviks. Two prominent warlords, Alekseev and Kornilov, found it difficult to get along, and this could bring discord in the units. In addition, Kornilov believed that work on the Don was established, it was necessary to raise other areas. In the Volga region and Siberia, he was able to expand a broad anti-Bolshevik movement. It is even possible to create a front that will allow, not only to sweep the Bolsheviks, but to resist the Germans.

At that time, a group of prominent political figures arrived from Moscow - princes Trubetskoy and Lviv, Milyukov, Struve, Fedorov. They represented the National Center created from the wreckage of moderate and liberal-democratic parties, which decided to support the "army" of Alekseev and had contacts with the Western powers. They demanded that Kornilov stay on the Don. Politicians knew that Kornilov had great authority and, if he remained, many military would be pulled to the Don. And the departure of Kornilov to Siberia, could bleed the formed white army on the Don. As a result, all initiatives on the Don could fall apart. The Moscow “wallets” set a tough condition - financial and material support will be provided only to a real-life military organization, if the leaders of the White movement work together and share their responsibilities. This condition was also supported by the Entente powers. Paris and London promised 100 million rubles (I must say that they cheated, they began to provide a little help only a year later). Kornilov was forced to yield. Thus, from the very beginning, the command of the Volunteer Army was oriented towards politicians and the rich who killed the Russian Empire and the “allies” in the Entente. This doomed the White Movement to defeat, despite the pure ideals of many simple officers and soldiers.

25 December 1917 of the Year (January 7) The Volunteer Army was officially established. Kornilov assumed the organization and command of the Volunteer Army, Alekseev - was the supreme leader of the army, took over financial affairs and issues of foreign and domestic policy, Kaledin - began to form the Don army and took over affairs concerning the Don Cossacks. The chief of staff was appointed Lukomsky, the chief of the 1918 division - Denikin, the chief of staff of the 1 division and the commander of the 1 Officer Regiment - “the sword of General Kornilov” General Markov. General Flug was sent to Siberia to unite anti-Bolshevik organizations. General Erdely was sent to the Kuban, where a volunteer detachment of Captain Pokrovsky was formed.

Kornilov still hoped that his position on the Don was temporary and planned to move to the East. He sent a number of officers to Samara, Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan, to organize an anti-Bolshevik movement there. However, most of them had no experience of underground activities, but could not learn along the way, so almost all were quickly calculated and fell into the hands of emergency bodies.

The volunteer army continued its formation. On average, 80-90 people were recorded daily. Weapons began to be taken away from the soldiers who were driving home, getting from the buyers. By the end of 1917, the “army” consisted of the Kornilov regiment, officers, Georgievsky and Cadet battalions, officer squadron, a company of guards officers, four batteries and an engineering company (about 4 thousand bayonets). Alekseev and Kornilov planned to bring the strength of the unit to the 10 of thousands of fighters and only after that begin hostilities. However, the situation was different. The Bolsheviks were not idle and cut off communications, cutting off the Don from the rest of the regions of Russia and Ukraine. The influx of volunteers fell to near zero. Only units reached Don. In December, the Red units launched an offensive against the Don.


General Kornilov with officers of the Kornilov regiment.
Author:
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  1. Brother Sarych
    Brother Sarych 4 December 2012 09: 17
    +1
    The author is not particularly convincing - then he has Kaledin against the Provisional Government, then suddenly against the Bolsheviks and for the Provisional Government, then ardent separatism, then single and indivisible ...
    Throughout the article, the ends do not meet - it seems that the author seeks to adjust everything to the finished result ...
  2. donchepano
    donchepano 4 December 2012 09: 28
    +1
    COUPLES, CHALLENGES, POOR RUSSIA ..
  3. Shkodnik65
    Shkodnik65 4 December 2012 11: 40
    +1
    the Bolshevik government, unlike the Provisional Government, was not going to sit idly by and developed vigorous activity to regain control of the regions.


    Of course it is very difficult to judge what actually happened then, 100 years ago, given that the history was rewritten by the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, in my opinion the whole trick is that indecision, somewhere - intelligence, the lack of a real unified command played a key role in the death of the White movement and the Russian Empire.
    I agree with donchepano, poor Russia!
  4. pakukr
    pakukr 4 December 2012 12: 01
    +1
    The author again ignores the view that the creation of the Volunteer Army was laid on November 6, 1917 by the colonel, later General Ivan Kasyanovich Kiriyenko. (At that time, General Alekseev was still hiding in civilian clothes in Novocherkassk and did not start the formation of the army).
    On that day, Kiriyenko arrived in Novocherkassk with 16 officers and 10 soldiers of the 1st St. George Regiment, formed by him in Kiev in August of that year in Kiev, and came to the Don Ataman General Kaledin, from whom he received permission to form the first part of the Volunteer Army under the name of the St. George Regiment. General Kiriyenko entered the first battle with the Bolsheviks near Nakhichevan on November 21, 1917.
    As for the "first saber of the empire" of General Fyodor Keller, on the night of December 21, 1918, he was cynically killed by the Galician Sich Riflemen under the command of Konovalets. Keller and his adjutants Panteleev and Ivanov were killed by the Galicians on Sophia Square, under the monument to Bogdan Khmelnitsky. Despite numerous hits (Keller later counted 11 gunshot wounds), those arrested were not killed. Seeing that the general and the officers were alive, the convoy began to brutally cut them with sabers, and around the monument the snow was splattered with the blood of the victims. Of course, theft and looting, which is invariably inherent in the Galicians, could not have been done. Subordinates presented Konovalets with the St. George weapon taken from Keller - a saber with diamonds, which he was awarded for outstanding personal bravery. The commander of the Secheviks, in turn, presented it to Petlyura, who did not hesitate to put on the blade stolen from the dead general. Immediately after the murder, a legend began to spread throughout Kiev that, dying, Keller cursed his executioners and spilled blood would fall on their heads. They really didn't die a natural death. Petliura did not have to admire for a long time in Paris the saber with diamonds he had taken out - he was overtaken by the avenger's bullets, and Konovalets was torn apart by a bomb hidden by craftsmen from the NKVD in a box of chocolates.
  5. 8 company
    8 company 4 December 2012 12: 48
    -3
    “It was not the Bolsheviks who destroyed and destroyed historical Russia, but the 'Februaryists' - politicians (from Octobrists and Cadets to Social Revolutionaries), most of the aristocracy and high officials, a significant part of the generals and high officers, bankers and industrialists. It was they who 'merged' the Russian statehood, opening wide the gates to the inferno. "

    A small educational program for the author: The Provisional Government was for the continuation of the war and was right, because before the collapse of Germany there was nothing left. The Germans surrendered in November 1918, and if Russia had not withdrawn from the war, they would have been blown away much earlier. But the Bolsheviks just carried on the most active anti-war propaganda, revolutionary agitation among the troops. Their activities were directed by Lenin and other leaders of the Bolsheviks, and Lenin gave a theoretical substantiation of the need to turn the imperialist war into a civil war in many of his "works." But the Bolsheviks not only destroyed the front, they signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty - having carried out an operation, monstrous in terms of betrayal of the state interests. As a result, the Germans seized vast territories of Russia and actively removed valuables from them, in addition, the Bolsheviks sent 95 tons of gold to Germany as "reparations" and allegedly "to support Russian prisoners." All of this was very much like paying for something. So whatever one may say, but the German intelligence operation to eliminate Russia as an enemy was carried out brilliantly. In addition, Russia lost Finland, Poland, the Baltic States, part of the Caucasian territories, Bessarabia, etc. And all this is a direct consequence of the activities of the RSDLP (b) party, headed by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other revolutionary figures who, according to the author, "have nothing to do with it."
    1. Brother Sarych
      Brother Sarych 4 December 2012 13: 11
      +1
      Still, the clinic is a clinic!
      Even in this article, the Russian language says that by October Ukraine did not actually submit to the Provisional Government, but declared independence, so what could the Bolsheviks give? What victory are we talking about? And in the Brest peace, the Germans forced to recognize this autonomy - not to give up what they did not have, but simply to admit that this is no longer ...
    2. predator.3
      predator.3 4 December 2012 13: 32
      0
      The front collapsed after the publication of Order No. 1 on March 2, 1917.
      Order No. 1.
      1 March 1917 city
      According to the garrison of the Petrograd district, to all soldiers of the guard, army, artillery and navy for immediate and accurate execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for information.
      The Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies decided:
      1) In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and individual services of various military departments and on the ships of the navy, immediately select committees from elected representatives from the lower ranks of the above military units.
      2) In all military units that have not yet chosen their representatives to the Council of Workers' Deputies, elect one representative each, who will come with written certificates to the State Duma building by 10 a.m. on March 2.
      3) In all its political speeches, the military unit is subordinate to the Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies and its committees.
      4) The orders of the military commission of the State Duma should be executed, unless they contradict the orders and decisions of the Council of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies.
      5) All kinds of weapons, such as rifles, machine guns, armored vehicles, etc., must be at the disposal and control of company and battalion committees and in no case should be issued to officers [5] even according to their requirements.
      6) In the ranks and in the discharge of official duties, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but out of service and in their political, civil and private life, soldiers cannot be diminished in anything in the rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing in front and obligatory giving honor outside the service is canceled.
      7) The titles of officers are equally canceled: Your Excellency, Honor, etc., and replaced by an appeal: Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc.
      Rude treatment of soldiers of any military ranks and, in particular, appeal to them on the "you" is prohibited, and of any violation of this, as well as of all misunderstandings between officers and soldiers, the latter must inform the company committees.
      This order to read in all companies, battalions, regiments, crews, batteries and other combat and non-combat teams.
      Petrograd Soviet of Workers 'and Soldiers' Deputies.


      Edited order No. 1 Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Petrosoviet N. D. Sokolov. According to the memoirs of the last Minister of War of the Provisional Government A.I. Verkhovsky, “The order was issued in nine million copies”
      1. 8 company
        8 company 4 December 2012 13: 47
        +1
        Quote: predator.3
        The front collapsed after the publication of Order No. 1 on March 2, 1917.


        You are wrong, the front collapsed in February 1918, when the Germans went on the offensive. The whole year somehow held out, and in July 1917 the "collapsed" front was still capable of carrying out offensive operations. Although the fighting efficiency of the troops as a result of "democratization" by the Provisional Government and the Bolshevik revolt was greatly reduced.
        1. Brother Sarych
          Brother Sarych 4 December 2012 17: 16
          -2
          In your fantasies, the front held out until 1918 — the peasants did not even know that they were still at the front! Even the article says that the veterans were already at home in the autumn of 1917 - or are you basically not reading the article?
          1. 8 company
            8 company 4 December 2012 17: 56
            0
            Quote: Brother Sarich
            In your fantasies, the front held out until 1918 — the peasants did not even know that they were still at the front!


            A small educational program for you personally:

            In December 1917, the Bolsheviks brought to a logical conclusion the process of “democratization of the army,” which began in March with Order No. 1 of the Petrosoviet. December 16, 1917 adopted joint decrees of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On the elective beginning and organization of power in the army" and "On the equation in the rights of all military personnel." The decree "On the elective beginning and the organization of power in the army" finally declared the sole authority in the army not the commanders, but the corresponding soldiers' committees, councils and congresses, also introducing the principle of electing commanders. The decree “On the Equal Rights of All Military Personnel” abolished all military ranks and all insignia in the army, introducing the title of “soldier of the revolutionary army” for all military personnel. These two decrees actually put an end to the final destruction of the former imperial army.
            Summary of mood information in parts of the Southwestern Front from November 1 to 8, 1917:
            Special army. 31st Corps: the attitude to military service in the 83rd Division is variable, in the 130th Division it is satisfactory, there are few classes and work. The attitude towards officers in the 83rd division is incredulous and hostile, in the 130th it is satisfactory. Parts of both divisions await peace ... The general mood in connection with the events is deteriorating. The combat efficiency of the parts of the body is doubtful, in recent years everything has been deteriorating ...

            39th building. ... In all divisions, except for reserve units and the 53rd division, classes are not conducted. Work in parts of the hull is either not conducted at all or performed poorly. The attitude towards officers in most parts is incredulous and hostile, satisfactory only in the 498th and 500th regiments and tolerant in the 486th, 487th and 488th regiments. The attitude to the war is negative, the soldiers are waiting for peace ....

            1st Turkestan Rifle Corps: attitude towards military service in the 1st Turkestan Division is indifferent, in the 2nd Division unsatisfactory, in the 113th Infantry Division the military service is carried out regularly .... The attitude towards officers in Turkestan divisions is incredulous and vicious, in 113 of the 1st division is satisfactory, the attitude towards war is everywhere negative, everyone is waiting for peace. The XNUMXst Turkestan regiment, being equipped with precautionary measures, fraternizes on the entire front, exchanging cigars and rum from the Germans ...

            34th building. ... On November 3, at a joint meeting of corps, divisions and regiments, one of the Ukrainians said the following: "Russia is now a decaying corpse that can infect Ukraine with its cadaverous poison." To this, a group of non-Ukrainian delegates issued a resolution protesting against such a determination.
            3rd Caucasian building. The desire for a speedy conclusion of peace and a defeatist mood paralyze the entire work of the officers in raising the combat significance of the units. Poor food and lack of uniforms make soldiers indifferent even to the fate of their homeland ....
            1. Zynaps
              Zynaps 4 December 2012 18: 44
              +2
              “Our army can win only when it feels for itself the whole country, in general, organized as a huge reservoir, from where it can infinitely supply itself” (General Polivanov - Minister of War, from a speech in the State Duma in August 1915) .

              So, I am starting a new publication of materials from General Golovin’s book “Russia's Military Efforts in the First World War”. Earlier, I already laid out enough materials from this book and not only from it about the military-technical supply of the Russian army to clearly demonstrate that tsarist Russia was economically unprepared for the First World War, moreover, the course of the war showed that its economy was not able to provide the army with everything necessary in military-technical terms. The lack of armaments and ammunition had to be partially offset by purchases abroad in the United States, Britain, France, Sweden, Japan and other countries. But even these purchases did not compensate for all the needs of the Russian army during the war.

              Today we will begin to consider the question of what position the Russian army was in during the First World War in terms of quartermaster supply. Only the most interesting and sensitive topics from this area will be considered: providing the Russian army with bread, meat and boots. Anyone who wants to read and learn more than I suggest, can turn to the source - the book of General Golovin. It is worth it for you to spend time studying it.

              But first, I want to remind you of one well-known quote characterizing which conscripts the Russian army received on the eve and time of the First World War:

              “Every year the Russian army becomes more and more ailing and physically incapable. Up to three million rubles annually the treasury spends only to clear itself of unfit recruits, to “protest” them. Of the three guys, it’s hard to choose one that is completely suitable for service. And despite this, the duration of the soldier's service is decreasing. Feeble youth threatens to overwhelm the military infirmaries. Poor nutrition in the countryside, wandering life on earnings, early marriages that require hard work at an almost youthful age are the causes of physical exhaustion ...

              It’s scary to say what hardship a rookie sometimes suffers before serving. About 40 percent almost the first time new recruits ate meat upon entering military service. In the service of the soldiers, in addition to good bread, they eat excellent meat cabbage soup and porridge, i.e. something that many do not already have a clue about in the village ... ”(Menshikov M.O. Youth and Army. October 13, 1909 // Ibid. P.109, 110).
              1. Zynaps
                Zynaps 4 December 2012 18: 45
                +1
                Interesting quote, isn't it? That was the Russian army, which had to fight in the First World War. And taking into account the data on mortality in the Russian army that I laid out earlier, on the incidence rate among wounded and captured Russian soldiers, there is no reason to doubt the quality of this army. She was such, as the author described, “ailing and physically incapable”, and the reasons for this were, inter alia, in the diet “in civilian life”. It would be interesting to hear on this occasion the reaction of the defenders of the damned tsarism. Another topic for debate! However, I deviated somewhat from the topic of presentation.

                Remember how I began to consider the issue of military-technical support of the Russian army during the First World War? C quotes from the book of Golovin, which I once again want to quote:

                “Already four months after the start of the war, the Russian army faced a catastrophe. “The size of the needs,” writes General Danilov, the former Quartermaster General of Stavka, “surpassed all the widest assumptions, and therefore their satisfaction was met by all the growing difficulties. The rear did not keep up with the front ... "

                As the First World War showed, these words turned out to be absolutely true not only for the military-technical support of the Russian army during the First World War, but also for its quartermaster, which we will discuss now. In this regard, first read the small introductory section from the book of General Golovin on this issue.

                1. MEETING DIFFICULTIES

                “Before the war, we firmly established the opinion that in peacetime there is no need to draw up any plans and considerations on how to food the army and the country during the war; Russia's natural riches were considered so great that everyone was calmly convinced that obtaining for the army everything necessary for the war would not present any difficulties.

                So writes in 1925, the former assistant to the chief quartermaster, General N.O. Bogatko.

                In July 1914, the Russian army had completely all the commissary supplies it needed to mobilize; during its concentration and in the first days upon arrival at the theater of operations, its units were content from stocks specially formed for this purpose.

                But well-being in the quartermaster's supply ended very soon.

                The needs of the army turned out to be so great that the naive idea of ​​satisfying these needs with a “peace order” was immediately untenable.

                “In general, the whole mechanism responsible for supplying the army with its legislation,” concludes General Bogatko. - was not adapted to the daunting task that confronted us in the past war. "

                During the first year of the war, difficulties were encountered in the food supply of the army. The tasks of this supply were expanding into the framework of servicing not only the millionth combat fronts, but also the all-Russian rear, unlimited in capacity, closely related to them.

                As a result, the army’s food supply business was transferred to the Main Directorate of Land Management (later, the Ministry of Agriculture). This decision was a complete impromptu, since in the pre-war period it was not involved in the supply business; it had no technically adapted apparatus for its activity and was completely unprepared for the management of this area. In peacetime, the issue of food supply was the responsibility of the Ministry of War (Quartermaster) and the Ministry of the Interior.
                1. Zynaps
                  Zynaps 4 December 2012 18: 46
                  +2
                  “I will not go into it,” writes A.N. Naumov, the former Minister of Agriculture, “in search and clarification of the reasons and circumstances that prompted, instead of correcting the shortcomings and urgent adaptation of the existing food apparatus, to invent and create something new, not competent in essence and cumbersome in form for such an enduring importance and urgency as the immediate food supply of four huge fronts and vast rear areas - I consider it only a duty to note that in November 1915, when I finally had to obey the order of the Tsar and accept from A.V. Krivoshein The Ministry of Agriculture, and therefore, by the power of things to become the head of the entire food supply of the army and the country, I was forced to find myself face to face in this inherited area with complete chaos of decisions, opinions and assumptions ...

                  As a result, instead of urgently fulfilling the definitely outlined and worked out beforehand plan for supplying huge military events in hot time, which captured almost the entire rear life of the country, they only had to start developing one, but, of course, in conditions of obvious and extremely unfavorable. In fact: on the one hand, the war-tense life and work of the military fronts, naturally, which did not fit into any borders and norms, required minute permissions of various food inquiries, to satisfy which ministries, it goes without saying, as a food administrative center to be ready at any time of the day or night - this explains the haste and nervousness of the daily current work of the central apparatus and the untimely organic work of creating a supply plan, which, in any case, could not contribute to the favorable course of the creative and historically responsible activities of the center. ”

                  The difficulty of the systematic use of Russian funds was increased by the fact that “there were no digital data on accounting for stocks of products existing in the country, even the first necessity; there were no statistically accurate data for the possibility of calculating the production and consumption of bread, meat, etc. products, either in the center or locally. If necessary, various ministries gave different data to receive certain certificates.

                  http://www.nn.ru/community/gorod/justice/?do=read&thread=2454110&topic_id=555044
                  80 - enlighten to full enlightenment. these are not political instructors' "murzilki" from lovers of crunching rolls.
            2. Brother Sarych
              Brother Sarych 4 December 2012 22: 32
              0
              Have you read your own quote? And what is she talking about? To me that the front has collapsed - how else to perceive that the soldiers are fraternizing and even those who are still in the trenches are waiting for peace?
        2. predator.3
          predator.3 5 December 2012 13: 41
          0
          What are the Bolsheviks, by 1917 this party numbered something apprx. 5 thousand members of them half sat in exile.
    3. Zynaps
      Zynaps 4 December 2012 18: 37
      +2
      Quote: Company 8
      The interim government was for the continuation of the war and was right, because before the collapse of Germany there was nothing left. The Germans capitulated in November 1918, and if Russia had not left the war, they would have been blown away much earlier.


      citizen former political officer! and what, in your opinion, could Russia profit from in the event of its remarkable victory? the German treasury was squeezed dry at the end of the war. the winners overlaid Germany with reparations, but could not profit from it. they forced her to the humiliating Versailles peace that gave birth to Hitler. the Austrians were rogues, and the Slavic periphery set sail from them as soon as it became clear that the empire was kirdyk. the British and French themselves very much hoped to improve their situation from the return of royal debts. when they realized that the citizen king smokes bamboo, it immediately went to
      transfer of Poland to the arm of Europa, as well as the Trans-Siberian with Murmansk, built for foreign loans. well, the little things - Baku oil, Donetsk coal, Siberian goldfish and wood. those. turning the country into a banana republic.

      Quote: Company 8
      But the Bolsheviks just carried on the most active anti-war propaganda, revolutionary agitation among the troops. Their activities were directed by Lenin and other leaders of the Bolsheviks, and Lenin gave a theoretical substantiation of the need to turn the imperialist war into a civil war in many of his "works."


      Yeah. this is who you need to be in order to accuse the small party, which was known only in Petrograd, of sifting the WWII ...

      you take the cornerstone works of the tsarist (!!!) military leaders. former Minister of War Kuropatkin - the work "Russian Army" and General Golovin - two-volume work "Military Efforts of Russia" - Golovin read it in foreign military academies. it is still being studied by smart people. it's complicated, but it's not for you to listen to Svanidze with a duroscope. you read. you stumble over all sorts of august persons, generals, industrialists, financiers, politicians. and not a single Bolshevik on the execution list. can you imagine? from the tsarist generals.

      so learn at least to study and do not read the yellow press either before lunch, or at any other time. it’s not for you to read political information.
  6. Karlsonn
    Karlsonn 4 December 2012 21: 41
    0
    and here is Kaledin’s comrade in triumvirate.
    1. The cat
      The cat 5 December 2012 02: 33
      0
      And Kolchak here what side?
      1. Karlsonn
        Karlsonn 5 December 2012 14: 07
        0
        The cat
        Read something from the history of your homeland, learn not only the answer to your question, but also discover a lot of new things for yourself.
        With all due respect.
  7. Black
    Black 5 December 2012 18: 13
    -1
    Aleksei Maksimovich Kaledin - a contradictory personality, like anyone who lived on that break in history. A man of unprecedented courage and honor, St. George Knight, smart and talented.
    When Russia began to burst at the seams, like an old patchwork quilt, the idea of ​​creating a Cossack region "from edge to edge" could not help wandering in the head of such a person. Moreover, at a time when the Provisional Government could not hold on to power (and most likely did not want and did everything to ensure that it was the Bolsheviks who came to power), and the Bolsheviks completely cynically began to trade in Russia (we recall the Brest Treaty here, so Let's remember the lands given to Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the seizure of the lands of the Terek Cossacks, the creation of a number of A.O.).
    Alexei Maximovich betrayed his own people. The Cossacks, tired of the war, did not appreciate the whole depth of the impending catastrophe, for which they paid with genocide.