Stalingrad Military Intelligence Battle
The defeat near Moscow forced Hitler at the beginning of 1942 to look for new approaches in the strategic planning of the war against the USSR. The goal of the summer offensive of the German troops on the Eastern Front in 1942 was set out in the secret directive of the German General Command No. 41, approved by Hitler 5 on April 1942. German forces, indicated in that directive, were to “... retake the initiative and impose their will on the enemy ". The main secret of Hitler's directive was the direction of the main attack of the German troops. In 1942, the main attack was planned to be inflicted on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front with "the aim to destroy the enemy west of the Don River, in order to then seize oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and pass passes through the Caucasus Range." This was the new strategic decision of Hitler - to deprive the Red Army of food and industrial base, as well as cut off the supply of petroleum products. In Berlin, the operation to seize the southern regions of the USSR was code-named "Blau".
In general, the implementation of this grandiose military plan was to drastically reduce the military and economic capabilities of the USSR and radically weaken the resistance of the Red Army troops.
The plan of Operation Blau supplemented the plan of a strategic offensive in the Caucasus, which received its code name — Operation Edelweiss.
In the course of implementing Operation Blau, the German command also planned to seize Stalingrad and cut off the transfer of military and other cargo along the Volga. To create the prerequisites for the successful implementation of such a plan, it was supposed to clear the Crimea, the Kerch Peninsula from the Soviet troops, and seize Sevastopol.
Hitler hoped that in 1942, Germany would be able to draw Japan and Turkey into the war against the USSR, which would contribute to the final defeat of the Soviet troops.
"Red Chapel" has hampered military intelligence activities
During the preparations for Operation Blau, Hitler ordered the command of the German counterintelligence agency to intensify the identification and destruction of Soviet intelligence officers operating in Germany and in the territories of the states occupied by German troops. To this end, the German intelligence agencies have developed the operation "Red Chapel". It was supposed to be held simultaneously in Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Switzerland and Sweden. The purpose of the operation is to identify and destroy the Soviet intelligence network. Therefore, the code name of the German counterintelligence operation was the corresponding - “The Red Chapel”.
During the active measures of the German counterintelligence, Soviet military intelligence officers Leopold Trepper, Anatoly Gurevich, Konstantin Efremov, Alexander Makarov, Johann Wenzel, Arnold Schnee and others were identified and arrested. In Berlin, the head of the agent group of the Soviet military intelligence, Ilze Stebe, who was listed in the Center under the pseudonym "Alta", was arrested. During the arrests conducted by the Gestapo in Berlin, Alta’s assistants, Baron Rudolf von Shelia, who worked at the German Foreign Ministry and transferred to Mr. Stebe valuable intelligence information of a military-political nature, journalist Karl Helfric, her closest comrade, and others agents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (GS GS).
As a result of active measures conducted by the German counterintelligence, the officers “Starshina” and “Corsican”, who collaborated with the foreign intelligence services of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), were also identified and arrested.
The Soviet intelligence network of German intelligence agencies in 1942 g. Dealt a serious blow. In general, the German counterintelligence was able to arrest about 100 people working for Soviet intelligence. After a closed military tribunal, 46 people were sentenced to death, and the rest to long prison terms. Ilse Stebe (Alta), one of the most valuable sources of Soviet military intelligence, was also sentenced to death on the guillotine. During interrogation and even under torture, Ilse Stebe did not extradite her assistants.
Unable to withstand the power of the Gestapo executioners, some intelligence officers under duress agreed to conduct a radio game with the Center. The goal of the radio game is to transfer misinformation information about the military plans of the German command to Moscow, as well as a deliberate attempt to split the USSR’s relations with its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, weakening their interaction on the eve of the German offensive on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
The vigorous activity of German counterintelligence in 1942 significantly hampered the activities of foreign residencies of Soviet military intelligence. The difficult working conditions in which the intelligence officers found themselves had an effect on the quantity and quality of the information obtained about the enemy. Admission to the Center of valuable materials that were necessary for a proper understanding of the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front, has declined. At the same time, the demand for military and military-political information of a strategic nature sharply increased at the Center. The General Headquarters of the Red Army developed its strategic plans for waging war against Germany, and this could not be done without intelligence information.
The political leadership of the USSR, which did not fully take into account the information about the enemy, which were mined by military intelligence, was also in a difficult situation. Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin 10 January 1942 signed a directive letter addressed to Soviet military leaders, in which he defined the tasks of the Red Army troops. The letter, in particular, stated: “... After the Red Army managed to exhaust enough the Nazi troops, it launched a counteroffensive and drove the Nazi invaders to the west. ... Our task is not to give the Germans a break and drive them west without stopping, force them to spend their reserves before spring ... and thus ensure the complete defeat of the Nazi troops in the 1942 year ... ”.
To drive the German troops without respite to the west the Red Army in the spring of 1942 could not yet. Moreover, the enemy was still very strong.
In the summer of 1942, the Supreme General Headquarters (Supreme Command) and the General Headquarters of the Red Army made a mistake in assessing the plans of the German command. The Supreme Command headquarters assumed that Hitler would again direct the main efforts of his troops to the seizure of the Soviet capital. This point of view was held by I.V. Stalin. Hitler had other plans.
It is well known that any strategic decisions are preceded by the hard work of intelligence, which extracts information necessary for assessing the situation and making decisions. What happened in the spring of 1942? What information about the intentions of the German command at the beginning of 1942 could the residencies of the Soviet military intelligence be obtained? How was this information taken into account by the Supreme Commander and members of the Supreme Command Headquarters?
Reliable information about the plans of the German command were extracted
Despite the active measures of the German counterintelligence carried out in the framework of the “Red Cappella” operation and the loss of part of its intelligence network by the Soviet military intelligence, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army managed to keep important sources of information in the capitals of several European states. In the spring of 1942, the residency of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (GRU GS KA) continued to operate in Geneva, London, Rome, Sofia and Stockholm. Their activities were led by residents Shandor Rado (“Dora”), Ivan Sklyarov (“Brion”), Nikolai Nikitushev (“Akasto”) and other intelligence officers. In the United Kingdom and Italy, illegal residences Dubois, Sonya and Phoenix also operated, also having agents capable of obtaining valuable military and military-political information.
This information, as evidenced by archival documents, correctly reflected the intentions of the German command in the summer campaign of 1942. An important feature of the military intelligence reports during this period was that they obtained information about specific actions of the German command on the Eastern front even before Hitler signed Directive No. 41, that is, at the stage of the formation of the strategic plan of the German command.
The first report on where Hitler plans to carry out the summer offensive on the eastern front was received at the 3 Center in March of 1942. Major A. Scout. Sizov ("Edward") reported from London that Germany plans to "launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus." The report of Sizov contradicted what was expected by I.V. Stalin and the Supreme Command. In Moscow, they were preparing to repel the new offensive of the German troops on the Soviet capital.
The reliability of intelligence information is verified in various ways. One of them is a comparison of information obtained from different sources. Comparing such information obtained in London, Geneva and Berlin, we can draw conclusions about their reliability. Following this rule, the Center could not but notice that the report of Major A.F. Sizov is confirmed by information received by the GRU GS of the Spacecraft from the resident of the Soviet military intelligence, Shandor Rado, who operated in Switzerland.
12 March Shandor Rado reported to the Center that the main German forces would be directed against the southern wing of the eastern front with the task of reaching the line of the Volga and the Caucasus to cut off the Red Army and the population of the central part of Russia from the oil and grain regions. Comparing the reports of S. Rado and A.F. Sizov, the Center prepared a special message “On the plans of Germany for 1942 year”, which was sent to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and to the General Staff. The special report indicated that in 1942 Germany would launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus.
In the spring of 1942, the illegal residency of Soviet military intelligence, led by Sandor Rado, was active in intelligence. The cooperation involved valuable agents who had connections at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies in Germany. These sources in the Center were listed under the pseudonym "Long", "Louise", "Lucy", "Olga", "Sisi" and "Taylor". Residency "Dora" had three independent radio stations operating in different cities: Bern, Geneva and Lausanne. This made it possible to successfully mask the radio broadcasts, which deprived the enemy’s counterintelligence of the possibilities of finding them and establishing locations. Despite the efforts of the German counterintelligence, which achieved success in Belgium, France and Germany itself, the Dora residency continued to carry out successful work on obtaining intelligence information. On average, Shandor Rado radio operators daily transmitted to the Center from 3 to 5 radiograms. The Rado Report Center received high marks and was used to prepare reports forwarded to the top political leaders of the USSR and the command of the Red Army.
In the summer of 1942, resident C. Rado sent information to Moscow on a wide range of military and military-political problems. He reported to the Center about the volume of aircraft manufactured by the German military industry, tanks, artillery guns, on the transfer of enemy military units to the southern section of the Soviet-German front, on relations among the top military leaders of the German armed forces.
Extremely valuable information about the enemy and the operational plans of the German command was extracted by the agent "Lucius". Rudolf Ressler, a German, acted under this pseudonym. A journalist by profession, a participant in the First World War, Ressler, after the Nazis came to power, left Germany and settled in Switzerland. While living in Geneva, he maintained contacts with influential people in Berlin, maintained contacts with them and obtained valuable military and military-political information. This information ROSSLER in 1939-1944's. handed over Swiss intelligence "Bureau X". In the first half of 1942, it was during this period that Hitler was preparing for a new general offensive on the eastern front, Ressler met antifascist Christian Schneider, who had close relations with Rachel Dübendorfer, a member of the Shandor Rado intelligence group. During the very first meetings with Ressler, Rachelle Dubendorfer realized that Ressler possessed extremely valuable information about the military plans of the German command. Ressler began to transmit this information to Schneider and Dübendorfer, who reported it to Sandor Rado. It was from Ressler that the first information came that Hitler plans to change the plan of war against the USSR and intends to launch a decisive offensive on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, seize the Rostov region, the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, and the Crimea and the Caucasus.
Resident of the GRU GSh KA in London, Major A.F. Under the cover of the post of Soviet military attache under the governments of the allied states, Sizov, 3 in March, 1942 also informed the Center that the German command was preparing an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus, where "... the main effort is foreseen in the direction of Stalingrad and secondary in the direction of Rostov and, besides, through the Crimea to Maykop ".
In March-April 1942, the words “southern flank” and “Caucasus” were frequently encountered in the reports of military intelligence officers. The information received from the intelligence officers at the Center was thoroughly analyzed, checked and after that in the form of special messages sent to members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the Chief of General Staff. Part of such reports was sent personally to the Supreme Commander.
From the leaders of foreign military intelligence residency in the spring of 1942, information was received on the foreign policy efforts of the German leadership aimed at drawing Japan and Turkey into the war against the USSR. The Center received similar information from AF intelligence officers. Sizov, I.A. Sklyarov and N.I. Nikitushev.
In early March, 1942, for example, a resident of the GRU GS of the Spacecraft in Turkey, obtained a copy of the report from the Bulgarian military attache in Ankara, which was sent to Sofia. It was reported that the new offensive of the German troops on the eastern front "... will not have the character of lightning, but will be carried out slowly in order to achieve success. Turks fear that the Soviet fleet will try to escape through the Bosphorus. The following measures will be taken against this:
1. As soon as the German offensive begins, the Turks will begin to regroup their forces, concentrating them in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.
2. From the same moment, the orientation of the Turkish policy towards Germany will begin. ”
Further, the Bulgarian military attache informed his leadership: “... The Turks do not expect pressure to fight the one or the other until July or August. By this time, they think that Hitler will achieve victory, and they will openly go over to the side of Germany ... ”
This report of a military intelligence resident, received by the 5 Center in March 1942, was directed to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the State Defense Committee (GKO) on instructions from the head of the GRU GS. The Turkish government waited. The failure of the Red Army in the fighting of the 1942 summer campaign could have provoked Turkey’s military action against the USSR.
15 March A military intelligence source in London, listed at the Center under the operational pseudonym Dolly, informed the head of the GRU GS KA about the content of the conversations of German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General H. Oshima, that took place on 18, 22 and 23 February 1942 d. In these conversations, Ribbentrop informed the Japanese ambassador that for the German command "... in the 1942 year, the southern sector of the Eastern Front will be of paramount importance. It is there that the offensive will begin, and the battle will unfold to the north. "
Thus, in March-April 1942, the residents of the Soviet military intelligence mined and sent to the Center evidence that the new general offensive of the German troops on the eastern front would be undertaken in the direction of the Caucasus and Stalingrad, and that the German leadership was trying hard to draw into the war against the USSR Japan and Turkey.
Summarizing all the information received from overseas residencies, the command of the GRU GSh KA in a special message No. 137474, sent to the GNO 18 in March 1942, reported that the center of gravity of the spring offensive of the Germans would be transferred to the southern sector of the front (Rostov-Maykop-Baku ). The conclusions of the special report indicated: "Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and will spread further to the north."
How did the top political leadership of the USSR react to military intelligence reports?
First, in accordance with the instructions of I.V. Stalin after the defeat of the Germans in the Battle of Moscow addressed the issue of the transition of the Red Army troops in the offensive. At the General Staff, the capabilities of the Red Army troops were evaluated more modestly. Chief of General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov, assessing the results of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops after the defeat of the Germans in the battle of Moscow, believed that in 1942, the Red Army should not "... drive them west without stopping" across the whole front, but go to a strategic defense.
I.V. Stalin and G.K. Zhukov agreed on the need to move to a strategic defense, but proposed to conduct several offensive operations. In the end, a compromise was worked out - as the main type of Red Army action for the summer of 1942, a strategic defense was adopted, supplemented, in accordance with the recommendations of I.V. Stalin, private offensive operations.
Secondly, the decision to conduct several offensive operations and strengthen the central sector of the Soviet-German front, where in the summer of 1942 a new offensive of the German troops was expected on Moscow, was taken in accordance with the instructions of I.V. Stalin. These instructions were constructed without taking into account intelligence information obtained by military intelligence officers.
At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the military intelligence officers obtained new information, which also revealed the plan of the German command and specified it.
1 July 1942. Military Attache Colonel N.I. Nikitushev, who acted in Stockholm, reported to the Center: “... The Swedish headquarters believes that the main German offensive began in Ukraine. The German plan is to break through the Kursk-Kharkov line of defense with the development of an offensive through the Don to Stalingrad on the Volga. Then the establishment of a barrier in the north-east and the continuation of the offensive by fresh forces to the south through Rostov-on-Don to the Caucasus. ”
Information obtained N.I. Nikitushev also reported to the members of the Supreme Command.
Reliable information about the enemy was obtained by agents of S. Rado - “Long”, “Louise”, “Lucius” and others. This information was reliable and fully confirmed during the offensive of the German troops that unfolded in the summer of 1942.
Based on the information of the GRU GSA, the Supreme Command headquarters could make strategic decisions taking into account the strike planned by Hitler towards the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. However, the basis of the decisions of the Soviet Supreme Command was the forecasts of I.V. Stalin that the German command would deliver the main blow in the direction of Moscow. Stalin's delusion arose on the basis of other information about the plans of the German command available in the Supreme Command Headquarters. At that time, the headquarters of the German Army Group Center, as directed by the Wehrmacht Army High Command, developed a disinformation operation under the code name Kremlin. To the rank and file performers, she looked like a real plan for an attack on Moscow. Provision was made for the regrouping and transfer of troops, the redeployment of headquarters and command posts, the supply of transport means to water barriers. The headquarters of the 3 Tank Army was redeployed from the left wing of Army Group Center to the Gzhatsk region. It was here that the army was supposed to attack according to the plan of Operation Kremlin. Aerial photography of Moscow defensive positions in the outskirts of Moscow, the area east of the Soviet capital, has increased.
The plans of Moscow and other large cities located in the center of the Army Group Center offensive zone were sent from 10 July right up to regimental headquarters, which increased the likelihood of information leakage. All the misinformation measures of the German command were closely linked to the preparation and implementation of Operation Blau. Thus, in the band of the 2 tank and 4 armies, they were to reach the climax of June 23, and in the band of the 3 tank and 9 armies - June 28.
The actions of the German command were carried out with a certain degree of camouflage, which gave them quite certain certainty. Apparently, it was precisely this information that seemed to Stalin more reliable. Such a conclusion suggests itself because Stalin believed that the German troops would deliver the main blow to the summer campaign of 1942 in the direction of the Soviet capital. As a result, the defense of Moscow was strengthened, and the southern flank of the Soviet-German front was poorly prepared to repel a major German offensive. This mistake led to an extremely difficult situation on 1942 on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky wrote about this in his memoirs: “The substantiated data of our intelligence on the preparation of the main attack in the south were not taken into account. In the south-west direction, less strength was allocated than in the west. ”
The same assessment was given by Army General S.M. Shtemenko, who believed that “... in the summer of 1942, the enemy’s plan to seize the Caucasus was also discovered fairly quickly. But this time the Soviet command was not able to provide decisive action to defeat the attacking enemy group in a short time. ”
These facts indicate that the foreign bodies of the GRU GSA spacecraft in the spring of 1942 produced reliable information reflecting the plans of the German command. However, they were not taken into account by the Soviet leadership. As a result, in June 1942, the Supreme Command headquarters was forced to take urgent measures that were supposed to deter the German offensive and prevent them from seizing Stalingrad. In particular, on the southern flank, the Stalingrad Front was urgently formed. 27 August 1942 I.V. Stalin signed a decree appointing G.K. Zhukov, First Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
During this period of war, it was important to have reliable information about the plans of the leaders of Japan and Turkey, who could join the war against the USSR on the side of Germany.
Initially, Operation Blau was to begin on June 23, but due to the delay in hostilities in the Sevastopol area, German troops launched an offensive on June 28, broke through the defenses and broke through to Voronezh. After large losses I.V. Stalin drew attention to military intelligence reports, in which it was reported that Japan was stepping up the efforts of its troops in the Pacific basin and did not intend to enter the war against the USSR in the near future. This information formed the basis for the decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to transfer 1942 in July from the Far East 10 – 12 divisions to the west to the Supreme Command reserve. For the second time in the years of the Great Patriotic War, information obtained by military intelligence formed the basis for the decision to transfer Far Eastern formations to the Soviet-German front to strengthen the forces of the Red Army. Intelligence information about the plans of the Japanese command also turned out to be reliable in 1942, which enabled the Stake to urgently strengthen the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
Other urgent decisions were taken to strengthen the defense of Stalingrad, to form strategic reserves and to plan operations that made it possible to achieve a breakthrough in the Battle of Stalingrad. But this change was achieved through extraordinary efforts and at the cost of heavy losses.
Tasks completed
During the defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (July 17 - November 18 1942) and during the preparation of the Soviet counter-offensive, foreign military intelligence residency solved a wide range of tasks. Among them were:
obtaining information about the plans of the German command for the winter of 1942 – 1943;
the opening of plans for the use of the German command of the Allied armed forces (Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia) on the Soviet-German front;
clarification of the composition and areas of concentration of reserves of the German army;
obtaining information on the course of mobilization in Germany and the attitude of the population towards it;
obtaining information on the number of reserve troops on the territory of Germany, on ways of transporting troops and military materials to the Soviet front, their weapons and organization;
obtaining information about the preparation of the German troops for the conduct of chemical warfare;
identification of the most important military and military-industrial facilities in Germany for air raids and locations of enemy air defense forces.
The GRU GSh KA was to regularly report to the Supreme Command headquarters on the losses of the German army on the Eastern front in personnel and military equipment, as well as on the results of the bombing of military facilities in Germany.
To solve these and other reconnaissance tasks, the command of the GRU GSh KA planned to actively use the existing foreign military intelligence residencies, as well as throw several reconnaissance groups and individual reconnaissance personnel into Germany to organize reconnaissance in Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig, Munich and other cities in Germany . The responsible officer for these tasks was the senior assistant to the head of the German division of the GRU, military engineer 2, rank B. B. Leontyev, Captain M.I. Polyakova and senior lieutenant V.V. Bochkarev. It was also planned to reestablish contact with the residency of the GRU GSA KA in Berlin, which was led by I. Shtebe (Alta). The center did not know that the German counterintelligence was conducting the “Red Cappella” operation and had already arrested a significant part of the intelligence officers who were part of the intelligence network of military intelligence in Europe. Therefore, the Center planned to restore contact with the intelligence officers I. Wenzel, K. Efremov, G. Robinson.
In 1942, the residencies of military intelligence “Akasto”, “Brion”, “Dora”, “Rod”, “Zhores”, “Zeus”, “Nac”, “Omega”, “Sonya”, “Edward” and others continued to operate. .
A significant contribution to the defeat of the German troops near Stalingrad was made by the residency of the strategic intelligence agency “Dora” and its leader Sandor Rado. In January-October, 1942 of the city of Rado sent encrypted radiograms to the 800 Center (about 1100 sheets of text). During the counteroffensive of the Soviet forces during the Battle of Stalingrad (November 1942, March - 1943), Rado sent another 750 radiogram to the Center. Thus, in 1942, the first quarter of 1943. S. Rado sent reports to the 1550 Center.
The main feature of the Dora residency activity was the procurement of proactive information about the enemy. The “Dora” residency gave timely answers to the Center’s requests for the German rear defense lines south-west of Stalingrad, about reserves in the rear of the Eastern Front, and about the plans of the German command in connection with the offensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad.
During the battle of Stalingrad, the residency of the military intelligence "Brion" was active in London. The activity of this residency was led by Major General I.A. Sklyarov. In 1942, Mr. Sklyarov sent reports to the 1344 Center. In January-February 1943, the Center received more 174 reports from Sklyarov. Thus, in the second period of the Great Patriotic War, only the residence “Brion” sent reports to the 1518 Center. Most reports of Major General I.A. Sklyarov was used by the command of the GRU GSA for reports to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
In the period of the Battle of Stalingrad, an employee of the Brion station, lieutenant colonel I.M. Kozlov ("Bilton") led the activities of the valuable source "Dolly", who served in the British military department. Dolly had access to the intercepted and deciphered texts of the radiograms of the German High Command and the Japanese ambassador in Berlin and other secret documents. “Dolly” information was very valuable and consistently received high marks at the Center.
During 1942, the “Dolly” was monthly transmitted to the Soviet intelligence officer I.M. Kozlov from 20 to 28 deciphered by the British German radiograms of Ribbentrop talks with the Japanese, Hungarian and Romanian ambassadors, the instructions of the General Staff of the German Army to the commanders of the units on the Stalingrad front, the order of Goering to the command of the German Air Force, which supported the army of Paul.
The reports of the Dolly source by the head of the military intelligence were often reported by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.
In 1942, the GRU GSA prepared and forwarded special reports on Europe, 102 on Asia, 83 on America, and 25 on Africa to the top political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army 12. Due to the arrests of a number of residents of the Soviet military intelligence by German counterintelligence, the total volume of special communications in Europe in 1942 compared to 1941 was reduced by 32 messages (in 1941 in Europe, special messages were prepared by 134).
On the eve of and during the Battle of Stalingrad, radio intelligence of the GRU GSA spacecraft has achieved considerable success. During this period of time, its activities were divided into three main stages:
obtaining information about the enemy during his offensive in the southern strategic direction (end of June - mid-July, 1942);
conducting radio intelligence during the defensive battle of the Battle of Stalingrad (mid-July - first half of November 1942);
conducting radio intelligence during the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops and defeating the enemy in the area of Stalingrad (the second half of November 1942 — the beginning of February 1943).
During the retreat of the Soviet troops, the radio intelligence of the GRU GSh KA was in an extremely difficult situation, since it had to operate in a complex and rapidly changing combat situation. Therefore, at the beginning of the German offensive on the offensive, information was not obtained about the creation by the German command of three strike forces of the German fascist troops: the 2 th field and the 4 th tank armies — to strike in the Voronezh direction; 6 th field army, reinforced tank units, - for striking at the direction of Stalingrad; The 1 th tank and 17 th field armies - for striking in the North Caucasus.
According to expert estimates of one of the leading experts in the field of domestic radio intelligence of the participant of the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant General P.S. Shmyreva, radio reconnaissance during this period of the war did not reveal the direction of the main strikes of the German troops and could not adequately reveal the reorganization carried out by the enemy, which affected the division of Army Group South into two Army Groups A and B. During the rapidly developing tank advance of the Germans, the front-line reconnaissance units of the German army in the operational link were poorly controlled, and in the tactical (division - regiment) they were completely excluded from observation. It is no coincidence, therefore, that there is not a word about radio intelligence in the report prepared by the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on the state of affairs at the front, which was presented by I.V. On July 9, 1942, Stalin, front commander Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko. The conclusions of the report stated: “... Of everything observed by military intelligence and according to aviation it follows that the enemy is sending all its tank forces and motorized infantry to the southeast, apparently with the goal of overwhelming the 28th and 38th front army holding the defensive line, and thereby threatens to withdraw its groupings to the deep rear of the South-West and South fronts. "
Failures in the activity of radio intelligence during the offensive of the German troops at the Stalingrad direction forced the radio intelligence department of the GRU to take additional measures for radio observation of the interaction of German headquarters. The front-line radio divisions began to be located at a distance of 40-50 km from the front line, which made it possible to observe German divisional radio networks. Other measures were taken, which made it possible to significantly improve the intelligence activities of the front-line parts of radio intelligence and to organize a better analysis and synthesis of the intelligence information they received.
By the beginning of the defensive period of the battle of Stalingrad, the 394 and 561 radio divisions of the Stalingrad Front had already fully opened and began continuous monitoring of the radio communication of Army Group B and its 6 tank armies. By the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, radio reconnaissance revealed a grouping of German troops and their allies in front of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts. During the counter-offensive, the radio intelligence of the fronts adequately covered the state and activities of the enemy troops, revealed the preparation of their counterattacks and the transfer of reserves.
The direct control of radio intelligence in the Battle of Stalingrad was carried out by the heads of radio intelligence departments of the front staffs N.М. Lazarev, I.A. Tseitlin, as well as the commanders of the radio intelligence units KM Gudkov, I.A. Lobyshev, T.F. Lyakh, N.A. Matveyev. Two OSNAZ radio divisions (394 and 561) were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for successful reconnaissance of the enemy.
Employees of the military intelligence intelligence decryption service in 1942 revealed the operating principle of the German Enigma encryption machine and began reading German radiograms encrypted with it. The GRU designed special mechanisms that accelerate the decryption process. The decoded enemy telegrams allowed the deployment of more than 100 headquarters of the German army formations, the 200 numbering of individual battalions, other units and units of the Wehrmacht. After opening the Abwehr ciphers (German military intelligence and counterintelligence), it became possible to obtain information about the activities of hundreds of German agents in the rear areas of the Red Army. In general, the GRU decryption service uncovered in 1942 the main German and Japanese ciphering systems of combined-arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, more than 220 keys to them, more than 50 thousand German cipher telegrams.
29 November 1942 was presented to the government awards by 14 officers of the interpretation of the GRU GS. Col. FP Malyshev, lieutenant colonel A.A. Tyumenev and captain A.F. Yatsenko was presented for the award of the Order of the Red Banner; Major I.I. Ukhanov, military engineers of 3 rank MS Odnorobov and A.I. Baranov, captain A.I. Shmelev - to award the Order of the Red Star. Other specialists of the military intelligence interpreter service were also awarded.
The decryption service of the GRU GSA at the end of 1942 was transferred to the NKVD, where a single cryptographic service was formed.
In 1942, military intelligence made some mistakes. On the one hand, the Supreme Command headquarters ignored information from the GRU GS of the Spacecraft about the impending German offensive in the southern direction of the Soviet-German front, which led to the failure of Soviet offensive operations in the Crimea and the Kharkov region. On the other hand, the foreign bodies of the Soviet military intelligence failed to extract documentary materials that revealed the plans of the German command for the 1942 summer campaign.
In general, the forces of foreign and operational intelligence of the GRU GSA KA were able to identify the composition of the German group and the intended nature of its actions.
15 July 1942. The Information Department of the GRU prepared the message “Evaluation of the enemy before the front of the USSR”, in which the following conclusion was made: “The Southern Army Group will seek to enter the r. Don and after a series of operations will pursue the goal of separating our South-Western Front from the Southern Front, under the protection of the r. Don enter Stalingrad, with the further task of turning to the North Caucasus. "
The offensive of German troops, which began on June 28, forced the Soviet troops to retreat to the Volga and suffer heavy losses. The intelligence departments of the Bryansk, South-West and South fronts headquarters could not organize effective reconnaissance and obtain information about the intentions of the German command. The scouts failed to establish the composition of the enemy's strike groups and the beginning of its offensive.
In the course of a dynamically changing situation, reliable intelligence about the enemy was obtained by military intelligence officers and reconnaissance aviation pilots. Military intelligence officers, senior lieutenant I.M. boldly and skillfully acted. Pozniak, captains
A.G. Popov, N.F. Yaskov and others.
However, the Supreme Command Headquarters, which made a mistake in assessing the strategic situation, expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of military intelligence on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad. The chief of military intelligence, Major General A.P. 25 Panfilov August 1942 was removed from his post and sent to the army as the deputy commander of the 3 Tank Army. Perhaps the appointment of Panfilov to the new post was due to the fact that Polish units, for the formation of which he was in the territory of the USSR, refused to fight together with the Red Army against the German troops. Subsequently, Panfilov became the Hero of the Soviet Union, and the GRU GS of the spacecraft temporarily became the head of the military commissar of the GRU, Lieutenant General I.I. Ilyichev, who began to take urgent measures aimed at improving the performance of all military intelligence agencies. It was found that while managing the activities of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence, the officers of the Center did not always successfully and efficiently solve the current numerous operational tasks. It was necessary to study the experience of intelligence activities in 1941-1942, and on its basis to take new measures, which should have increased the effectiveness of all the activities of the GRU of the Red Army.
In the course of the Battle of Stalingrad and, especially, at its final stage, military intelligence established the composition and the approximate number of enemy troops in the encirclement. In a special report prepared by the Office of the Military Intelligence of the General Staff and reported to V.I. Stalin and A.I. Antonov, it was stated: “The surroundings are units of the 4 and 6 of the German armies under the command of the general of the tank forces Paulus, as part of the 11, 8, 51 and two tank corps, the entire 22 division, of which - 15, td - 3, md - 3, cd - 1. The whole surrounded group has: people - 75 – 80 thousands, field guns - 850, PTO guns - 600, tanks - 400 ”.
The composition of the grouping was opened fairly accurately, but the number of enemy troops surrounded was much larger and amounted to 250 – 300 thousand people.
In general, at the final stage of the Stalingrad battle, foreign and operational intelligence agencies acted quite effectively, providing the Supreme Command Headquarters and front commanders with reliable information about the enemy.
The intelligence departments of the front staffs who took part in the Battle of Stalingrad were commanded by Colonel A.I. Kaminsky, since October 1942, Major General A.S. Rogov (South-Western Front), Major General I.V. Vinogradov (Stalingrad Front), Major General MA Kochetkov (Don Front).
During the Battle of Stalingrad, the reconnaissance divisions of the South (the chief of the intelligence department, Major General N.V. Sherstnev), the North Caucasus (the head of the intelligence department, Colonel V.M. Kapalkin) and the Transcaucasian (the head of the intelligence department, Colonel A.I. Kaminsky) actively operated in their areas of responsibility ) military districts, as well as intelligence agencies of the Black Sea fleet (the head of the intelligence department, Major General D. B. Namgaladze), the Azov (the chief of the intelligence department, Captain 1st Rank K.A. Barkhotkin) and the Caspian (the chief of the intelligence department, Colonel N.S. Frumkin) flotillas. They timely provided command of the fronts that took measures to disrupt Operation Edelweiss, during which the German command planned to seize the Caucasus and its oil regions.
At the end of 1942, due to the growing need for reliable intelligence information about the enemy, the need to timely take into account the multifaceted development of the situation in Europe, the Far East and Africa, as well as to objectively evaluate the actions of the Anglo-Americans, the Supreme Command ) intelligence intelligence Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
In October, 1942 was the next reorganization of the military intelligence system. October 25 The USSR People's Commissar for Defense 1942 signed Order No. 00232 on the reorganization of the GRU GS KA, which provided for the separation of the GRU from the General Staff and the subordination of the strategic intelligence agency to the USSR People's Commissar for Defense. The GRU was responsible for the organization of foreign intelligence. As part of the GRU spacecraft, three departments were formed: agent intelligence abroad, agent intelligence in the territory occupied by German troops, and information.
In accordance with this order, military intelligence was withdrawn from the subordination of the head of the GRU, all intelligence divisions of the headquarters of the fronts and armies.
To manage the activities of military intelligence in the General Staff, the Office of Military Intelligence was established, which was forbidden to conduct undercover intelligence. For this purpose, it was proposed to create operational groups on the fronts, to use the capabilities of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement to cover up their activities.
However, in practice, this reorganization of the military intelligence system did not bring any noticeable improvements in its activities. The headquarters of the fronts, due to the absence of agent intelligence subordinate to them, could not receive proactive and reliable information about the enemy from sources operating in its operational depth. The GRU command of the spacecraft also failed to ensure that the incoming information from sources operating in the territories occupied by the enemy was quickly brought to the front headquarters. These shortcomings of control began to adversely affect the planning and organization of hostilities. Thus, at the end of 1942, there was a need for another reorganization of the military intelligence system.
In general, in 1942, the Soviet military intelligence fulfilled its tasks, acquired a multifaceted work experience, unique in its content and bold resolution of complex problems, on which the course and outcome of the tremendous battle that unfolded between Volga and Don depended.
The Battle of Stalingrad military intelligence is unique in that during this tense period of World War II, the GRU General Staff officers, as always, reported reliable information about the enemy to the top political leadership of the USSR and the Red Army command, although this information often contradicted personal assessments of the Supreme Commander.
In general, the implementation of this grandiose military plan was to drastically reduce the military and economic capabilities of the USSR and radically weaken the resistance of the Red Army troops.
The plan of Operation Blau supplemented the plan of a strategic offensive in the Caucasus, which received its code name — Operation Edelweiss.
In the course of implementing Operation Blau, the German command also planned to seize Stalingrad and cut off the transfer of military and other cargo along the Volga. To create the prerequisites for the successful implementation of such a plan, it was supposed to clear the Crimea, the Kerch Peninsula from the Soviet troops, and seize Sevastopol.
Hitler hoped that in 1942, Germany would be able to draw Japan and Turkey into the war against the USSR, which would contribute to the final defeat of the Soviet troops.
"Red Chapel" has hampered military intelligence activities
During the preparations for Operation Blau, Hitler ordered the command of the German counterintelligence agency to intensify the identification and destruction of Soviet intelligence officers operating in Germany and in the territories of the states occupied by German troops. To this end, the German intelligence agencies have developed the operation "Red Chapel". It was supposed to be held simultaneously in Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, France, Switzerland and Sweden. The purpose of the operation is to identify and destroy the Soviet intelligence network. Therefore, the code name of the German counterintelligence operation was the corresponding - “The Red Chapel”.
During the active measures of the German counterintelligence, Soviet military intelligence officers Leopold Trepper, Anatoly Gurevich, Konstantin Efremov, Alexander Makarov, Johann Wenzel, Arnold Schnee and others were identified and arrested. In Berlin, the head of the agent group of the Soviet military intelligence, Ilze Stebe, who was listed in the Center under the pseudonym "Alta", was arrested. During the arrests conducted by the Gestapo in Berlin, Alta’s assistants, Baron Rudolf von Shelia, who worked at the German Foreign Ministry and transferred to Mr. Stebe valuable intelligence information of a military-political nature, journalist Karl Helfric, her closest comrade, and others agents of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (GS GS).
As a result of active measures conducted by the German counterintelligence, the officers “Starshina” and “Corsican”, who collaborated with the foreign intelligence services of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), were also identified and arrested.
The Soviet intelligence network of German intelligence agencies in 1942 g. Dealt a serious blow. In general, the German counterintelligence was able to arrest about 100 people working for Soviet intelligence. After a closed military tribunal, 46 people were sentenced to death, and the rest to long prison terms. Ilse Stebe (Alta), one of the most valuable sources of Soviet military intelligence, was also sentenced to death on the guillotine. During interrogation and even under torture, Ilse Stebe did not extradite her assistants.
Unable to withstand the power of the Gestapo executioners, some intelligence officers under duress agreed to conduct a radio game with the Center. The goal of the radio game is to transfer misinformation information about the military plans of the German command to Moscow, as well as a deliberate attempt to split the USSR’s relations with its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, weakening their interaction on the eve of the German offensive on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
The vigorous activity of German counterintelligence in 1942 significantly hampered the activities of foreign residencies of Soviet military intelligence. The difficult working conditions in which the intelligence officers found themselves had an effect on the quantity and quality of the information obtained about the enemy. Admission to the Center of valuable materials that were necessary for a proper understanding of the strategic situation on the Soviet-German front, has declined. At the same time, the demand for military and military-political information of a strategic nature sharply increased at the Center. The General Headquarters of the Red Army developed its strategic plans for waging war against Germany, and this could not be done without intelligence information.
The political leadership of the USSR, which did not fully take into account the information about the enemy, which were mined by military intelligence, was also in a difficult situation. Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin 10 January 1942 signed a directive letter addressed to Soviet military leaders, in which he defined the tasks of the Red Army troops. The letter, in particular, stated: “... After the Red Army managed to exhaust enough the Nazi troops, it launched a counteroffensive and drove the Nazi invaders to the west. ... Our task is not to give the Germans a break and drive them west without stopping, force them to spend their reserves before spring ... and thus ensure the complete defeat of the Nazi troops in the 1942 year ... ”.
To drive the German troops without respite to the west the Red Army in the spring of 1942 could not yet. Moreover, the enemy was still very strong.
In the summer of 1942, the Supreme General Headquarters (Supreme Command) and the General Headquarters of the Red Army made a mistake in assessing the plans of the German command. The Supreme Command headquarters assumed that Hitler would again direct the main efforts of his troops to the seizure of the Soviet capital. This point of view was held by I.V. Stalin. Hitler had other plans.
It is well known that any strategic decisions are preceded by the hard work of intelligence, which extracts information necessary for assessing the situation and making decisions. What happened in the spring of 1942? What information about the intentions of the German command at the beginning of 1942 could the residencies of the Soviet military intelligence be obtained? How was this information taken into account by the Supreme Commander and members of the Supreme Command Headquarters?
Reliable information about the plans of the German command were extracted
Despite the active measures of the German counterintelligence carried out in the framework of the “Red Cappella” operation and the loss of part of its intelligence network by the Soviet military intelligence, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army managed to keep important sources of information in the capitals of several European states. In the spring of 1942, the residency of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (GRU GS KA) continued to operate in Geneva, London, Rome, Sofia and Stockholm. Their activities were led by residents Shandor Rado (“Dora”), Ivan Sklyarov (“Brion”), Nikolai Nikitushev (“Akasto”) and other intelligence officers. In the United Kingdom and Italy, illegal residences Dubois, Sonya and Phoenix also operated, also having agents capable of obtaining valuable military and military-political information.
This information, as evidenced by archival documents, correctly reflected the intentions of the German command in the summer campaign of 1942. An important feature of the military intelligence reports during this period was that they obtained information about specific actions of the German command on the Eastern front even before Hitler signed Directive No. 41, that is, at the stage of the formation of the strategic plan of the German command.
The first report on where Hitler plans to carry out the summer offensive on the eastern front was received at the 3 Center in March of 1942. Major A. Scout. Sizov ("Edward") reported from London that Germany plans to "launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus." The report of Sizov contradicted what was expected by I.V. Stalin and the Supreme Command. In Moscow, they were preparing to repel the new offensive of the German troops on the Soviet capital.
Major General Sizov Alexander Fedorovich, Soviet military attaché at the governments of the allied states in London during the Great Patriotic War, during the Battle of Stalingrad - major
The reliability of intelligence information is verified in various ways. One of them is a comparison of information obtained from different sources. Comparing such information obtained in London, Geneva and Berlin, we can draw conclusions about their reliability. Following this rule, the Center could not but notice that the report of Major A.F. Sizov is confirmed by information received by the GRU GS of the Spacecraft from the resident of the Soviet military intelligence, Shandor Rado, who operated in Switzerland.
12 March Shandor Rado reported to the Center that the main German forces would be directed against the southern wing of the eastern front with the task of reaching the line of the Volga and the Caucasus to cut off the Red Army and the population of the central part of Russia from the oil and grain regions. Comparing the reports of S. Rado and A.F. Sizov, the Center prepared a special message “On the plans of Germany for 1942 year”, which was sent to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and to the General Staff. The special report indicated that in 1942 Germany would launch an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus.
In the spring of 1942, the illegal residency of Soviet military intelligence, led by Sandor Rado, was active in intelligence. The cooperation involved valuable agents who had connections at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government agencies in Germany. These sources in the Center were listed under the pseudonym "Long", "Louise", "Lucy", "Olga", "Sisi" and "Taylor". Residency "Dora" had three independent radio stations operating in different cities: Bern, Geneva and Lausanne. This made it possible to successfully mask the radio broadcasts, which deprived the enemy’s counterintelligence of the possibilities of finding them and establishing locations. Despite the efforts of the German counterintelligence, which achieved success in Belgium, France and Germany itself, the Dora residency continued to carry out successful work on obtaining intelligence information. On average, Shandor Rado radio operators daily transmitted to the Center from 3 to 5 radiograms. The Rado Report Center received high marks and was used to prepare reports forwarded to the top political leaders of the USSR and the command of the Red Army.
In the summer of 1942, resident C. Rado sent information to Moscow on a wide range of military and military-political problems. He reported to the Center about the volume of aircraft manufactured by the German military industry, tanks, artillery guns, on the transfer of enemy military units to the southern section of the Soviet-German front, on relations among the top military leaders of the German armed forces.
Sandor Rado, head of the Dora station in Switzerland
Extremely valuable information about the enemy and the operational plans of the German command was extracted by the agent "Lucius". Rudolf Ressler, a German, acted under this pseudonym. A journalist by profession, a participant in the First World War, Ressler, after the Nazis came to power, left Germany and settled in Switzerland. While living in Geneva, he maintained contacts with influential people in Berlin, maintained contacts with them and obtained valuable military and military-political information. This information ROSSLER in 1939-1944's. handed over Swiss intelligence "Bureau X". In the first half of 1942, it was during this period that Hitler was preparing for a new general offensive on the eastern front, Ressler met antifascist Christian Schneider, who had close relations with Rachel Dübendorfer, a member of the Shandor Rado intelligence group. During the very first meetings with Ressler, Rachelle Dubendorfer realized that Ressler possessed extremely valuable information about the military plans of the German command. Ressler began to transmit this information to Schneider and Dübendorfer, who reported it to Sandor Rado. It was from Ressler that the first information came that Hitler plans to change the plan of war against the USSR and intends to launch a decisive offensive on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, seize the Rostov region, the Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, and the Crimea and the Caucasus.
Resident of the GRU GSh KA in London, Major A.F. Under the cover of the post of Soviet military attache under the governments of the allied states, Sizov, 3 in March, 1942 also informed the Center that the German command was preparing an offensive in the direction of the Caucasus, where "... the main effort is foreseen in the direction of Stalingrad and secondary in the direction of Rostov and, besides, through the Crimea to Maykop ".
In March-April 1942, the words “southern flank” and “Caucasus” were frequently encountered in the reports of military intelligence officers. The information received from the intelligence officers at the Center was thoroughly analyzed, checked and after that in the form of special messages sent to members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the Chief of General Staff. Part of such reports was sent personally to the Supreme Commander.
From the leaders of foreign military intelligence residency in the spring of 1942, information was received on the foreign policy efforts of the German leadership aimed at drawing Japan and Turkey into the war against the USSR. The Center received similar information from AF intelligence officers. Sizov, I.A. Sklyarov and N.I. Nikitushev.
In early March, 1942, for example, a resident of the GRU GS of the Spacecraft in Turkey, obtained a copy of the report from the Bulgarian military attache in Ankara, which was sent to Sofia. It was reported that the new offensive of the German troops on the eastern front "... will not have the character of lightning, but will be carried out slowly in order to achieve success. Turks fear that the Soviet fleet will try to escape through the Bosphorus. The following measures will be taken against this:
1. As soon as the German offensive begins, the Turks will begin to regroup their forces, concentrating them in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.
2. From the same moment, the orientation of the Turkish policy towards Germany will begin. ”
Further, the Bulgarian military attache informed his leadership: “... The Turks do not expect pressure to fight the one or the other until July or August. By this time, they think that Hitler will achieve victory, and they will openly go over to the side of Germany ... ”
This report of a military intelligence resident, received by the 5 Center in March 1942, was directed to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the State Defense Committee (GKO) on instructions from the head of the GRU GS. The Turkish government waited. The failure of the Red Army in the fighting of the 1942 summer campaign could have provoked Turkey’s military action against the USSR.
15 March A military intelligence source in London, listed at the Center under the operational pseudonym Dolly, informed the head of the GRU GS KA about the content of the conversations of German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop with the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General H. Oshima, that took place on 18, 22 and 23 February 1942 d. In these conversations, Ribbentrop informed the Japanese ambassador that for the German command "... in the 1942 year, the southern sector of the Eastern Front will be of paramount importance. It is there that the offensive will begin, and the battle will unfold to the north. "
Thus, in March-April 1942, the residents of the Soviet military intelligence mined and sent to the Center evidence that the new general offensive of the German troops on the eastern front would be undertaken in the direction of the Caucasus and Stalingrad, and that the German leadership was trying hard to draw into the war against the USSR Japan and Turkey.
Summarizing all the information received from overseas residencies, the command of the GRU GSh KA in a special message No. 137474, sent to the GNO 18 in March 1942, reported that the center of gravity of the spring offensive of the Germans would be transferred to the southern sector of the front (Rostov-Maykop-Baku ). The conclusions of the special report indicated: "Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and will spread further to the north."
How did the top political leadership of the USSR react to military intelligence reports?
First, in accordance with the instructions of I.V. Stalin after the defeat of the Germans in the Battle of Moscow addressed the issue of the transition of the Red Army troops in the offensive. At the General Staff, the capabilities of the Red Army troops were evaluated more modestly. Chief of General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov, assessing the results of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops after the defeat of the Germans in the battle of Moscow, believed that in 1942, the Red Army should not "... drive them west without stopping" across the whole front, but go to a strategic defense.
I.V. Stalin and G.K. Zhukov agreed on the need to move to a strategic defense, but proposed to conduct several offensive operations. In the end, a compromise was worked out - as the main type of Red Army action for the summer of 1942, a strategic defense was adopted, supplemented, in accordance with the recommendations of I.V. Stalin, private offensive operations.
Secondly, the decision to conduct several offensive operations and strengthen the central sector of the Soviet-German front, where in the summer of 1942 a new offensive of the German troops was expected on Moscow, was taken in accordance with the instructions of I.V. Stalin. These instructions were constructed without taking into account intelligence information obtained by military intelligence officers.
At the beginning of the summer of 1942, the military intelligence officers obtained new information, which also revealed the plan of the German command and specified it.
1 July 1942. Military Attache Colonel N.I. Nikitushev, who acted in Stockholm, reported to the Center: “... The Swedish headquarters believes that the main German offensive began in Ukraine. The German plan is to break through the Kursk-Kharkov line of defense with the development of an offensive through the Don to Stalingrad on the Volga. Then the establishment of a barrier in the north-east and the continuation of the offensive by fresh forces to the south through Rostov-on-Don to the Caucasus. ”
Information obtained N.I. Nikitushev also reported to the members of the Supreme Command.
Colonel Nikitushev Nikolai Ivanovich, military attaché in Sweden during the Great Patriotic War
Reliable information about the enemy was obtained by agents of S. Rado - “Long”, “Louise”, “Lucius” and others. This information was reliable and fully confirmed during the offensive of the German troops that unfolded in the summer of 1942.
Based on the information of the GRU GSA, the Supreme Command headquarters could make strategic decisions taking into account the strike planned by Hitler towards the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. However, the basis of the decisions of the Soviet Supreme Command was the forecasts of I.V. Stalin that the German command would deliver the main blow in the direction of Moscow. Stalin's delusion arose on the basis of other information about the plans of the German command available in the Supreme Command Headquarters. At that time, the headquarters of the German Army Group Center, as directed by the Wehrmacht Army High Command, developed a disinformation operation under the code name Kremlin. To the rank and file performers, she looked like a real plan for an attack on Moscow. Provision was made for the regrouping and transfer of troops, the redeployment of headquarters and command posts, the supply of transport means to water barriers. The headquarters of the 3 Tank Army was redeployed from the left wing of Army Group Center to the Gzhatsk region. It was here that the army was supposed to attack according to the plan of Operation Kremlin. Aerial photography of Moscow defensive positions in the outskirts of Moscow, the area east of the Soviet capital, has increased.
The plans of Moscow and other large cities located in the center of the Army Group Center offensive zone were sent from 10 July right up to regimental headquarters, which increased the likelihood of information leakage. All the misinformation measures of the German command were closely linked to the preparation and implementation of Operation Blau. Thus, in the band of the 2 tank and 4 armies, they were to reach the climax of June 23, and in the band of the 3 tank and 9 armies - June 28.
The actions of the German command were carried out with a certain degree of camouflage, which gave them quite certain certainty. Apparently, it was precisely this information that seemed to Stalin more reliable. Such a conclusion suggests itself because Stalin believed that the German troops would deliver the main blow to the summer campaign of 1942 in the direction of the Soviet capital. As a result, the defense of Moscow was strengthened, and the southern flank of the Soviet-German front was poorly prepared to repel a major German offensive. This mistake led to an extremely difficult situation on 1942 on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky wrote about this in his memoirs: “The substantiated data of our intelligence on the preparation of the main attack in the south were not taken into account. In the south-west direction, less strength was allocated than in the west. ”
The same assessment was given by Army General S.M. Shtemenko, who believed that “... in the summer of 1942, the enemy’s plan to seize the Caucasus was also discovered fairly quickly. But this time the Soviet command was not able to provide decisive action to defeat the attacking enemy group in a short time. ”
These facts indicate that the foreign bodies of the GRU GSA spacecraft in the spring of 1942 produced reliable information reflecting the plans of the German command. However, they were not taken into account by the Soviet leadership. As a result, in June 1942, the Supreme Command headquarters was forced to take urgent measures that were supposed to deter the German offensive and prevent them from seizing Stalingrad. In particular, on the southern flank, the Stalingrad Front was urgently formed. 27 August 1942 I.V. Stalin signed a decree appointing G.K. Zhukov, First Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
During this period of war, it was important to have reliable information about the plans of the leaders of Japan and Turkey, who could join the war against the USSR on the side of Germany.
Initially, Operation Blau was to begin on June 23, but due to the delay in hostilities in the Sevastopol area, German troops launched an offensive on June 28, broke through the defenses and broke through to Voronezh. After large losses I.V. Stalin drew attention to military intelligence reports, in which it was reported that Japan was stepping up the efforts of its troops in the Pacific basin and did not intend to enter the war against the USSR in the near future. This information formed the basis for the decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to transfer 1942 in July from the Far East 10 – 12 divisions to the west to the Supreme Command reserve. For the second time in the years of the Great Patriotic War, information obtained by military intelligence formed the basis for the decision to transfer Far Eastern formations to the Soviet-German front to strengthen the forces of the Red Army. Intelligence information about the plans of the Japanese command also turned out to be reliable in 1942, which enabled the Stake to urgently strengthen the southern flank of the Soviet-German front.
Other urgent decisions were taken to strengthen the defense of Stalingrad, to form strategic reserves and to plan operations that made it possible to achieve a breakthrough in the Battle of Stalingrad. But this change was achieved through extraordinary efforts and at the cost of heavy losses.
Tasks completed
During the defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad (July 17 - November 18 1942) and during the preparation of the Soviet counter-offensive, foreign military intelligence residency solved a wide range of tasks. Among them were:
To solve these and other reconnaissance tasks, the command of the GRU GSh KA planned to actively use the existing foreign military intelligence residencies, as well as throw several reconnaissance groups and individual reconnaissance personnel into Germany to organize reconnaissance in Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig, Munich and other cities in Germany . The responsible officer for these tasks was the senior assistant to the head of the German division of the GRU, military engineer 2, rank B. B. Leontyev, Captain M.I. Polyakova and senior lieutenant V.V. Bochkarev. It was also planned to reestablish contact with the residency of the GRU GSA KA in Berlin, which was led by I. Shtebe (Alta). The center did not know that the German counterintelligence was conducting the “Red Cappella” operation and had already arrested a significant part of the intelligence officers who were part of the intelligence network of military intelligence in Europe. Therefore, the Center planned to restore contact with the intelligence officers I. Wenzel, K. Efremov, G. Robinson.
In 1942, the residencies of military intelligence “Akasto”, “Brion”, “Dora”, “Rod”, “Zhores”, “Zeus”, “Nac”, “Omega”, “Sonya”, “Edward” and others continued to operate. .
A significant contribution to the defeat of the German troops near Stalingrad was made by the residency of the strategic intelligence agency “Dora” and its leader Sandor Rado. In January-October, 1942 of the city of Rado sent encrypted radiograms to the 800 Center (about 1100 sheets of text). During the counteroffensive of the Soviet forces during the Battle of Stalingrad (November 1942, March - 1943), Rado sent another 750 radiogram to the Center. Thus, in 1942, the first quarter of 1943. S. Rado sent reports to the 1550 Center.
The main feature of the Dora residency activity was the procurement of proactive information about the enemy. The “Dora” residency gave timely answers to the Center’s requests for the German rear defense lines south-west of Stalingrad, about reserves in the rear of the Eastern Front, and about the plans of the German command in connection with the offensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad.
During the battle of Stalingrad, the residency of the military intelligence "Brion" was active in London. The activity of this residency was led by Major General I.A. Sklyarov. In 1942, Mr. Sklyarov sent reports to the 1344 Center. In January-February 1943, the Center received more 174 reports from Sklyarov. Thus, in the second period of the Great Patriotic War, only the residence “Brion” sent reports to the 1518 Center. Most reports of Major General I.A. Sklyarov was used by the command of the GRU GSA for reports to the members of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
Major General of Tank Forces Ivan Sklyarov, Head of the Brion Residency in London
In the period of the Battle of Stalingrad, an employee of the Brion station, lieutenant colonel I.M. Kozlov ("Bilton") led the activities of the valuable source "Dolly", who served in the British military department. Dolly had access to the intercepted and deciphered texts of the radiograms of the German High Command and the Japanese ambassador in Berlin and other secret documents. “Dolly” information was very valuable and consistently received high marks at the Center.
During 1942, the “Dolly” was monthly transmitted to the Soviet intelligence officer I.M. Kozlov from 20 to 28 deciphered by the British German radiograms of Ribbentrop talks with the Japanese, Hungarian and Romanian ambassadors, the instructions of the General Staff of the German Army to the commanders of the units on the Stalingrad front, the order of Goering to the command of the German Air Force, which supported the army of Paul.
The reports of the Dolly source by the head of the military intelligence were often reported by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.
In 1942, the GRU GSA prepared and forwarded special reports on Europe, 102 on Asia, 83 on America, and 25 on Africa to the top political leadership of the USSR and the command of the Red Army 12. Due to the arrests of a number of residents of the Soviet military intelligence by German counterintelligence, the total volume of special communications in Europe in 1942 compared to 1941 was reduced by 32 messages (in 1941 in Europe, special messages were prepared by 134).
On the eve of and during the Battle of Stalingrad, radio intelligence of the GRU GSA spacecraft has achieved considerable success. During this period of time, its activities were divided into three main stages:
During the retreat of the Soviet troops, the radio intelligence of the GRU GSh KA was in an extremely difficult situation, since it had to operate in a complex and rapidly changing combat situation. Therefore, at the beginning of the German offensive on the offensive, information was not obtained about the creation by the German command of three strike forces of the German fascist troops: the 2 th field and the 4 th tank armies — to strike in the Voronezh direction; 6 th field army, reinforced tank units, - for striking at the direction of Stalingrad; The 1 th tank and 17 th field armies - for striking in the North Caucasus.
According to expert estimates of one of the leading experts in the field of domestic radio intelligence of the participant of the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant General P.S. Shmyreva, radio reconnaissance during this period of the war did not reveal the direction of the main strikes of the German troops and could not adequately reveal the reorganization carried out by the enemy, which affected the division of Army Group South into two Army Groups A and B. During the rapidly developing tank advance of the Germans, the front-line reconnaissance units of the German army in the operational link were poorly controlled, and in the tactical (division - regiment) they were completely excluded from observation. It is no coincidence, therefore, that there is not a word about radio intelligence in the report prepared by the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on the state of affairs at the front, which was presented by I.V. On July 9, 1942, Stalin, front commander Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko. The conclusions of the report stated: “... Of everything observed by military intelligence and according to aviation it follows that the enemy is sending all its tank forces and motorized infantry to the southeast, apparently with the goal of overwhelming the 28th and 38th front army holding the defensive line, and thereby threatens to withdraw its groupings to the deep rear of the South-West and South fronts. "
Failures in the activity of radio intelligence during the offensive of the German troops at the Stalingrad direction forced the radio intelligence department of the GRU to take additional measures for radio observation of the interaction of German headquarters. The front-line radio divisions began to be located at a distance of 40-50 km from the front line, which made it possible to observe German divisional radio networks. Other measures were taken, which made it possible to significantly improve the intelligence activities of the front-line parts of radio intelligence and to organize a better analysis and synthesis of the intelligence information they received.
By the beginning of the defensive period of the battle of Stalingrad, the 394 and 561 radio divisions of the Stalingrad Front had already fully opened and began continuous monitoring of the radio communication of Army Group B and its 6 tank armies. By the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive, radio reconnaissance revealed a grouping of German troops and their allies in front of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts. During the counter-offensive, the radio intelligence of the fronts adequately covered the state and activities of the enemy troops, revealed the preparation of their counterattacks and the transfer of reserves.
The direct control of radio intelligence in the Battle of Stalingrad was carried out by the heads of radio intelligence departments of the front staffs N.М. Lazarev, I.A. Tseitlin, as well as the commanders of the radio intelligence units KM Gudkov, I.A. Lobyshev, T.F. Lyakh, N.A. Matveyev. Two OSNAZ radio divisions (394 and 561) were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for successful reconnaissance of the enemy.
Employees of the military intelligence intelligence decryption service in 1942 revealed the operating principle of the German Enigma encryption machine and began reading German radiograms encrypted with it. The GRU designed special mechanisms that accelerate the decryption process. The decoded enemy telegrams allowed the deployment of more than 100 headquarters of the German army formations, the 200 numbering of individual battalions, other units and units of the Wehrmacht. After opening the Abwehr ciphers (German military intelligence and counterintelligence), it became possible to obtain information about the activities of hundreds of German agents in the rear areas of the Red Army. In general, the GRU decryption service uncovered in 1942 the main German and Japanese ciphering systems of combined-arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, more than 220 keys to them, more than 50 thousand German cipher telegrams.
29 November 1942 was presented to the government awards by 14 officers of the interpretation of the GRU GS. Col. FP Malyshev, lieutenant colonel A.A. Tyumenev and captain A.F. Yatsenko was presented for the award of the Order of the Red Banner; Major I.I. Ukhanov, military engineers of 3 rank MS Odnorobov and A.I. Baranov, captain A.I. Shmelev - to award the Order of the Red Star. Other specialists of the military intelligence interpreter service were also awarded.
The decryption service of the GRU GSA at the end of 1942 was transferred to the NKVD, where a single cryptographic service was formed.
TsA MO RF. F. 23. Op. 7567. D. 1. Ll 48-49. Specified mailing: "T. Stalin
t. Vasilevsky, t. Antonov "
Radio intelligence and the deciphering Service of the Red Army during the Patriotic War achieved great success.
The radio intelligence units provided the decryption services of the Red Army and the NKVD of the USSR with the interception of open and encrypted telegrams of the enemy and neighboring countries.
The German army’s radio stations were looking for valuable information about enemy groupings, actions and intentions, and revealed the Japanese army group in the Far East.
The deciphering Service of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army revealed the basic German and Japanese codes of combined-arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, over 220 keys to them, read over 50.000 German cipher telegrams alone.
According to the read ciphertelegrams, the deployment of more than one hundred staffs of the formations of the German army was established, the numbering of two hundred separate battalions and other fascist units was revealed; valuable information was obtained on the combat effectiveness of our partisans in the German-occupied territory.
Extracted information about the activities of anti-Soviet groups, more than 100 German agents in the USSR and to 500 traitors to the Motherland, who joined the German intelligence service.
It was also established that the German agents managed to obtain information about two hundred of our parts and connections, about the relocation of factories and plants of our industry. All these materials were timely reported to the High Command and the NKVD for action.
The management team of the Office identified the ability to decrypt German telegrams encrypted with the Enigma machine, and began designing mechanisms that accelerate decryption.
Transferring the Radio Intelligence and Decryption Services to the General Headquarters of the Red Army and the organs of the NKVD of the USSR, I ask for your instructions on presenting the best commanders and officers of the 3 Directorate of the Red Head to the defense of the country for the Government Awards.
Appendix: List of Commanders and Officers of the 3 Office
GLAVRU SC submitted for government awards.
Division Commissar
“____” November 1942 of the year
t. Vasilevsky, t. Antonov "
Special message
Chief of the GRU
The General Staff of the Red Army
IN AND. Stalin.
November 29 1942 years
Chief of the GRU
The General Staff of the Red Army
IN AND. Stalin.
November 29 1942 years
Top secret
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION SSR
Comrade S T A L & N U
Comrade S T A L & N U
Radio intelligence and the deciphering Service of the Red Army during the Patriotic War achieved great success.
The radio intelligence units provided the decryption services of the Red Army and the NKVD of the USSR with the interception of open and encrypted telegrams of the enemy and neighboring countries.
The German army’s radio stations were looking for valuable information about enemy groupings, actions and intentions, and revealed the Japanese army group in the Far East.
The deciphering Service of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army revealed the basic German and Japanese codes of combined-arms, police and diplomatic ciphers, 75 ciphers of German intelligence, over 220 keys to them, read over 50.000 German cipher telegrams alone.
According to the read ciphertelegrams, the deployment of more than one hundred staffs of the formations of the German army was established, the numbering of two hundred separate battalions and other fascist units was revealed; valuable information was obtained on the combat effectiveness of our partisans in the German-occupied territory.
Extracted information about the activities of anti-Soviet groups, more than 100 German agents in the USSR and to 500 traitors to the Motherland, who joined the German intelligence service.
It was also established that the German agents managed to obtain information about two hundred of our parts and connections, about the relocation of factories and plants of our industry. All these materials were timely reported to the High Command and the NKVD for action.
The management team of the Office identified the ability to decrypt German telegrams encrypted with the Enigma machine, and began designing mechanisms that accelerate decryption.
Transferring the Radio Intelligence and Decryption Services to the General Headquarters of the Red Army and the organs of the NKVD of the USSR, I ask for your instructions on presenting the best commanders and officers of the 3 Directorate of the Red Head to the defense of the country for the Government Awards.
Appendix: List of Commanders and Officers of the 3 Office
GLAVRU SC submitted for government awards.
Chief of Chief Intelligence
Management of the Red Army
Management of the Red Army
Division Commissar
(Ilyichev)
“____” November 1942 of the year
In 1942, military intelligence made some mistakes. On the one hand, the Supreme Command headquarters ignored information from the GRU GS of the Spacecraft about the impending German offensive in the southern direction of the Soviet-German front, which led to the failure of Soviet offensive operations in the Crimea and the Kharkov region. On the other hand, the foreign bodies of the Soviet military intelligence failed to extract documentary materials that revealed the plans of the German command for the 1942 summer campaign.
In general, the forces of foreign and operational intelligence of the GRU GSA KA were able to identify the composition of the German group and the intended nature of its actions.
15 July 1942. The Information Department of the GRU prepared the message “Evaluation of the enemy before the front of the USSR”, in which the following conclusion was made: “The Southern Army Group will seek to enter the r. Don and after a series of operations will pursue the goal of separating our South-Western Front from the Southern Front, under the protection of the r. Don enter Stalingrad, with the further task of turning to the North Caucasus. "
The offensive of German troops, which began on June 28, forced the Soviet troops to retreat to the Volga and suffer heavy losses. The intelligence departments of the Bryansk, South-West and South fronts headquarters could not organize effective reconnaissance and obtain information about the intentions of the German command. The scouts failed to establish the composition of the enemy's strike groups and the beginning of its offensive.
In the course of a dynamically changing situation, reliable intelligence about the enemy was obtained by military intelligence officers and reconnaissance aviation pilots. Military intelligence officers, senior lieutenant I.M. boldly and skillfully acted. Pozniak, captains
A.G. Popov, N.F. Yaskov and others.
Lieutenant Colonel Poznyak Ivan Mikhailovich, military intelligence officer, during the period of the Battle of Stalingrad - senior lieutenant
However, the Supreme Command Headquarters, which made a mistake in assessing the strategic situation, expressed dissatisfaction with the activities of military intelligence on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad. The chief of military intelligence, Major General A.P. 25 Panfilov August 1942 was removed from his post and sent to the army as the deputy commander of the 3 Tank Army. Perhaps the appointment of Panfilov to the new post was due to the fact that Polish units, for the formation of which he was in the territory of the USSR, refused to fight together with the Red Army against the German troops. Subsequently, Panfilov became the Hero of the Soviet Union, and the GRU GS of the spacecraft temporarily became the head of the military commissar of the GRU, Lieutenant General I.I. Ilyichev, who began to take urgent measures aimed at improving the performance of all military intelligence agencies. It was found that while managing the activities of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence, the officers of the Center did not always successfully and efficiently solve the current numerous operational tasks. It was necessary to study the experience of intelligence activities in 1941-1942, and on its basis to take new measures, which should have increased the effectiveness of all the activities of the GRU of the Red Army.
In the course of the Battle of Stalingrad and, especially, at its final stage, military intelligence established the composition and the approximate number of enemy troops in the encirclement. In a special report prepared by the Office of the Military Intelligence of the General Staff and reported to V.I. Stalin and A.I. Antonov, it was stated: “The surroundings are units of the 4 and 6 of the German armies under the command of the general of the tank forces Paulus, as part of the 11, 8, 51 and two tank corps, the entire 22 division, of which - 15, td - 3, md - 3, cd - 1. The whole surrounded group has: people - 75 – 80 thousands, field guns - 850, PTO guns - 600, tanks - 400 ”.
The composition of the grouping was opened fairly accurately, but the number of enemy troops surrounded was much larger and amounted to 250 – 300 thousand people.
In general, at the final stage of the Stalingrad battle, foreign and operational intelligence agencies acted quite effectively, providing the Supreme Command Headquarters and front commanders with reliable information about the enemy.
The intelligence departments of the front staffs who took part in the Battle of Stalingrad were commanded by Colonel A.I. Kaminsky, since October 1942, Major General A.S. Rogov (South-Western Front), Major General I.V. Vinogradov (Stalingrad Front), Major General MA Kochetkov (Don Front).
During the Battle of Stalingrad, the reconnaissance divisions of the South (the chief of the intelligence department, Major General N.V. Sherstnev), the North Caucasus (the head of the intelligence department, Colonel V.M. Kapalkin) and the Transcaucasian (the head of the intelligence department, Colonel A.I. Kaminsky) actively operated in their areas of responsibility ) military districts, as well as intelligence agencies of the Black Sea fleet (the head of the intelligence department, Major General D. B. Namgaladze), the Azov (the chief of the intelligence department, Captain 1st Rank K.A. Barkhotkin) and the Caspian (the chief of the intelligence department, Colonel N.S. Frumkin) flotillas. They timely provided command of the fronts that took measures to disrupt Operation Edelweiss, during which the German command planned to seize the Caucasus and its oil regions.
Major General Sherstnev Nikolai Vasilyevich, Head of the Intelligence Division, Headquarters of the Southern Front
Major General Namgaladze Dmitry Bagratovich, Head of the Intelligence Division, Headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet
At the end of 1942, due to the growing need for reliable intelligence information about the enemy, the need to timely take into account the multifaceted development of the situation in Europe, the Far East and Africa, as well as to objectively evaluate the actions of the Anglo-Americans, the Supreme Command ) intelligence intelligence Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
In October, 1942 was the next reorganization of the military intelligence system. October 25 The USSR People's Commissar for Defense 1942 signed Order No. 00232 on the reorganization of the GRU GS KA, which provided for the separation of the GRU from the General Staff and the subordination of the strategic intelligence agency to the USSR People's Commissar for Defense. The GRU was responsible for the organization of foreign intelligence. As part of the GRU spacecraft, three departments were formed: agent intelligence abroad, agent intelligence in the territory occupied by German troops, and information.
In accordance with this order, military intelligence was withdrawn from the subordination of the head of the GRU, all intelligence divisions of the headquarters of the fronts and armies.
To manage the activities of military intelligence in the General Staff, the Office of Military Intelligence was established, which was forbidden to conduct undercover intelligence. For this purpose, it was proposed to create operational groups on the fronts, to use the capabilities of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement to cover up their activities.
However, in practice, this reorganization of the military intelligence system did not bring any noticeable improvements in its activities. The headquarters of the fronts, due to the absence of agent intelligence subordinate to them, could not receive proactive and reliable information about the enemy from sources operating in its operational depth. The GRU command of the spacecraft also failed to ensure that the incoming information from sources operating in the territories occupied by the enemy was quickly brought to the front headquarters. These shortcomings of control began to adversely affect the planning and organization of hostilities. Thus, at the end of 1942, there was a need for another reorganization of the military intelligence system.
In general, in 1942, the Soviet military intelligence fulfilled its tasks, acquired a multifaceted work experience, unique in its content and bold resolution of complex problems, on which the course and outcome of the tremendous battle that unfolded between Volga and Don depended.
The Battle of Stalingrad military intelligence is unique in that during this tense period of World War II, the GRU General Staff officers, as always, reported reliable information about the enemy to the top political leadership of the USSR and the Red Army command, although this information often contradicted personal assessments of the Supreme Commander.
Information