Why Kolchak did not reach the Volga?
It would seem that the 1919 campaign of the year white camp met much stronger. The vast territory of Siberia and the North Caucasus was freed and retained from the Reds. True, whites did not control the center of the country with the highest population density and the most developed industry, but they were preparing for an offensive that the fate of Soviet Russia was to decide. In the south, General Denikin, who had temporarily suppressed Cossack separatism in his hands, was able to concentrate the entire power in his hands, Admiral Kolchak in the east. In the summer of 1919, Denikin even announced his submission to Kolchak, but he did it already at the time when the Kolchak front was cracking and White from the Volga region rolled back to the Urals.
Supreme ruler Kolchak and British General Knox
The spring offensive of the Kolchak armies began in March of the 1919 of the year on the front of the Western army, already on March 13 of Ufa was taken by the whites, and according to some sources, Lev Trotsky himself was almost captured then. On the front of the right-flank Siberian Army 7 March, Okhansk was taken, the next day - the Wasp. Finally, March 18 on the left flank of the Eastern Front began a simultaneous attack by units of the Southern Group of the Western Army and the Separate Orenburg Army, which reached the approaches to Orenburg by the twentieth of April, but were stuck in attempts to capture the city. April 5 The Western Army occupied Sterlitamak April, April - Belebey, April 7 - Bugulma and April 10 - Buguruslan. The Siberian and Western armies delivered heavy blows against the 15 and 2 armies of the Reds. In this situation it was important, without losing contact with the enemy, to vigorously pursue him, so that, before opening the rivers, to acquire strategic points. However, this was not possible. Although the ultimate goal of the offensive was the occupation of Moscow, the intended plan of interaction of the armies during the offensive was thwarted almost immediately, and the action plan beyond the Volga did not exist at all [5]. In this case, it was assumed that the main resistance of the reds will be from Simbirsk and Samara [1].
The left flank of the Siberian Army braked the attack on Sarapul, occupied only on April 10, Votkinsk was taken on April 7, Izhevsk was taken on April 13, and then the troops moved on Vyatka and Kotlas. Meanwhile, April 10 from the 1, 4, 5 and Turkestan armies created the Southern Group of the Eastern Front of the Red Army under the command of M.V. Frunze, which from April 28 launched a counter-offensive, depriving Kolchak of chances for victory. Already 4 May Red took Buguruslan and Chistopol, 13 May - Bugulma, 17 May - Belebey, 26 May - Elabugu, 2 June - Sarapul, 7 13th - Izhevsk. On May 20, the Northern Group of the Siberian Army, which took 2 June Glazov, launched an offensive on Vyatka, but this success was only of a private nature and did not affect the position of the front and, above all, the Western army which began to retreat. June 9 was left with Ufa by White, June by Votkinsk by 11, and by Glazov by 13, since holding it no longer made sense. Soon, the Whites lost almost the entire territory they captured during the offensive, and rolled back over the Urals, and then were forced to retreat under the harsh conditions of Siberia and Turkestan, undergoing terrible hardships to which their short-sightedness of their own leadership doomed them. The most important reasons for the defeat were the problems of higher military command and strategic planning. It should not be forgotten that the source of each decision was an officer of the General Staff, who had individual theoretical and practical experience, his own strong and weak features. The most odious in the white camp in this context is the figure of the General Staff, Major-General Dmitry Antonovich Lebedev - Chief of Staff of the Headquarters Kolchak.
Many memoirists and researchers have called Lebedev the main culprit in the failure of Kolchak's offensive against Moscow in the spring of 1919. But in fact, hardly one person, even the most untalented, can be guilty of the failure of such a large-scale movement. It seems that Lebedev in the public consciousness became a scapegoat and was accused of those mistakes and failures for which he was not responsible. What is the naivety and short-sightedness of other Kolchak commanders and the Supreme Ruler himself! Ataman Dutov, for example, in a situation of euphoria about the success of the spring offensive, told reporters that in August the whites would be in Moscow [3], but by that time they were thrown back to Western Siberia ... Once in a conversation with General Foreigner Kolchak said: “You soon see for yourself how poor we are, why we have to endure even in high positions, not excluding ministers, people who are far from appropriate for the places they occupy, but this is because there is no one to replace them ”[4]. The Eastern Front of the whites had no luck with the leaders. Compared with the south, there has always been a shortage of personnel officers and graduates of academies. In the opinion of General Schepikhin, “it is incomprehensible to the mind, astonishment is like, to what extent our long-suffering patient and officer are long-suffering. There were no experiments with him which, with his passive participation, the “strategic boys”, Kostya (Sakharov) and Mitka (Lebedev), did not throw out our “strategic boys” [5].
There were very few truly talented and experienced military leaders and staffers on the Eastern Front. The most striking names can be counted literally on the fingers: generals V. G. Boldyrev, V. O. Kappel, S. N. Wojciechowski, M. K. Diterikhs, S. A. Shchepikhin, A. N. Pepelyaev, I. G. Akulinin, V.M. Molchanov. Here, perhaps, is the whole list of those who could be immediately attributed to talented military leaders of the highest level. But even these more than modest human resources were used by the white command extremely irrationally. For example, Kolchak’s rise to power deprived White of such a talented military leader as the former Commander-in-Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Boldyrev. It was about him that the Soviet commander in chief I. I. Vatsetis wrote in his memoirs: “With the advent of gene. Boldyreva on the horizon of Siberia, we had to be considered separately ”[6]. Diterichs was virtually removed from solving military issues for a long time, and throughout the first half of 1919, on behalf of Admiral Kolchak, he was investigating the murder of the imperial family, which could well be entrusted to a civilian official. Kappel from January to early May 1919 also did not participate in military operations, being engaged in the formation of his corps in the rear. The commanders of all three main armies of Kolchak were selected extremely unsuccessfully. At the head of the Siberian Army was placed the 28-year-old poorly managed adventurer R. Hyde with the outlook of the Austrian paramedic, who more than others contributed to the disruption of the spring offensive. The Western Army was led by General M.V. Khanzhin, an experienced officer, but an artilleryman by profession, despite the fact that the commander had to solve not the narrowly technical issues of artillery business. Ataman A. I. Dutov, commander of the Separate Orenburg Army, was more likely a politician than a commander, so for most of the time in the first half of 1919 he was replaced by chief of staff General A. N. Vagin. Other leading positions in the Cossack units were nominated almost exclusively by Cossacks by origin, sometimes contrary to the professional suitability of the candidate. Admiral Kolchak himself was naval a man who was poorly versed in land tactics and strategies, as a result of which in his decisions he was forced to rely on his own headquarters, headed by Lebedev.
However, no matter what talents warlords might have, they cannot do anything without troops. But Kolchak had no troops. At least in comparison with the red. The laws of military art are immutable and speak of the need for at least threefold superiority over the enemy in order to successfully conduct an offensive. If this condition is not observed and there are no reserves for the development of success, the operation will only lead to vain death of people, which happened in the spring – summer of 1919. By the beginning of the offensive, the whites had only a double superiority in forces, and given the non-combatants, and not just the combat force. The real ratio, most likely, was for them even less advantageous. By April 15, in the Western army that had dealt the main thrust, there were only 2686 officers, 36 863 bayonets, 9242 sabers, 12 547 people in teams and 4337 gunners - 63 039 officers and lower ranks [7]. In the Siberian army, 23 56 bayonets and 649 sabers were counted for 3980 Jun, in total 60 629 fighters [8]. In the Separate Orenburg Army, there were only 29 bayonets and 3185 checkers for the 8443 March, all 11 628 fighters [9]. The latter numbered almost six times less troops in its ranks (including by transferring all the most valuable non-combat units in combat to the Western Army) than the neighbors, whose command allowed themselves systematic mockery of the Orenburg people. The strength of the Separate Ural Army, in red reconnaissance, was in the summer around 13 700 bayonets and checkers. All in all, at least 135 of thousands of soldiers and officers of Kolchak armies took part in the spring offensive (excluding the Urals, who were actually autonomous).
The team of the armored train "Sibiryak" on vacation
When the Bolshevik leadership drew attention to the threat from the east, reinforcements were sent to the front, leveling the balance of forces by the beginning of May. White didn’t have anything to reinforce the exhausted units, and their offensive quickly exhausted. It was not by chance that Pepelyaev, who commanded the Northern Group of the Siberian Army during the offensive, 21 of June 1919, wrote to his commander, Gaida: “The headquarters lightly sent tens of thousands of people to slaughter” [10]. The flagrant mistakes and disorganization in command and control were evident even to simple officers and soldiers and undermined their belief in command [11]. This is not surprising, considering that not even all corps headquarters knew about the plan of the impending offensive. In addition to the unprepared army, the command did not have a well thought-out plan for the operation, and the strategic planning itself was at the infant level. What is the farce of the meeting of army commanders, their chiefs of staff, and Admiral Kolchak 11 on February 1919 of the year in Chelyabinsk, when the fundamental question of the offensive was being decided! Lebedev, who had not arrived at the meeting, had long ago adopted his own plan, which the admiral should have made to accept all the army commanders, the same had their own plans of action and were guided by them without proper coordination with the neighbors [12]. When failures began on the front of the Western Army, instead of providing immediate support, he openly rejoiced at the failure of his neighbor on the left [13]. Very soon the Reds transferred a part of the troops liberated during the rout of Khanzhin’s army against Hyde, who repeated the sad fate of the mocked. Until now, the question of the direction of White’s main attack is not completely clear. In the spring of 1919, it could be applied in two directions: 1) Kazan - Vyatka - Kotlas to join the troops of the Northern Front, General EK Miller, and allies and 2) Samara (Saratov) - Tsaritsyn, to join the troops of Denikin. The concentration of significant forces in the Western Army and operational correspondence [14], as well as the simplest logic, testify in favor of the main strike in the center of the front - along the Samaro-Zlatoust railway line in the most promising Ufa direction, which allowed the shortest way to reach the connection with Denikin [15] .
However, it was not possible [16] to concentrate all forces in the Western Army and coordinate the offensive with neighboring army formations. The right-flank Siberian army was almost as powerful in its composition as the Western, and its actions were largely associated with the northern direction of the attack on Arkhangelsk. A supporter of this path was the commander Hyde himself, who did not hide his views on this score even from civilians [17]. White commanders recalled that from the Siberian army it was always possible to take one or two divisions [18], and Gayda’s attempts, instead of supporting his neighbor on the left, with attacks on Sarapul and Kazan, to act independently in the north were a serious strategic mistake, which affected the outcome of the operation. This blunder of the enemy drew attention in his unpublished memoirs and the Soviet commander-in-chief Vatsetis [19]. It is no coincidence that 14 February, before the start of the offensive, Denikin wrote to Kolchak: “It is a pity that the main forces of the Siberian troops, apparently, are directed to the north. A joint operation in Saratov would have given enormous advantages: the liberation of the Ural and Orenburg regions, the isolation of Astrakhan and Turkestan. And the main thing is the possibility of a direct, direct connection between the East and the South, which would lead to the complete unification of all the healthy forces of Russia and to the state work on an all-Russian scale ”[20]. White strategists described in detail the advantages of the southern variant, noting the importance of creating a common front with Denikin, liberating Cossack regions and other territories with an anti-Bolshevik-minded population (German colonists, Volga peasants), capturing grain areas and coal and oil production areas, as well as the Volga, which allowed transport these resources [21]. Of course, Kolchak's communications inevitably stretched out, which, before connecting with Denikin, could lead to failure, but the army went out to a more developed area, which had a thicker railway network, besides, the front was reduced and reserves were released. However, the matter did not come to coordination with the south, since the offensive of the two white fronts developed in antiphase. Denikin's major successes began already after the Kolchak offensive was choked.
Vatsetis recalled: “The subject of actions for all the counter-revolutionary fronts was Moscow, where they all rushed in various ways. Did Kolchak, Denikin, Miller have a common plan of action? Hardly. We know that the general plan was put forward by Denikin and Kolchak, but it was not carried out by either one or the other, each acted in its own way ”[22]. If we talk about the choice between the "northern" and "southern" options, then the statement of the General Staff of Lieutenant-General D. is most close to reality. AT. Filateva, who later served at Kolchak Stavka: “There was another, third option, except for the two indicated: to move simultaneously to Vyatka and Samara. It led to an eccentric movement of the armies, a split-up action and to the exposure of the front between the armies. Such a course of action could be afforded by a commander, confident in himself and in his troops, and possessing superiority of forces, a strategic reserve and a well-developed railway network for the transfer of troops along the front and in depth. At the same time, one of the directions is chosen as the main one, while the others are the essence of the demonstration for misleading the enemy. None of the listed conditions was present in the Siberian army, except for the commander’s self-confidence, so this option should have been discarded without discussion, as leading inexorably to complete failure. Meanwhile, he was elected to crush the Bolsheviks, which led the Siberian army in the end result to collapse. The position of the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1919 was such that only a miracle could save them. It happened in the form of adopting the most absurd plan for action in Siberia ”[23]. In fact, due to the erroneous decision of the Stavka, the white offensive, which was already poorly prepared and small in number, turned into a blow with its fingers spread. Not only coordination with Denikin failed, but even effective interaction between the Kolchak armies themselves. Even in the first days of the attack, attention was paid to Stavka Khanzhin, who telegraphed 2 March to Omsk: “The Western army, delivering the main attack, has the right to count not only on the full connection with its actions of operations of neighboring armies, but also on their full support, even sacrificing the private interests of these armies in favor of the main attack ... The Siberian army made its plan of action and yesterday proceeded to fulfill it without taking the initial position indicated to it - so far, the left-flank section of this army from the Sarapul railway - Krasnoufimsk, to the demarcation line with the Western Army, is not occupied by the troops of the Siberian Army, and I have to cover this front gap with one and a half shelves of my Ufa corps, diverting these forces for an indefinite time from fulfilling the task set for the corps. The Orenburg army is in the same state of complete decomposition of the Cossack units, as it was near Orenburg; decomposition threatens to move to the infantry units attached to this army ...
The chief of staff of Khanzhin, General Schepikhin, wrote about the Orenburg Army, which, in essence, Dutov with his pseudo-army is a soap bubble and the left flank of the Western army is in the air [25]. But was the situation much better in the Western Army itself, where Shchepikhin served? In fact, this army, in spite of all sorts of recruits being poured into it, was experiencing problems common to all three white armies. 4 August 1919, Assistant Chief of Staff of the General Staff Headquarters, General-Lieutenant A. P. Budberg, wrote in his diary: “Now our position is much worse than it was a year ago, because we have already eliminated our army, and instead of us last year’s Sovdepov and the regular Red Army, which does not want to, - despite all the reports of our intelligence, - is falling apart; on the contrary, it drives us to the east, and we have lost the ability to resist and we roll and roll almost without a fight ”[26]. The composition of the Kolchak troops left much to be desired. It was a catastrophic situation not only with senior officers and military talents. At the middle and lower level, there was an acute lack of officers. Staff officers were generally rare. In the 63-thousandth Western Army, by mid-April there were only 138 personnel officers and 2548 military officers [27]. According to some reports, by the beginning of 1919, the lack of officers at Kolchak reached 10 thousand people [28]. The rear, on the contrary, was full of officers. The harsh treatment of former officers who had previously served in the Reds and were captured in white did not help to remedy the situation. 1917 year laid out both the soldier and the officer. During the years of the Civil War, disrespect towards elders began to show up in the officers' ranks, card games and other entertainment spread, drunkenness (possibly due to hopelessness), and even looting. For example, in the order on the Eastern Front No. 85 of 8 of September 1919, it was said that the commander of the 6 of the Orenburg Cossack Regiment, Army Sergeant A. Izbyshev “for evading military operations and continuous drunkenness” was degraded to ordinary [29].
In the White East there was practically no single division commander, corps commander, army commander (for example, Gayda, Pepeliaev, Dutov), not to mention atamans who would not commit disciplinary offenses during the Civil War. Senior bosses set a bad example to everyone else. The absolute value of the order did not exist. In fact, any significant military commander in the new conditions was a kind of ataman. The interests of his unit, detachment, division, corps, army, army were placed above orders from above, which were carried out only as needed. Such a "chieftain" for his subordinates was both the king and god. Behind him, they were ready to go anywhere. As the contemporary noted, “in the conditions of the Civil War there is no“ sustainability of the units ”, and everything is based only on the“ sustainability of individual leaders ”[30]. Military discipline, as well as interaction, was absent as such. A completely different discipline was put on the Reds. Placing the blame for the revolution and the Civil War on the Bolsheviks, we must not forget that the losing side is no less responsible, and perhaps even more responsible for all the consequences of this. Complete disorganization of their own military administration and the impressive successes of the enemy led to the loss in the ranks of the white faith in victory. Most clearly frustration can be traced to the statements of the commanding staff. Major-General L. N. Domozhirov, who was at the disposal of the army headquarters of the Orenburg Cossack army, speaking in the spring of 1919 on the village meeting of the village of Kizilskaya, spoke to the Cossacks about the futility of fighting the red [31]. “I feel that my faith in the success of our holy cause is undermined” [32], General R.K. Bangersky noted in early May. Commander II of the Orenburg Cossack Corps of the General Staff, Major-General I. G. Akulinin, in a report to the army commander from April 25, directly wrote about the absence of "an especially cordial attitude from" native stanichnikov "to the Cossack units" [33]. On May 2, when Kolchak’s defeat was not yet obvious, commander Khanzhin imposed a resolution on one of the documents: “Our cavalry must take an example from the Red Army” [34].
Such confessions of generals are expensive. The Kolchak army suffered from the wrong distribution of forces and means along the front: it experienced an acute shortage of infantry units on the Cossack fronts (which, for example, made it impossible to capture such an important center as Orenburg by the forces of the cavalry alone) and at the same time the lack of cavalry on the non-Kazach fronts. Only centralized management could lead the Whites to victory, but the Cossack regions remained autonomous, and the Cossack chieftains continued to pursue their own political line. In addition to tactical and strategic problems, this added moral and psychological inconvenience. The soldiers and Cossacks, fighting in their native lands, were strongly tempted to go home or go to the enemy at the first opportunity if their village or village were behind the front line (by the way, the Bolsheviks understood this and tried to prevent this from happening). After the liberation from the red Izhevsk and Votkinsk plants, even the legendary Izhevsk and Votkinsk citizens wanted to go home - the only white of its kind workers. During the hardest battles of the end of April, when the fate of the White case in the east was decided, most of these “heroes” of the struggle against the Bolsheviks simply went home (I must say that Khanzhin himself had promised to return to his families beforehand). By May, only 452 bayonets from the previous squad remained in the Izhevsk brigade, the recruits who arrived were poorly trained and surrendered to captivity [35]. May 10 Haide had to disband into the homes of the soldiers of the Votkinsk division [36]. Cossacks did not want to go beyond their territory, putting local interests above. As practice has shown, the Cossacks could only allocate part of their forces for the nationwide struggle against the Reds, as well as provide their territory as a base for the White movement. Before the creation of the mass Red Army, this feature of the Cossacks gave White an indisputable advantage over the enemy. However, White’s lack of an effective repressive apparatus did not allow the leaders of the White movement to quickly form mass armies (with the help of terror) and eventually doomed them to defeat. Mobilized by Kolchak forces were heterogeneous in composition. In many respects, the assessment of Vatsetis is fair: “Kolchak had a fairly heterogeneous front, both in his political orientation and in the line of a social grouping. Right flank - army gen. Guides consisted mainly of Siberian democracy, supporters of Siberian autonomy. The center - the Ufa Front was composed of kulak-capitalist elements and held along a political line the Great Russian-Cossack direction.
The left flank - the Cossacks of the Orenburg and Ural Regions declared themselves constitutionalists. So it was at the front. As for the rear from the Urals to Lake Baikal, the remnants of the left wing of the former Czech-Russian military bloc were grouped together: the Czech troops and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who opened hostile actions against the dictatorship of Admiral Kolchak's Supreme Rule [37]. Of course, with such a heterogeneous composition, the morale of the Kolchak troops left much to be desired. Schepikhin, Pepelyaev and others noted the indifference of the population to the cause of Russia's revival, which also influenced the morale of the troops. According to Pepeliaev, “such a moment has arrived, when you do not know what will happen tomorrow, whether the units will not surrender entirely. There must be a turning point, a new explosion of patriotism, without which we will all perish. ”[38] But the miracle did not happen. The morale of the troops also depends on whether there are reserves that allow them to replace parts on the front line and give the soldiers rest; it depends on how the soldier is dressed, shod, fed and provided with everything necessary. The problem of having reserves was one of the most painful for whites. In fact, the offensive of Kolchak, as well as Denikin, began and developed with the almost complete absence of any reserves, which could not but lead to a catastrophe. The calculations of white strategists were apparently based on the gradual compression of the ring around Soviet Russia and the reduction due to this own front line. At the same time, new territories were freed up, in which it was possible to mobilize reinforcements, and their own troops were released. However, to begin with, it was necessary to at least reach the line of the Volga and gain a foothold on it, which the Kolchak team failed to do. The operation began on the eve of the spring thaw, and very soon the small numbers of whites found themselves separated from their rear areas for several weeks (this happened both in the Western and in the Separate Orenburg armies), which had not been established earlier, and now were completely absent. Frunze rightly believed that the thaw would have to become an ally of the Red [39].
Indeed, as a result of the flood of the rivers, not only artillery and wagons could move forward, but even the infantry, which at first was forced to use "morning matinees" (morning frosts), and with warming there were cases when the horsemen sank along with the horses. As a result of the river flooding, parts of the hulls were separated, they could not act in a coordinated manner, they lost contact with each other. If the Reds retreated to their base, where they could quickly recover, then the White forces, rushing to the Volga in full steam ahead to get ahead of the muddy road, were deprived of food, clothing, ammunition, artillery and extremely overworked at the most crucial moment. This situation, for example, took shape in April 1919 of the year in the Western Army [40]. General N. T. Sukin asked the command how to proceed - to continue the attack on Buzuluk and sacrifice infantry, or wait out the thaw, pull up carts and artillery and put the troops in order [41]. According to Sukin, "to go ... on the Volga by weak forces, weak, thinned parts - this is tantamount to the failure of the whole business" [42]. In fact, it failed long before the Volga. It was not possible to get ahead of the advance of the thaw, and the whites got bogged down. Stopping in the conditions of a maneuverable Civil War almost always was a harbinger of retreat and defeat. “Stopping is death in a civil war” [43], ”wrote General Schepikhin. The Reds, taking advantage of a temporary respite, pulled up reserves, took the initiative in their hands, threw reinforcements to the threatened areas, and thus did not allow the whites to achieve a decisive victory anywhere. White did not receive much needed reserves. It was the thaw that allowed Red to recover and put a counterstrike from the Buzuluk-Sorochinskaya-Mikhailovskoye (Sharlyk) area by the forces of the Southern Group of the Eastern Front. The prepared blow of the Reds, although it became known in advance [44], had nothing to counter (a similar situation happened in the autumn of 1919 in Denikin).
White could not even reach Buzuluk, which was ordered to take until April 26 and intercept the Tashkent railway in order to block the connection of Orenburg with the Soviet center. Due to the lack of accurate intelligence, it was not clear where to move the Southern Group of the Western Army - with a fist to Orenburg or Buzuluk or to keep it between these points [45]. As a result, the third failure option was chosen. Pepelyaev wrote about the Siberian army: “The regiments are melting and there is nothing to replenish them ... It is necessary to mobilize the population of the occupied areas, to act independently of any general state plan, risking to get for their work the nickname“ atamanism ”. We have to create improvised personnel units, weakening combat units ”[46]. Schepikhin noted that there were no reserves behind the front of the Western Army: "... further eastward to Omsk, even with a roll, no regiment and little likelihood of getting anything in the coming months" [47]. Meanwhile, the offensive drained parts. In one of the best regiments of the 5 of the Sterlitamak Army Corps, Beloretsk, by the beginning of May, there were up to 200 bayonets [48]. By the middle of April, there were 6 – 400 bayonets in the shelves of the 800 of the Ural Corps, of which up to half could not operate due to lack of boots, some worn sandals, there was no clothing even for replenishments [49]. The situation was even worse for the Ural Cossacks, in whose regiments there were 200 people, there was an electoral beginning and an extremely weak discipline [50]. Budberg already 2 May noted in his diary that the white offensive was choked, and the front was broken by the red in a very dangerous place: “I consider the situation to be very alarming; for me it is clear that the troops were exhausted and disheveled during the continuous offensive - the flight to the Volga, they lost their stability and the ability of stubborn resistance (generally very weak in improvised troops) ... The Red transition to active actions is very unpleasant, because the Stake does not have ready and effective reserves ...
There is no action plan for the Bet; flew to the Volga, waited for classes of Kazan, Samara and Tsaritsyn, but did not think about what should be done in case of other perspectives ... There were no Reds - they were chasing them; red ones appeared - we began to brush them off as a pesky flies, quite the same way as we were brushing off the Germans in 1914 – 1917 ... The front is terribly, prohibitively stretched, the troops are exhausted, there are no reserves, and the troops and their bosses are tactically very poorly prepared, they can only fight and pursue, unable to maneuver ... The brutal conditions of the Civil War make the troops susceptible to detours and surroundings, for behind this are the torments and the shameful death from red beasts. The Reds in the military unit are also illiterate; their plans are very naive and immediately visible ... But they have plans, but we do not have those ... ”[51] Transferring the strategic reserve of the Headquarters - 1 of the Kappel Volga Corps - to the Western Army and putting it into battle in parts turned out to be a serious miscalculation of command . As part of the Separate Orenburg Army, Kappel's corps could change the situation [52], but at the decisive moment the Dutov army turned out to be the actions of the Headquarters granted its own fate. At the same time, Kappel's corps was sent to the front in raw form, partially transferred to the enemy (in particular, the 10 th Bugulminsky regiment passed almost in full force, transitions took place in other regiments), and the rest was used to plug holes front of the Western Army alone. According to the British military mission, about 10 of thousands of people [53] passed from Kappel's corps to the red, although this figure seems to be too high. Another reserve, the Pivot Corps, also did not play a major role in the operation. As part of the Siberian Army, the Combined Shock Siberian Corps formed from February – March of 1919 was in reserve. The corps was put into battle on 27 in May to cover the gap between the Western and Siberian armies, but literally in two days of hostilities lost half of its composition, primarily due to those who surrendered, and didn’t show itself in future battles. The reasons for the failure of the corps are both obvious and incredible: the troops were sent into battle without coalescing and proper training, most of the regimental, battalion and company commanders received their assignments only on the eve or during the advancement of the corps to the front, and the division commanders even after the corps had been destroyed. The compound was sent to the front line without telephones, field kitchens, wagons and not even fully armed [54]. There were no other large reserves in Gaida’s army.
Why, then, didn’t even such modest recruits provided White with everything necessary? The fact is that the issues of material support have become the bottleneck of the Kolchak military machine. The only Trans-Siberian railway, passing through Siberia, the fate of the offensive largely depended on its carrying capacity. It must be said that the railway in 1919 worked poorly and the supply was extremely irregular. As a result, the troops had to carry everything they needed with them, and as a last resort, switch to self-supply, which bordered on looting, embittered the local population and decomposed the troops. It was especially difficult in those areas where the railway was absent and it was necessary to ensure the supply of horse-drawn transport. This applied to the entire left flank of the whites.
Kolchak during the retreat in October 1919
Note that the "psychic" attacks of White without a single shot, famous from the movie "Chapaev", were undertaken not at all from a good life and not only in order to impress the enemy. One of the main reasons for such actions was the lack of white ammunition, which had little to do with psychology. General PA Belov wrote to Khanzhin: “The main reason for the decay of the spirit of my units, in the general opinion of the commanders, is that they have not been supplied with cartridges for a long time. Now there are thirty to forty cartridges left in units for a rifle and in my stock for the whole group there are ten thousand ”[55]. In March 1919, the Izhevsk residents who defended Ufa were given only two clips of cartridges [56]. Leaving the Volga region in the fall of 1918, the whites lost their military factories and warehouses (Kazan - gunpowder and artillery depots; Simbirsk - two cartridge factories; Ivashchenkovo - an explosives factory, a capsule factory, artillery warehouses, reserves of explosives for 2 million shells; Samara - pipe factory, gunpowder factory, workshops) [57]. There were military factories in the Urals in Izhevsk and Zlatoust, but in Siberia armory there were no factories at all. The Whites were armed with weapons of a wide variety of systems - rifles of the Mosin, Berdan, Arisak, Gra, Waterly, machine guns of Maxim, Colt, Hotchkiss, Lewis [58]. Rifles of foreign systems were sometimes no less common than the Russians. This diversity made it difficult to provide the army with appropriate ammunition. So, in the Western army there were no Russian rifles, and there were no cartridges for the Japanese ones [59]. The situation was no better with machine guns and guns. By April 15, the Western Army had 229 Maxim machine guns, 137 Lewis machine guns, 249 Colt machine guns, 52 other systems, 667 in total. 44 batteries had 85 three-inch guns, two 42-line guns, eight - 48 linear, seven - other systems and one bomb [60]. The Separate Orenburg Army lacked guns and machine guns.
In all armies there was a shortage of communications, cars, armored vehicles. Due to poor communication, for example, the coordinated offensive of the white corps to Orenburg actually broke down in early May. According to the data on May 28, in Orsk (the headquarters of the disbanded Separate Orenburg Army) from Ufa (the headquarters of the Western Army) could not get through to the 300 military telegrams [61]. The reasons were not only in imperfection and lack of equipment, but also in frequent sabotage when it was impossible to restore order in the rear. The army lacked gasoline. The pilots of the Western Army at the height of the spring offensive 1919 of the year were instructed to “keep a small amount of gasoline [in] the air detachments ... save for aerial work when crossing the Volga” [62]. And what about the appearance of a simple Kolchak soldier! Some of the few photographs depict a terrifying picture. More terrible is what is known from the documents. In the parts of the Northern group of the Siberian army, “people are barefoot and goals, they walk in armies and bastards ... Horse scouts, like the Scythians of the twentieth century, ride without saddles” [63]. In the 5 Syzran rifle regiment of the Southern Group of the Western Army, “most of the shoes were falling apart, they were knee-deep in the mud” [64]. In the 2, the Ufa Army Corps of the Western Army replenishment arrived without uniforms directly from military commanders and sent into battle [65]. Orenburg Cossacks, instead of their overcoats, wore Chinese wadded jackets, of which, during warming, many fighters popped cotton wool [66], and after an unexpected onset of cold weather, they became cold and sick. “You should have seen with your own eyes to believe what the army was wearing ... Most of them were in torn coats, sometimes wearing straight almost on a naked body; there are holey felt boots on their feet, which, with spring slush and mud, were just an unnecessary burden ... Total lack of linen ”[67]. In May, Kolchak, who arrived at the front line, “expressed a desire to see units of the 6 of the Urals Corps ... he was shown output units of the Urals division to the rear of the 12. The sight of them was terrible. The part without shoes, the part in the upper clothes on the naked body, the most part without overcoats. Passed perfectly ceremonial march. The supreme ruler was terribly upset by the view ... "[68].
This picture does not fit the data on multi-million deliveries of allies to Kolchak, including about two million pairs of shoes and full uniforms for 360 thousands of people [69], not to mention hundreds of thousands of shells, rifles, hundreds of millions of cartridges, thousands of machine guns. If all this was delivered to Vladivostok, it never reached the front. Hunger, fatigue from continuous marches and battles, the lack of normal clothing created fertile ground for Bolshevik agitation, and more often besides it led to unrest in the army, the killing of officers, switching to the enemy. Mobilized peasants fought reluctantly, quickly fled, went over to the enemy, taking their weapons with them and opening fire on their recent comrades. There have been cases of mass surrender. The 1 – 1 May 2 Ukrainian Kuren XI was the most well-known rebellion in which around 60 officers were killed, and the Reds turned to 3000 armed soldiers with 11 machine guns and 2 guns [70]. Later, the 11-th Sengiley regiment, the 3-th battalion of the 49-th Kazan regiment and other units [71] went over to the side of the enemy. Similar but smaller cases occurred in the Southern group of the Western Army, the Siberian and the Separate Orenburg armies. In June, 1919 of the year, two officers of the 21 Chelyabinsk mountain regiment shooters went over to the Reds, killing officers, and at the end of the month 3 and Dobriansky and 4 th Solikamsky regiments [72] surrendered without Perm. In total, during the counteroffensive, before the end of the Ufa operation, around 25 500 people [73] were captured in red. With the inability of the command to create the elementary conditions for the troops, the result of the Kolchak offensive is not surprising. The Chief of the 12 Ural Infantry Division of the General Staff, Major-General R. K. Bangersky, informed the corps commander Sukin 2 in May: “We have never had a rear. From the time of Ufa (we are talking about the capture of the city of 13 in March. - A.G.) we do not receive bread, but feed on anything. The division is not capable now. We need to give people at least two nights to sleep and come to their senses, otherwise there will be a big collapse ”[74].
At the same time, Bangersky noted that he did not see such heroism in the old army as was shown by the whites during the Ufa and Sterlitamak operations, but there is a limit to everything. “I would like to know in the name of which supreme considerations did the 12 division donate?” [75], the major general asked. But it was donated not only by the division of the Bangers, but by the whole Kolchak army. The Orenburg Cossacks in the Western Army did not have forage, the horses suffered from starvation, constant transitions and could barely move in steps [76]. Such a deplorable state of horse composition deprived him of an important advantage — quickness and surprise. The white cavalry, according to the testimony of the participant of the battles, could not be compared with the red one, the horses of which were in excellent condition and as a result had a high mobility. 6 Commander Urals Army Corps Sukin 3 wrote to Khanzhin in May: “Continuous marches on incredibly difficult roads, without days and daily battles of the last two weeks without rest, without carts, hunger, lack of uniforms (many people are literally barefoot ... without overcoats) - that's the reasons that can finally destroy the young cadres of divisions, people stagger from fatigue and from sleepless nights and their combat elasticity is completely broken. Please take the divisions to reserve to put them in order ”[77]. It was General Sukin, who was driven to despair by the situation, did not hesitate to expose a guard of honor [78] before arriving in Ufa soon after taking Kolchak with his bare feet. In his despair, Sukin wrote: “There is not even bread” [79].
Pepelyaev noted that “the area of military operations is completely gone, the rear is rich forever, but the transport is such that it is impossible to fight with it, in its current position” [80]. According to General Bangersky, “the capture of Ufa made it possible to form a strong rear, replenish the troops mobilized, get a wagon train, and now in early May launch an offensive with large forces pulling the corps ... Kappel and forming more new troops” [81]. But this was not done ... The crown of the monstrous state of the Kolchak military machine was rear, which was very poorly controlled by whites. Captain G. Dumbadze, who was sent to Krasnoyarsk at the end of the accelerated course of the Academy of the General Staff, recalled: “When I arrived in Krasnoyarsk, I saw for the first time the fiery flames of a partisan region that engulfed the whole province. Walking through the streets of Krasnoyarsk was fraught with great risk. Red gangs and individual Bolsheviks under the guise of government soldiers killed officers, using the cover of the night. No one was sure who stopped him to check his documents: a real legal patrol or masked red terrorists. The burning of warehouses and shops, the cutting of telephone wires and many other types of sabotage literally occurred every day. The light in the houses did not light up or the windows were curled with dark matter, otherwise a hand grenade would be thrown into the light in the apartments. I remember how I had to walk the streets at night, with a charged browning in my pocket. It was all literally in the heart of White Siberia ”[82]. The entire Yenisei province and part of Irkutsk were swept by the partisan movement, which chained considerable white forces to itself. In May, the guerrillas systematically and daily dismantled the routes (sometimes at a considerable distance), which led to long-term disruption of train traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railway (for example, on the night of May 1919, as a result of sabotage, the railway communication was interrupted for two weeks), bridges were burned, shelling trains, cut the telegraph wires, terrorized railway workers. For every 8 days, by the beginning of June, there were 10 derailments, to the east of Krasnoyarsk, more than 11 trains with ammunition and supplies, which would not be superfluous at the front [140], accumulated.
Dumbadze wrote: “There is no exact standard for determining the terrible moral, political and material damage caused to us by the partisans. I will always be in my opinion that the affairs in the Yenisei province were stabbed in the back of the Siberian army. Soviet general Ogorodnikov ... says that White lost in Siberia without any strategic defeats from the Red Army [84], and the cause of their death was in unrest in the rear. Having experience on this armed rear, I cannot disagree with what Ogorodnikov says ”[85]. The uprisings covered the counties of the Turgai and Akmola regions, the Altai and Tomsk provinces. Thousands of soldiers were used to suppress them, which in other circumstances could be sent to the front. In addition, in itself, the participation of tens of thousands of combat-ready men in the partisan movement clearly testified to the failure of the Kolchak mobilization in Siberia. We add that because of the ataman, the front did not receive replenishments from the Far East, which, perhaps, could turn the tide. An analysis of the internal state of the Kolchak armies clearly shows the complete impossibility of the successful implementation of the plans of the white command. The Reds, who successfully launched the flywheel of mass mobilization, had almost constant superiority in forces and assets. During 1919, the average monthly increase in the size of the Red Army was 183 thousands of people [86], which exceeded the total number of troops that were white on the Eastern Front. By April 1, when the whites were still hoping for success, the Red Army already had a half million fighters, and their numbers were constantly increasing. The number of troops of all opponents of the Reds, taken together, could not be compared with this figure. At the same time, the White’s advantage as a personnel was quickly lost before the creation of a mass Red Army. The number of troops is red, and in many cases their quality has rapidly increased; the quality of white troops, with relatively little changing numbers, was constantly falling. In addition, the central position of the Reds allowed them not only to take advantage of the reserves of the old army and the resources of the industrial center, but also to act along internal operational lines, smashing the enemy alternately. White, on the contrary, acted separately, attempts to coordinate their actions turned out to be late. Due to the vastness of the theater of war, they could not take advantage of their advantages, for example, the presence of trained Cossack cavalry.
The mistakes of some Kolchak generals, who made a dizzying career during the Civil War, but did not have time to acquire the necessary experience, had their effect. The mobilization resource of the white-controlled areas was not fully utilized, a huge mass of peasants joined the rebels in the white rear, or simply evaded mobilization. There were no prepared reserves. The army did not have an equipped rear base and military industry, the supply was irregular. The result was a constant shortage of weapons and ammunition, communications and equipment in the army. White could not oppose anything to the most powerful Bolshevik agitation in his troops. The ordinary mass possessed a rather low level of political consciousness, was tired of a long-term war. There was no unity in the Kolchak camp because of sharp internal contradictions, and not only on political issues between monarchists, Cadets and Social Revolutionaries. On the outskirts controlled by whites, the national question was acute. Historically there were uneasy relations of the Cossack and non-Kazach population, the Russian population with the Bashkir and Kazakh. The white leadership carried out a fairly lenient political course, and harsh measures often could not be implemented due to the lack of mechanisms for implementing orders on the ground and monitoring their implementation. Despite the brutal red terror, the persecution of the church, the land policy that infuriated the peasants, the white could not become the force that would bring order and become attractive to the masses. With the end of the First World War, the Bolsheviks lost the face of traitors, who entrenched themselves after the Brest Peace. White, on the contrary, is now in the role of accomplices of the interventionists. The leaders of the White movement, unlike their opponent, did not understand the whole complexity of the task before them, did not realize the need for the toughest measures to achieve victory.
No matter how much they talk about white terror, it is obvious that white leaders - people generated by the old regime - could not imagine the scale of violence that was needed in 1917 – 1922 for successful implementation of their plans. Such an idea existed among the Bolsheviks, hardened over the years in the illegal struggle. However, their methods of influence were not limited to terror alone, constituting a cruel, but at the same time effective, system of governance. The Bolshevik leaders were able to comprehend the principles of warfare in the new conditions, combining war and politics, which Clausewitz wrote about and that White failed. It was the creation of the mass Red Army under the leadership of qualified officers of the old army, controlled by the commissars, as well as the promotion of understandable and attractive slogans for the majority of the Bolsheviks. Whites had their advantages, but they could not use them effectively. As a result, the red organization won the white improvisation.
Notes
1. GA RF. F. P-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 78.
2. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 84.
3. GA RF. F. P-952. Op. 3. D. 28. L. 2.
4. Ibid. F. P-5960. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 89.
5. Ibid. F. P-6605. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 3 about.
6. RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 752.
7. Ibid. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 87. L. 11 ob.– 12.
8. Battle schedules of the armies of the Eastern Front. 1918-1919 Publ. A. A. Karevsky and R. G. Gagkuev // White movement in the East of Russia. White Guard. Historical almanac. 2001. No. 5. P. 148.
9. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 68 – 69.
10. "Russia will perish in the waves of the new anarchy." Publ. N. D. Egorova and N. V. Pulchenko // Military-Historical Journal. 1996. No. 6. C. 80.
11. See, for example: Petrov P. P. From the Volga to the Pacific Ocean in the ranks of the Whites (1918 – 1922). Riga. 1930. C. 75 – 76.
12. GA RF. F. P-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 78 on; Petrov P.P. Decree. cit. C. 76.
13. Budberg A.P. Diary // Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 14. Berlin. 1924. C. 235.
14. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 10.
15. See also: Plotnikov I. F. Chelyabinsk: development of a strategic plan for the offensive of the Russian army by A. V. Kolchak, successes in its implementation and subsequent failure (February – May 1919) // Ural in the events 1917 – 1921: current learning problems. Chelyabinsk. 1999. C. 79 – 83.
16. Volkov EV The fate of the Kolchak general. Pages of life of M. V. Khanzhin. Yekaterinburg. 1999. C. 128.
17. Hins GK Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak. M. 2007. C. 393.
18. Molchanov V. Struggle in Eastern Russia and Siberia // Eastern Front, Admiral Kolchak. M. 2004. C. 423.
19. RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 746.
20. GA RF. F. P-6219. Op. 1. D. 47. L. 1 ob. – 2.
21. Boldyrev VG Directory. Kolchak. The Intervention Memories (From the cycle “Six years” 1917 – 1922). Ed. B. D. Wegman. Novonikolaevsk. 1925. C. 60; Budberg A.P. Diary // Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 14. Berlin 1924. C. 241; Golovin N. N. The Russian counterrevolution. CH 4. Prince 8. B. m. 1937. C. 114.
22. RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 820.
23. Filatyev D.V. A catastrophe of the White movement in Siberia 1918 – 1922. Impressions of the witness. Paris. 1985. C. 53 – 54.
24. 24. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 31 – 31 vol.
25. GA RF. F. P-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 66 about.
26. Budberg A.P. Diary // Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 15. Berlin. 1924. C. 256 – 257.
27. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 87. L. 11 ob. – 12.
28. Eyhe G. Kh. Tilted rear. M. 1966. C. 148.
29. RGVA. F. 39483. Op. 1. D. 57. L. 59.
30. Sulavko A.V. Studies on tactics in the Civil War. Nikolsk-Ussuri. 1921. C. 19.
31. The State Archive of the Orenburg Region (GAOO). F. P-1912. Op. 2. D. 32. L. 30.
32. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 66.
33. Civil war in Orenburg 1917 – 1919 Documents and materials. Orenburg. 1958. C. 308.
34. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 53.
35. Plotnikov, I. F. The Urals Civil War (1917 – 1922). Encyclopedia and bibliography. T. 1. Yekaterinburg. 2007. C. 149 – 150. In the future, the situation with the discipline of Izhevsk and Votkinsk did not get any better - for more, see: Why did White lose? The appeal of officers and soldiers of Izhevsk and Votkinsk residents about the unauthorized abandonment of the ranks of the 1919 army, Publ. A. V. Ganina // White case. M. 2005. C. 239 – 242.
36. Konstantinov S.I. Armed formations of anti-Bolshevik governments of the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia during the civil war. Yekaterinburg. 1997. C. 165.
37. RGVA. F. 39348. Op. 1. D. 1. L. 817.
38. "Russia will perish in the waves of the new anarchy." C. 82.
39. Sirotinsky S. A. The Way of Arseny. M. 1959. C. 140.
40. For details, see: A. Ganin. Montenegrin on the Russian service: General Bakich. M. 2004. C. 73 – 75.
41. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 109 about.
42. Ibid. D. 27. L. 81.
43. GA RF. F. P-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 98.
44. Petrov P.P. Decree. cit. C. 80 – 81.
45. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 126.
46. "Russia will perish in the waves of the new anarchy." C. 81.
47. GA RF. F. P-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 71 about.
48. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 68.
49. Ibid. L. 109 about.
50. Ibid. L. 184.
51. Budberg A.P. Diary // Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 14. Berlin. 1924. C. 228 – 229.
52. Eyhe G.H. Ufa adventure of Kolchak. M. 1960. C. 218.
53. Smele J. Civil War in Siberia: the anti-Bolshevik government of Admiral Kolchak, 1918 – 1920. Cambridge. 1996. P. 320.
54. Simonov D. G. On the history of the Consolidated Siberian Shock Corps of the Army of Admiral A.V. Kolchak (1919) // Siberia during the Civil War. Kemerovo. 2007. C. 55 – 57.
55. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 68.
56. Efimov A. [G.] Izhevtsy and Votkintsy // Eastern Front, Admiral Kolchak. M. 2004. C. 436.
57. RGVA. F. 39617. Op. 1. D. 70. L. 156 – 158 vol.
58. See, for example: GAOO. F. P-1912. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 4 – 4; Op. 2. D. 75. L. 8, 9 Rev., 12.
59. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 188.
60. Ibid. D. 87. L. 11 ob. – 12.
61. Ibid. D. 186. L. 460.
62. Ibid. D. 11. L. 21.
63. "Russia will perish in the waves of the new anarchy." C. 81.
64. According to the oral recollections of the participant of the battles of A. F. Gergenreder - Letter from A. A. Gergenreder to the author from 13.01.2004.
65. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 53.
66. Ibid. F. 39606. Op. 1. D. 24. L. 25.
67. Sakharov K. V. Belaya Sibir (Internal War 1918 – 1920). Munich. 1923. C. 74.
68. Petrov P.P. Decree. cit. C. 88.
69. Spirin LM. The defeat of Kolchak's army. M. 1957. C. 89 – 91. See also some excellent UK supply data: Pereira NGO White Siberia. The Politics of Civil War. London; Buffalo. 1996. P. 105.
70. Plotnikov, I. F. The Civil War in the Urals ... T. 2. Yekaterinburg. 2007. C. 144.
71. Shushpanov S., Forgotten Division // White Army. White matter. Historical popular science almanac (Ekaterinburg). 1997. No. 4. C. 44.
72. Filimonov B. B. The White Army of Admiral Kolchak. M. 1997. C. 39; Filatyev D. V. Decree. cit. C. 79; Lobanov D. A. The Perm Rifle Division of the Army of Admiral Kolchak. 1918 – 1919 gg. / / White movement in Eastern Russia. White Guard. Almanac. 2001. No. 5. C. 91.
73. Kakurin, N. Ye., Vatsetis I., Civil War. 1918 – 1921. SPb. 2002. C. 238.
74. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 62 about.
75. Ibid. L. 64 about.
76. Vorotoff M.F. 2 Orenburg Cossack Regiment in 1918 – 1920 (Notes of Colonel Vorotov) // Hoover Institution Archives. Colonel Vorotovov Collection. Folder VW Russia V954. L. 17.
77. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 58 – 58 vol.
78. GA RF. F. P-6605. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 62; Sakharov K.V. Decree. cit. C. 78. General Budberg wrote that the guard was without pants, but this seemed less likely - see: A. Budberg. Diary // Archive of the Russian Revolution. T. 15. Berlin. 1924. C. 341.
79. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 109 about.
80. "Russia will perish in the waves of the new anarchy." C. 82.
81. RGVA. F. 39624. Op. 1. D. 69. L. 65.
82. Dumbadze G. What contributed to our defeat in Siberia during the Civil War. Publ. A.I. Deryabina // White Guard. 1997. No. 1. C. 43.
83. Eyhe G. Kh. Tilted rear. C. 229; Novikov P.A. The Civil War in Eastern Siberia. M. 2005. C. 163.
84. We are talking about the book: Ogorodnikov F. Impact on Kolchak in spring 1919, M. 1938.
85. Dumbadze G. Decree. cit. C. 45.
86. Calculated by: N. N. Movchin. Compilation of the Red Army in 1918 – 1921. / / Civil War 1918 – 1921: In 3 t. / Under total. ed. A. S. Bubnova, S. S. Kamenev and R. P. Eideman. T. 2. Military art of the Red Army. M. 1928. C. 87.
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