Opinion
Lieutenant General Golovkin Alexander Yakovlevich was born on August 31, 1934 at the Ilet station in the Zvenigovsky district of the Mari ASSR in the family of a railwayman. In 1952, after graduating from high school, he entered engineeringtank Faculty of the Military Academy of Armored Forces named after I.V. Stalin. After graduating from the academy, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st tank company for technical affairs in the 242nd tank regiment of the 41st Guards Tank Division of the Carpathian Military District. In 1960-1961 served as deputy commander of the missile division for the technical part of the army missile brigade. From 1962 to 1968 he served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany as deputy commander of a tank battalion for technical units in the 51st regiment of the 27th Guards Tank Division and head of the armored service of the 57th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the 8th Guards Army. Since 1969, he served in the Carpathian Military District in the following positions: deputy technical commander of the 274th motorized rifle regiment of the 24th Samaro-Ulyanovsk, Berdichev, Iron Division, deputy commander of the 23rd Panzer Division of the 8th Tank Army, chief of the armored service of the 13th army, deputy commander of the 13th army in armament. In March 1982, he was appointed deputy commander of the TurkMO troops in armament, and in March 1988, he was appointed deputy commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (Western Group of Forces, Western Group of Forces). Dismissed to the reserve in May 1992. Lives in Minsk.Awarded orders: Labor Red Banner, Red Star, For Service to Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces 2 and 3 degrees, Order of the Fighting Flag of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, many medals, badge of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "For service in tank forces."
We asked Alexander Yakovlevich a few questions about the development and operation in the troops of various objects of armored weapons and equipment, and the organization of their technical support. We believe that the detailed answers of a professional who has such rich practical experience in this field, his story about little-known details and important technical “trifles” of seemingly well-known machines, rarely mentioned problems of operation and technical maintenance will be of interest to readers.
- Alexander Yakovlevich, you have devoted forty years to the Armed Forces. Moreover, they served directly in the troops, and your entire service was connected mainly with armored vehicles. What would you like to especially note in your service, united by the concept of "zampotekh"?
- I still consider myself a happy man and thankful that the whole service from the deputy engineer of a company to the Deputy Commander of the Western Group of Forces and the Commander in Chief of the Western Arms for Armament went through full-blooded deployed units and formations together under the guidance of commanders (commanders) - participants of the Great Patriotic War of war. These were real highly skilled "fathers-commanders" who carefully, painstakingly, aggressively taught and raised their subordinates. After all, to have the most modern military equipment in the army is a big responsibility. But the main thing is to properly use it in combat conditions, to train personnel, to ensure the proper operation of this equipment, to store it safely, to organize repairs both in the field and in stationary conditions, to provide timely and proper equipment for ammunition, fuel and lubricants and other means technical supply. They were all well remembered by the Great Patriotic War, and especially its initial period, when we could not organize all this properly.
My whole service was aimed at solving the above problems. From the first days I was responsible for the performance of my duties responsibly and even passionately. With mechanics-drivers and tank company commanders, in addition to the scheduled technical training sessions, I conducted weekly classes on Sundays in a technical circle. At the first classes he told, showed himself. I see it does not affect everyone. I changed the method - I began to compose and issue questions in advance. Why? What if? What will lead if? The drivers themselves and the commanders themselves prepared and answered, the others supplemented them. It was an interesting, lively, initiative conversation, and it gave its result. In general, I fell in love with my “non-prestigious” tank-technical service and, until its completion, remained “deputy technotech”.
Being a company commander, he prepared a company of masters of tank driving, developed and published in the magazine “Tankist” No. 47 for 1960, the first “Technological map of removing the tank from storage” (this card was checked in our company with a stopwatch in hand) ..
Being in the position of a zampotekh regiment, he built a technical service center (PTOR), operational at any time of the year. Our regiment was the first in the district, and perhaps in the Armed Forces, to acquire shoes for wireless attachment of infantry fighting vehicles on a railway platform, which they produced in the repair shelter of the regiment (I have a copyright certificate for this device). The equipment for repair and maintenance of the BMP-1 in PTOR was also produced on its own. In the division he built a maintenance line for combat training vehicles at the Ignatpolsky training center, and also organized equipment maintenance lines in three shelves. In 1975 (summer training), he was the chairman of the commission for testing the “Project of the course for driving KVBM-75 combat vehicles”. According to my proposal, the design and dimensions of the two obstacles, which have survived to the present, were changed. Time limits were reasonably adjusted.
Becoming deputy army officer, he led and was responsible for the construction of exemplary fleets of combat vehicles of two regiments (44 guards. MnP, Vladimir Volynsky, and 313 guards. MNV, Rovno) for the commanders of the Interregional Military District district troops ( from the regiment commander and above).
- Alexander Yakovlevich, could you tell us more about the service in the 274 motorized rifle regiment, which has become one of the best in the Soviet Army?
- In 1969, I was appointed deputy commander for the technical part of the 274 th motorized rifle regiment of the 24 th Samara-Ulyanovsk, Berdichev, Iron Division of the Carpathian Military District. In the fall of 1969, the regiment switched to a new organizational structure and was one of the first in the Armed Forces of the USSR to re-equip it with new combat equipment. We received infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1), Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery systems, anti-tank missile systems (ATGM), new TMMs and MTU-20 bridge-laying vehicles, conveyors for evacuating heavy wounded from the front-line TPK-1, new means of communication to control the fight. The process of mastering the new technology continued at special gatherings, demonstrative, research test exercises, classes.
The regiment, in fact, was experimental. He spent on 2,5 — 3 the annual standards of motoresources and ammunition. A new educational and material base was created. This was purposefully done by the deputy commander, and from 1972, the regiment commander Col. I.N. Rodionov, the future general of the army, the Russian defense minister.
By the end of 1972, all military equipment was contained in the newly erected standard concrete stores. Warm storages were built for anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-tank systems, as well as an exemplary working maintenance line.
In 1972, the regiment was visited by USSR Defense Minister Marshal A.A. Grechko and praised the field training and combat readiness of the regiment. The following year, the state of the military equipment and the process of combat training of the regiment were commended by Commander-in-Chief Army General I.N. Pavlovsky. The service in the 274-i mp Iron Division became the high school of the organization of technical support. This experience became for me a base for further service.
- Alexander Yakovlevich, during your period of service, the rearmament of the Soviet Army with new equipment began and ended. How did this happen in the troops, which at the same time there were difficulties for individual machines?
- Adoption of military equipment, as is known, is preceded by factory, proving and military tests, which were conducted in military districts located in various soil-climatic zones of the USSR. And if in the first two types of tests, highly qualified specialists are involved, and they operate mainly on familiar landfills, then with military trials a completely different situation: the qualifications of technical personnel (crews) are much lower, and the conditions of operation and maintenance are far from ideal.
Practically only after the military tests and the adoption of equipment for armament, the constructive fine-tuning of this technology to the necessary level begins. And the final assessment of military equipment is given in the troops only after its long-term operation, and especially during combat use, as was the case in Afghanistan or in the course of other conflicts both in our country and abroad. It sometimes takes years (like the T-80 tank) or decades (like the T-64) to fine-tune the technology. In addition, the adoption of new equipment requires the restructuring of the entire service of technical support, repair, operation, construction of new landfills, tank sites, equipment sites and reservoirs for underwater and surface driving, parks for closed and open storage of equipment and other structures.
From personal experience I can give examples of small, but important changes in the design that have already been made to the troops.
Since the spring of 1959, the 242 tank regiment of the 41 Guards Tank Division has been re-armed with T-55 tanks. This was an important event in the regiment, command and personnel with great zeal studied and mastered the new machine. At first, we were tormented by the main clutches, the hydraulic clutch of the generator drive and especially the gas joint breakthrough through the gasket of the exhaust manifold of the first and sixth engine cylinders, as a rule, with the fifth stud wringing. With such a defect, the tank was forbidden to be launched into the water to force a water barrier along the bottom. I begged the deputy engineer of the regiment N.A. Solovyov call a representative of the plant for a complaint. They called and won a complaint, and I showed a way out on my combat training machine: for the fifth stud on the flange of the exhaust manifold of the first and sixth cylinders, instead of a round hole, make an oval. The plant took note of the proposal and after testing began to produce new engines with such a change. The defect was eliminated by my specialists together with the repairmen of the troops.
In my service fell mastering the operation of new types of armored vehicles: the BTR-60P, BMP-1, BMP-2, T-64A and T-80 tanks. And each had to deal with issues of reliability, making design changes and improvements.
The BTR-60P, for example, fell in love with the motorized riflemen: it was warmer than the BTR-152 in the winter, and most importantly, softer in motion on the march. We, the engineering and technical composition of the regiment and division (especially the regiment), had to deal with the failure of a large number of wheel brakes and a violation of the synchronism of the engines. With the brakes, everything was decided promptly: we called in the GSNG in 170-th Guards. MSW 57-th honey of the 8-th army of designers and military representatives from the Gorky plant, on the spot in the regiment figured out the reasons. As a result, they decided to modernize the design of the brake disc and replace them with all BTR regiments. Before replacing operation ban. New improved brake discs to the Group of Forces were delivered by aircraft. But with the synchronization of the engines on the BTR-60PA, BTR-60PB, BTR-70 in the troops still suffer.
I would like to tell you more about the development of the BMP-1. The 274-th MSP re-equipped the infantry fighting vehicles of the BMP-1 and switched to a new organizational structure, one of the first in the district. The BMP, without exaggeration, revolutionized motorized rifle regiments. First, the squad commander (the commander of the infantry fighting vehicle), the platoon commander, the company commander and all the other chiefs were responsible for the combat vehicle. In the motorized rifle regiments equipped with wheeled armored personnel carriers, all vehicles were brought together in a platoon of battalion armored personnel carriers headed by a foreman (later an ensign), who, as a rule, received all the bumps for the technical condition of the vehicles. Secondly, the platoon and company commanders should have been well aware of the device and operating features, supervise the maintenance and repair of the machine, be able to drive and shoot well of all kinds weapons BMP. The regimental command had to break the ideology of the infantrymen and engage in training motorized infantry officers in shooting and driving infantry fighting vehicles, to train them to participate in the maintenance of equipment.
During this period, from the middle of the 1960, the positions of platoon commanders in the Ground Forces were staffed by biennial officers; in a company, as a rule, there was only one platoon commander - a personnel officer. The full-time post of deputy commander of a motorized rifle company at an infantry fighting vehicle in technical terms (officer) was also staffed by two-year-olds. Having assessed the situation, we, in the technical part of the 274-th company, developed a solution and came up with a proposal to the commander of the 24-th Iron Division, Major General M.M. Bukshtynovich - to determine the position of two-year-olds with diplomas of mechanical engineers for the position of deputy mechanic of a motorized rifle company. To appoint the company commander only from the position of the deputy engineer of the company. The divisional commended our proposal. Of all the two-year-olds of the regiment, we selected 10 volunteers, conducted two-month training camps, taught them zampotech professions, and later only rejoiced, and the competition began between them. They were real, competent, responsible and enterprising officers, more than half of whom remained in the Armed Forces cadres and achieved high positions.
The BMP-1 itself was pleasant (except for making long-distance marches “in combat”: the landing got tired, many were swayed), our motorized infantry guns with the BMP had already joked about the motorized infantry of other regiments on the armored personnel carrier. For each failure and malfunction at the BMP, we assembled a “engineering council” of the regiment, discussed the cause and made a decision - whose fault was it: the operators or the plant. On failures and faults identified during operation, we reported to the personnel weekly on the summing up.
For all the faults due to the manufacturer’s fault, we called the plant representative to draw up a complaint. The difficult and difficult task is to convince the plant representative to sign the act. Some employees have had experience; since the times of the Great Patriotic War, they “ate the dog” and knew who feeds them, who gives them wages and bonuses. We have compiled many reclamation and technical acts. For example, the following defects occurred: the detachment of the rubber band from the track roller; bending of the balancers of the front (right and left) track rollers; wear of the teeth of sprockets; wear of the earrings of the track track joint; uneven and below the set pressure injection and spray fuel injectors of the engine. All complaints (even with the special opinion of the representative of the plant) were approved for my service by the Zampotech 274 regiment.
At the suggestion of the regimental commission, a factory produced and tested a radial stop for the axis of the right and left front rollers. Bends balancer stopped.
Another structural flaw in the BMP (which has remained until now) is the horizontal arrangement of the plungers of the high-pressure fuel pump. For this reason, there is one-sided (bottom) wear of the plunger pair and, as a result, a decrease in the fuel injection pressure, poor spray; the engine does not start from the starter (especially in cold weather). Honor and praise to the heads of design offices and head factories: Chelyabinsky, Kurgansky and Barnaulsky - they very responsibly and promptly intervened in production and eliminated shortcomings, therefore the BMP family became the most reliable among the machines of the Ground Forces, and for me - the most favorite armored vehicle weapon.
- Now there is a perception that the concept of BMP, adopted in our country in the 1960-s, was erroneous. This opinion was also revealed by the discussion on the prospects for the development of infantry fighting vehicles, which was developed in the pages of the magazine “Technics and Armament”. How do you evaluate modern BMPs from the point of view of their exploitation in the army?
- I am aware of this controversy, and as a person who devoted many years of his life to operating the BMP from the very beginning of the troops, I can say with responsibility that this machine fell in love with the troops, gave motorized rifle divisions and units so much unheard of maneuverability. Such vehicles as the BMP-1, its modifications, as well as the BMP-2 and the BMP-3, easily fitted into the existing system of support, operation and repair of armored weapons and equipment.
Did the BMP-1 and BMP-2 have flaws? Of course, there were some of which I have already said. There were others, smaller and more substantial, some remained today. This and the inconvenience of accommodating the crew, and its small number, uncomfortable conditions of stay in the BMP. Difficulties of landing and abandoning infantry fighting vehicles, especially in movement (and this is often required in a combat situation). Difficulty, and sometimes the inability for motorized infantry to fire from inside the car, especially when driving a car. Insufficient security of the crew from the bottom, sides. I understand the position and those professionals who strongly advocate for the further use of BMP in the army, and those who are against. I personally fully support the opinion of Colonel-General S.A. Mayev, which he expressed in the magazine "Technique and Armament" No. 10 for 2004.
- Alexander Yakovlevich, could you tell us more about the development of the troops and the operation of the T-64A, T-72, T-80 tanks?
- With the assimilation of the T-64 tank in operation, I ran into 1973 as a deputy technical officer for the 23 th commander of the 8 Tank Army (Ovruch). Before taking office, the head of the armored service of the Northern Caucasus Military District, Major General Pendak Alexander Savelevich, instructed me. He admonished: “Comrade Golovkin, you have been appointed to the high and responsible post of the deputy technologist 23-td, armed with the latest T-64A tanks. The operation of the tank and its development are under the control of the government. You should personally study this machine, perfectly know the features of its operation, competently and responsibly organize the study and mastering of the tank by personnel, and establish working cooperation with the plant. ”
The layout of the T-64A was new and promising. The refusal of the main clutch, guitar, turning mechanisms, fan for cooling, the installation of a powerful gun with flammable sleeves and a loading mechanism - this was a real revolution in tank design. But the tank was still "raw" by that time, it required a lot of constructive improvements. The engine was the most unreliable element, it was very capricious, demanding punctual compliance with the instructions for use. Reverse start was especially destructive for the engine, the nozzles and “cyclones” of the air cleaner were enveloped in combustion products, and this was the beginning of dust wear on the engine, and this is an accident! The drive of the supercharger and the supercharger blades failed. There were failures onboard gearboxes. Often let down the loading mechanism. Defects in the undercarriage were revealed: they could not withstand and wear out the last two support rollers to the edge of the guarantee period, internal rubber shock absorbers of the rollers, the caterpillar belt caused a lot of trouble. The plant accused us, troopers, of poor-quality assembly after disconnecting the tape (rivetting the flange of the wedge locking bolt of the track earring).
I will cite only one of the characteristic episodes. During the daily transition (240 km) of completely new tanks received from the factory, tracked belts disconnected on a frozen cobblestone road from 28 tanks to 19 on the march. This became known in the district. The training of a tank battalion with live firing from the march, without training, suddenly raised by alarm, was supervised by the 1-th Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District Colonel-General N. B. Abashin. He called me to the command post and sharply accused me of the lack of control of storage equipment and low demands. I swallowed the pill.
Upon returning to the regiment, we are with the head of the division's armored service, Lieutenant Colonel OB. Reasonable understood the reason and found: poor-quality track assembly at the factory. Officially summoned a representative to advertise from the factory (did not trust the representative of the MOP in the district). While the notification was being sent by mail, we checked the quality of the flange riveting on all the battle tanks of the division using a template made according to a drawing. All bolt heads with low-quality dent flange (template does not pass), we painted in red. The result was an ugly picture: from 360 bolts for fixing elements of the track (two earrings and a comb) did not match the drawing (pattern) from 40 to 90 on each track.
From the factory arrived a solid commission consisting of the deputy. the chief designer, the designer of the track, the head of the assembly line of the track, deputy. the head of the military acceptance and two more military representatives, a representative of the MOP in the district.
In the office they heard me, they checked our gauge with a radio meter, noted that it was made according to a drawing, but not in factory conditions. Then we asked to show the factory template, I examined it and directly to the forehead told them: “Your collectors of the track tape are criminally negligently failing to meet the assembly specifications and drawing requirements, and you all, including military representative, contribute to this. I will prove to you in the parks of combat vehicles in tanks. ” And proved! After visiting one regiment (39-th TP in Ovruch) they wanted to finish the work, but I insisted on checking in all the shelves to pay attention to the seriousness of the situation on the spot.
In the evening after the first day of work, the senior commissioner called the factory and ordered the assembly line of the tracks to be stopped until they returned (the conveyor stood for three days). For the plant it was a shock.
The complaint act was signed with a “special opinion”, referring to the fact that the template was made in an artisanal way and is not a basis for making claims. In a self-explanatory explanation, I proved my case with the drawings and photographs. My intention was to confirm the correctness of the troopers who precisely follow the instructions for use, not worse than the breeders understand the equipment and fight for its reliability.
And the point was that on the conveyor “crusher” the hard workers sharpened like a chisel, and not along the radius, as it should be according to the drawing and TU, and when pressing the flange of the bolt, there was no sharp pressing of the flange metal into the stopper milled groove earrings. After this “noise,” officers from GBTU and Kubinka came to the division, and the plant promptly began to improve the track.
A lot of stress experienced tankers from breaking the barrels of guns. Previously, for each torn barrel, officers paid from their own pockets, with a “cap around”. At one regimental teaching with live firing, four guns tore at once! This was a real shock. The commander of the 8 tank army, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Ivanovich, an excellent commander, a tanker-front-line soldier, stamped his feet in the analysis, accusing all officers of illiterate training of crews.
It came to me, zampotekha. "You, Golovkin, poorly teach driver mechanics, you are not specifically involved in driving tanks." I replied: "Comrade Commander, this is a constructive flaw, I will advertise." And he told me: “The tank was put into service by the state commission, and you, I found a smart one,“ declare ”. Sit down. " I still advertised the guns, and the claim was approved, I suggested the development of technology to replace the gun barrel without lifting and removing the tower. In the division of the state there was no crane that could raise a tower with a gun. And then, this is too laborious work. During my service as a divisional deputy engineer, I thus designed the technical act of 17 guns. The method of replacing the gun was subsequently introduced on all brands of new tanks.
Kharkov plant very carefully preserved its reputation. Under the pretext of the operational consideration of claims, in addition to the permanent representative of the Ministry of Defense Industry in the district, two or three representatives of the plant permanently lived in the division. In the ZGV, the plant kept its representatives in each army (there were five of them), and with the armored service of the group there were three more headed by a senior. Some followed the operation of tanks, collected all the seditions (by tank numbers!) And in the case of claims offered to make a deal (and sometimes intimidated) so as not to draw up an act. I dealt with such cases mercilessly and instilled in my subordinates: if we are guilty, we should answer us, if the plant is, let it be restored. After several serious clashes with a MOP representative in the district (V. Golovnin), I reported in writing to the deputy. Minister of Defense Industry Nezhluktow. At the end of the report I wrote: “The further stay of your representative comrade. V.A. I think that Golovnin in the district is not only inexpedient, but also dangerous in improving and increasing the reliability of military equipment. ” Soon his telegram was summoned to Moscow and removed from office.
In the fall of 1974 in the division, the profits of the deputy. General Designer, Major General Shomin, secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine for the defense industry (he forgot his last name) and another Tsekovsky worker. They heard the division commander, Colonel S.G. Yatsuk, deputy divisional commander, head of the political department and me. I reported on the technical condition of weapons and equipment (the main focus was on tanks), on training personnel, on reclamation work.
After my report, the secretary of the Central Committee concluded: “Your division is militant, has glorious military traditions, has good results in combat training, this is correct and good. You, Lieutenant Colonel, we will be expelled from the party for revising the quality of the production of military equipment, we will remove them from office. ” I replied to him: “Comrade Secretary of the Central Committee, you did not accept me into the party, you were not appointed to the post. I am guided and will be guided by the Instruction on advertising armored vehicles ".
They refused cooked dinner, did not stay overnight in Ovruch and left for obkom to Zhytomyr. The divisional officer was upset, but the head of the political department calmed him down: “We did everything right, and we will refill the dinner without them.”
As a result, following the results of mastering the T-64 tank in October 1975, I was awarded the most expensive award for me - the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. In the autumn of 1977 in the western theater of war, the USSR Minister of Defense conducted an operational-strategic command-and-staff exercise. The Marshal of the tank forces A.Kh. Babajanyan. I was then head of the armored service of the 13 Army. Marshal arrived at the TPU army, I met him and escorted him to the tent for listening. Before the hearing, he said: "Comrade Colonel, report to you briefly about yourself." I reported. He asks: “Did you aggressively fight the T-64А plant?” I replied that I had not fought, but had fulfilled my duties responsibly. He summed up - right, well done.
I will not speak particularly about the T-72 tank, much has already been written about it. It was created taking into account the shortcomings of the T-64A. The chief designer of the plant and its design bureau, together with the management of the plant, showed themselves to be talented and strong-willed people, highly responsible and infinitely loyal to the Motherland.
On the T-80 tank in June 1988, a technical conference was held in the Group of Forces on the basis of the 9 th TD (Riza) for two days. The initiator was the GBTU. The conference invited the head of the headquarters of the GBTU, Colonel-General A.A. Galkin with the heads of departments, General Designer N.S. Popov, director of the Leningrad and Omsk plants. The report was made by Commander-in-Chief of the Army General B.V. Snetkov. The officers also acted, mainly the link to the battalion, and, most importantly, the designers. Plant directors listened to the views of crew members - tank commanders, driver mechanics, gunners; they showed on the model of the turret of the tank what should be done for the convenience of working with the weapon and increasing the reliability. All the smallest details. Film, photo and video materials were widely represented at the conference.
A.A. Galkin and N.S. Popov praised the Group of Forces in the development of the T-80, its operation, increased reliability and further improvement. In general, the conference gave a positive assessment of the tank. Its unique maneuverability and speed were especially noted. On German roads, moving in a convoy (up to 10 cars), their speed sometimes exceeded 80 km / h (the “flying tank” overtaking cars on the western neighbors, which overtook cars on the highway, made an indelible impression). Turbine tank easily run in the winter of Western Europe. Its maintainability was assessed positively, as was the T-64A tank (replacement of a single power unit with a transmission and other elements).
But there were also significant shortcomings. When moving in a column, especially with other armored vehicles and vehicles, as is the case in a real situation, the average speed of the tank drops noticeably. It has a strong effect on the speed of movement and the dustiness of the air when staying in a column even in European conditions: the speed becomes even lower than that of the T-72. The T-80 was distinguished by high fuel consumption (approximately 1,5 times more than that of the T-72), insufficient auxiliary power plant power (work on parking), power plant resource, air cleaning level (the introduction of special valves complicates the control of the tank, and throttling the power installation leads to overheating). Ventilation of the fighting compartment during firing (as with the T-64A) is significantly worse than that of the T-72, where the spent and partially burned-out sheath is ejected from the tank.
Additional T-80 external fuel tanks are not connected to a common fuel line, like the T-72, which requires additional stopping time to transfer fuel from the external tanks to the tank's fuel system (and this time may not be in combat). More time and labor is needed to prepare the tank for underwater driving.
The maintenance and repair of the “eighty dozen” required an “aviation” approach and the presence of highly qualified, professionally trained personnel, and this, unfortunately, in the Western Group was at that time clearly not enough. Officers of all categories and specialties were taken to the Group of Forces — they sent the most worthy ones. But the Group was armed with T-64A, T-80, and in the internal districts such tanks entered a few divisions. Mostly tankers arrived with T-62, T-72, T-55, it was very difficult for them to learn T-64A or T-80, and they were forced to “tumble” in tankmen for half a year or more. But this is a matter of readiness. In the old days (1950-e - the beginning of 1960-s) tankers from regiments of heavy tanks, as a rule, were not transferred to medium tanks, and vice versa.
I will give one more episode. At the end of February 1987, Mr. Marshal VG Kulikov spent on the Western theater theater theater (he was still the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact) a large strategic command staff. After listening to me, he asked the question: “Comrade Golovkin, are you a tanker?” I answer: “Yes!” He told me: “Here is Marshal of the Losik armored troops and Chief Marshal of Tolubko’s artillery wrote a letter to the Central Committee and report that Soviet tank building is not going well , how to. What do you think? ”I answer:“ Comrade Marshal, allow me to express my opinion ”. - "I ask yours." “Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, while Losik, being the head of the Panzer Academy, was responsible for the design of tank design, he did not write. And now he is sitting in the country, playing cards and decided to remind himself to the Central Committee. Our tank building has chosen the right perspective, and each new tank is in no way inferior to modern NATO tanks. There is a drawback, our tanks have a small clearance of hatches, especially commander’s, tanks are made for boys ”.
During the Polish events 1980-ies. we called for tankers from the reserve for the deployment of two divisions in PriKVO. So, up to 30,% of the crew members who were called in could not get into the tank, did not crawl through the hatches. And there came the strong men of the first category of conscription (up to 35 years), the workers and peasants, and we were forced to replace them with “skinny”. This was the main design flaw of all three tanks: T-64, T-72 and T-80.
Kulikov asked also: “How do you rate T-80? Many accuse me of adopting this tank. ” “Comrade Marshal, a tank surpasses NATO tanks in its combat and technical characteristics. High fuel consumption is natural. The first, as they used to say in Russia, as you feed, so you go. The farmer fed his horse well — it ran well. The second is that commanders on T-80 need to be trained from college. The gas turbine engine has its own characteristics, it does not have an “idle”, it almost consumes fuel equally in motion and in place. Our tankers got used to the march — the column stopped, and everyone stood, threshing in place, and the tank commander (platoon commander) should be commanded: “Behind the scenes!”
Then I reported: “Comrade Marshal, before you approve the state act on the adoption of the T-80 tank for service, it was signed by hundreds of responsible, competent leaders, including the military. What you had to do was just to sign. ”
- Alexander Yakovlevich, what is your personal opinion about the so-called situation of the “three main tanks”?
- The Soviet tank building practically from its very beginning set itself the task of creating a reliable and easy-to-use and repair tank equipped with the most efficient weapons. This was confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period. T-44, T-54, T-55 tanks became the best base for creating the beautiful T-62 tank.
After the end of World War II, the world did not remain calm, then local wars with extensive use of conventional weapons arose at one point on the planet, then at another. Our tank designers have deeply studied, analyzed the results of military operations and solved the problem of shaping the appearance of the tank with combat characteristics that meet the most modern requirements. The first tank appeared T-64 (T-64A), then T-72 and almost simultaneously T-80.
All of them have almost identical performance characteristics, but have significant differences in design and layout. In service of the Soviet Army in 1970 — 1990-ies. they consisted almost simultaneously. And the trouble was not only in the impermissible luxury of holding in service three identical tanks that did not have (of course, except for the “stuffing” and the cannon) not a single bolt or nut, which greatly hampered their operation in the army. The problem was that around these tanks - I mean primarily T-64 and T-80 - a real battle unfolded, during which dissenters were simply removed from the path (dismissed, removed from work). State interests faded into the background, and clan interests, obtaining orders, gold stars, and titles of laureates of Lenin and State prizes came to the first.
Life itself has determined that the best main battle tank 1970 - 1990-ies. became the T-72 and its modifications, including the T-90 tank that originated directly from the Nizhny Tagil ancestor. This tank continued the continuity and best traditions of Uralvagonzavod and its tank design bureau. The troops easily switched to every new model of tanks of this outstanding team, be it T-54, T-55, T-62 or T-72 or their modifications. I personally loved these tanks. They, by the way, were widely demanded both in our country and abroad. "Seventy-twenties" were produced in our country and under a Soviet license in the countries of "people's democracy", in Yugoslavia, India, were supplied to many armies, took part in many military conflicts, including Africa and the Middle East. 30-year-old operating experience of the T-72 and testing of its reliability in various regions of the world have confirmed the correctness of the technical solutions incorporated in its design. In August, a monument to the legendary T-2004 tank was erected in Nizhny Tagil, 72.
As for his "competitors", I would still like to say a few kind words about them. The main battle tank T-64 of the Kharkov design bureau became the “firstborn”, opening a new generation of Soviet tanks. This is an outstanding tank that surpassed the best examples of NATO countries in terms of their weight and dimensions, power density, and logistic power. T-64 set the bar high for building T-72 and T-80 tanks. The first is always difficult. It was hard and the tank T-64 and its modifications. Its debugging was carried out for decades, but today it is a tank of another state, which in its new incarnation (T-84) has become a worthy rival to the domestic T-90 tank in the external market.
T-80 and its modifications stand out clearly against the general background of the main battle tanks with their speed and maneuverability characteristics. The T-80 is the world leader among gas turbine engine tanks. And I am sure that he has not yet said his last word in tank building and can successfully be used for special operations in the conditions of the North or countries with well-developed infrastructure, as in Western Europe.
- Alexander Yakovlevich, as the deputy for armament of the commander of the Turkestan IN, you took an active part in the Afghan war and directly in supporting the military operations of the 40 Army. What would you like to mention in terms of technical support in connection with these events? What, in your opinion, to a greater extent created problems in technical support and operation?
- Soviet troops entered Afghanistan using standard equipment of the Turkestan military district: they were T-54B, T-55, BMP-1, BTR-60PA tanks, ZIL-131, GAZ-66, and Ural-375 vehicles. With the development of the resource and combat losses, the equipment was replenished with new models: tanks T-62, BMP-2, BTR-70. All tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, "Shilki", MT-LB tractors, self-propelled artillery have proven themselves in the best way from beginning to end. They suffered a lot from the “Urals-375”, in the conditions of high mountains and heat they could not ensure the performance of combat missions. Transportation at all levels (battalion, regiment, division, army) improved with the arrival of KamAZ trucks.
The conditions for the operation of weapons and equipment were the most difficult and, if I may say so, “hellish” - during the day unbearable heat was more than 45 degrees, loess soil (fine dust), stony roads (as if specially sprinkled with rubble of different size), from which rubber bandages the track rollers wore out (“gnawed”) almost to the disk. Under the most difficult conditions, engines, air purifiers, engine system filters, and batteries worked. On each unit of weapons and equipment was a bottle (tank) with distilled water for topping up batteries in the tank during marches or combat operations. There was a constant shortage of distilled water for the battery industry. Established distillers (in mobile workshops) could not provide the need for this work and were short-lived. What kind of designs did not offer military Kulibins, but their functions were always carried out regularly!
We had to wash the filters and air purifiers in 2 — 3 times more often than envisaged by the instructions for use. In this work all mobile facilities and PTOR posts were involved.
In the post of deputy. on armament of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, I entered 1 on April 1982. After examining the situation in the 40 Army, I, together with the chiefs of the armament control services of the district, prepared a report to Colonel-General Yu.P. Maximov about the need to improve the base of maintenance and repair of equipment in the army. Attempts to create such a base have already been made, but sporadically.
The commander of the troops listened and approved, and said: “Now we cannot satisfy your needs in such a volume, but I will do everything possible.” And for each regiment, brigade, separate battalion, orvb division and army we needed CPM-10 (collapsible metal vaults on 10 parking spaces). In this CPM we equipped the PTOR regiment. Two parking spaces were fenced off with a wall under the battery room with all its sections. The condition of the batteries was, is and always will be the basis of the combat readiness of technology.
After my report, Maximov summoned Major-General K.A., deputy for the construction and quartering of district troops. Pogorelov and instructed him to study this issue and solve it as effectively as possible. After some time, Pogorelov calls me and says: "Alexander Yakovlevich, come to me." I intuitively understood why and almost ran. In the office, he hands me an outfit on the 15 sets of CPM, only he warned: from Termez and Kushka to the place - by self. For me it was a real reward.
For the installation of CPM, we undertook everything - from the district to the regiment. We made tight schedules for input, a service and repair base was created and grew in front of our eyes, and how much joy there was for repairmen and crews and drivers! Subsequently, on our initiative, the military project of the district developed a suspended crane beam on the 1,5 t, then the repairmen completely rejoiced.
In the 40 Army, we managed to create a complete, workable repair base. In the BTI warehouse of the district reloading base in Hairaton, I launched the 50 t bridge crane for reloading from trailers to the railway platform of equipment sent for major repairs. It was a holiday for all of us, and especially for the reloading team. Of course, in the technical support system of the 40 Army there were a lot of difficulties, some it makes sense to recall.
First, the staffing. The position of senior technicians of the company, batteries (tank, motorized rifle, other arms of the armed forces) was attended by ensigns who were far from equipment — former chiefs of warehouses, storage facilities, specialists from other branches of arms — chemists, signalmen, and others — would be only an ensign. But this is the main job position in the maintenance, repair and preparation of weapons and equipment for combat operations, training of personnel.
The abolition of the position of the deputy company technician (officer) caused irreparable damage to the tank forces, sharply decreased the level of technical and practical training of tank crews, infantry fighting vehicles in the maintenance and care of equipment, in the driving of combat vehicles. There was a catastrophic shortage of competent technical support specialists, the principle of succession of posts was interrupted.
The ensigns, appointed to the positions of senior technicians of the company, were masters of their work, but they had low technical literacy, they were performers, “home-grown craftsmen”, but with all their responsible attitude to the service they were not able to replace the officer who graduated (at that time) tank engineering school. We have repeatedly appealed to GOMU GSH with a request to introduce the position of a deputy engineer of a company - an officer - all to no avail.
Secondly, the supply of all material resources (from the pin and nut to the engines and other units, spare parts and materials) was carried by road transport, which was managed by the rear (regiment, division, army). There were no disruptions of supply, but disputes about who and what to export first of all sometimes arose.
Third, sending weapons and equipment to overhaul (as a rule, it is not on the move), especially tracked, was carried by a evacuation company on MAZ-543 trailers to Termez and Kushka. Loading on trailers, unloading and reloading onto railway platforms cost repairmen of great agony and effort.
We effectively used the excellent wheeled tractors MAZ-543, including them in the composition of the technical circuit of the columns. If roads allowed, tank tractors BTS-2 or BTS-4 were loaded onto their platform, if not - they were moving empty. We loaded the equipment damaged during the hostilities onto MAZs and carried them to the regiment or to the Orvb division.
I used this practice back in 23-th TD in exercises. For a long time I asked the weapons of mass destruction (organization) of the okrug to include three MAZ-543 trailers in the division's orvb state, asked for it and give it to me. Everything was explained by the fact that it was impossible to evacuate T-64 tanks with tank traces (one BTS-2 could not master, two is already a train, a whole epic!).
MAZs with tractors on the platform moved along improved roads parallel to the tank route, in case of impossibility (and sometimes inexpediency, the division must arrive in a given area by the full time to restore the tank in place of the trailer the shortest way out on the tank route, loaded the tank, BMP, SAU, etc. and went out again on his route to the area. There was no slip.
- You talked about the shortcomings of training personnel from among the conscripts to handle new equipment. Could you give examples of what this led to in practice?
- One such incident, which occurred in a peaceful environment, was related to my appointment to the post of deputy for armaments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western National Command in March 1988 (although I myself planned to continue serving in Belarus or Russia). At the beginning of that year, the next incident occurred. The mechanic-driver of the T-80 tank, during night driving, lost its course, lost orientation, lost control of the high-speed vehicle, jumped onto an international highway (West Germany — Berlin), climbed a steep embankment onto the railway track, and then the engine stalled. A poorly trained conscript soldier became confused, jumped out of the tank and ran away. As a result, the train collided with a tank, the railway accident had an international response. The commission to investigate the incident was headed by Minister of Defense Marshal Yazov. The review was attended by the Commander-in-Chief of the Headquarters of the Western Direction Marshal of the Soviet Union Ogarkov, I, as his deputy for armaments, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces, Army General Snetkov and his deputies. The training of tank mechanics and drivers was found to be unsatisfactory, and other shortcomings in the organization of the operation of ZGV tanks were noted. To the question of the Minister of Defense: "Who can bring order to the tank forces?" Marshal Ogarkov called my name.
Very much in these matters depends on the officer, the commander. In the service, say, I was irreconcilable to concealing faulty equipment, to restoring emergency and faulty machines without a detailed study of the reasons at the expense of the officers ’pocket“ with a cap around ”. You need to ask the commander, but you need to help him. I considered and consider it a shame for the regiment commander to restore defective machines in agricultural machinery or a collective farm. Accident accident discord. If the failure occurred due to the fault of incomplete and poor-quality maintenance, failure to comply with the output of the adjustment parameters, the use of fuels and lubricants not provided for by the lubrication card, you are guilty and pay. And if the connection of the pipelines is weakened, the gasket has struck, the driver has little practical experience, etc., what's the matter with the officers? Why should they pay? Try on the march at night, moving along the beaten tank routes, regularly monitor the instrument readings! Not every driver is capable of it. This is not a car, where appliances are always before your eyes.
I remember this case. The division marched to the exercise area. I follow the convoy on the BMP, the T-64A tank stands, I stop, I ask the driver (he was Uzbek): “What are you worth?” He answers: “Conchils diesel fuel.” "But the oil"? Answers: "And butter is more advanced than cumshot." Though stand, at least fall from such an answer.
- What are the essential features you would like to note in the technical support system of the Soviet Army? Do you think there are any positive changes in correcting the situation with technical support in the Russian Army?
- For my service in the troops, the technical support system was constantly developed and improved. The following factors should be noted:
- high-quality and in sufficient quantities trained engineers and technical staff. Two engineering-tank department of the Academy of Armored Forces. Two tank technical schools were transferred to the higher tank engineering schools. In Kazan, advanced training courses for tank officers;
- Improved repair units of the battalion, regiment, division;
- mobile repair and evacuation facilities (workshops, tank tractors, BREM repair and recovery vehicles) were modernized and increased in number;
- new plants for the overhaul of armored vehicles were expanded and built, the resource of overhauled vehicles was almost equal to the new models;
- junior repair technicians trained centrally (in the districts, the Center);
- good (with a reserve for the future) current supply of units, spare parts and materials for all types of weapons and equipment;
- carefully thought-out for completeness and convenient in transportation regimental (PC) and divisional (DK) repair kits for tanks, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers.
All this should be remembered if we want to revive our Armed Forces and return them to their former high combat readiness.
Of the recent reorganizations, I consider the decision to create three engineering faculties at the Academy of the Ground Forces of the Russian Army (rocket and artillery, tank and automobile) to be correct - these will be competent specialists and future heads of technical support of the Russian Army.
I would like to hope that the officers of the engineering and technical staff of all services and specialties will comply with their positions and continue the glorious traditions of veterans of the Great Patriotic War - not sparing the time and effort to teach subordinates to master the most reliable and best tanks in the world and other weapons in any setting.
The conversation led by Simon Fedoseev
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