High flying spies
A scattering of failures
On March XNUMX, in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, a local resident was detained for trying to transfer data about Russian military installations to Ukrainian intelligence.
“The detainee himself contacted via the Internet with a representative of the main intelligence department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in order to transfer information regarding military facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defense stationed in the Khabarovsk Territory,” the press service of the Russian FSB said. The detainee is suspected of treason, a criminal case has been initiated.
A week earlier, the FSB announced the arrest in Sevastopol of two agents of the Ukrainian special services who were collecting data on local military facilities. One of the detainees collected information about our military bases for the SBU and sent it by e-mail. The second confirmed his intentions of secret cooperation with the Foreign Intelligence Service, but did not have time to transfer the data.
On March XNUMX, in the Kherson region, law enforcement officers detained a citizen of Ukraine who was transmitting data to the SBU about the movement and location of Russian troops. He came under surveillance due to regular publications of extremist content on social networks. In particular, he sent to his acquaintances videos of the executions of Russian prisoners. Apparently, he enjoyed it and shared his joy with friends.
Detectives detained an "activist" 22 years old in one of the villages of the Novotroitsky district. It turned out that the spy forwarded information about the whereabouts of our troops to an acquaintance who "previously got in touch with him and promised money for information." For each message sent, the detainee was promised 300 hryvnia (about 600 rubles), but he was scammed - he did not receive a penny for "valuable" information. But now he gets a full term.
Such espionage passions have been boiling over in Russia and Ukraine lately, but it all started rather primitively.
Initiative is punishable
In March 2016, the FSB announced the arrest of a Ukrainian spy trained by the CIA. Then the Russian special services caught an employee of the counterintelligence department of the central apparatus of the SBU, Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Ivanchenko. He was going to become a "dummy" informant of the department.
Ivanchenko came to Russia under the pretext of visiting relatives (this despite the fact that Ukrainian special services are not allowed to travel to Russia). His role was conceived as an "initiator", that is, a defector, a traitor. But in serious intelligence services, as you know, defectors are not liked.
The risk of swallowing the “bait” is too great, and then the consequences will be severe. A lot of analytical work needs to be done to make sure of the sincerity of the intentions of the “initiator” (if he really decided to go over to the side of the enemy) or to split his legend, which, as a rule, is thought out to the smallest detail. In general, it is better and easier to split the “initiative” than to trust him, which they did not fail to do at Lubyanka.
Ivanchenko could have been sent to Russia by both the Ukrainians and their curators. If they were the first, it means that at that time they really had a low level of professionalism. Otherwise, they would have realized that the meticulous FSB men would crack the agent with the most impeccable legend. They have a lot of techniques in their assets - cross-examination, "good" and "evil" investigator, hypnosis, artificial induction into a state of trance, confrontations with dummy agents and "truth pills".
Perhaps Ivanchenko was launched to us by the Americans or the British. It is possible that they decided to simply sacrifice the lieutenant colonel of the SBU in order to make sure that the specialists in the FSB did not lose their uniform. We were convinced that Ivanchenko was cut by the court for nearly twenty.
And six months later, in November 2016, another high-ranking SBU officer was slammed in Crimea, this time Colonel Dmitry Shtyblikov. He was incorporated by the British into the Black Sea fleet Russian Federation back in 2014, immediately after the Crimean spring.
For two years he had been collecting information about the deployment and movement of our military units in Crimea, preparing a series of terrorist attacks. I transmitted all the information to Kyiv via the Internet. A special encryption program was developed for it. As a result, the Russian court soldered him fourteen years, two of his accomplices - a little less.
"Fox", aka "Baby" and the Britons
After that, a conflict broke out between the curators and the esbeushniks. Not only did the British at one time “take out” all the old cadres from the SBU, accusing them of working for the KGB (and jailed some), they didn’t really teach the new cadres how to work, they also handed over to the FSB an entire lieutenant colonel. And tomorrow, who will they start handing over - generals?
The conflict smoldered for several years and interfered with work. It had to be stopped, and at the same time to show the Ukrainian specialists their real place in such an intellectual business as intelligence. And the British conceived Operation Baby, which ended in a devastating fiasco. In principle, everything was conceived well.
The agent first had the operational pseudonym "Fox", who studied at the Warsaw Academy of Military Art, then collaborated with the Polish National Security Agency. The first tasks are the recruitment of students from Belarus and Ukraine who studied in Poland. In 2019, he was sent to Moscow, where he entered the Moscow State University at the Faculty of Political Science. Here he became "Baby".
The agent looked like a future political scientist and worked in the media sphere. The British planned to carry out a series of terrorist attacks against iconic Russian journalists and media people, and "Kid" played the role of a gunner in this operation. By the way, one of the first orders was for the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tsargrad group of companies, Konstantin Malofeev.
The attempted terrorist act nevertheless took place - exactly one year after the arrest of "Kid", in March 2023. Perhaps the British decided to show the FSB that they have long hands, and they just do not back down from their plans. Fortunately, the attack was thwarted.
All dots over "and"
After the failure of "Kid", the esbeshniks quietly rejoiced. The British had to urgently save their reputation. Therefore, undermining the Crimean bridge was conceived. It was a large-scale transnational action, which was attended by intelligence officers, residents and embassy workers from several countries at once.
She was preparing for six months, and in November 2022 the bridge was blown up. The SBU was depressed, but the sediment, as they say, remained. The British felt this, and in order to finally dot the “and”, it was decided to “drop” the Ukrainian specialists (from the English drop - lower) to the plinth.
Demonstrative action - the murder of the daughter of the philosopher Dugin. A special handwriting - a woman was invited as a performer - Natalya Vovk. Like, you even women think better than men. The attack took place, Vovk managed to hide in Estonia.
After that, the Britons decided to show mercy - to the "dropped" ones - they allowed them to take the initiative. Those have shown - since the beginning of this year, failures have gone one after another (they were listed above).
Instead of PS
Perhaps they all played a diverting role, covering up some big and resonant operation, which is now being hatched in the bowels of MI6 by the “knights of the cloak and dagger”. However, on the eve of the promised offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the British could drive away from sin.
Togo and look some "Caliber" will fly to their address. Nevertheless, our special services should not relax, and we must already prepare something resonant ourselves. It's high time - we've been waiting for a whole year.
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