The failure of the Timoshenko, Govorov and Meretskov offensive

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The failure of the Timoshenko, Govorov and Meretskov offensive
Red Army soldiers of the Leningrad Front are attacking near the wreckage of a downed German aircraft. 1943


Staraya Russian operation


The first stage of the Polar Star operation ended in failure: the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were unable to surround and destroy the Mginsk enemy grouping, and the armies of the North-Western Front - the Demyansk group of Germans (Operation North Star). Army Group North successfully withdrew the 16th Army from the Demyansk bridgehead and strengthened its defenses.



However, the Soviet command decided to continue the offensive, but with more modest goals (there was no longer any talk of defeating the entire Army Group North). The North-Western Front (NWF) Timoshenko was supposed to liberate Staraya Russa, creating conditions for the development of an offensive south of Lake Ilmen. The NWF included the 11th, 27th, 34th, 53rd, 68th and 1st shock armies. In total, more than 400 thousand people.

Timoshenko tried to break through the front of the enemy with a frontal attack. The offensive began on March 4, 1943. The 68th and 1st shock armies advanced on the left wing of the front, Trofimenko's 27th army on the right flank, advancing on Staraya Russa. The offensive of the NWF began without preparation. The situation in the Kharkov direction has changed, so Khozin's Special Group was disbanded on March 8. 1st tank Katukov's army was transferred to the south, handing it over to the Voronezh Front. NWF was left without strong mobile connections. Also, the offensive was carried out in extremely unfavorable weather conditions: an early thaw began, few roads became impassable, numerous rivers, rivers and swamps opened up. Therefore, the ski brigades were used as ordinary infantry.


The German command expected the Russians to go on the offensive in this direction. 12 liberated divisions of the German 16th Army became a serious reserve of the North group. The German defense was significantly condensed. Therefore, the divisions of Tolbukhin's 68th Army and Korotkov's 1st Shock Army had to attack the heavily fortified enemy defenses without preparation. The Germans built strongholds prepared for all-round defense, each height had pillboxes and bunkers, the area in front of them was covered with minefields and barbed wire. Also, the defense was saturated with firepower - cannons, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and machine guns.

The result was deplorable: in two weeks of fighting, Marshal Timoshenko lost every fourth soldier, the troops advanced only 10-15 km. It was possible to overcome only the first line of defense of the enemy along the Lovat River and liberate a dozen villages. The 27th Army reached the near approaches to Staraya Russa. On March 14, Timoshenko handed over the post of commander to Konev. The fronts did not give the marshal any more, transferring him to the representatives of the Headquarters until the end of the war.


Dogs of the sanitary service of the Red Army take out the wounded from the battlefield near Staraya Russa. 1943

On March 14, the 27th Army continued its attempts to break through to Russa, and the 68th Army tried to break through the defenses and bypass the enemy from the south. Frontal attacks by some infantry divisions predictably did not lead to success. Sitting in strong positions, the Germans repelled Soviet attacks. By March 19, our troops advanced another 5 km, reaching the next defensive line of the enemy on the Redya River. On March 20-21, the battles near Staraya Russa ended. The NWF went on the defensive. Local battles continued until the end of March.

The 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front (VF), which provided close support to the NWF, attacked in the area south of Novgorod on 14 March. Lacking sufficient forces and means, the divisions of the 52nd Army also did not achieve success and stopped the offensive on March 27.

The offensive failed. The main reasons: command errors, poor preparation and assessment of the situation. The NWF in the course of two operations eliminated the enemy's Demyansky bridgehead, but it did not succeed in defeating the enemy army and entering the operational space. Only a few tens of square kilometers of occupied forests and swamps were paid for with great losses. Therefore, the Germans called the withdrawal of the 16th Army from the Demyansk "bag" in the face of the many times superior Russian forces "fantastic achievement».


German ski battalion on the march in Staraya Russa. In the background is the Spaso-Preobrazhensky Monastery. 1943


German self-propelled guns StuG III Ausf. G on the street in Staraya Russa. 1943

Development of the Krasnobor operation


On February 27, 1943, the Stavka admitted that

"The operations carried out by the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts did not give the expected results."

The troops of the four armies (54th, 55th, 67th and 2nd shock) were ordered to temporarily stop the offensive and go on the defensive. The command of the fronts was supposed to present their views on the continuation of the operation.

As a result, it was decided that on March 14, the troops of the two fronts would resume the offensive with the same task - to encircle and destroy the Mginsk-Sinyavino grouping of the enemy of Army Group North. The 8th Army of the VF was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in the Voronovo-Lodva sector, intercept communications and go to the rear of the Mgin group. The 55th Army of the LF, advancing from the Krasny Bor area, liberate Ulyanovsk and Tosno, cut off the railway and highway communications in the Ulyanovka-Mga section with the development of an attack on Voitolovo, where it was supposed to connect with the troops of the 8th Army and create an encirclement ring. The 57th and 2nd shock armies in the Sinyavino direction temporarily went over to the defensive.

The troops of the two fronts failed to prepare for the offensive by March 14, including due to supply problems, and the start of the operation was postponed for 5 days. By this time, the NWF armies, having not achieved success and exhausted themselves, were already completing the operation. That is, the Germans could switch their attention to another direction.


On March 19, 1943, the 55th Army of Sviridov launched an offensive. In the first echelon there were 5 rifle divisions, 3 rifle and 3 tank brigades, in the second echelon - 4 rifle divisions and a guards tank brigade. On the German side, units of two German infantry, a Spanish division, SS troops, a company of "tigers" defended.

The troops of the 55th Army were able to break through the enemy defenses in a sector of 6-7 km, the advanced units advanced 8-10 km and reached the outskirts of Sablino and Ulyanovsk. Then the Germans transferred reinforcements - parts of three infantry divisions. The Nazis counterattacked and cut off our advanced forces. On March 26, our troops broke through the encirclement and advanced another 3 km. But this was the last success.

On March 25, the command of the Leningrad Front in Order No. 0077 "On shortcomings in command and control during the offensive operation of the 55th Army" gave an unsatisfactory assessment of the army:

"The Military Council of the Leningrad Front, evaluating the combat operations of the units included in the shock group of the 55th Army, considers them extremely unsatisfactory and the results achieved are insignificant."

The front command set the task "by all means capture the Sablino station and the village of Ulyanovka". Until the beginning of April, our troops attacked, but without success.


Double-armoured German bunker on the southern outskirts of Kolpino

Meretskov's failure


A similar situation was in the VF section. The 8th Army of Starikov had 5 rifle divisions, 4 tank regiments, all reinforcement artillery in the first echelon, 3 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades in the second. To the north of the breakthrough site, from Voronovo to Gaitolovo, the defense was held by one rifle division and one brigade. In front of the positions of the Soviet army, units of two German infantry divisions defended.

The offensive began with a powerful artillery preparation - 2 hours and 15 minutes. The army made a breach in a section 8 km wide, advanced 2-5 km. The mobile group (Guards Rifle Regiment and Tank Battalion) intercepted the railroad to Mgu, but was cut off by the enemy. The German command took retaliatory measures, deployed units of 3 infantry divisions to the dangerous sector. The Nazis continuously counterattacked, and the offensive bogged down.

On April 1, Meretskov led a rifle division and a brigade from the reserve into battle. They had to take a stronghold in Carbusel in order to create conditions for the development of the offensive of the entire army. However, enemy resistance intensified, the Germans transferred parts of two more divisions to this area. The enemy's defenses could not be broken. The offensive finally stalled.


Soviet heavy tank KV-1. Volkhov Front

Results


The representative of the Headquarters on the VF Voroshilov in his report to Stalin on April 1 noted that "both fronts did not fulfill the task assigned to them”and suffered heavy losses in people and equipment due to the fact that they were not well prepared for the operation. Six divisions of Govorov's front were drained of blood. The 55th Army has lost its offensive potential. Voroshilov proposed to give the troops a month to put themselves in order, accumulate ammunition, and teach reinforcements elementary actions in the offensive.

On April 2, 1943, the Soviet Headquarters instructed the troops of the LF and VF to go on the defensive. Thus, the second attempt to encircle the Mginsk-Sinyavino grouping of the enemy again ended in vain.

As a result, it was not possible to defeat Army Group North during the strategic operation North Star. The Germans had a strong defense and knew where the Russians would attack. They skillfully defended themselves and counterattacked, deploying reinforcements in time. The troops of Govorov and Meretskov were unable to crack the defenses, surround and destroy the Mginsko-Sinyavinskaya enemy grouping, providing a full-fledged connection between Leningrad and the country. Tymoshenko's troops were unable to surround and destroy the enemy's Demyansk grouping, creating favorable conditions for a further offensive.

There was a pause in the northern direction. Both sides waited out the mudslide, prepared for future battles, improved defenses and replenished supplies. Meretskov, assuring Stalin that the enemy was preparing an attack on Leningrad, asked for reinforcements and tanks to start a new offensive. The VF received reinforcements, but instead of tanks, it was ordered to strengthen the defense. VF switched to massive use aviation and artillery, since the industry has sharply increased production, and there were no problems with ammunition.


Commander of the Volkhov Front, General of the Army Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov


The commander of the German Army Group North, Field Marshal Georg von Küchler, awards the Knight's Cross to Sergeant Georg Straube in the Staraya Russa region. 1943
38 comments
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  1. -11
    27 March 2023 05: 16
    I really hope to see (and maybe participate) in a mirror situation. The expected spring-April offensive of the Ukrainians can largely be reduced to heaping and "take it at all costs." And the meat infantry assaults of the defense will be ineffective. Well, as folk wisdom says,
    Wait and see,
    Let's live - we'll find out
    We will survive - we will learn
  2. -1
    27 March 2023 07: 55
    This Tymoshenko should have been shot even after Kharkov
    1. -4
      27 March 2023 09: 41
      This Tymoshenko should have been shot even after Kharkov

      If they were shot for this, then we would be left without Zhukov, Rokossovsky and many others. The Kharkov catastrophe was inevitable, as well as the defeat of the Crimean Front.
      1. +11
        27 March 2023 10: 16
        What does it mean that the Kharkov catastrophe was inevitable, it was not necessary to send bravura reports to the headquarters about the situation at the front, then the operation would not have been started for nothing after the operation near Leningrad Timoshenko was forever removed from command of the fronts
      2. +13
        27 March 2023 10: 32
        The defeat of the Crimean Front should not have happened at all. There is pure bungling and stupidity of command.
      3. +7
        27 March 2023 12: 12
        First of all, a separate "thank you" to Khrushchev must be said for the Kharkov catastrophe, and Mekhlis for the Crimea. At that time, the commanders were under the strong influence of the so-called representatives of the Headquarters and members of the Military Council of the front. Everyone knows the result...
      4. +3
        28 March 2023 16: 26
        The lack of reliable communications, accurate intelligence, supply problems (logistics) and poor mobility, including reserves, were the Achilles' heel of the Red Army throughout the war ... Yes, and not much has changed since those times ..
        1. -1
          31 March 2023 10: 48
          Yes, a little has changed in anti-Russian propaganda since those times ...
    2. -1
      27 March 2023 17: 25
      And how many times did Konev have to be shot?
    3. +2
      28 March 2023 10: 25
      Quote: Ryaruav
      This Tymoshenko should have been shot even after Kharkov

      Together with Bagramyan. Which, for good, should have been shot in the fall of 1941. Along with the same Tymoshenko.
  3. +9
    27 March 2023 08: 48
    Everything that is written in the article is on Wikipedia, there is no author's own analysis. Rely on the memoirs of generals? There is nothing like leather.
    After the blockade is broken, it is incorrect to call the following operations a failure. The fault is not in the lack of proper training, but in the lack of the necessary resources, such as aviation, the farther from Leningrad, the harder it is to take off from airfields in the spring thaw. Therefore, ground attack aircraft played a significant role in the Iskra operation, which operated at low altitudes, hiding behind cloud cover. And as soon as the sky began to clear up and the German fighters no longer allowed our aviation to operate at full strength, and in practice there were very few of our aviation in these operations. In addition, continuous swamps, which did not freeze even in winter, did not allow the use of heavy equipment, and an offensive by one infantry was doomed to failure in advance, a more or less bunker became an insurmountable obstacle. We were not even able to finish off the encircled Demyansk grouping, due to the fact that we did not stop the air supply corridor. In the spring of 43rd, we not only operated unsuccessfully on the Leningrad and Northwestern fronts and with heavy losses, but also on the Western, and on the South = Western, we even left Kharkov, on the South the Novorossiysk landing operation ended in failure, during which the losses were comparable to these "failed" operations of the Leningrad and Northwestern fronts. Stop repeating the stereotyped assessments of unfortunate historians.
    We spent too much energy on the Battle of Stalingrad, it was necessary to restore the strength of the army, the industry was just entering a normal mode.
    1. +3
      27 March 2023 10: 26
      Tell the equestrian, if there was no strength, then why carry out failed operations, by the way, it reminds us of our time
      1. +4
        27 March 2023 10: 51
        Tell the equestrian, if there was no strength, then why carry out failed operations, by the way, it reminds us of our time


        And so that the crucian did not doze off ... It was impossible to leave the Wehrmacht alone, instead of preparing for the offensive, they repelled our attacks. Of course, it could have been more efficient, but there weren’t even shells in abundance, and especially there wasn’t enough aviation, and we didn’t use it especially effectively because of the wrong tactics, we studied for a long time. As a result of the spring of 43, a lot has changed in combat instructions . At this time, the Wehrmacht carried out only two successful operations, one was the evacuation of the Rzhev bridgehead by Model, since they realized that Rzhev would be the next Stalingrad, Konev and then Purkaev were removed for sleeping through the flight of the Germans. And Konev was sent to the North-Western Front in March, but for some reason the author did not mention him. Well, the operation to capture Kharkov by Manstein.
        1. 0
          27 March 2023 12: 18
          And so that the crucian does not doze off
          - it's not a dormant crucian, take the burden on your own so as not to die while walking. An elephant can only be eaten in pieces. We set too ambitious goals and overstrained ourselves ...
          1. +4
            27 March 2023 12: 38
            it's not a dormant crucian, take the burden on your own so as not to die while walking. An elephant can only be eaten in pieces. We set too ambitious goals and overstrained ourselves ...

            The fact of the matter is that this is not an elephant, but the same predator that will grow teeth if it is not disturbed ... and plans are often completely unrealistic. We completed the minimum program in the spring of 43, the Germans did not even try to launch a counteroffensive in order to restore the blockade of Leningrad.
      2. +6
        27 March 2023 11: 16
        Tell the equestrian, if there was no strength, then why carry out failed operations, by the way, it reminds us of our time

        I will add. Well, how can they be considered failures if the Germans were unable to block Leningrad again? If it were not for these "failed" operations, the Germans would definitely try to break through to Lake Ladoga again.
        1. +7
          27 March 2023 13: 13
          In the spring, the Germans were already preparing for the citadel operation and they did not have the strength to break through to Ladoga
          1. +4
            29 March 2023 00: 22
            Quote: Ryaruav
            they did not have the strength to break through to Ladoga

            This means that our offensive actions played a role, although at a high price, they did not allow the Germans to gather the forces necessary for this.
      3. 0
        25 August 2023 19: 34
        Yes, they were forces. Our superior to the Germans and manpower and equipment. But the command stupidly used it. Not everyone then learned how our "generals" to fight. The defense of Army Group North was not continuous. Consisted mainly of strongholds. , which ours stubbornly wanted to take head-on, instead of bypassing them, as they did later in 1944-45. As a result, they got stuck in these fruitless attacks, lost pace, time and, most importantly, people.
    2. +5
      27 March 2023 11: 27
      Believe Wikipedia, in matters of history?
      Strictly speaking, it is high time to do your own, like TSB but online and updated.
      1. 0
        27 March 2023 17: 45
        Quote: Hitriy Zhuk
        Believe Wikipedia, in matters of history?

        Wikipedia is based on Western sources and accuracy in assessing the actions of the Red Army cannot be expected from it.
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. +3
      28 March 2023 16: 30
      In 43, the Red Army Air Force was still weak and the advantage in it was on the side of the Germans. In a year, everything will change when most of the Luftwaffe migrates to the West .. Then on the eastern front there will be an air superiority ... DO NOT forget that the Germans had a cadet raid many times higher, respectively, and the quality ..
  4. 0
    27 March 2023 10: 11
    Timoshenko showed himself not at all brilliantly as a commander in the Winter War, huge losses during the frontal assault on the Mannerheim Line, but for this he was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union before the Second World War. Timoshenko was not awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union after the victory of the USSR in the Second World War for the victory in the Second World War, but for that he was awarded the Order of Victory among the Soviet marshals. The rarest order for Soviet marshals with the special status of the Winner! Some kind of military santa barbara. The civil santa-barbara with Timoshenko turns out that when his daughter, who had a rather unsplendid reputation, was taken away from the family of Stalin's son, nothing bad happened to this daughter or Timoshenko, on the part of Joseph Vissarionovich. But when Kapler, who had a completely unsplendid reputation, tried for the second time to take away the already adult daughter Svetlana from the Stalin family, then Stalin sent him to the camps a second time ... Well, why not Santa Barbara ...
    The commentary was written at the level, perhaps someone's memoirs of gossip, following the spirit of the article ...
    1. +4
      27 March 2023 12: 29
      But when Kapler, who had a completely unsplendid reputation, tried for the second time to take away his adult daughter Svetlana from the Stalin family, Stalin sent him to the camps a second time.
      There is nothing surprising in this, Stalin did not like Jews and did not want his grandchildren / granddaughters to be with Jewish blood.
      Therefore, he did not object to the marriage of Svetlana with the Russians, and strongly prevented relations with the Jews
  5. +5
    27 March 2023 15: 47
    The thing is that at the end of 1942 we had no superiority in forces (we had 6,2 million and the Germans had 6,1 million, the same applied to technology), we concentrated everything we could in the south, where we achieved large-scale victories, other areas (near Leningrad, Rzhev, etc.) served mainly to fetter the enemy. For the "Polar operation", simply, not enough forces were allocated. But on the other hand, in the south we destroyed the 6th Field and 4th Tank Army, inflicted heavy defeats on the 1st Tank and 17th Field, 2nd Field Armies. It is not superfluous to recall that the German armies, in terms of numbers, rather corresponded to our fronts. In addition, two Romanian armies, Italian and Hungarian, were defeated. The enemy was thrown back from the North Caucasus and Stalingrad, to Orel and Belgorod, and there was a moment when our tanks approached the Dnieper (in the spring of 1943). Then there was not enough strength to stay on the Dnieper ... The whole offensive was over. 1942 -beginning 1943 was based on the combat skills of our military leaders (it’s hard to win, and even so, without superiority in strength), the Germans advanced in 1941, having a total two-fold superiority in forces (2,68 million for us and 5.4 million for the Germans without a fleet) , and given that the troops in the app. districts, sometimes, were hundreds of kilometers from the border, then 4-5 times. And why not attack with such a balance of forces ...
    1. 0
      25 August 2023 19: 47
      after mobilization, by the end of 41 and the beginning of 42, there were more than 14 million in our army, and this gave us this superiority. As a result of the boilers near Kiev, Minsk, Kharkov and Vyazma, we only lost about 6 million prisoners and lost more than a dozen armies ..
  6. +2
    27 March 2023 16: 04
    Tymoshenko tried break through the front enemy with a frontal attack. The offensive began on March 4, 1943. The 68th and 1st shock armies advanced on the left wing of the front, Trofimenko's 27th army on the right flank, advancing on Staraya Russa.
    Samsonov in his repertoire - does not understand what he writes, if only there is more text. He has already written 1000 articles on the subject of the Second World War, but at the same time he does not know elementary concepts.

    Phrase "break through the front"A priori, it makes no sense. You can talk about a frontal strike when FORTIFIED POSITIONS (fortified area) break through with a frontal attack.
    Front this is never a fortified area at all, it is operational-strategic ASSOCIATION armed forces. That is a military group.
    They break through the front line, usually striking where it is most weakly fortified.
    And in this case, apparently, they did so, because (as the author himself writes) the offensive was carried out on two DIFFERENT sectors of the front, i.e. there can be no talk of any frontal impact here in principle.
  7. +5
    27 March 2023 16: 16
    The offensive of the NWF began without preparation.
    And how does the author imagine it?
    Like, officers are sitting at the headquarters of the NWF late in the evening, drinking, and then Timoshenko suddenly gets up and says: "That's it, men, it's good to sit on the defensive, tomorrow morning we will go on a decisive offensive with the whole front, for which I propose to drink!"
    This is where it started... Yes
    Apparently this is how Samsonov imagines the course of events.

    As far as I know, this offensive was the implementation of the second stage of the Polar Star operation. Therefore, his preparation must have been present, at least in the form of drawing up a simple plan for an offensive operation of 30 sheets with several sets of maps. And with the transfer of troops and the supply of ammunition in accordance with the plan (this is at least).

    The author's article is good because it can be edited indefinitely laughing
  8. +4
    27 March 2023 16: 25
    On March 14, the 27th Army continued its attempts to break through to Russa, and the 68th Army tried to break through the defenses and bypass the enemy from the south. Frontal attacks alone infantry divisions predictably did not lead to success.
    there were no infantry divisions in the Red Army, there were rifle divisions.
    Although the fact that the author stopped calling the Red Army the Russian army is already a huge progress in his work laughing

    I did not read further his hack
    1. 0
      April 1 2023 04: 56
      It's about the essence. There are infantry, tanks, artillery, etc. You can invent different names for infantry - rifle, archery, infantry - this does not stop it from being infantry.
  9. +3
    28 March 2023 10: 30
    Quote: faiver
    and for the Crimea Mekhlis. At that time, the commanders were under the strong influence of the so-called representatives of the Headquarters and members of the Military Council of the front.

    If the front commander really wants to command the front, then no member of the Military Council will interfere with him. On the contrary, such a front commander will find a way to use the activity of a member of the Military Council for the good of the front. But those front commanders who are afraid to make independent decisions, who themselves strive to get under the hem of their members of the military councils - yes, they certainly achieve the position they wanted to achieve. With all the ensuing negative consequences.
    1. +3
      28 March 2023 17: 11
      On one of the programs, the Way to Victory, the role of Mehlis in the defensive operation to protect the Crimea was discussed.
      Isaev expressed the opinion that on the basis of archival documents, one gets the impression that the activities of Mekhlis were more likely to benefit than harm.
      At least using direct access to Stalin, he ensured the supply of a large number of weapons to the army. And he smashed the army commanders mainly on business, and not because of his "bloodthirstiness"
      Well, of course, after the war, in their memoirs, they blamed everything on Mehlis, including their miscalculations
    2. +1
      April 1 2023 04: 59
      Mehlis was personally a brave man, not a coward. Fanatic somewhere. A good administrator - otherwise he would not have been Stalin's secretary for "dark" affairs, people's commissar of people's control - personal intelligence, etc. If he were in Sevastopol - you see, the command would shamefully not have fled, abandoning the troops and withdrawing all the commanders from the units, gathering them in a crowd at Chersonese.
      1. 0
        25 August 2023 20: 22
        [quote If he were in Sevastopol - you see, the command would shamefully not run away, abandoning the troops and removing all commanders from the units] [/ quote]
        So the command would not have had to shamefully flee from Sevastopol if this mekhlis with the commander of the Crimean army had normally organized the defense of the Crimean isthmus and had not let the manstein into the Crimea. And then they missed the opportunity to surround him there and defeat him. All for this they had a significant advantage in technology and people. They had a whole brigade of tanks, including heavy KV-1s. But they managed not to take advantage of this and lose everything and quit. Manstein himself in his memoirs was surprised how he managed to win in such a hopeless situation for him. After all, compared to our army, he had a handful of T-2: 3 light tanks and about a dozen self-propelled guns, though with strong aviation support.
  10. +5
    28 March 2023 10: 56
    Quote: Konnick
    In addition, continuous swamps, which did not freeze even in winter, did not allow the use of heavy equipment, and an offensive by one infantry was doomed to failure in advance, a more or less bunker became an insurmountable obstacle.
    Strange. But the operation "Bagration" next year, solid Belarusian swamps did not interfere. They even helped. In addition, the Germans had to somehow deliver food, ammunition, rotate to each of their more or less bunkers ... And this is all through solid swamps.
    Quote: Konnick
    The fault is not in the lack of proper training, but in the lack of the necessary resources, such as aviation, the farther from Leningrad, the harder it is to take off from airfields in the spring thaw. Therefore, ground attack aircraft played a significant role in the Iskra operation, which operated at low altitudes, hiding behind cloud cover. And as soon as the sky began to clear up and the German fighters no longer allowed our aviation to operate at full strength,.
    Interestingly, what, the spring thaw prevented only our aircraft from taking off? Did the spring thaw fundamentally bypass the German field airfields?
    Quote: Konnick
    and in practice there were very few of our aviation in these operations

    Our aviation was not enough ??? And whose aviation was a lot? Maybe the Germans had a lot of aircraft? In January 1943, the Volkhov Front was supported by the 14th Air Army, including during the strategic operation to break the blockade of Leningrad - Operation Iskra.
    From the memoirs of the commander, Hero of the Soviet Union I.P. Zhuravleva:
    “The 2nd Fighter Air Corps (commander - General A.S. Blagoveshchensky) and the 232nd Aviation Division (commander - Colonel A.G. Valkov) arrived from the Stavka reserve to strengthen the army by the beginning of the operation, and on January 29 the 1st bomber air corps commanded by Lieutenant General V.A. Sudetsa. In total, the 14th Air Army had 429 aircraft, including 35 bombers, 174 attack aircraft, 163 fighters, 23 reconnaissance and spotter, and 24 night light bombers. The enemy had about 200 aircraft, incl. The advantage in strength was on our side. We had to conduct reconnaissance, support the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, prevent the transfer of enemy reserves to the breakthrough area and reliably cover the strike force of troops ... In the operation, the pilots of our army provided great assistance to the troops of the front. More than 1700 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy's head, up to 11 rockets and more than 220 cannon shells were fired. In air battles, 90 enemy aircraft were shot down. A total of 3640 combat sorties were made.
  11. +3
    28 March 2023 18: 22
    Despite the ambiguity of the results, these battles have a huge positive effect - not a single German division from Army Group North went to the southern flag of the German Eastern Front. Although Manstein bombarded the headquarters of the Wehrmacht with requests for this. Of course, in the end, Manstein managed to carry out a counteroffensive in the Donbass and near Kharkov, but 5-7 fairly full-blooded divisions from Army Group North could have provided him much better results.
  12. 0
    30 March 2023 12: 49
    ABOUT! Another hack from Samsonov drove up, where from useful information only dates and places of events. There is no analysis of operations on the scale of the entire war, some kind of utter confusion in concepts, there is a frankly one-sided assessment of both the decisions of commanders and the results of battles ... In general, apparently, the main thing is to give a louder title with the word "Failure", and then it's all the same will read.
  13. 0
    22 May 2023 22: 09
    Equation to current events that are not war. They just didn't warm up.