The nature of the SWO needs to be fundamentally changed
A lot of questions arise about the possibility of a spring offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Almost after every publication related to the prospects of the spring campaign, quite logical questions come up: will we be able or not able to hold our positions, will we push back and go forward, or will we retreat to previously prepared positions for regrouping and preparing a retaliatory strike?
There are many questions, but the meaning is always the same. People are worried about the fate of loved ones, the fate of the army, the fate of the state. Yes exactly. This is not my idea. The Supreme is talking about it! He speaks almost constantly. The fate of our country is at stake! We are against the global West.
Don't underestimate your enemy! Analyzing those deliveries announced by Western countries, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion that the war of the 1914 model is ending. Sitting in the trenches in the hope that “the Ukrainians will soon run out” will no longer work.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine are moving, will be moving, to the war of 1941-1942. Not trench warfare, where artillery plays the main role, but maneuverable, high-speed, with the rapid capture of territories, with boilers, with the destruction of large units and formations ... It is for waging such a war that Tanks and BBM.
Is it possible today? I think so. A simple example. I recently mentioned the transfer of heavy weapons, tanks and AFVs to the Artemovsk area. Transfer to the area where the musicians operate. Or at the junctions where the PMC comes into contact with other units.
If all this is true, would the assault units be able to withstand the impact of such an armored fist? Without enough PTS, without new artillery systems, without enough personnel? Will the "seam" between the units with different subordination burst?
Yes, the musicians are motivated, well equipped for their work. But you can't argue against tanks with a machine gun or a machine gun. And what about the state of artillery, like other equipment, at Wagner after work of such intensity? What will we get as a result? The maneuver groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will work not only "on the forehead", but also along the flanks.
In the end, they will find a "hole". And then the classics - a tank wedge, a cut in the defense and either a cauldron, or the retreat of our units. Practically what was already a year ago... How many personnel, equipment, ammunition, weapons we then lost... Until now, Ukrainian media show Russian tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, "Orlans" and other things that are fighting against us today.
This is the situation almost everywhere today. We have equipped echeloned defense. We have installed engineering structures in areas where there is a danger of tanks. Equipped, as far as possible, the defenders with means of combating enemy armored vehicles.
In theory this will help. In practice, Ukrainians today have the ability to quickly maneuver, quickly change the direction of strikes. Alas, the problem with communication, which has been repeatedly voiced, the problem of creating communication networks “from headquarters to a soldier and back”, has not been solved globally. And the APU has it.
It is strange to me that we are still trying in every possible way to “calm the people down”. "What's going on at the front? “Nothing, they are fighting little by little ...” Alas, this is the leitmotif of many publications and speeches today. Why is this necessary? Well, at least billboards appeared in the cities with the names of fellow countrymen.
We will not understand in any way the repeatedly repeated phrase of the most competent military experts, both here and in the West, that the next six months or a little more will be decisive. Both for us and for Kyiv. And decisive not only in military terms.
Can the risk of attack be eliminated or reduced?
The question is interesting, but requires a little adjustment. I think it should sound like this, we understand that a positional war, all these assaults on strongholds, small settlements, even cities like Artemovsk, is a strategic dead end?
We take another opornik, and then the next, then another ... We lose personnel, the enemy loses, but in the end there is no victory and never will be. We are losing trained and fired upon pros, exchanging them for hastily trained and unsuitable for combat Teroboronets of Ukraine.
It turns out some kind of strange "game". We storm the opornik, the enemy flees or surrenders, but immediately begins to fly in. Positions were shot by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. And even if not shot, ground surveillance cameras, Drones and other reconnaissance means perfectly correct the fire of Ukrainian artillery.
And how many videos are online now about our tankers, who have turned into heavily armored artillery. T-90 firing from closed positions. Undoubtedly, this is a great help to the infantry, but the tank must fight there, along with the infantry. Destroy bunkers, the positions of machine gunners, snipers, grenade launchers ... And instead of it there is a "motor league" with an anti-aircraft gun on the armor.
The practice of recent months, especially the assault on Artemovsk, has shown that it is necessary to move on to maneuver warfare. Destroying boilers is easier than knocking out the enemy from each settlement. the same Aviation can be used to the full, and not as it is now. Heavy bombs quickly bring to life any warrior.
True, the question arises of preserving the infrastructure of cities and towns. But, I think, the footage of the same Artemovsk perfectly illustrates what happens during a “sparing assault”, as footage from Mariupol previously showed. Vesushniks, without hesitation, use houses and roofs of high-rise buildings to equip positions. They hide tanks in residential areas. And you don’t have to knock them out of there with jewelry accuracy.
It is important to understand that Kyiv will have the audacity to attack the territory of the Russian border regions. It is not for nothing that DRGs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have become more active. It is clear that they will not achieve serious success there, but even the very fact that they were able to occupy some kilometers of Russian territory there will seriously raise Zelensky's rating. This means that it is necessary to bring troops closer to the border that can repel the attack.
There is another nuance that can significantly weaken the offensive impulse of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is the creation of mobile military formations. Any offensive stretches the communications of the attackers and weakens the flanks. In order for the offensive to be suspended or even stopped, it is enough to "squeeze with pincers" these very flanks.
This is what these mobile units are intended for, or better parts. Theoretically, this function can be performed by the Airborne Forces or the Airborne Forces, in practice, these units, in conditions of saturation of the bridgehead with heavy weapons, are doomed to defeat. The very case when another scrap is required against scrap.
I understand that in the face of a shortage of heavy equipment, it is difficult to create such groups, but why not use the existing reserves of units and formations, reinforcing them with tank platoons, artillery and PTS. Let them not rush to plug holes in the defense, but hit where there are weak points.
Instead of conclusions
The scenario I described is radical in many ways. I am sure that something of what I wrote about is already being done, or the command has found a better solution. However, there is no “too much” in warfare. You need to know the current state of the enemy troops. You need to be able to think like an opponent and anticipate his decisions.
In principle, I did not set myself the goal of describing the only correct solution for our military generals and officers. Moreover, I am sure that those who are right now in the NVO zone will find a lot of shortcomings and understatements. This is understandable already because only in the box are the tin soldiers the same. In life, each unit or each part is the only and unique military formation.
My goal is much less ambitious. Show the difficulty of the upcoming campaign.
I am far from thinking that this campaign will be lost. On the contrary, I think that it is quite difficult to lose it. In particular, I think that the liberation of Artemovsk will cause a domino effect, it will be easier later on. The defense will begin to crumble. And we will drive the APU far enough and for a long time. You just need to take…
And the results of the latest UAV and missile strikes are impressive. We obviously stopped accumulating information and moved on to its implementation. I think that, if necessary, we may well deliver a blow that will put the offensive itself into serious question or significantly reduce its power.
I noticed how the rhetoric has changed in relation to our units. How the words “mobiki” disappeared in the reports. How respectful now the word "Barca" sounds. How they stopped mentioning the past of volunteer musicians. Even such a thing as the National Guard has changed.
With what respect did one of the Bars, a fighter from those who first came to the defense of Donbass in 2014, speak about the National Guard:
“We were pressed so that there were only two options. Retreat or die. Suddenly, three "Urals" of the National Guard appeared. No heavy weapons. I carry everything with me. For some minutes, the commanders put everyone in their places. Snipers and machine gunners were located where they needed to be. The crests were driven away. Masters!
How great our elite units - paratroopers and marines - showed themselves. How often I read presidential decrees on conferring the high rank of "Guards" to our units and formations. If the first such decrees were surprising, today they are just reports of another truly heroic military formation.
It is impossible to win a trench war. Especially when economically powerful states are fighting against you. It is necessary to attack. Just as our grandfathers once began near Moscow, so we must begin near Artemovsk...
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