Who is Prince Andrei Kurbsky?
To get an idea about him, you need to remember General Vlasov, who, having fallen into Hitler's captivity, led the so-called "Russian Liberation Army" against the USSR. Kurbsky did not fall into captivity, but voluntarily got in touch with the Polish king Sigismund II, with whom Muscovy was at war, and gave out military secrets for a year and a half; betrayed the governor of the castle, Helmet, and thwarted the bloodless surrender of the fortress; issued a plan for the movement of the 20th army, helped to defeat it.
This produced the effect of an exploding bomb. The traitor personally led the Polish army, helped bypass patrols on the border and attack, gave out secrets about the weak points of the Russian army. Tens of thousands of deaths are on his conscience. It was his lie that formed the basis of the myth of the tyrant Grozny. Let's take a closer look at his actions.
Betrayal of Prince Kurbsky No. 1
In 1562, he was entrusted with an army of fifteen thousand people. Kurbsky received an order to go against the Lithuanian troops. But he suffered a crushing defeat from an enemy army numbering four thousand people. And I note that he was not executed and persecuted.
On the contrary, a year later he was appointed governor-viceroy in Derpt (Yuriev), where under his command there was a 100-strong army. Here is how this event is described by the Polish historian Valiszewski:
“Previously, Prince Kurbsky fought in Livonia at the head of the tsarist troops and won victories. But in 1562 he was defeated near Nevel. Perhaps this failure was prepared by some suspicious relations between him and Poland. Since then, the former favorite of Ivan has already fallen halfway into the royal disgrace, which contributed to the fact that he rebelled against the despotic habits of the Moscow sovereign. Finally, in 1564, the irritable and tough boyar openly rebelled against Ivan and showed it in a completely Moscow way - he fled outside the borders of his state.
If Kurbsky had fallen under suspicion, then he would not have been entrusted with a 100-strong army.
Betrayal #2
Kurbsky's betrayal number two also happened during the Livonian War.
Count Arts was the governor of the Helmet castle, which was attacked by Russian troops. Arts offered Kurbsky to surrender the castle without a fight. The terms of the agreement were not only agreed upon, but even signed and sealed. Count Arts was betrayed to the Lithuanian authorities, arrested and wheeled.
From the annals of the chronicler Franz Nieshtadt, it follows that Kurbsky himself surrendered the Swedish governor of Livonia. Thus, Kurbsky prevented the bloodless surrender of the castle. Being the viceroy of Livonia from the Russian side, "without sparing his belly" he gave out military secrets, plans for the Russian army for a year and a half. He fled because he was afraid that they would soon come upon him.
Betrayal of Kurbsky No. 3
At first, the Livonian War developed successfully for the Muscovite state. Pal Polotsk. If we draw a parallel with the battles of the Great Patriotic War, then it was akin to the fact that Prussia fell. At the end of 1563, a large Polish-Lithuanian embassy arrived. The Lithuanians refused to recognize both the loss of Polotsk and the cession of land up to the Dvina.
The king expected such an outcome of the negotiations and was ready for it. Moreover, he personally developed a plan to capture two large cities - Minsk and Novgorodok-Litovsk (Novgorodok). After the departure of the delegation of negotiators, hostilities continued. According to the plan of Grozny, the army of Peter Shuisky set out from Polotsk, and the army of the Serebryany-Obolensky princes from Vyazma. They were given the task of uniting and taking these two cities - Minsk and Novgorodok-Litovsky.
Under the command of Shuisky there was a 20th corps. On January 28, 1564, the troops of the Lithuanian hetman Radziwill, having reliable information about the route of movement of troops, organized an ambush and unexpectedly attacked the governor's headquarters. 200 people from the army command were killed, including Commander-in-Chief Shuisky. The warriors, as the soldiers were then called, having lost control and management, fled back to Polotsk, without putting up resistance to the few attackers. This event is included in history like the battle of Ula.
Someone might think that the losses were not so great and not fatal: out of 20 thousand, 200 people from among the governors died. And it was not only the command staff, but the event had the effect of an exploding bomb. The Poles and Lithuanians cheered up, they realized that the Russian army could be defeated.
In addition, this worsened the military situation, because the Crimean Khan refused an alliance with the Muscovite state. This betrayal nullified all diplomatic efforts in negotiations with Devlet Giray.
As Skrynnikov writes:
“Having received news of Moscow's military failures, the Crimean Khan did not approve an alliance treaty with Russia and entered into an alliance with the king (of Poland). The anti-Russian coalition took joint action against Moscow already in the autumn of 1564" [2].
This meant not only inspiring enemies with military successes, but also Grozny's war on two fronts.
The event near Ula became known in Moscow a couple of days later. Historian Ruslan Skrynnikov claims that it was Kurbsky who "had a hand" in the defeat of Shuisky's army, informing in his letter to Hetman Radziwill the route plan, stopping places, details and its weak spots. It turned out that the army of Peter Shuisky was not riding in combat gear, but was carrying armor in a sledge, confident that there were no opponents nearby.
In addition, the tsar realized that there were traitors in his inner circle, since he personally developed the plan, members of the Boyar Duma claimed. Suspicion fell on two other people - Repnin and Kashin. They fell under suspicion not because of their negligent service, but because they abandoned their own people and did not go to their rescue.
Prince's Betrayal #4
As Mazurov writes,
“Arriving in Lithuania, Kurbsky immediately declared that he considered it his duty to bring to the attention of the king about the “intrigues of Moscow”, which should be “immediately stopped.” He gave the Lithuanians all the Livonian supporters of Moscow, with whom he himself negotiated, and Moscow agents in Poland, Lithuania and Sweden, as well as all action plans, locations of Russian troops, their number and composition, supply routes, information about the defense infrastructure of Russia: about fortresses, outposts, etc. As a result of Kurbsky’s information, the Poles managed to win several victories over the Russian troops” [3].
Comments are superfluous.
Betrayal of Kurbsky No. 5
This scoundrel not only betrayed the military secrets of his country, but also gave advice on how to set other states against her, to draw her into a war on several fronts. In the archives of Latvia, the historian Skrynnikov found this evidence:
“On the advice of Kurbsky, the king set the Crimean Tatars against Russia, then, having sent his troops to Polotsk, Kurbsky participated in the Lithuanian invasion. A few months later, with a detachment of Lithuanians, he crossed the Russian borders for the second time. As evidenced by newly found archival documents, the prince, thanks to his good knowledge of the area, managed to surround the Russian corps, drove it into a swamp and defeated it.
An easy victory turned the boyar's head. He persistently asked the king to give him an army of 30, with the help of which he intended to capture Moscow.
If there are still some suspicions about him, Kurbsky declared, he agrees to be chained to a cart during the campaign, surrounded in front and behind by archers with loaded guns, so that they would immediately shoot him if they notice intention in him; on this cart, surrounded by horsemen for greater intimidation, he will ride in front, lead, direct the army and lead it to the goal (to Moscow), even if the army follows him” [4].
An easy victory turned the boyar's head. He persistently asked the king to give him an army of 30, with the help of which he intended to capture Moscow.
If there are still some suspicions about him, Kurbsky declared, he agrees to be chained to a cart during the campaign, surrounded in front and behind by archers with loaded guns, so that they would immediately shoot him if they notice intention in him; on this cart, surrounded by horsemen for greater intimidation, he will ride in front, lead, direct the army and lead it to the goal (to Moscow), even if the army follows him” [4].
V. Kalugin quotes the Polish historian and heraldist of the XNUMXth century Simon Okolsky about Kurbsky:
“He was a truly great man: firstly, great in his origin, for he was in common with Prince John of Moscow;
secondly, great in position, as he was the highest military leader in Muscovy;
thirdly, great in valor, because he won so many victories;
fourthly, great in his happy fate: after all, he, an exile and a fugitive, was received with such honors by King Augustus.
He also possessed a great mind, for in a short time, already in his advanced years, he learned the Latin language in the kingdom, with which he was previously unfamiliar.
secondly, great in position, as he was the highest military leader in Muscovy;
thirdly, great in valor, because he won so many victories;
fourthly, great in his happy fate: after all, he, an exile and a fugitive, was received with such honors by King Augustus.
He also possessed a great mind, for in a short time, already in his advanced years, he learned the Latin language in the kingdom, with which he was previously unfamiliar.
The fugitive traitor was from the Yaroslavl princes - the Russian princely family of the Rurik dynasty. According to the history of the family, they received a surname from the village of Kurba (in the Middle Ages, the term “votchestvo” was used on behalf of the estate or inheritance, which was disposed of by the feudal lord by inheritance received from his father).
Prince Kurbsky believed that he had more rights to the Russian throne, because he was a descendant of Rurik in the senior line, and Ivan IV in the junior line. Maybe that's why he is very "hard" and worked on the "field of betrayal"?
For these numerous betrayals, he was awarded by the Polish king. In the possession of the prince for the “righteous works”, which he did tirelessly with a bloody sword and pen, he received the city of Kovel with a castle, ten villages, in Lithuania he received 4 thousand acres of land and 28 villages in Volyn. By the way, Grozny let his wife and son go to Kurbsky, but the presence of a Russian wife did not prevent him from marrying twice, but already to the Poles.
V. A. Mazurov writes:
"Kurbsky is guilty of the death of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers and residents" [6],
at the same time they praise him, try to justify him.
During the 37 years of his reign, Grozny approved the execution of up to 5 people! They were investigated. Among those sentenced to death are foreign spies, traitors, arsonists, murderers and other criminals, that is, persons who have committed serious crimes.
Historians' estimates
Historians assess the significance of Kurbsky as a commander in different ways.
The first group claims that in the historical chronicle of those times there is not a single material left that shows Kurbsky as an intelligent governor, that he never even came close to the steps of the elite of the military hierarchy.
The second claims that he was the best combat commander.
The third point of view is that the feat of the other Kurbskys was mistakenly attributed to Andrei Kurbsky. Roman and Mikhail Kurbsky, who were killed near Kazan, fought in the army. Andrey Kurbsky "became famous" for his robberies, but he got into the chronicles as a "hero".
But all groups of historians are unanimous that Kurbsky fled to the West to the enemy, but differ in their assessments of this escape.
The side of historians who hate Grozny stubbornly proves that Kurbsky fled because of the unreasonable disgrace that threatened him from the tsar, and the execution that could inevitably follow this. As an example, I will quote from Skrynnikov’s book with my own comments: “The term of the prince’s annual service in Yuryev expired on April 3, 1564.
However, he remained there for another three weeks, apparently due to a special order from Moscow. Yuryev was remembered by everyone as the place of disgrace and death of Adashev (from alcoholism - commentary of the ShAA), so the delay did not bode well for Kurbsky.
At the end of April 1564, the disgraced boyar fled from Yuriev to the Lithuanian borders. Late at night, faithful servants helped Kurbsky get over the fortress wall. In a safe shelter, 12 accomplices were already waiting for him - the children of the boyars. The detachment managed to elude the chase and cross the border (they knew the road perfectly and in exactly the same way they could bring enemy troops to their homeland, which Kurbsky would later do - SHA comment). In Yuryev, the voivode left his wife and newborn son (according to other sources, the boy was 9 years old - comment by ShA).
Judging by the subsequent correspondence, he did not have time to take with him almost nothing of his property, even military armor and books, which he valued very much (he allegedly took money on credit in the monastery, in addition, he took a large sum of money with him, left with 12 bags - comment SHA.) The reason for the extreme haste was the sudden news received from Moscow (the execution of Repnin and Kashin due to suspicion of betrayal - SHA comment).
Once in Wolmar, Kurbsky wrote a letter to the tsar, in which he explained the flight abroad by tsarist persecutions (Grozny did not suspect him of anything - comment by the ShAA).
The second group of historians list the betrayals and atrocities of the prince, but for all this they remain admirers of Kurbsky. Historians-admirers of Kurbsky, justifying the escape by the demand of Christianity, for one who does not save his life by flight in case of a threat to his life, is like a suicide. Here is what Kobrin writes:
“Let's not rush to condemn the one who did not want to put his neck under the executioner's ax, but preferred to loudly tell the truth about the tyrant. But let's not rush into something else: we shouldn't turn a runaway boyar into an angel.
A few months will pass and Kurbsky will lead the Lithuanian troops in a campaign against Rus'. But, I repeat, the flight itself was not treason. Yes, and the concept of loyalty then was different: they served not the country, but the sovereign. Having come into conflict with Grozny, Kurbsky, naturally, waged war against him” [7].
A few months will pass and Kurbsky will lead the Lithuanian troops in a campaign against Rus'. But, I repeat, the flight itself was not treason. Yes, and the concept of loyalty then was different: they served not the country, but the sovereign. Having come into conflict with Grozny, Kurbsky, naturally, waged war against him” [7].
From Skrynnikov:
“For the first time, he (Kurbsky) had the opportunity to openly, without fear of persecution, criticize the actions of the sovereign ruler of Russia, and at the same time justify his betrayal and departure to Lithuania” [8].
I consider it strange the interpretation of historians-critics of Grozny that they then served the sovereign, and not the state. It seems that the country is perceived as a hut or apartment. I liked the apartment - you serve its owner, but you liked the chambers of another monarch - you changed your home, brought thieves, rapists and murderers to your old house.
The third group of historians unconditionally considers the Yaroslavl prince a traitor.
An indisputable fact is that Kurbsky is a traitor who must be brought to the judgment of history. It is his betrayals that should be shown in films and serials made at the expense of the state budget, and not fabrications of what Grozny was not and did not do.
Doctor of Historical Sciences, author of many books about Ivan IV Skrynnikov writes:
“Prince Kurbsky was one of the few people who was not afraid to argue with the autocrat and condemned the clergy for compromising with the tyrant. Discord with the tsar put an end to the boyar's career. After returning from the Polotsk campaign, Kurbsky did not receive the expected awards, but was expelled from Moscow to the voivodeship in Yuryev (Derpt) "[9],
or:
“After the conquest of Polotsk, the victorious army returned to the capital, a triumph awaited it. Senior officers could count on awards and rest. But Kurbsky was deprived of all this. The tsar ordered him to go to Yuryev and gave him less than a month to prepare" [9],
then it seems that due to the fact that he was not given, as a manager, a bonus or bonus, and rest, he thereby received the right to betray. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet generals fought tirelessly, sometimes did not sleep for days, but did not leave their command post or dangerous sector of the front. The soldiers slept in the trenches in the rain, in the mud, in the snow in severe frosts, and Kurbsky simply did not receive the expected awards ...
The phrase of regret and justification is amazing that during the war years Kurbsky was not given a month to pack. I would like to draw a parallel with the battle for Moscow in the winter of 1941. At the cost of incredible efforts, the fascist hordes not only stopped, but also drove back. Imagine the following situation: Stalin, a week after the end of the battle for Moscow, instructs the great commander Zhukov, for example, to fly to another no less dangerous sector - to break through the blockade to the Leningrad Front.
And here Georgy Konstantinovich is offended that he was not given well-deserved awards, rest on his laurels, a month of rest and was sent to Leningrad. And as a result of such resentment that he is not appreciated, not respected, our great commander decides to enter into correspondence with Hitler, give out secret plans for military operations and the state of affairs in the army, go over to the side of the enemy, and then fight at the head of the enemy troops with his homeland.
Can we imagine such a thing? May Victorious General Zhukov forgive me for this nonsense, which I was forced to come up with as an example, but this is exactly what an attempt to justify the traitor Kurbsky looks like in my eyes.
Information war
Modern historians, writers and screenwriters make extensive use of the correspondence between Grozny and Kurbsky. What kind of correspondence are you talking about?
Let's turn to the World Wide Web:
“The correspondence of the Russian Tsar Ivan the Terrible and his former commander Prince Andrei Kurbsky, who was in exile, continued from 1564–1579, and became widely known, occupied a significant place in the journalism of the 1564th century. Correspondence began after Andrei Kurbsky left Russia in April XNUMX and went to Lithuania (there was no unity in assessing the reasons for leaving - both the persecution of the prince and treason on his part were called), and wrote the first letter to the king.
In July of the same year, the tsar sent an answer - a letter of a rather large volume, which Kurbsky assessed as "broadcast and noisy", Kurbsky sent a short answer, but failed to deliver it to Russia, as he himself explained, due to the closure of Moscow's borders, and correspondence interrupted. In 1577, after a campaign against Livonia, the tsar sent a new letter, and in 1579 the prince compiles a new answer and sends it along with the previous letter.
In total, the correspondence was limited to five letters. There are suggestions that Andrei Kurbsky tried to compose a more detailed answer to the tsar and even create a literary work based on this answer, but did not complete this work.
In July of the same year, the tsar sent an answer - a letter of a rather large volume, which Kurbsky assessed as "broadcast and noisy", Kurbsky sent a short answer, but failed to deliver it to Russia, as he himself explained, due to the closure of Moscow's borders, and correspondence interrupted. In 1577, after a campaign against Livonia, the tsar sent a new letter, and in 1579 the prince compiles a new answer and sends it along with the previous letter.
In total, the correspondence was limited to five letters. There are suggestions that Andrei Kurbsky tried to compose a more detailed answer to the tsar and even create a literary work based on this answer, but did not complete this work.
Making a comparison between Kurbsky's betrayal of Muscovy and General Vlasov of the USSR, she asked herself the question: if Vlasov had written a letter to Stalin, would Stalin have answered him? Under what circumstances would Vlasov write a letter to Stalin?
I want to draw your attention to the fact that the first letter was written in April 1564. This is the year of Kurbsky's flight to Lithuania. This letter contains the following lines:
“Written in the city of Volmer, the possession of my sovereign King Sigismund August, from whom I hope to be granted and consoled in all my sorrows by his royal grace, and especially with the help of God.”
Despite the fact that it always bugs me when traitors and murderers hope for "God's help", now it's about something else.
It was the writing of this letter by Kurbsky the Terrible that contributed to the emergence of such a political phenomenon as the information war against Russia. This phenomenon is more than 450 years old. And the fantasy of Russia's opponents, alas, will not run out. For the first time, cartoons, leaflets, nonsense about Russia appeared in Europe in the era when Ivan the Terrible ruled.
The debate about whether this correspondence was in reality, or is it fiction, continues to this day, but Kurbsky's first letter was unambiguous. To answer other questions, let's turn to the book of the military historian Valery Shambarov:
“... But the message was not intended for Ivan IV. It spread throughout European courts, among the gentry - so that it would not be passed on to the tsar, sent to the Russian nobles, so that they would follow the example of the prince and instead of "slavery" choose "freedom" [10].
When the first letter appeared, Sigismund II was king. Kurbsky, either decided to justify himself, or received an order to denigrate the tsar in order to help rally the Medieval European Union against Rus', where a tyrant supposedly rules, from whom the people need to be freed. But Kurbsky continued to write and help Bathory, who became the next king after the death of Sigismund. When the Poles, led by the new monarch, surrounded Polotsk, Kurbsky arrived to persuade the defenders of the fortress and the townspeople to go over to the side of the "liberators", those who would "bring them peace and prosperity" after many years of war.
Grozny from the Principality of Moscow created a state that became larger in area than all other European countries combined, population growth was 30–50%, carried out many reforms that strengthened the state and its defense capability, founded 155 cities and fortresses, 300 postal stations, laid the foundation for book printing , created printing houses, six secondary schools, etc. Western rulers had reason to hate Grozny ...
But in a surprising way, the libel of the traitor, on whose conscience the treacherous escape, return from weapons in the hands of the head of the enemy army, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, not only formed the basis of lies about the life and service of Grozny, but are still published, his image is ennobled in cinema.
Footnotes:
1. Valishevsky K. Ivan the Terrible. Historical essay. 1993, p. 182.
2. Skrynnikov R.G. The Great Sovereign Ivan Vasilyevich the Terrible. 1998, p. 181.
3. Mazurov V. A. Truth and lies about Ivan the Terrible. 2018. S. 54.
4. Skrynnikov R. G. The Great Sovereign Ivan Vasilyevich the Terrible. (Tyranny). 1998, p. 241.
5. Kalugin V. V. “Moscow scribes in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the second half of the 2020th century.” Russian Resurrection website, XNUMX.
6. Mazurov V. A. Truth and lies about Ivan the Terrible. 2018. S. 54.
7. Kobrin V. A. Ivan the Terrible. 1992, pp. 522–523.
8. Skrynnikov R.G. The Great Sovereign Ivan Vasilyevich the Terrible. 1998, p. 230.
9. Skrynnikov R. G. The Great Sovereign Ivan Vasilyevich the Terrible. 1998, pp. 223–224.
10. Skrynnikov R. G. Vasily III. Ivan groznyj. 2008, pp. 304–305.
11. Shambarov V. E. "The Tsar of Terrible Rus'" electronic edition of the book.