Elections in Kazakhstan - the completion of the formation of a new political model
On March 19, in neighboring Kazakhstan, the election campaign for the republican parliament (Majilis), as well as regional and municipal councils (maslikhats) ends. The elections are called upon to put an end to the system of the “super-presidential” system, built over two decades by N. Nazarbaev, and to form a management vertical for President K.-Zh. Tokayev of reforms, which, by the date of their announcement, is also called the "Program of September 1st".
What's new in the model?
With all the credibility of the victory of K.-J. Tokayev in the early presidential elections, the transformation of the electoral system, which was recorded in the amended Constitution of Kazakhstan, is a frankly bold decision. In the conditions of the "information silence" that is observed in our media in terms of coverage of these elections (however, Tokayev's elections were also fairly modestly covered in our country), there is no doubt that those "who need it" will follow them very and very closely. Simply because the scheme of “managed democracy” in Russia and the model of “managed democracy” that will now be tested in Kazakhstan differ quite significantly.
Since last May, after bringing the situation in the country into relative order (and in January, as we remember, Kazakhstan went through an attempted coup d'état), Tokayev's team has been launching processes to bring various political forces into the field of wide public discussion. Many public associations, both new and quite old, came out with their theses and proposals, and Astana practically did not limit this vigorous activity.
As a result, six political forces proper were formed by autumn: Ak Zhol (Bright Path), People's Party of Kazakhstan, Auyl (Village), National Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, Baytak (Boundless), counting and the former ruling party - "Amanat". The seventh party - Respublica, registered only this year, is a separate, but perhaps the most interesting project (rather, even a "business project") in the new system.
The theses that Tokayev put forward in the Program on September 1 turned out to be so "centric", understandable and positively perceived by the majority of the population, that it became obvious that the election campaign of 2023 would be called upon to form precisely the administrative vertical. But the very method of its formation is indeed quite bold, and it is worth dwelling on it in detail and trying to make predictions.
First of all, the new representative model of Astana formally erodes the very concept of "party of power" as a kind of principle of the political axis. Tokayev himself left the Amanat party (former Nazarbayev's Nur Otan), while those deputies who were previously actually appointed by the administration (out of 107 deputies of parliament, 98 were elected, and 9 were approved according to the quota of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan), now they have become the prerogative of the upper house Parliament - the Senate. If in the past the Nur-Otan ruling party used to occupy almost all the seats, now its task as a renewed Amanat is to become the “center party”, at the same time seriously updating the payroll, both at the parliamentary level and at the regional level. This question has already simply "set the teeth on edge", especially at the level of regions and the "three capitals" of the republic.
A serious step is an attempt to bring back the so-called "industry" into politics in the most significant way. "self-promoters". 69 seats in the Parliament will be distributed according to party lists with a 5% barrier to entry, and another 29 seats will be given to single-member constituencies, where self-nominated candidates already participate. This does not mean that a party member cannot nominate himself, but the very ratio of registered candidates speaks for itself: 76 are members of party associations, 359 are independent or conditionally independent players. This is a very decent competitive background of 15 people for one place.
If self-nominees form 30% of the Parliament, then at the regional level this share rises to 50%, and at the municipal level it goes up to 100%. Again, this measure is designed to close the issue that just at the regional and municipal level, there were many questions to the representatives of Nur Otan in terms of the distribution of contracts, especially with regard to the three capitals of the republic - Astana, Almaty and the core of southern Kazakhstan - Shymkent (Turkestan region), which concentrate over 25% of the population (4,7 million out of 19,6 million). In Shymkent, in general, the proportion of party members among self-nominated candidates is minimal.
The scheme by which single-member constituencies are formed, where capitals account for 6 out of 29 constituencies, as well as the structure of candidates in capital constituencies by party, including an analysis of some municipal lists, suggest the specifics of the future management vertical. An ordinary self-nominated candidate has few chances to snatch victory in a constituency with the number of voters of ±450 people. Considering that single-mandate constituencies were originally created as a non-party representation, there are more chances for representatives of large business groups to take seats there (and we will consider which ones below). Nevertheless, the number of party representatives nominated by political associations in a single-mandate constituency roughly shows the estimated shares that these associations are guided by as a whole, since the capitals are a kind of electoral concentrate.
Thus, in Almaty and Astana, the participation of party candidates in single-member constituencies is described by the following figures: 59 candidates - "Amanat" (center), "Ak Zhol" (organized in fact as centrists, but "on the right" and even often with nationalist rhetoric) - 16 candidates , "Auyl" (village issues and the left flank) - 7 candidates, "Baytak" ("green") plus candidates from Western and Turkish NGOs - 14 candidates. And two candidates from the Respublika association.
The new “fashionable” Respublika party is often described as a party of young entrepreneurs, even a “party of bloggers,” but the fact is that behind the fashionable and successful, in fact, is the backbone of Kazakhstan's non-primary business. These are computer technologies, mechanical engineering, import of equipment and licensed production, several largest agricultural holdings, construction and waste disposal - the list of areas here can take up a whole section.
The important thing is that “Respublika”, although it will not be able to lead candidates directly from the party so sharply, de facto influences entire sectors in regions and districts, and these, in fact, are the very self-nominated candidates in the field, business representatives level below, the impact on the voices of workers, not to mention the interested youth. That is, “fashion bloggers” are not at all as fashionable as they might seem, looking at their performances - this is the backbone of the business, and for quite understandable and objective reasons, it is oriented towards inclusion in the global economy and the Western investment circuit.
Respublika's rather abrupt entry into official politics, and at the same time with good funding and a decent organization of work, in fact, is due to the fact that "normal business" must maintain acceptable proportions of representation among self-nominated candidates, without the use of direct administrative mechanisms and, in general, a roll in " pure politics. In fact, Tokayev indirectly delegates representation to business from the regions and in the regions, and through him (albeit outwardly and not explicitly) stakes on personnel renewal.
As a result, a rather interesting construction can turn out, where centrists and business, similarly oriented, will occupy about 70% of the political field, "pure Westerners" -12-13%, rural areas and right-wing nationalists 6-7% each and another ± 3% " other". Municipalities, on the other hand, will receive practically non-partisan representation, which will deal with internal issues and, again, focus on the business project described above. All this without direct "manual" control and even with a functioning column in the "against all" ballots.
Advantages and disadvantages
This is actually a very bold model, but it is unlikely that Tokayev and his administration would have gone for it without thoroughly weighing the pros and cons. In the end, until the last moment, his calculations brought an obvious result. There is no doubt that in Russia these maneuvers were and will be viewed rather warily - too different approaches. On the other hand, we must take into account the fact that Tokayev does not have and does not expect such geopolitical challenges that Russia has. Including it is not expected until Moscow decides this geopolitics at the forefront, although this, unfortunately, is not obvious to many in Kazakhstan itself.
For Russia, which has recently been living within the framework of the “with us” or “against us” paradigm, interacting with the new Kazakhstani model will be difficult not technically, but rather from the point of view of political psychology. It's just a different political system.
Of the pluses here, one can single out the fact that the rampage of Russophobia in social networks, which was rampant during the time while Astana was preparing a political transition, will be brought into a relatively rigid framework, especially since part of the described large non-resource business in Kazakhstan is Russian (though not Russian). Also, perhaps, it will be a plus that Turkish expansion will find limits to its growth.
Of the minuses, it should be noted right away that the emerging system is unlikely to just release the relocated startups and IT projects, as well as personnel, and Moscow will somehow have to take care of this issue separately. And those who are working on parallel import schemes should be very careful when moving logistics to the Kazakh steppes.
In general, it is necessary to talk about the minuses here, relying on a specific frame of reference: in a broad sense, the basis of the new Kazakhstani system is what we call the “globalist project”, in which, by the way, China feels good and within which China moved well. But the modern world is no longer the usual globalist monolith, and this project is just one of many.
As long as this old project is relevant, Astana's position of "face to the East, heart to the West" is practical. Objectively (and politically, everything is clearly and explicitly expressed) while being drawn into the Chinese supercluster, at the same time interact with Western institutions and take loans there. But, if China and its Western partners in the traditional model of globalism do not keep this project in competition, problems may already await Astana here.
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