Characteristics of the NATO logistics system

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Characteristics of the NATO logistics system


Introduction


I immediately warn you that to view some of the materials you need a VPN if you are in Russia.



In modern wars, it is impossible to achieve success if military units and subunits are not properly supplied with fuel, ammunition and food, and if their weapons and equipment are not maintained. Modern combat is characterized by decisive and dynamic actions, as well as abrupt changes in the situation, which require more supplies than in the Second World War. Therefore, the continuity of logistics support plays an increasingly important role, the purpose of which is to supply each soldier in a timely manner with everything that he needs to carry out his combat mission.

Colonel General I. M. Golushko, Chief of Staff of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR, 1984

Starting from the spring of 2022, publications on the integration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into NATO structures began to appear more and more often on the Internet. When it became obvious that Russia's original plans for the operation in Ukraine had not been fulfilled, not only the embassies began to return to Kyiv. Trains, convoys and aircraft / steamers with military equipment and equipment went to Ukraine.

Along with this movement of machinery and equipment, other work also intensified. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are moving by leaps and bounds to NATO standards not only in the field of armaments, but also standards. In particular, material support. The entire modern information system, which began to actively build up after 2014, was already formed under the influence of NATO. The events of February 2022 accelerated this movement many times over and, in fact, completely subordinated all processes to curators from NATO.

Amateurs discuss tactics, armchair generals discuss strategy, and professionals discuss logistics.

Bridge between NATO armies. Ukraine transfers military logistics to the NATO IT system LOGFAS. How difficult is this path (September 8, 2022), Arms deliveries: Ukraine has successfully introduced the LOGFAS logistics system from NATO (October 21, 2022). These are just some of the articles on this topic (I advise you to look at them).

Modern logistics can do a lot, and it is critical to constantly improve logistics support. I will briefly describe NATO's logistics system and draw some conclusions. All information is taken from public sources. NATO prudently does not hide what is in principle obvious.

Theoretical basis
NATO Logistics Principles


• Collective responsibility. NATO as an organization and all its members have a collective responsibility for providing operations and missions (“one for all and all for one”). Responsibility is distributed in accordance with the capabilities of the participant and - in certain cases - the desire of one or another participant.

• Authority. The appropriate level of NATO Commander must be given sufficient authority to deploy, receive, use, maintain and redeploy nations-contributed forces in the most efficient manner.

• Priority of Operational Requirements. Logistics must provide the right support - in the right amount - in the right place - at the right time. Must be fully integrated into the operational structure and operations planning process. Both military and civilian structures of NATO are focused on the implementation of the assigned tasks, so that the operation (from planning to completion) is carried out successfully.

• Cooperation and Coordination. Cooperation and coordination between nations and NATO is essential. The civil and military sectors are coordinated; non-NATO countries and other relevant organizations - UN, EU, OSCE, etc.

• Assured Provision.

• Sufficiency.

• Efficiency.

• Flexibility.

• Visibility and transparency (Visibility and Transparency). Using various tools (LOGFAS) to understand the "logistics picture" (planning and management).

• Simplicity.

Functional and related areas of NATO logistics


Functional areas:

• Supplies.
• Ensuring the life cycle of materials.
• Equipment maintenance.
• Movement and transportation.
• Services.
• Medicine.

Related areas:

• Budget and finance.
• Military engineering.
• Funeral affairs.
• Support of operations by contractors.
• Civil-military interaction.
• Military police.

The effectiveness of logistics depends not only on the quality of each individual area, but also on the quality of their interaction at various levels (NATO as an organization, between NATO and individual members, between NATO members). Unification and synchronization of procedures increase the level of support in various areas of support.

Logistics
Deployment of the armed forces


The red dotted line is the JOA (joint operation area), the area where the conflict is taking place and where the aircraft will be deployed to carry out the mission.

Home base - the place of permanent deployment of the armed forces.

AA / FD (Assembly Area / Final Destination) - the "collection" point or the final deployment point on the ground.

Aircraft move from Home base to APOE/SPOE (Airport of Embarkation/Seaport of Embarkation) and then to APOD/SPOD (Airport of Debarkation/Seaport of Debarkation) – air/sea port of loading/unloading. The same applies to equipment and materials. After arriving at JOA, aircraft are concentrated in HA (Holding area, holding area), and equipment - in MA (Marshalling area, sorting).

After that, the aircraft and equipment move to the meeting in SA (Staging area, intermediate zone). After the necessary preparations, the aircraft with equipment and materials moves forward to AA / FD. If AA / FD cannot be reached in one transition, then a stop is made at the CSC (Convoy Support Center).

The first part (moving from home base to APOE / SPOE) is the responsibility of the one whose forces and means are moving. Moving from APOE / SPOE to APOD / SPOD is the responsibility of NATO structures (SD, Strategic Deployment).


Support levels


There is a close relationship between the level of operation and the lines of supply support. The Level of operation indicates the level at which the control is performed. The Lines of Support shows where supplies are grouped, stored, in the context of the military command structure. The support level is where the stocks are physically located, including.

When planning an operation, the number of days of provision is determined. This figure (number of supply days) determines the amount of stocks needed to be distributed along the supply chain to supply the aircraft participating in the operation.

One day of resource consumption is the basic unit of calculation. The DOS indicator (Days of supply, days of consumption) is set for each support level. That is, for how many days of support a reserve must be formed for the successful completion of the mission.
These metrics vary from operation to operation and are part of the planning and forecasting task that is performed in advance.


If we talk about 30 days of stock, then an example distribution could be as follows:

• The first line (2 days) is the support of the ship, unit, squadron (I don't know how to translate this adequately; probably the minimum indivisible unit: tank, infantry fighting vehicle, platoon).

• The second line (3 days) refers to the tactical level and for the ground forces - this is the brigade logistic unit (brigade logistics unit).

• The third line (15 days) refers to the operational zone. Third line support capabilities provided to the armed forces as part of operations in the theater of operations or at facilities established along the strategic line of communication. Often this will be the logistical base of a theater of operations. Typically, this level contains up to 50% of all stocks for planned days of consumption.

• The fourth line (10 days) refers to the strategic area and includes stocks at home base, civilian supplies and industrial production, as well as stocks "in transit" that have not yet reached JOA.

Types of collateral
(Classes of supply)



TOE - table of equipment (list of equipment), POL - petroleum, oil and lubricants.

All nomenclature units belong to one of the specified classes (the remark is made that not all NATO members adhere to such a classification, and there is a separate standard for such "individuals", which describes the rules for classification and the rules for transposing into a standard classification).

This simplifies accountability for individual supplies, both in terms of who is responsible within the functions and in terms of how supplies are stored and transported.

Push-Pull Strategies
(Push and pull)


There are two provisioning strategies:

Push is a strategy where inventory is shipped in predetermined quantities, at predetermined intervals, to predetermined locations. Usually used for positions with low uncertainty of demand (i.e., the rate of consumption is known in advance with a high degree of probability), a high level of economies of scale of movement. For example, water, food and groceries, ammunition per brigade or battalion based on average daily consumption rates. Deliveries are carried out constantly, tactical units do not need to carry out an order.

Pull - tactical units carry out the order of positions that they need. This strategy is used for positions with a high level of demand uncertainty, low volume values. In this regard, the supply chain is guided by real demand.



General Logistics System
(Generic Theater Sustainment System)


This picture shows a general description of how stocks are distributed between support lines.

The third line, as mentioned earlier, is TLB (theater logistic base, theater logistics base). If necessary, there may be several TLBs (for example, due to the geography of the theater of operations).

The main task of TLB is to replenish stocks of the second line of support. The logistics units of the second line depend on the type of troops (land, air or sea) and can also be represented by a different number of units depending on the requirements and characteristics of the theater of operations.

Each brigade has its own brigade support area (BSA), which is managed by the brigade support battalion. Typically, the TLB uses a push strategy to restock the second line of support.

Ground and air units use both push and pull strategies to resupply the first line of support. For marine units, pull is usually used exclusively. When performing tasks, the supply of marine units is carried out by transport and cargo ships, and not by entering the port (RAS, replenishment at sea). Either directly from ship to ship, or using helicopters.


Logistics at the tactical level depends on operational logistics in the theater of operations and conditions, which are determined through planning and coordination at the operational level. The use of theater logistics allows the tactical level to properly leverage its capabilities and ability to maintain operational efficiency over time and ensure resilience.

Joint Logistics Group
(Joint Logistic Support Group JLSG)


The picture shows generalized information about JLSG. The main elements of this group are responsible for the functioning of the TLB. TLB's logistics departments are responsible for receiving, storing and distributing stocks of all classes. Also, there are dedicated units in the ports of receipt, escort services that can receive, organize temporary storage and transport both aircraft and equipment.

The area of ​​responsibility also includes engineering and security units of the TLB.


Unified Logistics Network
(Joint Logistic Support Network, JLSN)


Logistics entities are linked through the Logistics Network (JLSN). The integrated logistics support network is a system of interconnected logistics hubs, activities, organizations and facilities, their multimodal connections in the zone of joint activity. As shown in the figure, a typical integrated logistics network consists of loading and unloading points, communication lines, a theater logistics base, convoy support centers, and transfer points.


It is important to emphasize that the commander of the joint logistic support group is not the owner of the combat space. The battlespace commander usually has command and control of units passing through his area.

LOGFAS


Logistics Functional Area Services - LOGFAS is a set of tools supporting NATO's logistics processes for strategic movement and transportation, deployment planning and execution, theater movement planning and support planning. Developed and maintained by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Help Desk and Business Applications.

NATO's LOGFAS is the cornerstone of the interoperability of multinational forces. LOGFAS manages logistics information at all levels of planning and execution, both within NATO forces and across NATO allies and partners.

Benefits of using LOGFAS:

• Provides the ability to plan and conduct multinational logistics operations, including with NATO allies and partners.

• Can work offline when connection is not available during operations. With automatic synchronization after the connection is restored, the ability to enter manual updates through files.

• Entrance to the overall operational picture with a variety of options available in one click. For example: modeling the movement of motorcades in LOGFAS or access to the dashboard and map in real time, as well as historical data.

LOGFAS includes the following modules:

• GEOMAN (Geographical Data Management Module) – geographic data management module. Everything related to maps and geographic information services. As far as I understand, they collect in this module all the necessary and possible maps (including satellite and aerial photography) and saturate them with information about objects (sea and air ports, bridges, roads, railways) and their properties (throughput, type of coverage, etc.) . P.). A sort of OpenStreetMap and GoogleMaps. Moreover, they collect data from open sources as well. This module can be used both independently and provide data for other modules of the system.

• LDM (LOGFAS Data Management Module) – data management module. This is a large classifier (reference book) of all positions from nuts to brigades and corps inclusive. For complex objects (such as an infantry fighting vehicle, a tank, a brigade), there are profiles and specifications that show what the object consists of, what resources it consumes at what speed (and under what conditions).

• SPM (Sustainment Planning Module) – maintenance planning module. The module is primarily intended for operational planning of logistics support for units. In particular, it can be used for the following types of calculations: long-term stock planning; planning the logistics of existing units; analysis of the sustainability of existing logistics centers.

• ADAMS (Allied Deployment and Movements System) - deployment and movement module. Used for planning, estimating and modeling movement and transportation. The data includes a list of personnel, equipment, consumables, modes of transport, communication lines, and schedules. The result is a detailed deployment plan (Detailed Deployment Plan, DDP), which consists of information about what, where, when and how assets are moved. The focal point collects national DDPs, resolves their conflicts and develops a multinational DDP.

The main objective of this module is high-level planning and conflict resolution between different national deployment plans in case of coalition operations.

• CORSOM (Coalition Reception, Staging and Onward Movement) - Coalition reception, staging and further movement (something like that). In my opinion, this is a module designed to plan, monitor and resolve RSOM conflicts (reception, arming and further movement) during the deployment of forces. Allows you to: plan in detail and coordinate the movement from places of unloading to the final destinations of units; monitor traffic, administer convoys and trains; plan, analyze the execution of tasks; select alternative routes. Unlike ADAMS, there is already detailed planning and real-time monitoring of the situation in relation to previously formed plans.

The following module is used to verify and model the planned logistics support: SDM (Supply Distribution Module) - supply distribution module. It is a decision support tool used for scenario planning.

To support the planning process, a number of countries use the Allied Commands Resource Optimization Software System (ACROSS, Command Resource Optimization System).
ACROSS is an information subsystem to support the decision-making process in planning critical and combat-required supplies. The system consists of a common database (LOGBASE) and four models for calculating ammunition consumption:

• ADMEM (Air Defense Munitions Expenditure Model) – Air Defense Munitions Expenditure Model.

• AGMEM (Air-to-Ground Munitions Expenditure Model) - Air-to-Ground Munitions Expenditure Model.

• LEMEM (Land Forces Equipment and Munitions Expenditure Model) - a model of the consumption of equipment and ammunition for the ground forces.

• MARMEM (Maritime Munitions Expenditure Model) is a model for the consumption of naval munitions.

The models use linear programming to calculate the optimal combination of ammunition to inflict maximum damage on certain targets at the minimum required level of cost of purchased ammunition.

In simple words, these are mathematical models that, having received data about the enemy at the input, can simulate the consumption of ammunition to perform the assigned tasks (destruction, containment, etc.).

Information support of logistics in the Russian Armed Forces


There should have been a chapter on the logistics of the Russian Armed Forces. But, unfortunately, I could not find any useful and interesting data on the net so that I could study this issue in a reasonable time. Most likely, everything is on paper and “for official use”.

- Logistics in the logistics system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: specifics and directions of development.

- Implementation of the national project "Digital Economy of the Russian Federation".

- The logistics system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is a reliable guarantor of their combat capability.

- Five years on the road to innovation.

An American view of the logistics capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces


Almost at the end of 2021, a very interesting article was published in one of the US online publications Feeding The Bear: A Closer Look At Russian Army Logistics And The Fait Accompli. One well-known blog has translated into Russian - Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at the Logistics of the Russian Army and the Possibility of a Politics of "Facit Facts". I strongly advise you to read this article, keeping in mind the time when it was published.

The essence of this article is that the Russian Armed Forces do not have adequate (including comparable to NATO) logistical support for the existing composition of the Armed Forces. And it is precisely this, and not the power of the Russian Armed Forces, that is the “weak link”. And it is precisely this weakness that needs to be turned into weakness by destroying the existing logistical potential. The Russian Armed Forces are capable of only small seizures of territories outside the former USSR without an operational pause. And NATO’s strategy in a hypothetical confrontation between NATO and Russia should be to withdraw the aircraft deep into the territory (so that we stretch our communications) and destroy everything that the logistics of the aircraft relies on (and this is primarily the railway infrastructure).

Conclusion


But, as “practice” has shown, even on the territory of the former USSR, the logistical capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces turned out to be extremely limited and not adequate to the tasks being solved. And the key problem here, in my opinion, is the almost complete lack of information support for logistics activities.

NATO countries have launched a large process to digitize data in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A specialized solution based on SAP - S / 4HANA is being implemented there. This solution already has the ability to integrate into LOGFAS. Understanding the importance of this work, they do it not “first we will win, and only then we will do it”, but right now.

NATO logistics is distinguished primarily by its methodological sophistication. What you have read is only part of a small training course on "introduction" to the specialty. Moreover, the data is completely open and available to those interested. Those who are familiar with civilian logistics, who understand the abbreviations BOM, MRP, MRP2, DRP, APS, in fact, will not find anything new. And this is precisely the strength of NATO's logistics support - they use what they already use in the world (in particular, all calculations and supplies are carried out in standard twenty-foot containers).

Of course, they also have difficulties.

LOGFAS was born in the late 80s and was originally conceived as a temporary measure until a commercial system was developed. But there is nothing more permanent than temporary. Apparently, changes in the geopolitical realities of the late 80s - early 90s influenced the course of events, and LOGFAS, developing and supplementing with new opportunities, survived until the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century. In the 2010s, a project was launched to switch to a new system (LOG FS), which was supposed to replace LOGFAS by 2020. But it didn't work out.

We urgently need a program to build our own logistics information system. I am sure that part of the problems with what is called the "sluggishness of the Defense Ministry" is directly related to the lack of adequate information systems. The problem will grow as the crisis grows and new types of weapons and support appear, which are needed already “yesterday”.

Total informatization is not a panacea. But it will definitely avoid this:


TG channel FightBomber

List of materials for additional study


- YouTube NATO Logistics lessons.
- Use Of Logfas Tools In Logistics Planning In NATO.
- Application Of The New NATO Logistics System.
- NATO Logistic Handbook.
- NATO Logistics Handbook.
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30 comments
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  1. 0
    16 March 2023 03: 52
    There is no time to delve into it now, but I want to, so bookmark it. Plus in advance!
  2. +1
    16 March 2023 04: 32
    What the author listed in general is what has been known and understood since the Second World War ... when the USSR established logistics at the end of 1942-43, positive changes immediately began at the front.
    Now, of course, work is underway on logistics for the Russian army ... smile belated as always.
    Until the thunder strikes the man will not cross himself.
    The only question is whether Russia's resources are capable of blocking NATO's resources?
    Amateurs discuss tactics, armchair generals discuss strategy, and professionals discuss logistics.

    Just at the beginning of the NWO, amateurs were ringing the bells about this logistics ... the professionals screwed up completely with this NWO.
    1. +6
      16 March 2023 10: 54
      Just at the beginning of the NWO, amateurs were ringing the bells about this logistics ... the professionals screwed up completely with this NWO.

      And then the question is - who in the end turned out to be an "amateur"? :)
  3. -5
    16 March 2023 08: 28
    The question is relevant, but not everything is as bad as it is believed. We were not preparing for a war in this format, now the system is being restructured, but, unfortunately, already in the course of the NWO ... I hope that it will be successful
  4. +7
    16 March 2023 08: 57
    an increasingly important role is played by the continuity of logistic support, the purpose of which is to supply each soldier in a timely manner with everything that he needs to carry out his combat mission.

    Deprive the logistics of the enemy and he will lose.

    Is our army even trying to do this? Here the Ukrainian one is trying (Krymsky bridge and Antonovsky bridge), although its capabilities are much lower than Russian ones. And the result is impressive - the surrender of Kherson with the adjacent region.

    Amateurs discuss tactics, armchair generals discuss strategy, and professionals - logistics.

    It seems that we do not have professionals among the generals.
    1. +2
      19 March 2023 10: 26
      That's right, a mystery for our "strategists" ... "It flows into the pool from the side of its western side from 9.00 to 18.00 through three pipes !!!"
      Question: From which side, through how many pipes and at what time does it flow? And what should have been done a long time ago so that it doesn’t leak?
  5. +4
    16 March 2023 09: 13
    It would seem that we have one country, one army. Establishing logistics channels is easier than coordinating many countries with an adversary.
    There would be a desire. There are only two conclusions from this: the unwillingness of the relevant officials / incompetence, or deliberate sabotage, sabotage.
    1. -1
      16 March 2023 10: 56
      Everything is simpler "laziness mother" - our everything. We "harness for a long time", wait for the "thunder to strike", and "the fried rooster pecks". Magic "pendal" is needed, in short.
    2. +4
      16 March 2023 10: 57
      I think that the reason is the complication of the logistics itself and the inadequacy of processes and information support in the Armed Forces. Roughly speaking, the tasks that are now being set are stuck in the bottleneck of regulations and "paper" work. If the processes were appropriate and this was supported by a modern information system, the human factor could largely be leveled. And yes - it all depends on the degree of competence of a particular person.
  6. -1
    16 March 2023 11: 34
    Total informatization is not a panacea. But it will definitely avoid this:
    For "such" it is necessary to send this supplier immediately to the trenches, he did not cope with the logistics, let him redeem with blood.
  7. -11
    16 March 2023 12: 21
    As usual, the Americans are all Pts. beautiful and interactive, just like a business presentation. Pts. a lot of abstruse and beautiful words like "efficiency", "focus on completing the task" and so on ..

    What is the point behind all this? The guys just have a lot of dough, for which they can maintain bloated services with a bunch of heterogeneous equipment and warehouses and a bunch of specialists and bureaucracy - for all this, a hell of a cloud of rules has been written, some of them, perhaps, are quite good in terms of organizational and executive cycles. And all)
    And if even shorter - loot + specialists + bureaucracy + a fleet of good and varied equipment. The key to this is precisely the loot, because it rules the roost by attracting capable specialists and keeping them where their professional level grows. It is also responsible for the availability, rotation and development of suitable equipment in dost. qty.

    All these beautiful systems devour the more money, the farther they are from the "yeshak-with-dekhan". And in this area, I have great skepticism about the successful integration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into this system in the foreseeable future. On some formal grounds, yes, the process can be successful. But these will be precisely the key trodden paths and not some single successful system-with-integration.
    1. +7
      16 March 2023 13: 30
      Why don't you really understand how a systematic approach works? You seem to be considered a specialist here, you seem to write articles there, don't you? All these "pretty" presentations are exactly an example of a systematic approach to the issue. Systematicity in this case is a set of algorithms in which the performer does not have to think, but immediately act within a certain protocol, which speeds up the process at times. This system laid on a common basis (communication and information support) allows you to respond many times faster to a change in the situation. With regards to Ukrainians, of course, all this will work 100% far from immediately, but we will feel the result for ourselves, I assure you.
      It would be calmer if we could hope that we have someone involved in the analysis of the enemy’s supply chains, so that when an order is received, we immediately know where to hit. I understand that you can’t turn such a ossified mechanism, but you can start small with such a small unit ... But something is completely unbelievable, to be honest.
      1. -6
        16 March 2023 13: 54
        I perfectly understand "what a systems approach is" - if you read less superficially, then you may also understand that no approach will work WITHOUT MONEY. And the more colorful and openwork schemes, the more regular pumping will provide for their execution.
        At the moment, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are waging war and the budget of Ukraine itself is "breaking through the bottom", and will break through for a long time (no matter how the events develop), because at the expense of the budget it will be necessary to rebuild the destroyed, pay loans, re-equip the Armed Forces and so on and so forth. They will not have time for beautiful arrows and they will have a minimum of competent specialists for the implementation of these schemes - stupidly because a bunch of muzhygofs have been knocked out and will be knocked out, and a bunch more piled up. The most educated and, so to speak, "talented". Some part of this system will help to establish NATO, but I point out that the Armed Forces of Ukraine themselves will not be up to discussing all these beauties for a VERY long time.
        The United States itself, generally speaking, has a lot of these openwork schemes, and they work remarkably well in conditions where the affected side does not have the tools for unpredictable mass introduction of chaos into these constructions. And how will it work in conditions if there is such chaos? What will happen if all this perfection collides with a severe shortage of fuel and lubricants in a large theater of operations?
        Bazara 0, the system is cool, but its "apparent perfect" is based not so much on its perfection or effectiveness, but on the opponent's ability to checkmate. resources ANY of their toys and in the proper quantity. What I'm pointing out - loot conquers evil. If it exists.
        1. +13
          16 March 2023 14: 40
          As a person who deals with information support of logistics for civil use, I can tell you that all the possible scenarios for adverse developments, both purely technical (failure of servers, interruptions in communication) and business (growth of own production, drop in the production of suppliers, problems with transport) nature are taken into account in the models and templates of work. I am sure that the logic is absolutely similar in military logistics, but adjusted for their specifics. Yes, shit happens. And one that has not been worked out and not modeled before. But the developed information support, firstly, makes it possible to track this situation (and moreover, in most cases, to predict in advance so that there is time to react), and, secondly, to react and rebuild processes. It is not the loot that wins over evil, but the efficiency of using this loot.
          1. +2
            16 March 2023 15: 11
            Your comments are even more interesting than the article! hi
            Plus not in vain put.
        2. +1
          16 March 2023 14: 59
          Well, the United States has this loot in the right quantities, do you have doubts about their willingness to spend it on providing the level of logistics they need?
          1. -6
            16 March 2023 15: 39
            Well, the United States has this loot in the right quantities, you have doubts about their willingness to spend it on providing the level of logistics they need

            If this is for me, then I see the situation like this.
            For quite some time now, the US has had some problems maintaining accepted standards to the extent that it wants to maintain them. Figuratively speaking, firstly, their global scheme has swelled up, and secondly, the American economy itself is under increasing pressure from the economies of China, India and other countries that are developing much less dynamically. Thirdly, the number and potential of challenges for the United States and its architecture around the world has increased significantly over the past 10 years - hypothetical problems have become less hypothetical and the loose state in which everything could exist to suppress dissent is no longer satisfying. And not loose requires focus and bablosik. Immediately on several distant fronts, if you can call it that.

            The United States understands this, and therefore, over the years, the trend of demanding contributions from its allies has been increasing. This contribution can compensate, but cannot shift the critical part of the US burden in its design to the allies - for most of them, strictly speaking, cannot.
            The Ukrainian front is secondary for the United States, because the Americans understand that we really cannot (and do not really want to) challenge their hegemony, vision and architecture. Ukraine itself, as a state, is currently drawing off the resources of the United States and NATO and is drawing it back considerably. As is attention. Given that the dividends from these delays are not so obvious. For allies in Europe, this is generally a net loss, for the United States in the future it is another "big Baltic" at best. They can organize "something like" there, but within the framework of their concept of "self-support of a certain level" there This will NOT work, and for a VERY LONG time. Some key elements -may, I admit. "Treaded Paths". But as a SYSTEM, and even more so as a system for which Ukraine itself is responsible, it is excluded. Ukraine consumes resources and spends them, the human resources of Ukraine are currently focused on more trivial areas, and in the future this trend will worsen or reorient to areas of greater profit.

            It must be understood that the ability of the United States to fill everything with loot is sinking great, it will not be better - they will have to fold their tentacles, as they did in Afghanistan. Attempts to throw parts of the problem onto the EU - tactically can be successful, strategically the EU will not be satisfied with this. They have enough problems there without chronic "donates" to Ukraine.

            So far, I don’t see who will pay and support all this - just as I don’t see a “point of no return” for Americans to get into this situation.
            1. +4
              16 March 2023 15: 59
              That's right. But if we talk about the information support of logistics at the state level (and not an order of magnitude more complex international organization, such as NATO), then this is not an unaffordable amount of money. And efficiency, perhaps, will be higher than if you spend on something in production. But in any case - the question is the efficiency of spending. ESU TK (RIP) is an example of this.
        3. +2
          16 March 2023 15: 13
          I'm talking about "here and now", and not about a hypothetical future when something will have to be rebuilt. They will print as much money as they need here and now. And Ukrainians get a ready-made supply scheme with all the supplies. It is only necessary to arrange people (who will certainly be found for this case). In our country, no one bothered with this and is not going to (apparently). The loss of Kherson is primarily about logistics.
  8. +3
    16 March 2023 12: 42
    I repeat. In my opinion, I consider the preparation for the war with Japan in August 1945 to be a model of preparation, including joint work of all parts of the army rear and civilian infrastructure. It is easy to count from the Yalta Conference in February to August. Everything was calculated, prepared, delivered, relocated. From communication only telephone, mail, telegraph. During the war and immediately after. Destruction and across the country.
    At the present time, all that is needed is to creatively rework the already existing experience, taking into account our realities.
    1. +3
      16 March 2023 14: 44
      Then there was no shortage of anything needed for the front. The current situation differs from that one in that we have to operate in conditions of limited resources (machinery, equipment - thermal imaging vehicles, UAVs, etc.). In order to be able to compare with that time, it is necessary to transfer the economy to a military footing, and then it will be seen whether they will be able to act just as effectively or not
  9. +1
    16 March 2023 16: 11
    A good article (perhaps somewhat chaotic due to the large amount of information by the standards of VO) put an asterisk - special thanks for mentioning Vershinin's article.
    More than a year ago, until February 23.02.2022, XNUMX, there was a series of discussions on VO logistics in / in Ukraine, including on Vershinin’s article, but, no matter how funny and sad, the authors of VO then turned out to be right in many respects.
  10. 0
    16 March 2023 16: 33
    We urgently need a program to build our own logistics information system. I am sure that part of the problems with what is called the "sluggishness of the Defense Ministry" is directly related to the lack of adequate information systems. The problem will grow as the crisis grows and new types of weapons and support appear, which are needed already “yesterday”.

    Total informatization is not a panacea. But it will definitely avoid this:

    Uh-huh, total informatization, but don’t forget to attach a paper version to the electronic application (report, report, information), and even agreed upon (corrected, redone, etc.), and don’t forget about the cover of the desired color. Attach the slides too, on a disk and a flash drive ...
    P.s. this concerns not only the military sphere
  11. +2
    16 March 2023 18: 49
    If a direct war suddenly starts with NATO or the EU separately, then our losses will be terrible, the Second World War will stand on the sidelines, even if we win.
    Logistics and interaction are on their side, and how this affects the course of hostilities can be seen in the example of Ukraine. It is now mimicking NATO's command and logistical approach (although it is far from being completely replicated), and this, combined with supplies from outside, has ALREADY allowed it to deter us, despite the fact that we are more numerous and more armed.
  12. -4
    16 March 2023 22: 00
    Comparing the logistic organizational problems of their own and NATO, many commentators tear button accordions without understanding what. Our standards were written under the USSR and its realities, and now they stumble over capitalism in the Russian Federation, and that’s lame. Plus, we sort of survived the collapse of the country and the reformatting of the brain, which also adds problems (yes, yes, reformatting, otherwise, well, they run away from mobilization abroad, scammers cash in on outbidding, citizens don’t care about vigilance, they are sold to the SBU, what is it like not reformatting, they don’t want the victory of their country apparently?)
  13. +1
    17 March 2023 01: 11
    squadron is a squadron, such as a tank company, squadron, motorized infantry company., artillery batteries, it seems, are also called squadrons in some armies.
  14. +1
    17 March 2023 08: 27
    very interesting! always loved this kind of articles translated from the original, and something that we would rarely pay attention to. Obviously, in order to solve logistical problems with such a huge number of bases, something so complex and carefully designed was required. The only thing I didn't hear was losses. Troops, equipment and more. What if the troops suffer losses, and not planned, how this system will behave. Thank you very much, I would like to read more like this. Write more)
  15. +2
    17 March 2023 14: 33
    is this some advertisement for NATO? What is the benefit for people to know anything much about it when they cannot compare to what Russia's supply logistics looks like. Otherwise its just feeding the Western propaganda machine and West adoration. Then again, maybe its just me who is looking at it negatively....
  16. -1
    20 March 2023 15: 30
    Excellent article.
    Harsh conclusions:

    "The Russian Armed Forces are capable of only small seizures of territories outside the former USSR without an operational pause. And NATO's strategy in a hypothetical confrontation between NATO and Russia should be to withdraw the Armed Forces deep into the territory (so that we stretch our communications) and destroy everything that logistics relies on Aircraft (and this is primarily the railway infrastructure)."

    Have we already seen this somewhere?

    I hope our Defense Ministry has a well-thought-out plan, countermeasures, modern approaches to reduce / level the influence of the Western approach to supplying and providing troops.
  17. 0
    21 March 2023 01: 37
    Quote: Knell Wardenheart
    Well, the United States has this loot in the right quantities, you have doubts about their willingness to spend it on providing the level of logistics they need

    If this is for me, then I see the situation like this.
    For quite some time now, the US has had some problems maintaining accepted standards to the extent that it wants to maintain them. Figuratively speaking, firstly, their global scheme has swelled up, and secondly, the American economy itself is under increasing pressure from the economies of China, India and other countries that are developing much less dynamically. Thirdly, the number and potential of challenges for the United States and its architecture around the world has increased significantly over the past 10 years - hypothetical problems have become less hypothetical and the loose state in which everything could exist to suppress dissent is no longer satisfying. And not loose requires focus and bablosik. Immediately on several distant fronts, if you can call it that.

    The United States understands this, and therefore, over the years, the trend of demanding contributions from its allies has been increasing. This contribution can compensate, but cannot shift the critical part of the US burden in its design to the allies - for most of them, strictly speaking, cannot.
    The Ukrainian front is secondary for the United States, because the Americans understand that we really cannot (and do not really want to) challenge their hegemony, vision and architecture. Ukraine itself, as a state, is currently drawing off the resources of the United States and NATO and is drawing it back considerably. As is attention. Given that the dividends from these delays are not so obvious. For allies in Europe, this is generally a net loss, for the United States in the future it is another "big Baltic" at best. They can organize "something like" there, but within the framework of their concept of "self-support of a certain level" there This will NOT work, and for a VERY LONG time. Some key elements -may, I admit. "Treaded Paths". But as a SYSTEM, and even more so as a system for which Ukraine itself is responsible, it is excluded. Ukraine consumes resources and spends them, the human resources of Ukraine are currently focused on more trivial areas, and in the future this trend will worsen or reorient to areas of greater profit.

    It must be understood that the ability of the United States to fill everything with loot is sinking great, it will not be better - they will have to fold their tentacles, as they did in Afghanistan. Attempts to throw parts of the problem onto the EU - tactically can be successful, strategically the EU will not be satisfied with this. They have enough problems there without chronic "donates" to Ukraine.

    So far, I don’t see who will pay and support all this - just as I don’t see a “point of no return” for Americans to get into this situation.

    Many words but meaning 0, straight analyst from the State Duma before the Izyum regrouping. It's been a year now blah blah blah that the EU is getting tired, the US is getting tired, communication for Ukrainians will not work like the American one because repeaters
    the Ukrainians sold it, the logistics will not work because some specialists are needed and it is not clear that just when using NATO programs, a stupid conscript can be put in a warehouse and he will do just fine.

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