As a child, I, like anyone who is fond of military history Soviet child, there was a “Book of Future Commanders”, which told about famous battles and famous commanders in a fascinating and picturesque way, starting from Alexander the Great and Hannibal, Napoleon and Suvorov, and ending with the victorious marshals in the Great Patriotic War.
But even then, reading about some battle on the Kalka, I wondered - how was the command carried out during the battle? Even to see what is happening at a distance of a couple of kilometers, especially if the troops raise clouds of dust, is almost impossible, not to mention the transmission of the order. Messenger only.
Later, I read opinions that the same Hannibal or Alexander the Great simply lined up an army for the battle, and after it began, nothing could be done.
On the other hand, the repeatedly mentioned false retreats and flank attacks of the nomads, especially the Mongols, suggest that this is simply impossible to do without operational control, and their means did not differ from those of the same Macedonian. But how this was done, I do not know.
Organization of command and control
This is where we turn to such an important thing as communications - for organizing command and control of troops, which is impossible without the exchange of information.
We will not go back to hoary antiquity, but at the very beginning of the First World War, Russian troops in Prussia suffered a terrible defeat precisely because of the lack of normal communication between the two armies, which made it impossible for joint actions.
The Second World War was in this regard even worse for the Red Army, to fight against the enemy, who had radio stations from every unit, where in tank and mechanized troops, there were special command tanks, the main weapons which was precisely the connection, it turned out to be very difficult.
One example is the introduction into battle in the summer of 1942 of three tank corps with a total strength of more than a thousand tanks. This blow was supposed to stop the German offensive "Blau" that had begun and seize the initiative from the enemy. And what is the result? Yes, almost nothing, again the corps were brought into battle one by one, the headquarters of the corps had no connection with the brigades, and those with each other and with higher headquarters, as a result, any orders were late, if at all. And the enemy had a complete picture, thanks to aerial reconnaissance and uninterrupted radio communications.
In the air, the situation was no better. Only by September 1942, fighters began to install radio stations on one hundred percent of the aircraft, but even then, on half of the machines, the radio station worked only for reception. I do not want to compare with the Germans at all.
But they learned, and by the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army was able to use radio communications at almost all levels. But it never came to the possibility of calling heavy artillery fire directly from the front line, as was the case with the Americans.
And then, already in the Soviet Army, the elemental base seriously failed. Who dragged an army radio station along with a set of batteries on a hump knows what we are talking about. But still, in Afghanistan, and in Chechnya, communications ensured the interaction of troops in sufficient volume. The low intensity of hostilities and the number of troops involved made it possible to do this.
But in the war of 888, when speed decided a lot, communications again turned out to be not up to par. I'm sure many have seen footage of the general calling on the phone. And then it seemed that the problem would be solved. I myself thought so when I read about mobile army cells, which make it possible to deploy reliable digital communications over an area of hundreds of square kilometers, about repeaters on drones, and footage from the exercises inspired optimism.
But here comes the NWO. And the insight began. What kind of network-centric war is there, where different units can exchange information in real time? There was often no communication within the groups. And the purchased Chinese radio stations show the horror of the situation.
I'm sure many have seen the recording from drone, where a Russian tank drives literally dozens of meters from the enemy, receives an RPG shell in the side, which, fortunately, ricochets. And all this time, the drone operator is trying to contact the tankers in some way to give information.
In general, again the same rake. There is no continuous communication system in the Russian army. Again.
Let's not talk about the enemy, so as not to become even sadder, let's remember a simple thing - civil communications. Surprisingly, mobile communications and the Internet in Russia are at the most advanced positions in the world, both in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, the territory of our country is not at all small. So why did it work for civilian structures, and not for the military?
I do not know the exact answer, but the most important factor is the lack of control over the armed forces by society. At least in the form of the same State Duma deputies. Where are the committees investigating the current situation, where are any conclusions and decisions? That's right, nowhere.
No one has answered and is not responsible for anything, and the problem is solved mainly by the forces of enthusiasts together with production structures.
So what to do?
I do not pretend to be the truth, but, apparently, we need a separate single military communications operator like the military Beeline or MTS, which will provide each soldier and each unit with reliable, secure, fast communications. And it is better if there are several of them, for competition.
Oh dreams, dreams...