Strategic Stability and Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century
Launching another British nuclear submarine. Photos from the official site of the company BAE Systems (UK)
Nuclear missile appearance weapons in the bipolar system of international relations, the concept of strategic balance was reduced to the parity of intercontinental nuclear weapons (over 5500 km), which the two superpowers had. This was due to the ability of such weapons in the short term to achieve decisive results, to destroy the enemy’s half of the population and two-thirds of the industrial potential (“mutual guaranteed destruction”).
Such a “narrow” definition took into account only warheads mounted on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. It did not take into account medium- and short-range nuclear weapons, as well as the giant conventional weapons that the United States and the USSR had. Beyond this definition were both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of other states.
A narrow understanding of strategic stability became the basis for the conclusion of Soviet-American nuclear arms control agreements. The SALT and START agreements set quantitative limits for the strategic triad. True, at the end of the Cold War, arms control was expanded. The INF Treaty was concluded, which destroyed Soviet and American ground-based missiles with a range from 500 to 5500 km. In addition, Washington and Moscow announced unilateral, but parallel steps to reduce tactical nuclear weapons.
A multilateral Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was also signed, limiting the five types of conventional weapons not only to the United States and the USSR, but also to all member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.
Nevertheless, until recently, the “narrow” definition of strategic stability was maintained, which was recorded in the new START Treaty, where only the traditional components of the strategic triad are taken into account.
However, at the beginning of the 21st century, the military-strategic balance is not limited only to strategic nuclear forces, but includes new components. Today, achieving the decisive goals of the war (defeat a wide range of military and economic goals, the destruction of the system of political and military control) becomes possible not only with the help of nuclear weapons. There are non-nuclear strategic means, the destructive power of which is increasingly approaching the capabilities of nuclear weapons. Over the coming decades, non-nuclear strategic weapons will probably reach maturity, which will have a significant impact on the military-strategic balance. And the leading role in creating strategic non-nuclear weapons belongs to the United States.
NEW CONTENT OF MILITARY STRATEGIC BALANCE
The aggregate balance of power in the polycentric world is now made up of so many factors.
Anti-missile technologies, the potential of a global lightning strike using conventional warheads, the possibility of launching weapons into outer space are becoming increasingly important. Large imbalances exist in the field of conventional weapons. The interrelation of these factors becomes more and more obvious. It is necessary to develop an integrated approach to solving problems arising from military technological breakthroughs.
It is significant that in the first decade of this century there has been a tremendous expansion of the functions of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which has undergone a fundamental reorganization. Initially STRATKOM united the strategic nuclear forces of the Air Force and Navy. Now its structure includes the Command of the Rapid Global Strike Forces (including nuclear and non-nuclear weapons), the Command of Intelligence and Surveillance Means, Space Command, the Command of Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense, the Command of Cybernetic Means of Struggle (and the director of the National Security Agency) and others.
It seems that the revolution in the field of information technology, without which modern economies and armed forces cannot exist, plays a crucial role in the evolution of strategic balance. Means of radio-electronic warfare became widespread in the last century. However, modern means of cybernetic struggle allow, without fire damage, to inflict such a blow on the enemy, which is capable of causing economic chaos, disrupting the functioning of energy, transport and information systems, as well as paralyzing political and military authorities.
The military leadership of the United States developed the concept of "Spherical Theater of Military Operations", which combines space and cyberspace. It is believed that the integration of these areas will achieve a synergistic effect.
Near-Earth space for half a century has been widely used for military purposes. But this concerns mainly communication satellites and reconnaissance spacecraft. The situation may radically change if shock systems are deployed in space, which can be used not only to destroy enemy space vehicles, but for anti-missile defense and for striking ground targets.
Cybernetic operations can include offensive and defensive actions in order to gain information superiority by destroying the enemy’s infrastructure and protecting it from attacking its own information systems. At the same time, cyber operations are considered as an alternative to the use of fire weapons to achieve a military goal without physically destroying enemy personnel and objects.
American experts often fear the "cybernetic Pearl Harbor." About this, in particular, said US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.
In July, 2011, the US Department of Defense published a document entitled “Cyberspace Operations Strategy”. The strategy notes that “cyber threats to US national security affect not only military facilities, but also all aspects of public life,” and speaks of the possibility of responding to cyber attacks by any available means — economic, political, diplomatic, and even military.
STRATCOM leaders argue that it is necessary to develop both offensive and defensive cyber deterrence. An example of offensive cyber weapons is the Stuxnet computer virus, which the United States and Israel have used to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.
The functions of the Cyber Command include preparation, coordination, integration, synchronization of operations to conduct operations and protect information networks of the US Department of Defense, as well as conducting military information operations "across the spectrum" to ensure the actions of the armed forces in all spheres, including ensuring the freedom of action of American and allied armed forces in cyberspace, the defeat of the enemy information media.
According to statements by US intelligence leaders at a congressional hearing on threats to national security, the potential of Russia and China is of particular concern in cyberspace.
The development of information technology has led to a sharp increase in the accuracy of conventional weapons, primarily - aviation bombs and cruise missiles. As noted in the report of the Congressional Research Service, "The United States has been a leader in the development of precision weapons from the very beginning and has a monopoly in this area for 20 years." For the first time, high-precision weapons were used by the United States during the Gulf War in 1992 (8% of all used ammunition), and then on a wider scale in military operations in Kosovo (29%), Afghanistan (60%), Iraq (68%) and Libya. In recent years, the United States has been actively using high-precision weapons on unmanned aerial vehicles in Pakistan and several other countries.
The US Navy has a large number of sea-based cruise missiles (SLCM) of the Tomahawk type. According to official data, in the year 2012, the USA had 3755 SLCMs. In 2013, it is planned to purchase another 361 cruise missile for surface ships and 123 SLCM for submarines.
Of great interest was the report entitled “Modernization of the nuclear strategy”, published in May 2012, prepared under the auspices of the Global Zero movement. Among the authors of this report are the former Deputy Chairman of the JLS and the Commander of STRATCOM, General James Cartwright, the former head of the US delegation to the negotiations on the START-1 Treaty, Richard Bert, the former First Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, the former Senator Charles Hagel, the retired General Jack Schiehene, and the co-founder of the movement Global Zero by Bruce Blair. The report argues that long-range US non-nuclear weapons can hit up to 30% of all targets on Russian territory that are on the list of targets for current US nuclear weapons. If the Russian program of creating aerospace defense is implemented, the number of targets hit in Russia will be reduced to about 10%.
The list of targets in China is approximately two times less than in Russia. With the use of US conventional weapons, 30 – 50% of Chinese targets can be hit.
The key role in the development of high-precision conventional weapons was played by the American space navigation system GPS. The Soviet Union later created its similar GLONASS system. This system, although not fully supported, is now supported by Russia. China is currently deploying its space navigation system.
Another promising direction is lasers. However, current ground-based and sea-based laser systems have a limited range. Space-based lasers may become more effective, but for now they remain just projectors.
THE HOUR OF GLOBAL IMPACT
In the past decade, the United States has put forward various options for a “fast global strike”, which involves defeating any targets on the planet within one hour using non-nuclear missile systems. ICBMs and SLBMs with conventional warheads were considered as means for such an attack. In particular, it was intended to deploy two SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads on each strategic Ohio-type submarine. At the same time, according to the terms of the new START Treaty, strategic missiles with conventional warheads should be included in the total number of carriers of strategic nuclear weapons limited by the Treaty.
Later, a proposal appeared to place medium-range missiles (2000 – 3000 miles) with conventional warheads on Virginia-class submarines.
The Air Force and the DAPRA began developing the FALCON system, which should hit targets at a distance of 9000 miles. It is also proposed to use the HTV-2 supersonic aerial vehicle with a range over 4000 miles. The Navy conducted work on the creation of the ArcLight system based on the first stage of the SM-3 interceptor missile.
It should be noted that in the above-mentioned report “Modernization of the nuclear strategy” it is proposed to deploy 12 – 20 ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads (Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2) in California or other regions of the United States so that, without flying over the territory of Russia and China, hit six rocket mines in the DPRK and Iran. According to the authors of the report, the United States will be able to destroy 100% of all necessary targets in North Korea and Iran without using nuclear weapons with conventional high-precision weapons.
The balance of conventional weapons is also essential. During the Cold War, the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had significant superiority over the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance in the ground forces, but were inferior to the West in naval weapons. Now the United States and American allies are many times superior to the Russian Federation in all components of the conventional armed forces. According to the latest official figures, 22 NATO countries participating in the CFE Treaty have 11 in Europe tank, 22 BBM, 788 artillery systems of a caliber of 13 mm or more, 264 combat aircraft, 100 attack helicopters, and Russia - 3621 tanks, 1085 armored combat vehicles (BBM), 3660 artillery systems of a caliber of 7690 mm or more, 4634 combat aircraft, 100 attack helicopters. Thus, the North Atlantic Alliance is superior to the Russian Federation in all types of weapons that are included in the CFE Treaty: 1542 times for tanks, 365 times for armored combat vehicles, 3,2 times for artillery, 2,3 times for combat aircraft and 2,9 times for attack helicopters.
In addition, in 2007, Moscow announced a moratorium on the implementation of the CFE Treaty, and in 2011, it ceased to comply with the terms of this Treaty and the NATO countries. It should be recalled that 7 from 29 of the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance are not parties to the CFE Treaty, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, directly bordering the Russian Federation.
The CFE Treaty has played a certain role in reducing the level of military tension in Europe. Over the 20 years of its operation, the parties eliminated over 70 thousand units of weapons. However, in recent years several wars have occurred in Europe, including in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR.
Nevertheless, every year in mid-December, representatives of the 56 OSCE participating States gather in Vienna to exchange information about their armed forces, military organization, personnel and main weapon and equipment systems. Countries also exchange defense planning and budget information throughout the year. This comprehensive exchange of information is carried out in accordance with the most important tool in the field of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) in the OSCE region - the Vienna Document 2011 of the Year.
At the same time, neither the CFE Treaty nor the Vienna Document touches on the most important elements of the modern military-strategic balance. The decisive role today is played by high-precision destruction systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as information systems providing reconnaissance, command and control, and command of troops, on which success on the battlefield depends. Nor are naval-based strike systems, such as cruise missiles and carrier-based aircraft, which have been used very effectively in military conflicts of recent decades, not taken into account.
NATO is constantly improving the means of aerospace attack.Photos from the official site of the company BAE Systems (UK)
ADAPTIVE APPROACH
An increasing role in the military-strategic balance is played by missile defense systems designed to intercept ballistic and cruise missiles of various classes. However, the United States withdrew from the Treaty unilaterally in June 2002 of the year. The administration of George W. Bush announced its intention to create a layered defense missile defense system on land, sea, air and space-based. Under Bush Jr., the Pentagon planned to deploy GBI 44 rockets. In addition, it was planned to deploy a Third Positional Area with 10 two-stage GBI interceptors in Poland (as well as radar stations in the Czech Republic).
The administration of Barack Obama in 2009, radically changed the priorities of missile defense, focusing on missile defense on theater. It was decided to limit the number of GBI 30 interceptors to units. At the same time, the Obama administration announced it has abandoned the development of a number of strategic missile defense systems, including KEI, MKV and the space program, as well as the Third Positional Area in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) was proclaimed, which should be implemented in four stages of implementation up to the 2020 year.
The EPAA envisages the deployment in the fourth phase (after 2018 of the year) of the advanced SM-3 Block 2B interceptors, which can carry out “limited” interception of ICBMs. Hence the fear that the United States could deploy a layered strategic missile defense in the future.
As the director of the ABM Agency Patrick O'Reilly said, "first of all, the SM-3 Block 2B program is designed to intercept ICBMs, and it is for this purpose that it is being developed." This is the first echelon of American defense. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Brad Roberts, "The goal of the fourth phase of the Adaptive Approach is to protect the United States."
In addition, it is planned to deploy SM-3 interceptors on US Navy ships equipped with the Aegis system. By 2020, a total of 94 such ships will be equipped with several hundred anti-ballistic missiles. At the same time, the grouping of ships assigned to the Atlantic the fleet USA, can increase to 20. Of these, about a third can be in the Mediterranean and North Seas. It is possible that these ships may periodically call into the seas adjacent to the shores of Russia - the Black, Baltic, Barents, and this means a direct opportunity to intercept Russian ICBMs in the middle flight area.
The report of experts on missile defense issues, prepared in April 2012 of the year under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), caused a great resonance. The panel of experts was headed by David Montague, former president of the Lockheed missile unit, and Walter Slowcomb, former deputy secretary of defense for the Clinton administration.
According to the assessment of the authors of the report, the Aegis, THAAD and Patriot-3 missile defense systems, envisaged in one to three phases of the EPAA, are able to provide effective comprehensive protection of American troops and allies in Europe, the Middle East and the Western Pacific from ballistic short-range and medium-range missiles.
The NAS report states that if the interceptor speed is at least 4 km / sec, then it will take only three or four missile defense areas for ground and sea deployment to protect Europe. The presence of such interceptors will also provide protection against attempts to interfere with the access of US forces to the western Pacific Ocean and against attacks on bases in Guam and Okinawa.
If these measures are fully implemented, then there is no need to implement the fourth phase of the EPAA and deploy SM-3 Block 2B interceptors in Poland and other regions. According to the authors of the report, the fourth phase is not necessary for a missile defense system in theaters and is not optimal for the protection of American territory. To protect the territory of the United States, NAS experts consider it necessary to create a third strategic missile defense area on the East Coast of the United States. To this end, it is recommended to develop a new strategic interceptor using the 1 and 2 stages of the KEI interceptor, which was discontinued by the Obama administration in the 2009 year.
The problem of missile defense is analyzed in detail in a report devoted to the issue of missile defense in relations between Russia and the United States, excerpts from which were published in the Independent Military Review.
In a polycentric world, the military-strategic balance cannot be reduced, as in the years of the Cold War, only to the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia, although they still account for more than 90% of the existing nuclear arsenals. According to the new START Treaty, Russia and the United States have stopped both on warheads and on carriers, which still significantly exceed the arsenals of these weapons available to other nuclear powers.
Currently in the world there is in addition to Russia and the United States about 1 thousand nuclear charges that are in service with China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.
However, this does not mean that other nuclear powers can still remain outside the nuclear weapons control regime. Other possessors of nuclear weapons should gradually be connected to it. The process of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, should cease to be bilateral and become multilateral. Nuclear arms control issues require a collective solution to the problems existing here. This requires the gradual involvement in the negotiation process of other members of the “nuclear club” that have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Particularly important is the participation in this process of China, which has 55 – 65 ICBMs and has the potential to multiply its nuclear forces. Since the majority of Chinese missile systems and long-range and front-line aircraft have a dual purpose, that is, they can be used with both conventional and nuclear warheads, some experts believe that the nuclear arsenal of the PRC is many times higher than the generally accepted estimate in the West (180 – 220 warheads). The situation is complicated by allegations of a network of giant underground tunnels in which Chinese nuclear weapons can be secretly stored. Some American experts argue that China no longer adheres to minimal deterrence, but pursues more ambitious goals, intending to level off with nuclear superpowers by the middle of this century. This uncertainty may prevent further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States.
There is also a more difficult task - to ensure that in the process of further negotiations the accounting of nuclear potentials possessed by non-parties to the NPT: Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea. It is necessary to find approaches acceptable to all on how these potentials can be involved in the disarmament process.
NEED NEW APPROACHES
In the 21st century, it seems that the arms control mechanism created in the Cold War years on the basis of legally binding agreements (establishing quantitative ceilings, verification and verification measures) is hardly applicable to the possible regulation of many components of the military-strategic balance on both bilateral and multilateral levels.
All the regions of the World Ocean are available to warships armed with interceptors of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Photos from the official site of the company BAE Systems (UK)
The traditional arms control mechanism can still be effective in the field of nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States, which was confirmed in the new START Treaty, although non-strategic nuclear weapons of the two countries are still beyond the scope of this mechanism. In our opinion, it is theoretically possible to reach new Russian-American legally binding agreements on nuclear weapons. However, it is extremely doubtful that it will be possible to achieve the conclusion of a new legally binding agreement on limiting missile defense (the PRO-2 Treaty). It is unlikely that the CFE Treaty will be reanimated, although it is necessary to continue the search for agreements on a new international legal arms control regime with the participation of all European countries.
Taking this into account, it seems that the development of new instruments for regulating the military-strategic balance, which should complement legally binding agreements, is required. Maintaining and strengthening military-strategic stability is a process that should ensure the predictability of the situation, avoid sharp imbalances, avoid unjustified expenditures on the arms race, and prevent the emergence and escalation of military-political crises.
One of such tools can be confidence and transparency measures in relation to, for example, certain components of the military-strategic balance. Parties must recognize the need to exercise restraint and not try to seek excellence, which, as evidenced by story, is temporary and turns into a new dangerous spiral of the arms race.
It can be assumed that such measures may include unilateral, but parallel steps at both a bilateral (for example, Russian-American or Chinese-Indian) level. Such measures may affect both the quantitative parameters of certain types of weapons, and the provision of information about their operational activities. These measures can be taken on the basis of political agreements, rather than contractual legal obligations.
Another form of maintaining strategic stability can be cooperative actions to ensure joint security and joint defense. In this regard, it can be recalled that the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance led to the fact that a military clash between the NATO member states is practically impossible, although historically they have repeatedly fought with each other. Former opponents became allies, the differences between which can no longer lead to armed conflict. It seems that this experience is also very useful for the future interaction between Russia and the United States, which have never been adversaries in a multipolar system of international relations. Moreover, Washington and Moscow were allies in World War II, despite the ideological contradictions.
Thus, the stability of the military-strategic balance in the 21st century can be based on three pillars: treaty obligations on arms limitation and reduction, confidence-building measures and transparency on the basis of political obligations and security and defense cooperation on the basis of mutual legal obligations.
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