Tank versus infantry: something needs to be done about it
Photo: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Question by Viktor Murakhovsky
Reserve Colonel Viktor Ivanovich Murakhovsky, a member of the Expert Council of the Board of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation, in his telegram blog raised a very topical issue about the vulnerability of modern tanks in front of the infantry. In the light of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, this problem requires separate consideration.
The issue of situational awareness of the crews of armored vehicles escalated once again when there was a lot of video evidence of tanks passing literally under the noses of enemy infantry. On one of them, neither the driver nor the tank commander was able to see the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine hiding literally at the side of the road. As a result, the tank slowly drove past the nationalists' hole and got into the back of the RPG turret.
The Russian tank did not notice the hole with the nationalists (circled in black). In a few seconds, the militant will hit from a grenade launcher into the stern of the tank. Fortunately, to no avail. Source: Telegram
Fortunately, the ammunition only struck the armor without causing any damage to the tank. But he could get into the MTO and immobilize the armored vehicle. The outcome of the event was resolved in a draw. At the same time, the entire video sequence was accompanied by emotional comments from our fighters, who, observing the situation from a quadrocopter, were unable to communicate the position of the enemy to the tank crew by radio. The incident, certainly far from the only one, revealed a long-standing problem in tank building - the crew of a combat vehicle sees little around them.
It's all about the original concept of using tanks. The above-mentioned Viktor Murakhovsky in his telegram channel comments quite clearly:
It would seem that support for attacking tanks should be provided by escort infantry fighting vehicles. Regarding the effectiveness of small-caliber artillery (for example, a 30-mm automatic gun 2A42), the reserve colonel also spoke:
Often, a tank is forced to go to the front line to the trenches of the Armed Forces of Ukraine alone. It is worth mentioning that such tactics are associated either with the hopelessness of command, or elementary incompetence. An alternative option was to work outside the reach of anti-tank equipment, supporting the infantry at a distance of several hundred meters, or even a kilometer or two. In any other case, the losses of the advancing tanks will be excessive and completely incomparable with the objectives of the operation. The roles on the battlefield have changed - if earlier they said that the tank should attack with the support of the infantry, now the foot soldiers go forward, and the tank moves behind them if necessary.
The second question - if a grenade launcher is found right next to him, how will the tank commander destroy him?
If you're lucky, you can use a course machine gun or even the main caliber. You can take advantage of the Syrian experience, drive up to a building with entrenched infantry and just shoot out the window - heavy contusions are provided to the inhabitants. In the conditions described above, when a Russian tank slipped past the nationalists' hole, it was enough just to fire a cannon over them so that most of the hiding people never got up. But that's if you're very lucky.
In all other cases, the commander has to water the surroundings from a machine gun on the tower, which is sometimes also called anti-aircraft. Only now, in the vast majority of Russian tanks, the commander is forced to operate a heavy machine gun outside the armored vehicle. Neither the T-80BV nor the T-72 "B" series are equipped with a remote-controlled machine gun mount. They are not equipped even now, a year after the start of the special operation. The exception is the T-90M "Breakthrough", on the turret of which the UDP T05BV-1 flaunts with a PKM machine gun. A good product, but the caliber had to be lowered from the original 12,7 mm to 7,62 mm, which affected both the range and lethal force.
Recall that the fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for the most part, are well equipped with personal protective equipment, which, under certain conditions, can mitigate the lethal effect of even a machine-gun bullet. The 12,7-mm caliber completely eliminates all the advantages of protected infantry, but for it to work, the tank commander must sacrifice his life. It turns out a vicious circle.
UDP T05BV-1 is the exception rather than the rule on Russian tanks. Source: vk.com
As Victor Murakhovsky rightly notes, most of the enemy infantry is destroyed by artillery or, at best, aviation. Verbatim:
And a tank capable of responding quickly simply cannot cope with the remaining manpower of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is especially acute in the completely urbanized landscapes of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The infantry, under the cover of the ruins of cities, actively maneuvers and enters areas that are not visible to the tank crew.
Ways to solve the problem
The issue of the crew's poor awareness of what is happening around them will never be finally and irrevocably resolved, but you can try. Solutions may or may not be expensive.
Among the expensive ones, of course, is the increase in the crew by one member. It is no coincidence that the Terminator BMPT can accommodate five tankers at once, two of which are exclusively engaged in the destruction of nearby infantry. We are talking about operators of course grenade launchers AG-17D.
The layout and placement of the crew of the BMPT "Terminator". Source: ursa-tm.ru
But here, too, there are paradoxes.
Two powerful anti-personnel weapons are seriously limited in horizontal angles of fire and actually cover only the frontal projection of the armored vehicle. For all other threats, either a twin automatic cannon or, in extreme cases, anti-tank missiles have to take the rap.
By analogy with the BMPT, a fourth crew member, equipped with appropriate surveillance equipment, can seriously enhance the anti-personnel capabilities of the tank. Especially if the tanker is equipped with an all-angle grenade launcher and, in a Western manner, with a small-sized reconnaissance copter. But all this, of course, sounds like a fantasy - no one will remake tank hulls for the sake of such an “insignificant” problem.
There is another way out of the situation - to equip combat tanks with "transparent armor" complexes. For example, the Israeli IronVision helmet from Elbit System allows you to see through the hull and turret of a tank. On commercials, the product looks impressive, but it is completely incomprehensible how to use the equipment in combat conditions. War is not a computer game where, in which case, you can save.
The second way out is to update the staffing of the tank unit. The tank should not go into battle without the support of real-time aerial reconnaissance. For each tank crew - one operator drone. Whether he will transmit a picture to the commander’s monitor or inform on the radio about what is happening around is already a matter of technology. Not bad if the escort quadrocopter is capable of dropping a couple of VOGs on the heads of enemy anti-tank crews. Something similar is already being practiced in a special operation, but how common it is and, most importantly, how it is analyzed by the military, is a matter of discovery.
One of the main discoveries of the Ukrainian campaign was the effectiveness of the “artillery-drone” communication, which turns the ancient D-30s into high-precision guns. Correction from the air is not so important for a tank (after all, most of the time the gun works direct fire), but information support from the air is critical for a blind tank. However, this is far from being only a problem of tanks - the staffing of almost platoons with copters was talked about from the very beginning of the special operation.
Now let's return to the issue of defeating the detected infantry.
As mentioned above, there is virtually nothing to destroy tank-dangerous targets. But the Israelis have. Each Merkava has a 60-mm mortar, which, depending on the modification, is either on the armor or inside the turret. The range of the gun is from 150 to 3 meters. It is not easy to kill infantry in body armor and helmets with such weapons, but it is quite possible to suppress the desire to shoot at a tank.
For reference: the Russian army is armed with a similar 60-mm mortar "Gall". With minor modifications, it can be used from a tank to fight infantry.
Israeli tank mortar. Source: oleggranovsky.livejournal.com
Not easy with tank ammunition. Unlike NATO tanks, we do not have a specialized projectile for effective point-blank shooting at manpower.
The Abrams boasts the M1028 or Canister Shot. More than a thousand 9,5 mm balls effectively mow the clearing in front of the tank. According to sources in the United States, "one such projectile provides a guaranteed defeat of up to 50% of an attacking enemy infantry unit of up to a company at a distance of up to 500 meters." The ammunition works well against light fortifications, barbed wire and thickets.
The Israelis have an M329 Apam in the tank ammunition, firing six consecutive shrapnel charges on a trajectory. As planned, it is better to shoot with such a projectile along the street, which is guaranteed to hit grenade launchers at a great distance.
A great danger to the infantry is the German DM11, capable of undermining the enemy's trenches in the air, or on contact with the target.
An effective anti-personnel weapon is the fragmentation-beam tank "Telnik". Do our tankers have it in a special operation?
Domestic tanks in this area also do not lag behind and are equipped with remote detonation systems for the Ainet ammunition, still of Soviet design, and more modern Telniki. A programmable fuse allows you to set the projectile to explode above the target, as well as with a delay after overcoming an obstacle. For example, behind a brick wall. The shells of the "Telnik" complex are of the fragmentation-beam type and so far are intended only for the T-90M. A beam is a stream of tiny striking elements that a projectile throws out in the air at a given point in the trajectory. In this, the ammunition has similarities with the German DM11.
Interestingly, it is also possible to turn an ordinary high-explosive fragmentation ZOF26 into a programmable projectile - for this it is enough to replace the standard fuse with an electronic 3VM-12.
There is currently no information on the use of tank systems for remote detonation "Aynet" and "Telnik" against nationalists in Ukraine.
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