Military Review

Shield and sword

Shield and sword
Russian Federal Security Service versus US intelligence

Although the concept of the “main enemy” after the collapse of the USSR is gone, it is the US special services that are most active in their quest to gain access to the most important state and military secrets of our country. RUMO, CIA, as well as other special services that are part of the American intelligence community, are constantly improving the ways and methods of obtaining data of interest to them. Today, the veil of secrecy is being removed from certain operations conducted by US intelligence against the Russian Federation. We offer readers of the National Defense magazine documentary materials obtained during operational activities of the Russian counterintelligence.


The materials refer to a not so old time (the middle of the 90 of the last century - the beginning of the present), when the old foundations collapsed, the future seemed very vague, the life of the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation was poor and half-starved, and the offers of foreigners seemed like a gift of fate. It was during these years in Russia that intra-and interdepartmental narrow corporate structures were formed, which established relations with the United States at a qualitatively new unofficial level. It is characteristic that all these numerous scientific, technical, economic and social structures, as a rule, used (and use today) the word "Center" in their names. This circumstance, according to the Russian counterintelligence, can be considered a distinctive sign of their use by the Americans or by someone else in the implementation of a policy of globalization of the economy, security and information.

Issued the appointment of the Centers and the problems they were engaged in: developing weapons, including non-lethal actions, using dual-use technologies, collecting and analyzing defense information, organizing scientific and technical expertise, coordinating the interaction of defense industry enterprises from different countries in creating effective military technical equipment.

Representatives of the United States in these Russian organizations were mainly former and current military, high-ranking officials, and personnel intelligence officers. Previously, they tended to work in the US Department of Defense structures - Advisory Council, Defense Research and Development, Special Weapons, Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Research and Engineering Center of the US Army Strategic Command, NASA, Sandy, Livermore and Tartan national laboratories.

The staff of the Centers on the Russian side also did not consist of liberal intellectuals who had little meaning in military affairs. There were also completely retired high-ranking officials from various structural divisions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: the main headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces, central research institutes, military academies, a nuclear test site, the office of the deputy minister of defense, and so on. And more and more academicians, admirals and generals, doctors of military and other sciences. They regularly traveled to the States, read lectures there, took part in symposia and conferences under innocuous names for many, which only an expert read correctly and understood what was behind it. And our retirees were specialists and understood what they were doing.

The slogan "Vigilance - our weapon"remains relevant in modern conditions (BN Shirokrad, poster, 1953 g.)

One involuntarily comes to mind история, told by Lieutenant-General of the Foreign Intelligence Service Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, now deceased. At the meeting (in the midst of “perestroika”), our staff members and the American former intelligence officers popped up: if you knew how high the posts our agents occupied in Russia ... Apparently, not everyone today knows about the work of the public science centers. We are about what is known. On the basis of one of them, they even planned to create a Russian-American joint venture in the form of a closed joint-stock company. This form provided the greatest freedom of action in the commercial market outside the rigid dependence on government funding and control. The creation of a joint venture would allow the accumulation of numerous “satellite” formations already created at regime enterprises, research institutes, design bureaus and educational institutions - as independent legal entities.

The main obstacle for informal cooperation was the state intermediary in the trade in armaments and military equipment (IWT) - Rosvooruzhenie (the current Rosoboronexport). He was determined by law the status of a monopolistic intermediary between the Russian defense industry and a foreign customer. The work through Rosvooruzhenie did not suit the Americans. This would lead to a rise in the cost of 40-60% contracts, reducing the role and importance of the Centers and the income of their functionaries. In addition, it would expand the circle of people aware of the existence of military technical contracts, some of which contradicted international norms on the proliferation of nuclear missile and other military technologies. And instead of the joint venture, the mechanism of tripartite relations between representatives of the Russian defense industry and foreign military partners has earned, with the intermediate role of one authoritative Russian academy and the same Centers.

Let's see what this collaboration was legendary. Of course, as “cooperation in the interests of mutual and international security, countering terrorists,” under the overwhelming concern about the proliferation of military technologies, solving problems related to the development and combat use of modern types of weapons. The “gullible” Russians were hammered: at the present stage, the issue of using highly accurate and intelligent weapons systems has ceased to be abstract, has moved into the area of ​​decision-making, and for this there is a need for a constructive dialogue between leading experts from the United States and Russia.

The money for Russian secrets flowed: separate joint projects had funding amounts of $ 100 000 and more.

American "colleagues" explained to Russian "partners" that they were given the opportunity to declare themselves in the Western market and make money. Unless, of course, they demonstrate their creative potential. The interaction was proposed at the levels “scientist with scientist, engineer with engineer”, who, being experts in their field, should themselves determine the most appropriate methods of scientific and technical developments, giving them constructiveness and effectiveness.

It looks nice and quite harmless, but it is worth reading the requirements for materials accepted for examination by Russian scientists, as this goodness disappears. So, the development had to combine a description of what has already been done and, in more detail, the expected results; have a comparison of each of the proposed technologies with existing or traditional methods - to highlight the competitive advantages of these new approaches; have evidence of actual use and experimental results.

Required "colleagues" from the United States to specify and "accurate cost estimates." The military-political and military-technical programs of the USA in Russia were financed through the grant system through international funds and as part of assistance programs in the then fashionable conversion of the defense-industrial complex. All this turned out to be possible with, alas, the absence of legislative federal regulation and control.

Fierce customers resorted to cheating methods - materials often taken for examination by Russian specialists did not pay and justified by the fact that most Russian specialists "know very little in structuring technological and business proposals to develop and implement technologies that meet the needs of the world market." Payments to the Russian side went in stages, and only groups that provided valuable information, demonstrating essential abilities, received full and continuous funding.

With the keen interest of the Americans, the money flowed. Individual joint projects had funding amounts of $ 100000 and more. Russian specialists received money in cash, by credit cards of various banks, by transfer to open personal accounts in foreign banks. The only thing unanimous was that the unofficial incomes of legal entities and individuals that had appeared were not declared, and taxes in Russia were not paid.


The mechanism of action of social-scientific Centers and similar structures paid from abroad was independent of the will of the political leadership of Russia, of the military-political decisions taken by it and of the current federal legislation. On the contrary, these structures performed the functions of influence. In the final result, Russia turned, essentially, into an object of unilateral disarmament without taking into account the interests of its national security.

On the territory of Russia, employees of these structures were looking for carriers of important information. And found. These were plenipotentiaries of the executive branch, the defense industry complex, employees of leading research institutes and design bureaus, high-ranking officials from ministries, departments, federal government bodies, representatives of key committees of the chambers of the Federal Assembly (the documents contain specific names). They were established with them, and then developed when direct, when mediated contacts. These people were gradually attracted to work in the right directions - naturally, with funding through various kinds of international funds. First of all, customers were interested in information about the state of Russia's nuclear missile potential, land-based, sea-based and air-based strategic nuclear weapons, and various military space systems.

The “attracted” Russian officials, experts and scientists aimed at collecting, processing and analyzing just such information - under the guise of conducting scientific research. Here is an example of official fishing information. In a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, the head of one of the Centers (a very famous figure) wrote: “Since one of the most important tasks of our work is helping state and intergovernmental structures in the fight against terrorism,” we ask you to give us the opportunity to familiarize ourselves with such and such plans.

And then, in the order of “informing the public on disarmament issues”, the collected classified information was massively dumped into an open message through the media. Recall that the censorship was then absent as such, the information security structures that replaced it were not yet on their feet, and were also intimidated by the liberal editions constantly attacking them. This is where, in part, many "sensational" articles, publications, brochures and books. Through them, confidential information became unclassified, convenient for transfer to customers. A process very similar to money laundering.

The technique of publications on a closed topic was quite tricky. Used tactics "from the reverse." Using specific methods, the Centers obtained the necessary objective data, then, in some approximation, open publications were selected, and the existing “gaps” were filled with data supposedly obtained from scientific analysis. It is this line of defense that arrested "scientists" choose today.

The practice of the Russian counterintelligence in cases of disclosure of classified information showed that the law “On Mass Media” did not even allow the criminal procedure to establish a specific source of information in the case of publication in the media of information constituting a state secret. And the law “On State Secrets” and even the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation did not allow guaranteeing the inviolability of any federal information resources.

American agents did not hesitate to contact even the government of the Russian Federation for information of interest to her.

The centers involved a whole contingent of staff correspondents of domestic and foreign publications with their confidential sources. Such journalists were fueled by specialized intelligence information, obtained, among other things, by technical means. During a search in one of the Centers, even informational reports on the presence of Russian satellites in elliptical orbits and geostationary satellites of the missile attack warning system were found. The Centers' employees created an extensive network of “consultants” from the number of secret carriers, whose services were also paid. However, informal relations under the “information - money” scheme were reinforced, as it is done in agent intelligence, by selecting subscriptions. They are then attached to the reporting financial documents.

Publications in the media of classified information allowed to increase the official status of specialists in this field and to be in demand as independent experts in the highest Russian legislative bodies. The latter, in turn, allowed to expand the range of opportunities for access to the information of interest. For example, one of these experts was involved in the preparation of parliamentary hearings on the radiation accident at a chemical plant and officially got access to information related to regulatory support, compliance with process regulations, operation and adequacy of protection systems at a special-purpose Minatom facility. The information he received was then used in the preparation of open information articles.

Mandatory principles of interaction between American and Russian researchers were developed in order to avoid possible problems with the Russian counterintelligence when transferring information to the West. These principles, set out in various reports, provided for all American participants to obtain approval of US counterintelligence prior to any interaction with their Russian colleagues. All interactions must be at an unclassified level, and the materials or information provided to them must be “cleaned up” by appropriate expert procedures. In addition, the Centers and creative teams collaborated emphatically “informally,” as private companies or public organizations that do not represent the interests of American government structures. Russian scientific teams instructed by Americans to cover up their unseemly work made out applications for the fulfillment of the state defense order for R & D, completely identical to those that they carried out for the Americans. And it turned out that according to the documents they worked for Russia, but in fact - for the United States.

The declared need to ensure the joint security of Russia and the United States in the face of a common threat from third world countries advocating international terrorism was taken as the ideological basis of informal cooperation. How familiar this is! Some joint conferences were based on the principle: “Official Russian-American relations are not constant magnitude, whereas informal and private exchanges most fully meet the interests of the world community on issues of universal security.” Such a frank “crap” is now and again found in documents describing unofficial military-technical cooperation. Sometimes it takes just a bewilderment: after all, for our idiots, for Ivanushki-fools, they held some of our admirals and doctors of science!

And in the future, the Americans continued the same policy. For example, the texts of the START-2 Treaty in the English and Russian languages ​​turned out to be non-identical. The Russian text contains the Global Protection System - Global Protection System with reference to the joint statement of the presidents and is derived from the full name of the system in English: Global Protection Against Limited Ballistic Missile Stikes System. This phrase is correctly translated into Russian as “a system of global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes.” That is, we are talking about a “global protection system”, and not a “global protection system”, as it is in the Russian translation.

In the first case, everything is done on a legal basis: both parties agree on the creation of a certain system capable of exercising global protection against ballistic missile attacks. But no one obligated them to create a global system for protecting the rest of the world, but this is the ultimate strategic goal of the United States.


Today it seems wild and impossible, but a few years ago, on the basis of the development of the “science-based” priorities of the military-technical policy funded from abroad, the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine of Russia were formulated. The main components of these documents, prompted or imposed by the Americans, were, in particular, reducing the role of strategic nuclear weapons and, due to Russia's geostrategic position, a significant increase in the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), the need to formulate a containment policy of one of the third countries with the right to “ Demonstration Explosion of TNW. And, of course, the transition to a partnership between Russia and the United States.

The partners “helped” the partners also to substantiate the main directions and priorities of the military-technical policy of the Ministry of Defense of Russia. Various public centers together with similar foreign structures have developed mathematical models that allow, allegedly, to make calculations of strategic equilibrium in a multipolar world in the field of nuclear weapons. The Russian top political leadership was Jesuitly "prompted": that they mistakenly did not take into account the factor of high-precision weapons (WTO). It is much more significant in ensuring strategic parity than the potential capabilities of the future US national missile defense system, which in the foreseeable future will not be able to prevent a retaliatory nuclear strike by Russia. There is a usual way to switch attention from a more significant topic to a less significant one. And in the documents determining the level of the national security of the country, appropriate adjustments were made, often harmful to the Russian Federation.

A few years ago, on the basis of the development of the “science-based” priorities of the military-technical policy paid out from abroad, the National Security Concept and the Russian military doctrine were formulated.

As part of a research project (code “ALPHA”), proposals were developed for the creation of an information infrastructure (databases, computer systems, etc.) on the problem of the global defense of the world community from ballistic missiles. As a result, the existing regulatory framework related to the preservation of state secrets was questioned. In particular, the law of the Russian Federation "On State Secrets" and lists of information classified as state secrets. The amendments made to them led to a direct, purposeful erosion of the country's information security.

The unprofitable directions of scientific and industrial policy were imposed on Russia, which, of course, weakened our fundamental science, a resource of national security. The US intelligence agencies legally, from the standpoint of various types of Centers in Russia, created real conditions for their military departments and military industrial companies to penetrate the Russian high-tech market. And for the long term and without significant financial costs. The US intelligence services were able to organize, on an unofficial basis, research and development work (R & D) in Russia to create their own new offensive and defensive weapons.

Counterintelligence seized correspondence customers and performers. It can be concluded from it: in the territory of Russia, in the framework of the Concept for the Creation and Joint Operation of the Global Protection System (PES) developed by the Americans, the US military strategic objectives were systematically implemented. This decrease in Russia's military-political status, obtaining information about its military-strategic potential, has a negative impact on the pace and direction of Russia's most important defense programs. The Americans unexpectedly went out on such unique Russian scientific and technical developments that they had difficulties in forming technical assignments for our specialists in their further improvement and application.

In particular, the project “Studying the Affection of Manpower” provided for the analysis of data obtained from tests of weapons and military actions in order to predict the situation (pressure, time, impulse) outside the volume-detonating cloud. It was also proposed to determine which physiological effects (damage to the lungs, rupture of the tympanic wall, loss of hearing, etc.) are used to create safety standards, what level of injury affects the deterioration of combat missions. No money can pay for this experience, but the price was named, and bring it just awkward because of the scanty.

Using the latest Russian military technology, the United States solved its scientific, technical, economic, and organizational problems. For example, they created and then entered into the architecture of their national missile defense strategic space monitoring systems, technical means of reliably assessing and classifying the rocket and space situation, and detecting Russian ICBMs. Such "cooperation" brought the United States huge political and economic dividends to the detriment of Russia's defense.

Bypassing legislative restrictions by various Centers, groups and public organizations under the auspices of the United States led to a shift in the center of gravity of solving military construction tasks in the non-governmental sphere and in the interests of a foreign state. In addition, informal military-technical cooperation on the territory of Russia became widespread and involved hundreds of officials from many dozens of highly sensitive and secure facilities in its orbit, which caused a massive violation of criminal law.

The project "Study of the susceptibility of manpower" included an analysis of data obtained from weapons tests and military actions in order to predict the situation (pressure, time, momentum) outside the volume-detonating cloud.

In that situation, it was quite possible to expect that if federal defense programs were funded in the near future, ready-made, but morally obsolete technologies and weapons would come from the Russian defense industry, and the most unique developments would be patented in the United States. To argue that today everything is different, alas, is impossible.


The United States, among other things, has funded joint research projects to study the effects of nuclear explosions. They especially needed it in the conditions of the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. And they wanted to solve the problems by someone else. And the problems are very serious. For example, what is the impact of high-altitude nuclear explosions on Russian electricity transmission and telecommunication networks, on structures and materials located at great depth underground, on land and air military systems. They were interested in the work of radar and radio wave propagation, exposure of people to high and low radiation doses, and many others.

Under the scrutiny of the Americans were ways to improve the conventional warheads. In particular, to increase their armor-piercing and other destructive abilities depending on the classification of targets — underground bunkers, armored vehicles, moving launchers, and “soft”, distributed over the area, targets. There have been attempts to improve the guidance system with increasing accuracy of delivery of warheads and resistance to interference, to upgrade the launch platforms of precision weapons.

However, from a wide range of intelligence and information aspirations of the US special services, as follows from the available materials, the problems of improving their own arsenals of nuclear weapons lay in the priority plane. They succeeded in this, having gained a lot of valuable information from "colleagues" from the Russian military research institutes and scientific centers. Americans then became aware that, for example, the construction of almost two-meter-thick armor plate covering the missile shaft was multi-layered. It uses materials that are more resistant to the impact of a projectile with high kinetic energy and a cumulative jet. In combination with layers of steel, the resistance of uranium ceramics may be higher than the resistance of steel by 2,5 times under kinetic effect, and 4 times by cumulative.

As a result, as a “zero approximation,” the researchers suggested that the protection of a silo launcher cover (silo) with a direct hit is equivalent to the strength of a plate made of rolled armor with a thickness of no more than 2-3 m. For Topol-M mobile soil rocket complexes there is an assumption in calculations that the thickness of the walls of the transport and launch container does not exceed 70 mm. That is, everything that has been gained over the years by the labor of many people and at great expenditure, the United States received for nothing.

By that time, the US Department of Defense was running about 30 programs to develop and improve the WTO. It was planned then (and is being implemented today) to deploy more than 100 thousand cruise missiles to destroy various types of targets: underground bunkers, fortified structures, bridges, buildings, industrial enterprises, roads, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, radar stations.

US-funded research was aimed at finding the vulnerabilities of mine launchers of Russian ICBMs.

According to the calculations, with sufficient kinetic energy of the warhead, the power of the cumulative jet or their cumulative effect, penetration of the protective silo roof is possible. This will damage the MBR container and the missile itself, so that its launch will no longer be possible. The mine can also be incapacitated when a warhead hits critical components. For example, wedge the cover, which will also lead to the impossibility of launching a rocket.

Our scientists also helped in carrying out R&D aimed at deploying conventional warheads on strategic ICBMs. This was also needed to break through the silo defense. Experiments carried out in the United States showed that a warhead with a speed of 1,2 km / s and a mass of about 270 kg passed through a layer of granite 13 m thick. To reliably defeat silos with one or two warheads, an accuracy of at least 1-2 meters is required. The existing types of high-precision weapons did not provide such high accuracy. And then they settled on the managed aviation bombs (UAB) with laser guidance - they had the greatest accuracy. The UAB can hit the Topol-M mobile ground-based missile system (PGRK) with an accuracy of 40 meters when applied from a height of 6-7 km. That is, the probability of hitting a PGRK here is close to unity, since each bomb contains 40 combat elements. So today we must bear in mind that Russia may be left without nuclear weapons even before the start of a nuclear war. These conclusions were made by Russian specialists who know what they are talking about.

Thanks to the well-wishers, the Americans had information about the throwing weight on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles of each type. The exact geographic coordinates of the 47 launch control shafts and 366 mine launchers of ICBMs, 353 deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs with coordinates, their 10 locations and deployment areas were indicated. Similar information was transmitted on Russian submarines and heavy bombers equipped with nuclear weapons. The organizational structure of the Strategic Missile Forces grouping, the use of strategic aviation and air defense systems and missile defense, and much more, were revealed.

We are looking more closely at the project "Preventing the possible seizure of nuclear weapons." According to legend, of course, the terrorists. But it is worthwhile to get a grasp of the questions posed to Russian scientists, as it becomes obvious - the “colleagues” are interested in intelligence information for themselves. Employees of the secret Russian research institutes were asked to talk about the creation of positional areas of missile divisions, taking into account the dislocation of the ground forces of the okrug, the size of the combat positions of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the mine base of the “single start” type. Customers were also interested in mobile missile systems and nuclear weapons storage sites ("C" objects). The questions were posed very professionally: the criteria for choosing combat deployment routes and combat patrols, guards on routes, and so on.

Or this “modest” research problem: “The Moscow anti-missile defense system and its capabilities.” As a result, Russian performers conducted an evaluation analysis of such capabilities in comparison with the similar American system “Seyfgard” and formulated it in “Assessment of the height of the intercept of the missile defense system”. They “only” explored the capabilities of the Russian anti-missiles like the Gazelle (and in Russia, few people knew about them), who have the ability to achieve very large accelerations and are designed to intercept ballistic targets. They also answered questions about the architecture, characteristics and parameters of Moscow’s missile defense system components - described the operation modes of radar stations, anti-missile speeds, methods for separating enemy ICBM warheads from a cloud of false targets, means of overcoming missile defense.

From the information thrown into the open press one could learn a lot of curious. For example, the description of the launch position and the perimeter capacitive technical control system, which, when approaching it, generates an alarm signal. It is told that there is an electrified grid under voltage around 800 volts, and when a signal arrives, the voltage rises to 1500-1600 volts. Mine-explosive barrage, the depth of the underground bunkers, food supplies - Americans were aware of everything. Even the fact that to cool diesels used a supply of ice, frozen in the neck of the mine.

The research program "The Moscow anti-missile defense system and its capabilities" is a classic example of the legendary espionage.

8-e management of the Russian General Staff recognized: all this information is a state secret. But even these are trifles, if we consider that the development of "mathematical and software scientific analysis describing the course and results of a hypothetical collision between Russia and the United States with the use of precision weapons, including nuclear ones, was carried out."


In the northern regions near the Russian borders, Americans created a universal integrated monitoring system that works in conjunction with space-based elements. The system is aimed at collecting detailed information about Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles during their tests at the start from the North Sea, Plesetsk (Arkhangelsk region), and also Tatishchevo (Saratov region) regions. Data was collected from the entire flight trajectory, including the maneuvering areas of the breeding platform and the self-dilution of the separable warheads of individual guidance (MIRVSHI), the means to overcome the missile defense system, the entry of warheads into the atmosphere in the area of ​​the Kamchatka polygon. In addition, this complex could simultaneously direct high-precision weapon systems to attack strategic facilities in Russia, both with nuclear warheads and in conventional equipment.

This system is the result of the joint development of elements of US strategic missile defense in the framework of the US-Russian cooperation in the military-space field under the RAMOS program. It was organized through the mediation of non-governmental scientific and public structures in Russia. Arguments about the alleged inability of the Russian missile attack warning system (EWS) to accurately identify the attacking enemy served as a political rationale for such cooperation. And this can lead to inadequate counter-strike. The Americans believed that such a situation allowed them to take control of Russian communications and combat control systems of strategic forces - with the possibility of duplication or blocking.

The main goal of developing a strategic missile defense system for the United States is not exactly what is being declared now. The true, main goal is to protect our own Armed Forces during operations in various regions of the world. However, almost all of the fundamentally new generation of weapons systems developed by Americans are not defensive, but pronounced offensive in nature. Therefore, the United States missile defense system, as a priority, solves the tasks of targeting and targeting.

The most effective hunt for a bear is when it leaves the den, when the animal is awakened from hibernation. So the ICBM is easier to intercept in the initial part of the flight: the speed is lower, the area more irradiated by the locator, since the first stage has not separated. Therefore, the American anti-missile "umbrella" will be deployed in outer space not at all over the territory of the United States, as the international community is trying to convince, but over the territories of their likely adversary! And under the flag of the joint struggle against international terrorism and in direct interaction with the developers of Russian anti-missile defense systems, the US Department of Defense, in the same design bureau and scientific research institute, created modern systems for their effective combat suppression. This, alas, so.

Assessment of the state and development prospects of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is the subject of primary attention to US intelligence.

In the event of aggravation of the Russian-American relations of the United States, without violating international obligations, have the opportunity to quickly deploy a mobile missile defense system near the borders of the Russian Federation. In addition, to send warships and airplanes in the waters of the Barents and Okhotsk seas and to block the areas of combat patrols of the Russian RPLSN, which are not capable of being covertly enough, and in significant numbers, be at sea.


In one of the US-imposed projects, it was about creating technologies for the active protection of automotive vehicles from modern projectiles with high penetrating kinetic energy, as well as cumulative weapons and high-tech submunitions with self-assembling fragments during an air attack. The problem is so subtle that two independent Russian sources were used to compare technical solutions and use the best indicators of each of them.

A lot of attention was paid to precision weapons (WTO). Including in the study of the survival of a group of strategic forces during a preventive strike of a non-nuclear WTO. Then the Americans proceeded from this. Given current trends, by 2010 Russia will be able to deploy no more than 500-600 ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). And then they did not miss. Perhaps they believed that the number of ICBMs would be even lower due to cuts in strategic offensive arms (START) in accordance with the new agreements of the Russian Federation with the United States.

The combat readiness of a significant part of the strategic complexes will be reduced, and thus, the latter will become more vulnerable to high-precision non-nuclear weapons. The WTO will be improved, and, in the future, it may have even more counter-force potential than the US nuclear weapons, since the development and deployment of the WTO is not regulated by any international agreements. By the way, until today.

The deteriorating state of the Russian general-purpose forces most likely will not allow an adequate response to an increase in the US strategic counter-force capabilities. Had Washington been able to deliver the first disarming strike with the help of a conventional WTO, such a move would be very attractive for the Americans, since it would not have caused the negative consequences that would certainly occur as a result of the use of nuclear weapons. The calculation of the effectiveness of the WTO against Russian ground-based ICBMs was based on the following factors: the large destructive capacity of these weapons, the declassification of the positions of the ICBMs at the time of the strike, the ability to strike the entire group at once.

The project “Methods of dealing with precision weapons” proposed by Russian scientists was based on “concern over the spread of the WTO on the world market”, the threat to the world community, and the increased activity of terrorists. All this dictated the need to develop special (including non-lethal) selective-action weapons, equipped with high-precision guidance and target designation. Hence (this is the next step), the need for advanced technologies related to microwave munitions to effectively combat high-precision weapons. This technology should be compared with other anti-WTO measures to identify advantages and disadvantages.

One of the projects imposed by the Americans was about creating technologies for the active protection of automotive vehicles from modern projectiles with high penetrating kinetic energy, as well as cumulative weapons.

The American-Russian conference was also scheduled there, where it was supposed to discuss, among other things, tandem high-power anti-tank warheads, “smart” (smart) ammunition, semi-active lasers, portable WTO launch systems, equipment of Russian anti-tank guided shells with armor-piercing or thermobaric warheads. Countermeasures were also considered: reactive armor, active tank protection, electro-optical countermeasures - “blinding” and “invisible” technologies. The problem of converting conventional weapons with submunitions into special weapons was also investigated. In the field of non-lethal weapons were going to apply electromagnetic and optical technologies.

Russian scientists were engaged in the development of neural network algorithms to support a variety of targets, neurocomputers for processing aerospace information, neural networks for pattern recognition. Using neural methods, it was planned to process optical images, create speech processing systems. When developing high-precision weapons guidance systems, Americans showed interest in automatically extracting information from radar, infrared and optical imagers using neural networks. They allow you to improve the resolution and image compression in real time.

There was even a project “Recognition of keywords in a stream of continuous speech in a telephone channel using neural networks of transputers”. Russian specialists were offered to create transputer complexes, the basis of which is made up of storage devices from a set of parallel-connected neural-like elements. They allow you to increase the dictionary of standards, increase the number of groups of announcers, increase the number of channels.

The research and engineering center of one of the commands of the US Army was interested in a light humeral individual portable disposable weapon system to attack various targets when firing in urban environments. The project "Thermobaric explosives" suggested the defeat of fortified complex underground structures intended for the production and storage of special weapons. This implied underground structures of various configurations. The condition is a small destructive effect for the structures themselves.

All this even today seems exotic. Nevertheless, many promising developments merged to the Americans almost free of charge. Apparently, sometime they will emerge - directed against Russia.


It is clear that it makes no sense to talk about morality, decency in the cooperation we describe. But the top of cynicism in the history of foreign grants can be considered a contract with the Russians of the Department of Special Weapons of the US Department of Defense to conduct scientific work on the issue of "Metro". The total cost is $ 34500. Russian specialists had to simulate the possible consequences of a terrorist nuclear explosion in a system of large tunnels and obtain quantitative estimates of the “effects of the occurrence and propagation of seismic shock waves in the geological array, the propagation of gas flows and damage zones resulting from a nuclear explosion”.

The American side received a method of calculating with the use of computers of a variety of options for choosing the optimal nuclear warhead and determining the most sabotage-sensitive places of the Moscow metro.

At the request of the customer, the “thermodynamic and mechanical characteristics of soft, water-saturated sedimentary soils,” in which the Moscow Metro facilities are located, as well as its underground geometry, are taken as the initial data. Russian specialists were supposed to perform “six simulations for three energy releases with a power of 1, 10 and 50 kilotons of TNT equivalent and two explosion positions” in agreement with the customer. The work was recognized as unique, since the consequences of a nuclear explosion were modeled “in a close approximation to reality”.

Our experts worked hard and came to the conclusion: in some places the bookmarks of an explosive device are one of the central stations within the ring line and a peripheral station on one of the radial lines. For obvious reasons, we do not call them. But the American side received a method of calculating with the use of computers of a variety of options for choosing the optimum warhead and determining the most vulnerable in a sabotage situation.

The counterintelligence officers reported to their leadership: “Due to the fact that the scientific work was initiated and funded by the US military, it is obvious that in this case the problem of the possible destruction of low-power (knapsack type) underground military-strategic facilities, which are organically included in the system, is being solved. Moscow Metro. Due to the complex geological structure, the presence, in addition to the metro, an extensive network of underground communication facilities, many of which are in disrepair, carrying out a real terrorist act in these situations can lead to unpredictably disastrous consequences for the central part of Moscow. ”

To this we add - the problem of "Metro" organically fits into the mainstream of the concept adopted by the US military: to prevent a retaliatory nuclear strike, the most effective and cheap is to neutralize the control and communication system. Lubyanka has a reason to assume: it is possible that in the territory of Russia the Americans carried out scientific developments of nuclear weapons forbidden in the USA with a capacity of less than 5 kilotons.


According to the reports of the Americans to their leadership, the content of which was obtained by the Russian counterintelligence, large-scale military-strategic, tactical and technological projects were implemented on a large scale in Russia as part of the program “Using Russian experience and technology to increase the effectiveness of US submarine forces in the coastal zone of the enemy. " On the territory of Russia, this program with the support of one of the Russian academies was implemented as the “Program for the creation of the Interstate Multinational Permanent Committee to study the problems of fighting in shallow waters with diesel submarines of third countries”.

The program provided for a two-year plan for experimental testing and selective selection of the results of research and development in real conditions. At the same time, the use of both American and Russian submarines was envisaged as a “target”. In general, joint military-technical projects imposed by the Americans would necessarily include testing in real conditions. Based on the results of such tests, an analysis was made of the technical and operational assessment of Russian developments and their potential when used in American systems.

Moreover, in the opinion of Russian counterintelligence, the newest models of military equipment and weapons developed for the needs of the American army could be tested unofficially during training combat operations of the Russian Armed Forces. In other words, during the exercise. For example, in one of the joint projects, it was envisaged to conduct an anti-submarine anti-submarine training exercise on the search and "destruction" of a submarine in a shallow area. Against the background of such exercises, one can consider the causes of the tragic incident in the Black Sea area, when the C-200 anti-aircraft missile system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces shot down a civilian aircraft from Israel, as well as the nuclear submarine cruiser Kursk in the Barents Sea in August 2000 year

Each exit to the sea of ​​the Typhoon type TRPLSN was accompanied by tracking from the multi-purpose submarines of the US Navy.

Shortly before the “Kursk” tragedy, the activity of the US Navy in the Barents Sea increased significantly, becoming dangerous and provocative. In the materials studied there is an analytical information that before there were prerequisites for the commission of such incidents with serious consequences.

2-3 December 1997 The Russian Navy was about to launch 20 sea-launched SS-N-20 ballistic missiles with the Typhoon type TRPLSN. Under the inspection agreements (START-1), American observers from the On-Site Inspection Agency were invited to observe and register. During preparation for launch at a very short distance from Typhoon, an American nuclear submarine of the type Los Angeles maneuvered. Conditions then hampered the use of sonar tools. "American" then walked parallel to the course "Typhoon", then crossed it. This extremely dangerous maneuver, considered operational by the leadership (operational doctrine) of the US Navy, could lead to a collision.

The American boat was watched and pursued by Russian surface ships and helicopters. They used active and passive detection methods for more than five hours, trying to contact an American submarine by means of underwater acoustic communications. When she refused to leave the launch site, in order to emphasize the concern of the Russian side, grenades were dropped. Only after that the American submarine left the area at a speed of 20 nodes. Since she left the area at the speed prescribed by the US Navy to perform a certain type of action, it can be assumed that her commander did not know about the actions of the Russian anti-submarine defense forces before using grenades. If this explanation is correct, then it underlines the high probability of a collision and a serious accident. However, it is difficult to assume that the competent submarine commander believed that his boat remained unnoticed for several hours in a limited area, moreover, surrounded by Russian ships and anti-submarine aircraft at a distance of several kilometers from them.

Typhoon is a relatively old type of submarine. On it, one of the first, advanced noise reduction technologies were applied. The potential of Western intelligence services to obtain acoustic information on this type of boat has existed by that time for almost fifteen years. Therefore, the value of acoustic and electronic data obtained during such an operation is, from a military point of view, very limited and short-lived, and in no way justifies dangerous maneuvering. Not to mention political risk. This means that the main objective of the actions of the American nuclear submarine was to obtain radio-electronic information from the ships of the Russian Navy, which accompanies the preparation for the launch and the launch of sea-based ballistic missiles.

In March, the American submarine "Grayling" 1993 collided with a relatively noisy Delta-4-type RPLSN and severely damaged its nose section. However, as his body. Russian boat at the time of the collision was moving forward. Had a hit on the 10-20 seconds later, it would have inevitably damaged one or both of the missile compartments. In such a collision, a rocket fuel would ignite, which would lead to the death of a Russian submarine, and possibly an American one.

With 1996, the Stalworth-type sonar observation ships began operating in the Barents Sea. Prior to this, their activities were limited to the waters of the Norwegian Sea. Targeting, which can give such ships, was regarded as critical information for conducting anti-submarine operations of the US Navy in the Barents Sea. Such information can be used by American multi-purpose submarines in actions against Russian RPFsN. As in the anti-submarine operations to ensure the defense of aircraft carrier groups from the attack of Russian submarines. It is obvious that such reconnaissance operations are aimed at preparing for the actions of the American aircraft carrier groups near the shores of Russia.

Proceeding from the above, the Navy experts found it possible: in August 2000, the crew of the Russian submarine cruiser Kursk in the Barents Sea could perform, without knowing, in the dark, the combat mission in the interests of the US Navy as a target that predetermined his logical doom.

This version works and this circumstance. Americans obtained various databases formed in the USSR and Russia for decades. They made it possible to effectively isolate the background disturbances introduced by Russian submarines, determine the degree of environmental exposure to acoustic and non-acoustic remote sensing systems, and much more.

The Americans showed interest in the Russian forces to combat submarines, carefully studying the effectiveness of the submarine detection system, the database for the design of hydro-acoustic subsystems of submarines. All this was necessary to create in the waters of the Barents Sea a system of underwater surveillance and tracking of Russian submarines. This kind of “anti-submarine umbrella” is a network of predictive stations that continuously illuminate the underwater situation.

The intelligence capabilities of the United States intelligence services are supported by the orbital grouping of reconnaissance satellites, which control the entire territory of Russia and the adjacent marine areas.

The project “Research into the nature of a future war at sea during regional conflicts” addressed the problem of localization, or even reduction to zero, of the possibility of combat employment of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet strategic purpose. It was decided by our own hands. The goal is to create a modern, highly effective integrated system for detecting, tracking and destroying Russian nuclear submarines in crisis situations in the Barents Sea. The Russian scientists who received the grants helpfully suggested: the lack of great depths facilitates the use of anti-submarine weapons and makes it possible to block exit routes from places where Russian nuclear submarines are permanently based to the deep-sea areas of the open ocean for combat patrols.

The project “Investigation of the degree of radioactive contamination of the Arctic Ocean (as in the text - N.P.) and the North Pacific in the coastal Russian zone” continues the maritime theme. Here the Americans were already interested in the actions of the Russian nuclear submarine fleet in ice-covered waters, where the above-mentioned methods and means of detection are either limited or generally unacceptable. Therefore, actively developed means capable of probing the "radioactive emission of nuclear power plants" of Russian submarines. For this, the United States created a network of special sensors. What attracted our scientists.

At the same time, against the background of an artificially exacerbated problem of the ozone layer in the Arctic zone, the United States conducted large-scale studies of the Arctic Ocean, which interested them in a military-strategic sense. The flights of balloons with instruments and equipment from the test site of the international center ESRANGE in the Swedish city of Kiruna were part of this program. It is obvious that the US military obtained exhaustive information about the possible locations of temporary combat positions of Russian submarines, depending on the configuration of the bottom and the thickness of the ice cover, conclude Russian counterintelligence.


Extensive information by the American specialized agencies was obtained through direct cooperation with the then Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia. It developed, among other things, in such delicate areas: design and development of nuclear charges, the creation of superpowerful thermonuclear charges and their testing, military exercises and nuclear tests, specialized nuclear tests in the interests of studying the damaging factors of nuclear explosions. In development, the Americans provided questions in their area of ​​interest. Among them are the effects of nuclear explosions on radar operation and radio wave propagation, the joint effect on structures of shock waves in the ground and the atmosphere, the zone of origin of the electromagnetic pulse (EMP), the effect of EMR on typical systems (for example, power transmission lines), the effect on land and air systems at peak radiation level.

X-ray and plasma radiation, ion beams, the correlation between above-ground and underground tests, the effect on people of high and low radiation doses can be listed for a long time. From a single Russian federal nuclear center, there was even a proposal for a possible research project on the topic “High Altitude Effects of a Nuclear Explosion”.

Americans, I suppose, offered our work on what they themselves were not very strong. And the missing information was easily obtained. In particular, the formation of a magnetic trap in an airborne nuclear explosion, the seismic effect of an underground nuclear explosion, the possibility of accelerated latent production of plutonium, communication with missiles in a nuclear explosion, over-the-horizon radar, and so on.

It is curious that some high-ranking officials from the then Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy contributed to such cooperation of Minatom and the United States. All of them adhered to the position that “the process of improving nuclear technology is irreversible, in the interests of maintaining a moratorium on tests and agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, any cooperation of nuclear powers under appropriate international control is advisable.

Minatom objects have always aroused keen interest among American "scientists."

There was only one person who thought differently - Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov. He blocked the conclusion of direct treaties of the Russian super-secret institution with the Americans, and with subsequent negative consequences for its initiators from among the subordinates. If in Russian, someone was fired without benefits. From the e-mail correspondence of customers and performers it is clear that the decision of General of the Army Rodionov was the subject of detailed discussion. The parties were looking for options for concerted action by the parties concerned on the nuclear program outside of Russian federal jurisdiction and control by the RF Ministry of Defense. They also determined the format of cooperation, the composition of its participants.

For Americans, the most favorable was the option of direct scientific contacts with the sanction of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. In the absence of intermediaries, this would reduce the cost of joint scientific and technical projects being implemented and would place them in an invulnerable position from the current legislation of the partners - Russian military scientists. To solve the problem, the Americans took measures to exert pressure on the Russian top management. This partly explains the imminent dismissal of Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov and the subsequent long-term confrontation between the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

And then the customers and performers in parallel developed alternative ways of organizing cooperation. The particularly interested Russian partners, including those from the leadership of military science, kindly sent recommendations of the tactical plan. One of them wrote: the main reason for the delay in concluding contracts is the lack of agreement at the government level. And advised how to make a version of such an agreement, including in it an item on joint work “on verifying the accuracy of the calculation and theoretical apparatus used to predict the consequences of a nuclear explosion in all environments”, on developing a set of international standards for the protection of civilian objects from a high-altitude electromagnetic nuclear pulse. the blast. Again - “to eliminate the threat of nuclear blackmail from third countries”.

In addition, he wrote, it is extremely useful to organize a cycle of publications in the Russian mass media about the need for military-technical cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and non-proliferation of nuclear technologies, prevention of nuclear terrorism, use of the scientific and technical potential of the Ministry of Defense to solve non-military tasks. Everything is great if you don’t know what forms this cooperation actually took when it came to the strike force and the Russian nuclear umbrella - the Strategic Missile Forces.

Let us turn to the findings of counterintelligence: it should be assumed that on the basis of the domestic scientific and intellectual product produced earlier in the military field, Russian scientists and specialists in Russia, outside the jurisdiction of the competent federal agencies, created a fundamentally new weapon under the control of the US special services, comparable in effectiveness to nuclear ammunition . It is not excluded that samples of a new generation of special weapons, created in the Russian research institutes and design bureaus, may be located on the territory of the Moscow region and, under certain conditions, may be used for terrorist and other actions.


Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev wrote to his US counterpart Richard Cheney so that he would not worry “regarding the conversion of the 90 silo to the destroyed PC-20 (SS-18 Satan) heavy missiles to install monoblock missiles in them”. First, Grachev assured the American that a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2,9 meters would be installed at the top of each mine, which would not allow loading heavy ICBMs. Secondly, each mine will be poured with concrete to a depth of 5 meters. Thirdly, the conversion will be monitored by experts from the United States.

In response to the guaranteed destruction of our heavy, not intercepted by any promising missile defense missiles with multiple warheads of individual targeting, the Americans pledged to facilitate the arming of their strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. After the letter, they promised to carry out a "one-time display" of strategic bombers with weapons on the suspension nodes. At the same time, they were convinced: by the number of suspension units, it is impossible to judge about the possible arming of the aircraft. Well, are American aircraft designers completely fools to install equipment on the console that will never be used? Political guarantees and assurances not to equip planes with more than promised, the number of nuclear weapons in such a situation does not cost anything. The Russian inspectors left - hang under the plane of weapons, including nuclear, twice. This is another example of inadequate partnership in disarmament.

Today it is precisely calculated: in general, under the START-2 Treaty, Russia was infringed upon its rights. Non-governmental scientific centers were involved in the compilation of the Russian-language version of the Treaty text, whose employees translated the text of the document from Russian into English and vice versa. Progressive identification of the document in Russian and English revealed gross spelling, punctuation and semantic errors in the English text, which could lead to different interpretations by the parties of the provisions of such a serious Treaty. And this is not the only such, in essence, fateful agreement, in the creation of which the Centers participated.

The seized counterintelligence materials found draft packages of documents on the bilateral interstate disarmament process prepared by non-governmental structures. Variants of official interstate documents reveal the mechanism for modeling the adoption of significant political decisions at the level of governments of the two countries, prompted by so-called independent experts from non-governmental scientific centers of the United States and Russia. Naturally, not in favor of the latter. It should be taken into account that “independent” specialists were also involved in the preparation of specialized laws “On space activities in the Russian Federation”, “On state policy in the field of radioactive waste management”, “On the use of atomic energy in Russia”, “On ratification of the Treaty on the Restriction of Nuclear Weapons” -2 "and others. Most of these documents are still valid.

"Independent" experts were involved in the preparation of the relevant laws "On space activity in the Russian Federation", "On state policy in the field of radioactive waste management", "On the use of atomic energy in Russia", "On ratification of the START-2 Treaty" and other

Another example of the fake justification by the Americans of their actions. The United States has stated: they must help Russia during its economic crisis maintain the organizational capacity to work with the early warning system that is necessary for its nuclear forces. If this organizational capacity is lost, then for decades Russia will remain without an adequate early warning system and with thousands of nuclear warheads ready for a quick launch. A half-blind Russian missile warning system (missile attack warning system), if a combination of technical and human factors occurs.
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  1. 1
    1 3 November 2010 14: 12
  2. piedro
    piedro 4 November 2010 13: 52
    Are you talking about the author? ............... I agree winked
  3. AK
    AK 20 January 2011 16: 09
    Well, and the author, in my opinion, wrote an excellent article. With a very large amount of information ...