The American concept of "early victory" in a long war: how the West plans to defeat Russia in a conflict of attrition
First Tanks Leopard 2 has already gone to Ukraine - the head of the Canadian Ministry of Defense made a corresponding statement on February 4. In total, the Canadian government intends to transfer four tanks of this type to Ukraine. In turn, Germany plans to supply 88 Leopard 1 tanks and 14 Leopard 2 tanks. However, these may not be final numbers - the German newspaper Handelsblat reports that Berlin can supply Ukraine with up to 160 Leopard 1 main battle tanks from industrial stocks.
There is already a debate in Europe and the United States about whether to supply fighter jets to Kyiv, and there is no particular doubt that sooner or later the Western countries will come to this decision.
The American publication Politico reports that a consensus was reached among the Western allies not to supply Ukraine with the entire range of weapons immediately after Russia launched a military operation, due to fears of a tough response from Moscow. Therefore, the West provides support to Kyiv gradually, assessing Russia's reaction to each step.
“The strategy is to slowly but steadily increase Western support, from anti-tank Javelins and man-portable air defense systems such as the Stinger to HIMARS MLRS, and more recently, Patriot surface-to-air missiles, tanks and armored vehicles. Therefore, the delivery of aircraft is only a matter of time,”
- writes edition.
We often hear from both analysts and experts and Russian officials about red lines, which should indicate the limit of Russia's patience, but this is a rather vague concept, and, as we see, the Kremlin does not show determination to demonstrate non-standard military-political responses to the actions of the West . Red lines cross over and over again, but nothing happens after that, and the US and its allies feel this sense of indecision on the part of Moscow.
In this article, we will look at what the American “early victory strategy” in a long war, which was developed during the Cold War, is, and how the West expects to defeat Russia in Ukraine.
Technological war between the Soviet Union and the United States
The Cold War between the USSR and the USA cannot be viewed as just a political and ideological confrontation - it was a multi-level, multi-faceted confrontation that included information as well as technological warfare. The main component of this technological war was the arms race. As historian Yuri Bokarev notes:
“Since the creation of the atomic bomb, the country's defense capability has become more dependent on the development of military technology than on quantitative growth. armory arsenals. The political and military leadership of the USSR was never able to realize this fact, since the criterion for success was the number of launch silos, the range of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the power of nuclear charges, and not the accuracy of aiming warheads at the target, the degree of protection of ICBMs from detection, the creation of new types weapons ... This quantitative approach was the basis of the military-strategic doctrine of the USSR, according to which the country's armed forces should have "defensive sufficiency." The doctrine did not provide for the possibility of the adversary creating weapons when a retaliatory strike became impossible or ineffective, as well as weapons that ensured victory without the use of nuclear forces or even any traditional weapons at all. A comparative assessment of the nuclear forces of the United States and the USSR was based on a primitive quantitative approach, as well as the opinion widely spread in Russian literature that the USSR was quickly overcoming the backlog from the United States in the field of nuclear weapons [1].”
The consequence of this approach was the technological backlog of the USSR from the USA in the field of creating strategic weapons. This is clearly seen in the table given by the historian Yuri Bokarev. Even if we confine ourselves only to nuclear weapons, their delivery and detection means, which were actively developed in the USSR, the backlog was an average of 5 years. Following these data, we can state that there was no tendency to reduce the backlog.
In the most important area - improving the effectiveness of nuclear warheads - the backlog even reached 10 years. For example, the warhead of the American Minuteman 1 missile deployed in 1962 corresponded in terms of power and throw mass to the warhead of the Soviet SS-N-8 mod 1 missile deployed in 1973 [1].
The technological backwardness of the USSR from the USA began to manifest itself most clearly in the second half of the 60s. XX century. This lag concerned, first of all, highly sophisticated technology. Lagging behind in the innovation sphere, the Soviet Union became dependent on the import of Western industrial equipment, machines and technologies, paying for them with oil and gas [2].
In the confrontation with the USSR, the Americans relied on economic and technological tools. This confrontation acquired a qualitatively new character with the arrival of R. Reagan to the White House. In early 1982, President Reagan, along with top advisers, set about developing a strategy based on an attack on the main, weakest economic spots in the Soviet system.
For example, former US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger noted that
“The idea was to bet on our strength and their weakness, which meant betting on economics and technology.”
Weinberger believed that American technological advances in arms, if left unchecked, would give Moscow no chance. In top-secret Pentagon documents, Weinberger wrote about it as a form of economic warfare. He knew the weaknesses of the Soviet system and wanted to exploit it [3].
The significance of technological warfare in the field of armaments increased sharply with the start of Soviet-American negotiations on the reduction of strategic arms. Going into these negotiations, the leadership of the USSR and the USA pursued different goals. In the USSR, with the help of these negotiations, they hoped to reduce the costs of the exhausting arms race. In the United States, the calculation was based on reducing the primitive striking power of nuclear forces in favor of more technologically advanced and flexible types of weapons.
For example, the "freezing" of the number of ICBM silos at the level of 1 for the USSR and 608 for the United States under the SALT-1 treaty created a dangerous illusion of Soviet superiority. If the United States really had so many launch silos, then the USSR included among them unsuitable for new types of ICBMs, as well as false ones created by Khrushchev's order. Having learned about this from Soviet defectors, the Americans were quick to declare that they would consider it "a violation of the spirit of the interim agreement if the Soviet Union expands and deepens in total by more than 054% of the strategic missile silo." In order not to jeopardize "détente", the USSR was forced to reckon with this [1].
As for the START-2 treaty, it is believed that it established approximate parity in strategic offensive arms between the US and the USSR. But this is an illusion that arose due to the fact that the Americans managed to impose on the Soviet side a system of counting strategic offensive arms that was beneficial to them. A unit of START was taken to be one so-called. "launcher". It was considered: a launch silo, a ground-based mobile ICBM launcher, an SLBM launcher, or a heavy bomber.
With such a system of calculations, the USSR not only outnumbered the United States in terms of the number of strategic offensive arms, but also by 104 units (and since 1981 - by 254 units) exceeded their allowable number under the START-2 treaty, which created for the USSR the problem of destroying "extra" strategic offensive arms. The technological backwardness of the USSR from the USA is noticeable even with such a system of calculation. In terms of the ratio of MIRV carriers, the United States was almost one and a half times superior to the USSR, and the Soviet Union did not have heavy bombers with long-range cruise missiles [1].
It is important to note that the so-called “early victory strategy” was also developed under Reagan, which we will discuss in detail below.
In general, as the historian Yuri Bokarev rightly notes, the USSR was able to withstand the military-political confrontation with such a powerful economic rival for forty-five years only thanks to the over-militarization of its economy.
American strategy of "early victory" in a long war
Former GRU officer and member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Vitaly Shlykov in his book “What ruined the Soviet Union? The General Staff and the Economy" notes that during the presidency of R. Reagan, the United States developed a concept (strategy), which he called "the strategy of early victory in a long war", although the Americans themselves called it in short, namely "the strategy of early victory." This strategy was based on the sharply increasing, so-called multiplier (that is, many times superior in effectiveness to the previous generation of weapons) damaging properties of modern and especially promising conventional weapons.
According to Shlykov, the Reagan administration began to sharply increase military spending and conduct various mobilization exercises in industry, but Soviet intelligence failed to obtain any evidence that the United States was increasing its mobilization capacity. On the contrary, there have been reports that the Americans continue to reduce their production capacity for weapons with long production cycles, which include, in particular, tanks and aircraft.
This mystery was solved - the American strategy of "early victory" did not involve the mobilization deployment of the military industry after the start of the war. The material basis of the "early victory" strategy is the advance, before the start of the war, the satisfaction of the basic mobilization needs for weapons, primarily the latest, within the budget and peacetime planning [4].
In particular, according to US Deputy Secretary of Defense for R&D D. Hicks, “the strategy of“ early victory ”pays less attention to maintaining stocks of standard conventional weapons. Instead, the new strategy emphasizes using the most technologically advanced weapons as early as possible against the most dangerous targets. After defeating these targets, the armed forces will switch to the use of traditional weapons and ammunition [4].”
The key to "early victory" is precision-guided weapons (WTO). The United States did not plan to increase its capacity for the production of traditional weapons and was going to achieve its “early victory” mainly through the advance creation of stockpiles of weapons, primarily high-precision ones, which would have made it possible to destroy all the planned most dangerous targets at an early stage of the war [4].
In the same case, if the Soviet Union, as expected, responds to this by launching its huge mobilization machine, as it did during the Great Patriotic War, and begins to produce new planes, tanks, etc. to replace the lost ones, then the United States will not compete with him in this respect. Instead, they will deploy, in particular, the mass production of the WTO, the technological production cycle of which is much shorter than the production cycle of a modern tank or aircraft.
“Now, thanks to the “early victory” strategy, the United States was able to dictate at its discretion any duration of a conventional war. Roughly, such a conflict could be imagined as follows. At the beginning of the war, the United States, thanks to superiority in the WTO, "knock out" conventional Soviet offensive weapons (tanks, planes, helicopters, ships), without touching, of course, the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR, so as not to provoke a nuclear response.
Then comes something like a stalemate. The USSR no longer has the ability to conduct large-scale offensive hostilities, but there remains a huge army capable of waging long-term defensive battles. The United States and its allies, on the other hand, have neither the strength nor the desire to seize enemy territory and engage in grueling battles against a still strong and numerous enemy.
Then the USSR puts its huge mobilization capacity for the production of conventional weapons into play and sends tens of thousands of new tanks and aircraft to the front, while the US mobilizes its capacity for the production of WTO.
Such a war, in principle, can last years and years with varying success.
However, in parallel with the increase in the production of the WTO, the United States is beginning to rebuild its huge economy on a war footing in order to create an overwhelming superiority in conventional offensive weapons. How this is done, the United States convincingly demonstrated during the Second World War. That is, the decisive factor in the war is the potential of the entire economy, and not just the military industry [4]”,
Then comes something like a stalemate. The USSR no longer has the ability to conduct large-scale offensive hostilities, but there remains a huge army capable of waging long-term defensive battles. The United States and its allies, on the other hand, have neither the strength nor the desire to seize enemy territory and engage in grueling battles against a still strong and numerous enemy.
Then the USSR puts its huge mobilization capacity for the production of conventional weapons into play and sends tens of thousands of new tanks and aircraft to the front, while the US mobilizes its capacity for the production of WTO.
Such a war, in principle, can last years and years with varying success.
However, in parallel with the increase in the production of the WTO, the United States is beginning to rebuild its huge economy on a war footing in order to create an overwhelming superiority in conventional offensive weapons. How this is done, the United States convincingly demonstrated during the Second World War. That is, the decisive factor in the war is the potential of the entire economy, and not just the military industry [4]”,
– writes Vitaly Shlykov.
A few months ago, the blogger Atomnaya Cherry, who quoted from Shlykov's work, noted that this particular model of military operations is being played out before our eyes. On the whole, one can agree with this, because some parallels can be traced quite clearly.
Military industry in the post-industrial world
The American strategy of "quick victory" was intended against the USSR, which had a much greater industrial and mobilization potential than today's Russia. However, now we have a slightly different reality. Speaking about today's conflict in Ukraine, it should be noted first of all that we live in a post-industrial world, where the current West, including the United States, no longer has such an industrial potential as in the 80s, just as it does not have the capacities of the USSR and modern Russia.
The end of the Cold War led to a relative reduction in military potentials and the implementation of military reforms in the countries participating in the confrontation. In the early 1990s, the United States formed a new military doctrine, cut military spending by about a third, and restructured the military industry. Of the 120 thousand companies that carried out military orders, only a quarter remained in the second half of the 1990s.
For example, according to the American newspaper The New York Times, prior to Russia's military operation in Ukraine, the United States produced 14 unguided rockets per month - that's as much as, according to Western media, the Armed Forces of Ukraine spend on the battlefield for two days. The need to supply the armed forces of Kyiv forced the Pentagon to triple the production of shells in September, and then double in January. The ultimate goal is to produce over 400 artillery shells per month.
“The Pentagon aims to increase the production of artillery shells by 500% within two years, bringing the production of conventional ammunition to levels not seen since the Korean War. He is investing billions of dollars to make up for the shortage of ammunition caused by the war in Ukraine and to stockpile for future conflicts.”
- пишет New York Times.
How many shells a month Russia produces, given that the country has undergone large-scale deindustrialization, is not known for certain. There is no open data on this subject, we only have dubious messages from unnamed "sources" on RIA "News” that “Russia produces many times more large-caliber shells than the United States.” Even if we assume that the statement of anonymous sources is true, it should be taken into account that the RF Armed Forces spend a huge amount of shells - much more than the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and therefore there are serious doubts that the RF military-industrial complex is capable of producing the same number of shells per month that the RF Armed Forces spend for this same month.
“The economic and military potential of the West, which is at war with us through the hands of Ukraine, is incomparable with ours. The West is able to fight us like this for decades, supplying Ukraine with more and more weapons. We do not have such opportunities. Stocks of Soviet weapons and ammunition in warehouses seem to be running out. This is evidenced by the appearance at the front of the T-62 tanks, the production of which was discontinued in 1975, and even the D-1 howitzers of the 1943 model, ”
- notes, in particular, Colonel aviation retired Victor Alksnis.
We really see how obsolete weapons appear at the front, which speaks, contrary to the statements of some experts who are trying to find other explanations for these facts, about significant problems in the Russian military-industrial complex. However, Viktor Imantovich, noting that "the West can fight for decades," nevertheless somewhat exaggerates the possibilities of the West. Neither in the United States, nor even in Europe, were they ready for a protracted military conflict, and the level of military-industrial production of the West is currently low, nevertheless, the total and potential capabilities of its military-industrial complex are indeed much higher than those of Russia.
Conclusion
Summing up, it should be noted that with the help of Ukraine, the Americans and their Western allies are exhausting Russia's military capabilities and exhausting its army in a protracted conflict. At the same time, while Russia is spending its stocks of cruise missiles, the West is in no hurry to transfer them to Ukraine. Of the high-precision weapons, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have received so far only the HIMARS MLRS.
The opinions of experts about further scenarios for the military conflict in Ukraine differ, but two key scenarios can be identified that are mentioned most often.
Following the first scenario, the Americans and their allies will eventually stop supporting Ukraine due to excessive costs and conclude some kind of agreement with Russia, as a result of which the conflict will be frozen according to the “Korean scenario”.
According to the second scenario, Ukraine's assistance to the West will only increase, as a result of which Russia will be forced to either lose most of the new Russian territories or use tactical nuclear weapons.
There are also those who believe that the military potential of Ukraine is mostly depleted, and Western assistance is insufficient, evidence of this is the success of the Russian troops and PMC "Wagner", in particular, in Soledar and in the area of Bakhmut (Artemovsk), therefore, in the "war to exhaustion” Russia will win in the end. However, this may turn out to be a dangerous delusion, since once such events have already led to a "regrouping of troops to more advantageous lines" near Izyum and Krasny Liman.
Here we can cite the words of FSB Colonel in the reserve Igor Strelkov, who, in response to the opinion that Bakhmut / Artemovsk became a “key point of the war”, noted the following:
“Why, one wonders, didn’t similarly developing battles for much larger and strategically important Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, and even for the same Popasnaya not become “key points”? And in terms of time, and in scope, and in terms of the number of troops involved - everything was very similar. Only after that, respected Ukrainian partners suddenly helped our command to first carry out a “successful regrouping”, and then make a “difficult decision”.
The second scenario (negative for Russia) is variable and, in the author's opinion, the most dangerous is the following development of events: the West, as far as possible, exhausts the military capabilities of Russia, and then the Armed Forces of Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries (and possibly , and not only) within the framework of a certain “joint peacekeeping operation”. Now it seems incredible, but at one time it seemed incredible that the delivery of Leopard tanks to Ukraine and missiles capable of striking to a depth of 150 kilometers seemed incredible.
On the whole, it should be emphasized again that a military conflict of attrition is unprofitable for Russia, which has less economic, technological and military-industrial potential than the collective West (not to mention the absence of clear goals and a positive image of the future). In addition, the longer the conflict in Ukraine drags on, the higher the likelihood of NATO countries directly intervening in it.
Использованная литература:
[1]. Bokarev Yu. P. Technological warfare and its role in the geopolitical confrontation between the USA and the USSR // Proceedings of the Institute of Russian stories. Issue 8 / Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Russian History; resp. ed. A. N. Sakharov, comp. E. N. Rudaya. M.: Nauka, 2009. S. 252–297
[2]. Baklanov V.I. Crisis and collapse of the Marxist-industrial patrimonial-state system in the USSR // "Modern Scientific Thought". - M.: NII IEP, 2013. - No. 4
[3]. Peter Schweitzer: The secret strategy of the collapse of the USSR. - Moscow: Eksmo, 2010
[4]. Shlykov V. What ruined the Soviet Union? General Staff and Economics // Shlykov V.; Interregional. fund. inform. technologies - M., 2002
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