Operations "Mountains" and "Sea"
Soviet 152-mm howitzer-gun model 1937 (ML-20) and its crew at the position near Novorossiysk. 1943
Black Sea Group of Forces
On December 29, 1942, the Headquarters ordered the command of the Transcaucasian Front (ZF) to organize attacks on Novorossiysk and Krasnodar with the general task of intercepting the Armavir-Rostov railway in the Tikhoretskaya area.
On January 4, 1943, Stalin instructed the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Tyulenev, to shift the center of gravity of the front's actions (How Mackensen's 1st Panzer Army Escaped the Caucasian Cauldron) in the area of the Black Sea group. Petrov's troops were to break through to Tikhoretskaya, preventing the enemy from leaving the North Caucasus to the west, then attacking Bataysk, Azov and Rostov from the east, blocking the North Caucasian Wehrmacht grouping. The Black Sea group was to go on the offensive no later than January 12th.
Generals Tyulenev and Petrov began to prepare a large-scale operation. The situation was difficult. Winter, and especially January, is not the best time to attack in the mountains. Frosts, the spurs of the mountains are covered with deep snow. Plus the scale of the operation. About this in Tbilisi - there was the headquarters of the Polar Front, and they did not dream of it. Since November 1942, the command of the Polar Front has been preparing to attack in the Maikop direction. There they developed a road network, accumulated supplies and trained troops.
The Black Sea Group of Forces included the 46th, 18th, 56th and 47th Armies, the 5th Air Army. They were going to transfer the 10th Guards and 3 Rifle Corps, 2 divisions from the 58th Army from the Northern Group to the Black Sea Group. The group also strengthened 3 tank brigades, one such regiment and 5 separate tank battalions. More than 300 tanks in total.
Red Army soldiers in position defending a mountain pass in the Caucasus. In the foreground is a sniper pair - S. Mataryan and B. Bondarenko. 1942
Operation Mountains
The Soviet command developed plans for two operations under the code names "Mountains" and "Sea".
In the "Mountain" plan, the main role was assigned to the 56th Army, commanded by Commander-18, who had shown himself well in the defense of Tuapse, General Grechko. Accordingly, Commander-56, General Ryzhov, received the 16th Army.
The 56th Army included 6 rifle divisions, 7 rifle and 2 tank brigades, one tank regiment, 2 tank battalions, 4 artillery and 3 mortar regiments, and a group of guards mortars. More than 1,1 thousand guns and mortars and more than 190 tanks were concentrated in the Grechko army zone. The army was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in the area of Goryachiy Klyuch and Krepostnaya in four days with two strike groups, defeat the enemy - the 9th Romanian cavalry and 1st Slovak motorized divisions, liberate Krasnodar and take the crossings across the river. Kuban. Due to the limited road network, part of the army was preparing to attack on the left flank, here an auxiliary attack was made on Kholmskaya, Maryanskaya.
To the right of the 56th Army, the 18th Army (3 divisions and 6 brigades, 950 guns and mortars) was to strike. The army also advanced in the Krasnodar direction with the aim of defeating the German 44th Corps from the 17th Army and reaching the river. Kuban east of Krasnodar. The 46th army of General Leselidze (5 divisions and 2 brigades) advanced in the Maikop direction. It was supposed to defeat the enemy 49th mountain rifle corps, liberate Maikop, and go with the main forces to the Kuban in the Ust-Labinsk region.
At the second stage of the operation, the armies of the Black Sea Group were to develop the offensive on Tikhoretsk and occupy it by the end of January. About Bataysk and Rostov, which was in the directive of the Stavka, was not mentioned. The command of the ZF doubted that the troops would even reach Tikhoretskaya.
Fighters of the German 1st Mountain Infantry Division, December 22, 1942
Stuck German tractor Sd. Kfz. 8, towing an 88 mm FlaK 36 anti-aircraft gun in the Caucasus. January 1943
Operation "Sea"
Operation "Sea" was carried out in cooperation with the Black Sea fleet. It consisted of three stages.
At the first stage, the 47th army of General Kamkov (5 divisions and 5 brigades, more than 850 guns and mortars) part of the forces was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in the Abinskaya area, occupy Krymskaya, creating conditions for the liberation of Novorossiysk and moving deep into the Taman Peninsula.
At the second stage of the operation, they were going to liberate Novorossiysk by attacking Kamkov's army from land and by amphibious assault from the South Ozereyka area.
The third stage is the complete liberation of the Taman Peninsula by the end of January.
From the air, the operation was supported by 270 aircraft of the 5th Air Army (4 air divisions and 6 separate regiments) and aviation Black Sea Front.
After reviewing the plan of the operation, the Soviet Headquarters noticed that the headquarters of the Polar Front "forgot" about the development of the attack on Bataysk. So the plan was adjusted. Despite the haste, the offensive of the Black Sea group was delayed, due to both objective and subjective reasons. Therefore, the Headquarters allowed to postpone the start of the operation for four days.
The regrouping of troops began belatedly, there were few roads, they were in very poor condition, most often it was impossible to use vehicles on them, only horse-drawn vehicles. And with a change in the weather, the roads passable from the dry season became generally impassable. Thaws led to the fact that the rapid melting of snow paralyzed traffic on the roads.
The command did not use the capabilities of the available engineering troops in the preparation of the operation. The offensive plan of the Black Sea group was developed without taking into account the traffic situation. As a result, in the first period of the offensive, our troops had no roads, and their supply was minimal. Only with access to the Khadyzhenskaya and Apsheronskaya districts did the situation improve.
The Germans had order with the roads. They took care of it beforehand. Therefore, the German command could maneuver forces, reinforce troops in the right direction.
As a result, by the beginning of the offensive, the command of the Polar Front failed to create powerful strike groups. The ammunition necessary for a successful breakthrough was not accumulated. Half of the troops of the Black Sea Group were on their way to the places of concentration, stuck in traffic jams many kilometers long.
German assault gun StuG III Ausf. F-8 in the suburbs of Novorossiysk. The frame also shows a German 88 mm anti-aircraft gun. December 1942
Offensive. First step
On January 11, 1943, the 46th Army went on the offensive from the area northeast of Tuapse. She struck with two divisions on the left flank at Neftegorsk. The blow was auxiliary to distract the enemy. There were enough ammunition in the army, since they began to accumulate them even during the preparation of the Maikop operation. True, half of the artillery was unable to take up positions due to heavy rains and problems with the horses. Therefore, artillery preparation was weak.
The Germans quite easily repulsed the attack of our troops. Then they themselves counterattacked and pressed the Soviet division. But on January 12, the commander of the 17th Army, General Ruoff, coordinating the maneuver with the retreat of Mackensen's 1st Panzer Army, began to withdraw his left flank to the Khadyzhensky-Absheronsky line. On the 12th, the Nazis left the Marukhsky, Klukhorsky, Sancharo and Belorechensky passes. The troops of the 46th Army, followed by the 18th, began to pursue the enemy.
On January 12, without waiting for the full concentration of forces, the 47th Army launched Operation Sea. At this time, the 3rd Rifle Corps transferred to Kamkov was stuck in Kabardinka, and the 383rd Rifle Division was in Tuapse. These troops will appear on the front line only in two weeks. The command of the 47th Army, trying to make a gap through the Abinskaya to the Crimean, abandoned the approaching brigades and divisions in parts, as they approached. At the same time, reconnaissance of the positions of the enemy, his forces were not carried out in a timely manner. As a result, the 47th Army suffered heavy losses and progress was minimal.
On January 15, the 56th Army went on the offensive in the main direction. Also not at full strength. The army headquarters arrived on the 10th. Corps and divisional artillery got stuck on the rain-washed Shabanovsky and Khrebtovoy passes. By the beginning of the offensive there was only a third of the artillery. The 10th Guards Rifle Corps got stuck on the Storozhevaya-Shabanovskoye section of the road due to lack of fuel. Therefore, the formations of the second echelon of the army were introduced into battle from the march.
In 7-day heavy battles, Grechko's troops pushed through the defenses of the German 5th Army Corps of General Wetzel west of Goryachiy Klyuch, advanced up to 20–30 km. Soviet troops reached the approaches to Krasnodar. Could not go further. The artillery fell behind completely, there was not enough ammunition.
At this, the first stage of the Novorossiysk-Maikop operation ended.
Soviet submachine gunners in the battle for the liberation of Novorossiysk
- Alexander Samsonov
- https://ru.wikipedia.org/, http://waralbum.ru/
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