Operations "Mountains" and "Sea"

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Operations "Mountains" and "Sea"
Soviet 152-mm howitzer-gun model 1937 (ML-20) and its crew at the position near Novorossiysk. 1943


Black Sea Group of Forces


On December 29, 1942, the Headquarters ordered the command of the Transcaucasian Front (ZF) to organize attacks on Novorossiysk and Krasnodar with the general task of intercepting the Armavir-Rostov railway in the Tikhoretskaya area.



On January 4, 1943, Stalin instructed the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Tyulenev, to shift the center of gravity of the front's actions (How Mackensen's 1st Panzer Army Escaped the Caucasian Cauldron) in the area of ​​the Black Sea group. Petrov's troops were to break through to Tikhoretskaya, preventing the enemy from leaving the North Caucasus to the west, then attacking Bataysk, Azov and Rostov from the east, blocking the North Caucasian Wehrmacht grouping. The Black Sea group was to go on the offensive no later than January 12th.

Generals Tyulenev and Petrov began to prepare a large-scale operation. The situation was difficult. Winter, and especially January, is not the best time to attack in the mountains. Frosts, the spurs of the mountains are covered with deep snow. Plus the scale of the operation. About this in Tbilisi - there was the headquarters of the Polar Front, and they did not dream of it. Since November 1942, the command of the Polar Front has been preparing to attack in the Maikop direction. There they developed a road network, accumulated supplies and trained troops.

The Black Sea Group of Forces included the 46th, 18th, 56th and 47th Armies, the 5th Air Army. They were going to transfer the 10th Guards and 3 Rifle Corps, 2 divisions from the 58th Army from the Northern Group to the Black Sea Group. The group also strengthened 3 tank brigades, one such regiment and 5 separate tank battalions. More than 300 tanks in total.


Red Army soldiers in position defending a mountain pass in the Caucasus. In the foreground is a sniper pair - S. Mataryan and B. Bondarenko. 1942

Operation Mountains


The Soviet command developed plans for two operations under the code names "Mountains" and "Sea".

In the "Mountain" plan, the main role was assigned to the 56th Army, commanded by Commander-18, who had shown himself well in the defense of Tuapse, General Grechko. Accordingly, Commander-56, General Ryzhov, received the 16th Army.

The 56th Army included 6 rifle divisions, 7 rifle and 2 tank brigades, one tank regiment, 2 tank battalions, 4 artillery and 3 mortar regiments, and a group of guards mortars. More than 1,1 thousand guns and mortars and more than 190 tanks were concentrated in the Grechko army zone. The army was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in the area of ​​​​Goryachiy Klyuch and Krepostnaya in four days with two strike groups, defeat the enemy - the 9th Romanian cavalry and 1st Slovak motorized divisions, liberate Krasnodar and take the crossings across the river. Kuban. Due to the limited road network, part of the army was preparing to attack on the left flank, here an auxiliary attack was made on Kholmskaya, Maryanskaya.


To the right of the 56th Army, the 18th Army (3 divisions and 6 brigades, 950 guns and mortars) was to strike. The army also advanced in the Krasnodar direction with the aim of defeating the German 44th Corps from the 17th Army and reaching the river. Kuban east of Krasnodar. The 46th army of General Leselidze (5 divisions and 2 brigades) advanced in the Maikop direction. It was supposed to defeat the enemy 49th mountain rifle corps, liberate Maikop, and go with the main forces to the Kuban in the Ust-Labinsk region.

At the second stage of the operation, the armies of the Black Sea Group were to develop the offensive on Tikhoretsk and occupy it by the end of January. About Bataysk and Rostov, which was in the directive of the Stavka, was not mentioned. The command of the ZF doubted that the troops would even reach Tikhoretskaya.


Fighters of the German 1st Mountain Infantry Division, December 22, 1942


Stuck German tractor Sd. Kfz. 8, towing an 88 mm FlaK 36 anti-aircraft gun in the Caucasus. January 1943

Operation "Sea"


Operation "Sea" was carried out in cooperation with the Black Sea fleet. It consisted of three stages.

At the first stage, the 47th army of General Kamkov (5 divisions and 5 brigades, more than 850 guns and mortars) part of the forces was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in the Abinskaya area, occupy Krymskaya, creating conditions for the liberation of Novorossiysk and moving deep into the Taman Peninsula.

At the second stage of the operation, they were going to liberate Novorossiysk by attacking Kamkov's army from land and by amphibious assault from the South Ozereyka area.

The third stage is the complete liberation of the Taman Peninsula by the end of January.

From the air, the operation was supported by 270 aircraft of the 5th Air Army (4 air divisions and 6 separate regiments) and aviation Black Sea Front.

After reviewing the plan of the operation, the Soviet Headquarters noticed that the headquarters of the Polar Front "forgot" about the development of the attack on Bataysk. So the plan was adjusted. Despite the haste, the offensive of the Black Sea group was delayed, due to both objective and subjective reasons. Therefore, the Headquarters allowed to postpone the start of the operation for four days.

The regrouping of troops began belatedly, there were few roads, they were in very poor condition, most often it was impossible to use vehicles on them, only horse-drawn vehicles. And with a change in the weather, the roads passable from the dry season became generally impassable. Thaws led to the fact that the rapid melting of snow paralyzed traffic on the roads.

The command did not use the capabilities of the available engineering troops in the preparation of the operation. The offensive plan of the Black Sea group was developed without taking into account the traffic situation. As a result, in the first period of the offensive, our troops had no roads, and their supply was minimal. Only with access to the Khadyzhenskaya and Apsheronskaya districts did the situation improve.

The Germans had order with the roads. They took care of it beforehand. Therefore, the German command could maneuver forces, reinforce troops in the right direction.

As a result, by the beginning of the offensive, the command of the Polar Front failed to create powerful strike groups. The ammunition necessary for a successful breakthrough was not accumulated. Half of the troops of the Black Sea Group were on their way to the places of concentration, stuck in traffic jams many kilometers long.


German assault gun StuG III Ausf. F-8 in the suburbs of Novorossiysk. The frame also shows a German 88 mm anti-aircraft gun. December 1942

Offensive. First step


On January 11, 1943, the 46th Army went on the offensive from the area northeast of Tuapse. She struck with two divisions on the left flank at Neftegorsk. The blow was auxiliary to distract the enemy. There were enough ammunition in the army, since they began to accumulate them even during the preparation of the Maikop operation. True, half of the artillery was unable to take up positions due to heavy rains and problems with the horses. Therefore, artillery preparation was weak.

The Germans quite easily repulsed the attack of our troops. Then they themselves counterattacked and pressed the Soviet division. But on January 12, the commander of the 17th Army, General Ruoff, coordinating the maneuver with the retreat of Mackensen's 1st Panzer Army, began to withdraw his left flank to the Khadyzhensky-Absheronsky line. On the 12th, the Nazis left the Marukhsky, Klukhorsky, Sancharo and Belorechensky passes. The troops of the 46th Army, followed by the 18th, began to pursue the enemy.

On January 12, without waiting for the full concentration of forces, the 47th Army launched Operation Sea. At this time, the 3rd Rifle Corps transferred to Kamkov was stuck in Kabardinka, and the 383rd Rifle Division was in Tuapse. These troops will appear on the front line only in two weeks. The command of the 47th Army, trying to make a gap through the Abinskaya to the Crimean, abandoned the approaching brigades and divisions in parts, as they approached. At the same time, reconnaissance of the positions of the enemy, his forces were not carried out in a timely manner. As a result, the 47th Army suffered heavy losses and progress was minimal.

On January 15, the 56th Army went on the offensive in the main direction. Also not at full strength. The army headquarters arrived on the 10th. Corps and divisional artillery got stuck on the rain-washed Shabanovsky and Khrebtovoy passes. By the beginning of the offensive there was only a third of the artillery. The 10th Guards Rifle Corps got stuck on the Storozhevaya-Shabanovskoye section of the road due to lack of fuel. Therefore, the formations of the second echelon of the army were introduced into battle from the march.

In 7-day heavy battles, Grechko's troops pushed through the defenses of the German 5th Army Corps of General Wetzel west of Goryachiy Klyuch, advanced up to 20–30 km. Soviet troops reached the approaches to Krasnodar. Could not go further. The artillery fell behind completely, there was not enough ammunition.

At this, the first stage of the Novorossiysk-Maikop operation ended.


Soviet submachine gunners in the battle for the liberation of Novorossiysk
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  1. +1
    3 February 2023 06: 38
    The most mediocre generals Tyulenev and Petrov, everything rested on the heroism of our fighters.
    From Shtemenko's memoirs, he tried to write softer ...

    During the second half of February, in March and the first half of April, offensive battles continued without major successes. The enemy was pushed back to the line of the Kurka and Kuban rivers to Prikubansky, to the Adagum river to Krasnoy, to the heights near the villages of Krymskaya, Neberdzhaevskaya, but he did not suffer a decisive defeat. This was explained by many circumstances, and in particular by shortcomings in the leadership of our troops.


    The headquarters did not know the exact position and condition of the troops. The 58th army lagged behind its neighbors and found itself, as it were, in the second echelon. The 5th Guards Don Cavalry Corps and tanks were unable to get ahead of the infantry. The front command tried to restore order, but without much success.

    And this is when the Wehrmacht retreated practically without a fight and its 1st Panzer Army managed to retreat through Rostov, held by Manstein.
    1. 0
      3 February 2023 08: 44
      The most mediocre generals Tyulenev and Petrov
      Can you clarify what is the mediocrity of General Petrov? If he was later appointed commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, and for the skillful command and control of troops in the Berlin and Prague operations, initiative and dedication on May 29, 1945, General of the Army Ivan Efimovich Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. wink
      1. +2
        3 February 2023 11: 32
        Can you clarify what is the mediocrity of General Petrov?

        I quoted Shtemenko's words. And this is just from wikipedia

        However, on March 3, 1944, for the unsuccessful conduct of a number of private offensive operations (including the landing on Cape Tarkhan and the landing in the Kerch port), Petrov was relieved of his post as commander of the Primorsky Army, enlisted in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and demoted to Colonel General. From March 13, 1944, Colonel-General I. E. Petrov commanded the 33rd Army of the Western Front, from April 12 to June 6, 1944 he was the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front. However, he was also removed from this position after the report of a member of the Military Council of the Front L. Z. Mekhlis to I. V. Stalin about “Petrov’s softness, his inability to ensure the success of the operation ... that Petrov is sick and devotes too much time to doctors,” this happened due to a few days before the start of the Belarusian operation, for which Petrov fully prepared the troops of the front. Then he spent two months in Moscow without a new assignment.
        1. +2
          3 February 2023 11: 45
          I quoted Shtemenko's words. And this is just from wikipedia
          Assessment of Mekhlis and his behavior during the defense of the Crimea was given by I.V. Stalin:
          You hold the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean Front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot.
          The result was: Based on the results of his activities on the Crimean Front, by Directive of the Stavka No. 155452 of June 4, 1942, Mekhlis was reduced in rank by two steps to the corps commissar and removed from the post of deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Glavpolitupr.
          I recommend reading, if you have not read: the book by Vladimir Vasilyevich Karpov "The Commander" (About Petrov I.E.) hi
          1. +1
            3 February 2023 16: 38
            I recommend reading, if you have not read: the book by Vladimir Vasilyevich Karpov "The Commander" (About Petrov I.E.)
            Rare nonsense. The opinion of General Shtemenko is still more significant than the opinion of the writer.
            1. 0
              3 February 2023 22: 07
              Rare nonsense. The opinion of General Shtemenko is still more significant than the opinion of the writer.
              Before writing such a thing about a person whom you do not know, at least bother to read the biography. Perhaps it will be interesting not only to you: about V.V. Karpov
              In February 1941, as a cadet, he was arrested and convicted under Article 58 by a military tribunal of the Central Asian Military District for anti-Soviet agitation to five years in prison. In November 1942, he went to the front as part of the 45th separate penal company, formed in Tavdinlag from volunteer prisoners.
              Since January 1943 - in the reconnaissance platoon of the 629th rifle regiment of the 134th rifle division of the 41st army. By order of the 629th Infantry Regiment of the 134th Infantry Division No.: 5 / n dated: 28.01.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX, the Red Army soldier of the foot reconnaissance platoon Karpov was awarded the medal "For Courage".
              In February 1943, a criminal record was expunged from him for his distinction in battle. In the same year he was admitted to the CPSU (b). Later he was the commander of a platoon of scouts. In April 1943, the 41st Army was disbanded and the 134th Rifle Division was transferred to the 39th Army. August 17, 1943 was wounded. By order of the 134th Infantry Division 0176 \ n dated September 3, 1943, the commander of a platoon of foot reconnaissance of the 629th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Karpov, was awarded the Order of the Red Star.
              Participated in the capture of 79 "languages".
              By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 4, 1944, V. V. Karpov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
              He accomplished the last feat in preparation for the Belarusian offensive operation - on the instructions of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, in German military uniform, he crossed the front line, made his way to occupied Vitebsk, and received documents from local underground workers with important information about the enemy’s defense. When returning back, he was detained by a patrol, when delivered to the commandant's office, he pretended to be drunk and, taking advantage of the weakening of the guards' vigilance, destroyed them and fled. During the reverse transition across the front line, he received several severe wounds, was rescued by a reconnaissance group sent towards him. The intelligence was delivered to the command.
              hi
              1. 0
                4 February 2023 13: 42
                Before writing such a thing about a person whom you do not know, at least bother to read the biography.
                I got acquainted, and not only with the officialdom, distributed personally by Karpov, but also with the analysis of this officialdom, which was done by V.S. Bushin. He was convicted under the standard article on theft, but to talk about the fact that the delivery of 79 prisoners to our rear is the taking of so many languages ​​is the height of impudence. About the flight from the fascist patrol - still the same nonsense.
          2. +1
            3 February 2023 19: 40
            I recommend reading, if you have not read: the book by Vladimir Vasilyevich Karpov "The Commander" (About Petrov I.E.)

            I read it, don't worry, even in the Roman newspaper. It's just that Karpov had been closely acquainted with Petrov since the age of 38.
            1. -1
              3 February 2023 21: 53
              I read it, don't worry, even in the Roman newspaper.
              So, at about the same time, you and I had to get acquainted with the work of Karpov.
              It's just that Karpov had been closely acquainted with Petrov since the age of 38.
              So he doesn't seem to be hiding it? wink
              1. +1
                4 February 2023 09: 02
                So he doesn't seem to be hiding it.

                But he shields Petrov and all the blame, for example, he blames Oktyabrsky for the landing in Ozereevka. And who made the decision to transfer additional troops to the bridgehead near Stanichka, and not to evacuate Kunikov's detachment, as Kunikov himself asked? 225 days of mindless sitting in trenches on a piece of land surrounded by minefields and under constant shelling. 25 thousand dead on Malaya Zemlya. The troops stationed there did not contribute in any way to the liberation of Novorossiysk, so they spent more than a day on demining when the city had already been liberated. Previously, this operation was not mentioned, glorification began under Brezhnev. Again, the mistakes of the generals covered up the heroism of our soldiers.
  2. -1
    3 February 2023 07: 24
    The interaction of armies, fronts has gone into the realm of legends. We do not see such a brilliant picture on the map anywhere else. It is often said that all Soviet victories rested on the heroism of the Soviet people. But heroism does not appear by itself. Often the rank and file look at the behavior of their commanders. At the enterprises, the rank and file also decide everything. And the tasks that he solves are set from above.
    1. Eug
      0
      3 February 2023 13: 47
      Needless to say, in many respects the conditions for the heroism of the Soviet people were created by their own
      bosses - for the heroic deed of some requires, to put it mildly, the bungling of others ...

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