How the German "Stalingrad fortress" was stormed

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How the German "Stalingrad fortress" was stormed
Tanks T-34 on the central square of Stalingrad on the day of the surrender of German troops


German "Stalingrad fortress"


On November 23, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts united in the Kalach region. In the resulting cauldron were 22 enemy divisions, numerous reinforcement units and RGK, which were part of the 6th field and 4th tank armies, the headquarters of the 4th, 8th, 11th, 51st army and 14th tank buildings.



After assessing the situation, General Paulus suggested that von Weichs, commander of Army Group B, immediately withdraw troops to the line of the Chir and Don rivers, restoring a solid front. The general noted that resistance in the environment is impossible. There are few forces, more than half of the front has no equipped positions, there is no forest for dugouts. Supply was inadequate even with land communications, and air supplies were even more limited. Commander Paulus offered an immediate breakthrough while the troops could still go for it.

General Weichs was of the same opinion. He was supported by the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Zeitzler. The boiler did not have enough ammunition, fuel, provisions, winter uniforms.

But Hitler believed that it was impossible to retreat. The Fuhrer declared Stalingrad a "fortress" and the encircled troops a garrison. The 6th Army had to withstand the siege. Marshal Goering promised that the valiant Luftwaffe would provide the "fortress" with everything necessary.

As a result, Paulus did not dare to take responsibility and make a breakthrough. The army was ordered to hold out with all their might and wait for help. The Don army group was formed, which was supposed to release the army of Paulus and return the lost positions.

The breakthrough of the 6th Army itself, in conditions when the encirclement closed, was a risky undertaking with a dubious result. Under conditions of constant enemy pressure, shelling, throwing heavy weapon, when the fuel was running out, without enough ammunition, provisions, in winter in a snowstorm and snow - there was little chance.

Manstein himself noted:

“Even if the army succeeded in breaking through the enemy encirclement front in a southwestern direction, it would be followed on its heels by the enemy armies, which were currently standing in front of its Eastern, Northern and Western fronts near Stalingrad. West of the Don River, the enemy could switch to a parallel pursuit in a southerly direction in order to prevent the army from crossing the Don.
It was clear that sooner or later the army, not supported by other German troops, would again be stopped by the enemy in the steppe, not having enough ammunition, fuel and food!
It is possible that individual units, especially tank units, could have escaped.
But the destruction of the 6th Army was a foregone conclusion!
The enemy forces bound by it so far would be released. This could lead to the destruction of the entire southern wing of the eastern front (including Army Group A, which was still in the Caucasus).

Thus, the German command and Manstein were ready to sacrifice the 6th Army so that it would divert the Russian forces. A convenient moment for the withdrawal of Paulus's army was missed, so the troops remained in Stalingrad, hoping for outside help.


German tank Pz. Kpfw. III passes through a pontoon crossing near Stalingrad. December 1942

It was not possible to crush the 6th Army on the move


The Soviet command had to solve two difficult problems.

First, create a stable outer front of the encirclement and move it as far as possible to the west.

Secondly, quickly liquidate the 6th Army, freeing the troops.

Both tasks began to be solved without a pause on November 24, 1942. The idea was to strike in converging directions on Gumrak by the forces of the 21st, 65th, 24th, 66th, 62nd, 64th and 57th armies, reinforced by the 26th, 4th and 16th Panzer Corps and supported aviation 17th, 16th and 8th air armies (more than 1 vehicles), dismember the German army and destroy it.

For a week, Soviet troops on three fronts continuously attacked the Germans from all directions. Aviation made more than 6 thousand sorties. The morale of the troops was high. Soldiers and commanders were eager to crush the enemy. However, several days of stubborn fighting showed that the desire to win was not enough.

In particular, the command was still in a hurry and made mistakes. So, mobile formations were thrown head-on, to storm enemy positions, without conducting reconnaissance of the area, without breaking through the enemy’s defenses, without establishing interaction with infantry, artillery and aviation.

On the site of Galanin's 24th Army, Maslov's 24th Panzer Corps was thrown into the attack on the strong defense of the Germans on the morning of November 16. The interaction of infantry and tanks was not organized. Several tanks died in a minefield, others ran into enemy anti-tank artillery fire. The corps did not complete the task of capturing the crossings across the Don from Vertyachey. In the 57th army of the Stalingrad front, the 13th mechanized corps was similarly thrown into the attack. The mobile connection suffered heavy losses.

It was not possible to destroy the 6th German Army on the move. It became clear that a strong enemy cannot be broken with one blow. The commander of the Don Front Rokossovsky noted:

"Time passed, and the results of the offensive were clearly disappointing."

Careful preparation of a new offensive operation was required.


Soviet fighters in winter camouflage suits are searching for the enemy in the destroyed workshop of the plant in Stalingrad. 1942–1943

By November 30, 1942, the encirclement ring had been halved, but not split.

The command of the 6th Army withdrew troops from the small bend of the Don and strengthened their positions to the west of the Rossoshka River. Paulus shortened the front line, condensed battle formations, organized combat units and subunits from various rear services, signalmen, staff officers, etc.

The Germans skillfully maneuvered their reserves inside their internal front: 30–40 km long from north to south and 70–80 km from west to east. In the center, in the area of ​​Pitomnik and Gumrak, there were airfields inaccessible to Soviet artillery. The German Air Force created an air bridge.

The Nazis skillfully used the Stalingrad defense system created by the Soviet troops (in the summer of 1942). Settlements were turned into nodes of resistance, heights were fortified, railway embankments were adapted for defense, tanks, steam locomotives and wagons that were out of action were used as firing points.

As a result, a strong “fortress”, a fortified area, was created. The soldiers of the Wehrmacht, believing in the help promised by the Fuhrer, despite the cold, the reduction in rations, fought skillfully and steadfastly.


Soviet artillerymen firing from a 76,2 mm divisional gun mod. 1939 near Stalingrad. November 1942


Fight in one of the shops of the plant "Red October". December 1942

December. Underestimation of the enemy


In the first ten days of December, at the request of the Headquarters, a new attempt was made to destroy the Stalingrad enemy grouping. But unsuccessfully.

Firstly, Stalingrad was liberated by two fronts - Stalingrad (Eremenko) and Don (Rokossovsky). There was no unified leadership, which led to poor organization. The armies of the two fronts advanced at different times, the Germans could maneuver their reserves.

Secondly, the enemy was still seriously underestimated. It was believed that there were about 85 thousand people in the boiler. In fact, the Stalingrad grouping of Paulus numbered about 220 thousand people, 3 guns and mortars, 200 tanks.

As of December 1, 1942, the Stalingrad and Don Fronts included 480 thousand people, more than 8,4 thousand guns and mortars, and more than 450 tanks.

Therefore, they decided to reinforce the Don Front with the Headquarters reserve - the 2nd Guards Army, which included selected formations - the 1st and 13th Guards Rifle Corps, the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps. A new operation was being prepared to defeat the 6th Army. The start of the offensive was scheduled for 18 December.

However, on December 12, the German operation “Winter Thunderstorm” began - the 57th tank corps of the Goth group began to break through from Kotelnikovo to Stalingrad. In five days, the Nazis advanced 75 km. Three tank divisions (about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns) pierced the corridor along which they planned to supply the Stalingrad fortress with a steel ram.

Hitler did not plan to withdraw Paulus's army from the city. Therefore, the 2nd Guards Army was thrown into the Kotelnikovsky direction.


Calculation of the Soviet 82-mm mortar arr. 1941 covers advancing machine gunners northwest of Stalingrad. December 1942


Red Army soldiers run past a wrecked German tank Pz. Kpfw. III in the attack near Stalingrad. November-December 1942

Manstein's attempt to break through to Stalingrad was repulsed.

Gotha's group, having lost 230 tanks, began to withdraw. However, Operation Ring to defeat the 6th Army had to be postponed for a month. At the same time, frequent operations continued at that time, the divisions launched attacks, exhausted the enemy, depleted his ammunition. They improved positions, slowly pushed back the Nazis, reducing its territory. The Germans responded, counterattacked, trying to maintain their positions and recapture what they had lost.

The consumption of shells had no analogues in the world.

The average monthly consumption of ammunition in the Stalingrad offensive operation was 3 million shells and mines, more than 90 million cartridges for small arms - 64 wagons per day. Long-range aviation formations and three air armies attacked enemy airfields in the ring itself and behind the outer front of the encirclement. An air defense division and almost 400 anti-aircraft guns guarded enemy transports.

It was decided to entrust the final defeat of the German Stalingrad group to Rokossovsky. On December 30, the 62nd, 64th and 57th armies of the Stalingrad Front were transferred to the Don Front.


Sniper of the 117th Infantry Regiment of the 23rd Infantry Division of the 21st Army of the Don Front Alexander Frolov in position near Stalingrad. Alexander Ivanovich Frolov (07.03.1924/04.10.1978/1941 - 1942/20/1942) was drafted into the Red Army in August 10, on the fronts since 1942. As part of his regiment, he fought on the North-Western, Stalingrad, Don fronts. Wounded 117 February 92. During the Battle of Stalingrad he was one of the best snipers. On October 4, 4, a sniper of the 2th Infantry Regiment (of the same division), Corporal A. I. Frolov, was presented by the command of the unit for a new award for the destruction of 1 Nazis (of which: 6 officers and 1 snipers). In addition, armor-piercing incendiary bullets knocked out 272 machine guns and 44 light machine gun. By that time, he trained 5 fighters in sniper business, who destroyed 1942 fascists in just 18 month. By Order No. 1943/n dated November 143, 6, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the troops of the Don Front. On February 105, 31, junior lieutenant A.I. Frolov was presented by the command of the unit to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the destruction of 1943 enemy soldiers and officers, 21 machine guns and the training of a large group of young snipers. And by order No. XNUMX / n dated March XNUMX, XNUMX, he was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner for the troops of the XNUMXst Army. Came to Germany.

Operation "Ring"


On January 4, 1943, the operation plan was approved. It provided for a cutting blow from west to east by the forces of the 65th Army (10 rifle, 2 artillery divisions, a tank brigade).

At the first stage, the army was to advance southeast to Novy Rogachik and, in cooperation with the 21st Army (7 rifle divisions, one heavy artillery division, a tank brigade) and strike groups of the 64th and 57th armies, destroy the Nazis who were defending west of the river Rossoshki. More than a quarter of the artillery forces of the front (65 artillery regiments, including 36 high power, 2 anti-aircraft and 5 regiments of rocket launchers) were concentrated on the sector of the 5th Army. The main forces of the 16th Air Army acted in the interests of Batov's army. The left flank of the 65th Army was supported by Galanin's 24th Army (6 divisions).

At the second stage of the operation, the main blow was going to be delivered to the zone of the 21st Army, which, in cooperation with the 65th, 57th and 64th armies, was to develop an offensive on Voroponovo.

At the third stage - a general decisive assault.

From the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the front was reinforced with another artillery division, two regiments and a division of high-powered artillery, 5 anti-tank regiments, 2 rocket artillery divisions, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment, 7 breakthrough guard tank regiments. March replenishment arrived - 20 thousand people.

In total, by the beginning of the operation, the Don Front consisted of 39 rifle divisions, 10 rifle, motorized rifle and naval brigades, 7 air divisions, 45 mortar and artillery regiments of the RKG, 10 rocket artillery regiments, 17 air defense artillery regiments, 5 tank brigades and 14 tank regiments. The density of artillery in the main direction was 220 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front.


The 65th army of Batov and the 21st army of Chistyakov were opposed by the 384th and 44th infantry, 29th and 3rd motorized divisions of the enemy. The German divisions were already bled dry. So, in the 3rd motorized division there were 25 tanks, 36 guns and 80 active fighters in each of the 6 battalions. The reserve of the division consisted of a sapper battalion (150 people). Most of the tanks, due to the lack of fuel, were turned into fixed firing points.

On January 8, the Germans were offered to surrender.

The Germans did not answer. The Fuhrer forbade surrender. The command of the 6th Army carried out the task of pinning down the Russian armies, which gave the high command the opportunity to reorganize the southern flank of the Eastern Front.

At the first interrogation, Paulus said that he did not lay down his arms, as this was required by the strategic calculations of the rate. Hitler also promised that by mid-February a powerful deblocking blow would follow, which would change the situation at the front. For this, they planned to use the troops that were withdrawn from the Caucasus, and the SS tank corps that had begun redeploying from France.


Commander of the 65th Army of the Don Front, Lieutenant-General P.I. Batov with officers in the Stalingrad region. Winter 1942–1943


Captured soldiers of the Wehrmacht record an appeal (or broadcast it on the radio) to their comrades fighting in Stalingrad. January 1943

To be continued ...
22 comments
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  1. +14
    2 February 2023 05: 45
    Thanks for the interesting article. Usually skip the period from the environment to the "Winter Thunderstorm".

    Previously, the Germans went to see Volgograd, ugh, Stalingrad, who still remembered that it was for them. Now they are gone. And so it will be with our students. I talked a lot with historians, they are completely broken as scientists during the Soviet, liberal, and now church (especially philosophers). There will be no truth from them, which means there will be continuous blah blah blah.


    Return the name of Stalingrad to our history, forever!!!
    1. +12
      2 February 2023 10: 42
      Previously, the Germans went to see Volgograd, ugh, Stalingrad, who still remembered that it was for them. Now they are gone.
      Exactly. And the former Japanese prisoners of war came back in the 80s themselves and brought their children and grandchildren to us in Nakhodka. They showed and told how they built houses, schools and so on. And at the same time, on Leninskaya Street (the closest to the sea station) they raked out all the black bread (namely black) and took it back with them in trunks (without exaggeration).
    2. +4
      2 February 2023 13: 24
      Quote: bya965
      I talked a lot with historians, they are during the Soviet, liberal, and now church
      During what time "Soviet, liberal, and now ecclesiastical" ...?
    3. 0
      2 February 2023 22: 44
      Back in the days of my Volgograd childhood, the question of renaming the city was raised. And then the majority of the inhabitants wanted to be called Stalingraders.
      Now the situation has changed, unfortunately.
  2. Eug
    +16
    2 February 2023 12: 05
    Manstein's plan "Winter Thunderstorm" was not just a plan to release the 6th Army - it provided for the "encirclement of others." Hitler was not going to leave Stalingrad, hoping to turn the tide. That is why the army of Paulus was never given an order to counter strike. But the beginning of "Small Saturn" clearly indicated the threat of a "big" cauldron, in which Mainstein's troops would also find themselves. Stalin's strategic genius can only be admired...
    PS I am of the opinion that Stalingrad should be on the map of Russia. As for me, this renaming alone will mean much more for patriotic education than dozens of churches built with paid faith in God ..
    1. 0
      2 February 2023 23: 57
      Quote: Eug
      Manstein's plan "Winter Thunderstorm" was not just a plan to release the 6th Army - it provided for the "encirclement of others." Hitler was not going to leave Stalingrad, hoping to turn the tide. That is why the army of Paulus was never given an order to counter strike. But the beginning of "Small Saturn" clearly indicated the threat of a "big" cauldron, in which Mainstein's troops would also find themselves. Stalin's strategic genius can only be admired...
      PS I am of the opinion that Stalingrad should be on the map of Russia. As for me, this renaming alone will mean much more for patriotic education than dozens of churches built with paid faith in God ..

      I completely agree. Who in the world knows the city of Volgograd?
      But ask about Stalingrad and many will answer.
      This is despite the propaganda.
      Why do we have a hero city Volgograd? I have not heard something about the "Battle of Volgograd".
      There was the Battle of Stalingrad, which means -
      The hero city of Stalingrad, no matter how anyone would like it.
    2. 0
      3 February 2023 04: 29
      Stalin's strategic genius can only be admired...

      —- It is hoped that in the NMD, the strategic thinking of the headquarters will not be in conflict with the tactical and operational troop skill, and the practical lessons of the Army in reducing losses.

      —- In the Battle of Stalingrad, as is clear from the above, the strategy repeatedly did not rely on tactical and operational practical military skills, not to mention the task of minimizing losses.

      —- Heroism, skill and character in close combat are not to be occupied by Russian infantry! It is good to add to this the military skill of the Army to reduce the need for melee infantry!!
  3. +3
    2 February 2023 15: 13
    Quote: Eug
    Manstein's plan "Winter Thunderstorm" was not just a plan to release the 6th Army - it provided for the "encirclement of others." Hitler was not going to leave Stalingrad, hoping to turn the tide. That is why the army of Paulus was never given an order to counter strike. But the beginning of "Small Saturn" clearly indicated the threat of a "big" cauldron, in which Mainstein's troops would also find themselves. Stalin's strategic genius can only be admired...
    PS I am of the opinion that Stalingrad should be on the map of Russia. As for me, this renaming alone will mean much more for patriotic education than dozens of churches built with paid faith in God ..

    I agree with you. However, patriotic education in the sense that we put into this concept is categorically not needed by the current political leadership, and the political class of the Russian Federation as a whole. From the word - absolutely. Moreover, it - the leadership is afraid of such education! That is why he is satisfied with the "patriotic" education in the style of O. Gazmanov, and ... Solzhenitsyn! And God forbid, in their opinion, someone, somewhere, to the left deviates from this course! sad hi
  4. +4
    2 February 2023 16: 31
    A deep bow to all the inhabitants of military Stalingrad and his defenders!
    To everyone who died. To everyone who survived. To everyone who restored the city from ruins.

    A scarlet dawn flared up.
    The grasses bowed at their feet.
    Oh, how disturbing and bitter
    smells like steppe wormwood!

    Quiet sunset time
    a wing descended into the Volga ...
    Oh you guys guys!
    How many of you have been killed here!


    How young you were
    how did you fight...
    Here, we have not forgotten about you -
    How can we forget about you!

    Here we take, as once,
    a handful of Stalingrad land.
    We won guys!
    We've made it to Berlin!


    ... Again the evening dawn
    paints poplars with fire.
    Again anxious and bitter
    smells like native land.

    Again harsh and holy
    Young hearts beat...
    Oh you guys guys!
    There is no end to life.


    Margarita Agashina, 1972
  5. +1
    2 February 2023 18: 37
    The article often points out our mistakes, underestimation of the enemy and the courage of the Nazis in defense, skillful command and control of troops, reserves and competent maneuvers. And we are not skillful, not organized.

    Thanks to the author and a deep bow for not writing directly - "thrown with mass", even though such a conclusion can be traced between the lines.

    However, how did it happen that the competent, skillful and competent leadership of the Nazis, in fact, not only lost the key mega-battle of the entire WWII (not only WWII), ruining one of the best army groups (6th Army was in fact not JUST an army), the vaunted Luftwaffe did not was able to provide an air bridge in terms of goal-setting supplies, and Hitler's personal "firefighter", having suffered serious losses in armor and grenadiers, also did not complete the task ??? He did not complete the task of releasing Paulus and did not complete the likely task of encircling our two fronts as a variant of a successful scenario.

    Glory to our fallen ancestors! Their heroism! Stop lying about the wild incompetence of our commanders, hushing up the failures of the vaunted Nazi generals and marshals!
    1. +1
      2 February 2023 22: 03
      Author - "The consumption of shells had no analogues in the world.
      The average monthly consumption of ammunition in the Stalingrad offensive operation was 3 million shells and mines, more than 90 million cartridges for small arms - 64 wagons per day. "- it would be interesting to compare our ammunition consumption with the consumption of the enemy.
    2. +1
      2 February 2023 23: 15
      Quote: lubesky
      The article often points out our mistakes, underestimation of the enemy and the courage of the Nazis in defense, skillful command and control of troops, reserves and competent maneuvers. And we are not skillful, not organized.

      This is Samsonov, get acquainted! And there are a lot of fans of him here who are sure that they won due to "corpse-filling", that the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, until the end of the war, were an order of magnitude higher than the Red Army in terms of training.

      I have repeatedly written about this, but, apparently, such "Samson" and "buffoons" are in trend among the local public.
      1. +1
        4 February 2023 02: 35
        They just fill up with a mass of printed characters. This does not mean at all that they are "a trend among the local public."
    3. 0
      3 February 2023 11: 47
      Well, Samsonov has most of the articles like this. You read it - and it’s as if we didn’t have a single normal victory, everything is contrary: our communications were poor, and there was no interaction between the troops, and the commanders for the most part were either mediocre or indecisive, and the tactics were clumsy, and so on and so forth. How the brilliant Germans were defeated - FIG knows. Miracle, nothing else! General "Moroz", Colonel "Rasputitsa" and Major "Russian Spirit" - that's who should have been given medals.
    4. 0
      3 February 2023 19: 48
      And my father, who went through the entire war (called up on June 18!!! 41, demobilized at 46) "ON THE FRONT", in anti-tank artillery (45 mm), said so. In the first half of the war, then they did the same. And the front-line soldiers (50 years ago they were not yet veterans!), especially from the infantry, said the same thing. Uncle Vanya Semyonov, who went through the whole war in the infantry, was wounded more than once, said that an infantryman, in a happy situation, and the attack goes only twice, if they don’t kill and wound in the first. I pass on what the front-line soldiers said among themselves. They did not like to talk about the war to outsiders - they would not understand anyway, and it was hard. In a dream, my father often commanded a battery and cried. I asked in the morning - I saw the comrades of the dead in a dream. Twice "sat" under the tank ...
  6. +6
    2 February 2023 23: 38
    Twenty years have passed since my father passed away. I am now almost three times older than him, who then defended Stalingrad from the Nazis. And here again our country is fighting fascism, this ugly offspring of capitalism that brings death and suffering.
  7. +3
    2 February 2023 23: 50
    Excellent article, thanks. There seems to be nothing to add.
    But I'm talking about Stalingrad and the anti-Soviet coven.
    Everyone knows that at the memorial in honor of the Battle of Stalingrad, at the request of the veterans, three busts of Stalin, Zhukov and Vasilevsky were installed.
    Understanding the attitude of the guarantor towards Stalin, this hardly pleased him.
    But he couldn’t forbid either, it would mean offending the veterans.
    And the guarantor carefully monitors his image and rating.
    But he did not begin to lay flowers, which he expressed his displeasure with. But I didn't forget the wreaths for the graves of Yeltsin and Solzhenitsyn.
    But in the evening at 20 o'clock I accidentally went to the Spas channel and stumbled upon a truly Vlasov-Bandera Sabbath.
    Just shock and outrage.
    And here's the thing, in Melitopol, the local authorities decided to return the names to the streets and other objects of the city, which were before Bandera and which Bandera renamed.
    Including the Soviet ones. The question is, what's wrong with that.
    But what started in the studio during the discussion.
    What only accusations did not fall down. And that the local authorities are against Putin and that they are replacing the goals of the special operation, and that here the Communists are going to take revenge, and so on.
    Allow me, it seems like the goals voiced by the president are denazification and demilitarization.
    Something I don’t remember that de-Sovietization was also voiced there?
    De-Sovietization is carried out by the Ukronazi-Banderites.
    This is what turns out the clergy from the Russian Orthodox Church sided with Bandera? Wow!
    We agreed that our guys do not have the right to fight under the red banners of Victory! These are Soviet flags!
    They completely went crazy on the basis of anti-Sovietism.
    Give them free rein and they will forbid celebrating Victory Day on May 9, because the Soviet Union won! SOVIET!!!
    If they had given free rein, they would have banned the 80th anniversary of the Victory in Stalingrad, near Kursk, and so on.
    Have they forgotten that, according to the Constitution, Russia is the legal successor of the Soviet Union?
    Trying to cancel everything Soviet, they are canceling Russia.
    What has the ROC come to, isn’t it time to put these presumptuous gentlemen in their place so that they don’t get into their own business?
    Let them be engaged in souls, and not climb into secular and state affairs.
    However, why they allow themselves this is understandable.
    They take an example from whom it is clear.
    1. +3
      3 February 2023 01: 16
      Quote: Ulan.1812
      Let them deal with souls

      Our church is separated from the state! And let them not get involved in secular affairs. It remains to introduce the "Law of God" into the school, along with the study of Solzhenitsyn's "creativity"!
  8. 0
    3 February 2023 12: 22
    The author - minus only one title of the article. Just to hype.
    The German "Stalingrad fortress" is cynicism and Judaism. We never left Stalingrad to storm it...
  9. -3
    3 February 2023 19: 39
    Quote: Ulan.1812
    Stalin's strategic genius can only be admired...

    Russophobes and admire
  10. 0
    3 February 2023 19: 49
    Quote: agond
    The average monthly consumption of ammunition in the Stalingrad offensive operation was 3 million shells and mines, more than 90 million cartridges for small arms - 64 wagons per day. "- it would be interesting to compare our ammunition consumption with the consumption of the enemy.

    for the entire time of the Second World War, the Red Army spent 750 million shells and mines and about 16 billion rounds of ammunition. this is approximately 16 million shells per month and 340 million rounds per month. Against this background, the Stalingrad offensive operation looks deprived, on a starvation shell and cartridge ration
  11. 0
    4 March 2023 16: 58
    STALINGRAD STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION
    November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943
    The operation was carried out by the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts with the assistance of the forces of the Volga military flotilla. In the course of hostilities, the directorates of the 1st and 2nd Guards, 5th shock and 6th armies, five tank and three mechanized corps, and six brigades were additionally introduced into the Soviet troops.
    The duration of the operation is 76 days. The width of the combat front is 850 km. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops is 150-200 km. The average daily rate of advance: rifle formations - 1,5-2,5 km; tank and mechanized formations - 4-4,5 km.
    As part of the Stalingrad strategic operation, the following front-line operations were carried out: the November offensive operation to encircle the Stalingrad enemy group (“Uranus”), the Kotelnikovskaya, Srednedonskaya (“Small Saturn”) operations, as well as the operation to eliminate encircled enemy troops in Stalingrad (“Ring” )
    Operation results. During the fighting, Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed the main forces of the 4th tank and 6th field German armies, defeated the 3rd and 4th Romanian and 8th Italian armies. Enemy losses amounted to over 800 thousand people, 32 of his divisions and 3 'brigades were completely destroyed, and 16 enemy divisions suffered heavy losses. Only during the liquidation of the encircled grouping from January 10 to February 2, 1943, more than 91 thousand people were taken prisoner, including 2500 officers and 24 generals.

    The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 154885 people ...

    Wherever the author imagines the mistakes of Soviet military leaders and unsuccessful offensives - God knows. Perhaps the author confuses private operations with strategic ones - this is often the case with inexperienced beginners when studying the Second World War - the basis has not been studied, there is not enough knowledge, they do not know how to think.
    Everything that is incomprehensible means “wrong”, without trying to understand ...
    The author needs to read more, in general, write less.